118. Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- United States Participation in Fairs and Exhibitions Abroad
I. Problem
To provide for increased U.S. “political-purpose” participation in certain international fairs and exhibitions.
II. Discussion
On the basis of an Interagency Exhibits Committee review of United States participation in fairs and exhibitions abroad (copy attached),2 the Under Secretaries Committee has concluded that the United States is suffering political disadvantages because of both a lack of participation and poor-quality representation in a number of foreign exhibi [Page 292] tions which do not meet the present criteria for U.S. Government involvement.
The problem has arisen largely as a result of changes in the priorities of the two principal agencies in the exhibition field. Department of Commerce exhibitions have become wholly “hard-sell” commercial operations staged primarily in Western Europe and Japan. Budget cuts have seriously limited USIA participation in international fairs; that agency has in fact been forced to concentrate its efforts in Eastern Europe.
A survey of U.S. missions reveals that there are currently some twenty annual or biennial events outside Eastern Europe for which U.S. participation has been solicited primarily for political reasons. The city locations are:
| Accra | Nairobi |
| Addis Ababa | New Delhi |
| Berlin | Rabat |
| Bogota | San Salvador |
| Dar-es-Salaam | Santiago |
| Djakarta | Thessaloniki |
| Guatemala | Tripoli |
| Izmir | Tunis |
| Kinshasa | Valleta |
| Lima | Vientiane |
| Lusaka |
In many instances, e.g., Izmir and Thessaloniki, the United States is expected to be a major participant. U.S. absence is viewed with indignation as a politically-motivated sign of lack of interest. Local government and U.S. Embassy pressures have on a number of occasions persuaded the U.S. to make last minute decisions to participate without adequate resources or time to stage a creditable exhibit.
An avowed policy of not participating in non-commercial exhibits outside of Eastern Europe is unduly restrictive and unrealistic. As in the past, the pressures for U.S. participation in a certain number of exhibitions will continue to be applied by officials of the sponsoring countries. A planned program would accommodate most situations where political considerations are paramount and eliminate the present unsatisfactory makeshift and crash-planning procedures which are not conducive to either proper selectivity or effective participation.
The Under Secretaries Committee therefore recommends an orderly participation in selected exhibitions, based on alternative No. 3 as described on p. 11 in the attached Interagency Exhibits Committee report. This would provide limited scale participation, making use wherever possible of reusable, transportable exhibits. The above-men [Page 293] tioned cities constitute only a suggested list from which exhibition sites could be selected. The plan, to be implemented by USIA under State Department policy guidance, would call for an increase in Special International Exhibition (SIE) funding in the order of one and one-half million dollars annually.
III. Recommendation
That you endorse the concept of increased United States “political-purpose” exhibits and forward to the Office of Management and Budget, for consideration in the budget review now in process, this Committee’s recommendation that USIA be given a special fund of approximately one and one-half million dollars annually. This fund would be used to mount modest exhibits in those areas where the U.S. presence is deemed by the Department of State to be in the best interests of U.S. foreign policy.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1971. Limited Official Use. Drafted in S/PC. Under a November 17 covering memorandum (NSC–U/DM 53), Hartman sent a copy of the memorandum to Packard, Kissinger, Helms, Moorer, Siciliano, and Shakespeare. (Ibid.) An attached IOP/P routing slip indicates that copies were also sent to Hoffman, Sablosky, Noah, Telich, and Beko. An October 23 version of the memorandum, drafted by Malcom Lawrence (E/CBA), is ibid.↩
- Not attached.↩
- The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. In a January 8, 1971, memorandum to Irwin, Kissinger indicated that the President “has decided that the request for a special fund of $1.5 million for USIA political purpose exhibits should be handled through the usual budget process.” Under a January 13 covering memorandum, White sent Dunlap a copy of Kissinger’s memorandum, adding: “Ted Curran sent us this advance copy of the Kissinger memorandum. We will doubtless get another copy through channels later.” (National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1971) In a March 19 memorandum to Halsema, White commented on Nixon’s decision, stating: “You remember that it [the special appropriation] was turned down by the White House, but to my knowledge we never pursued it very vigorously. Frank mentioned at one point that he intended to talk to Henry Kissinger, but I do not believe he did. Perhaps Henry knows, or else we should check with Frank.” (Ibid.)↩