Attachment
Paper Prepared by Joseph Hanson, Office of Policy and Plans,
United States Information Agency3
DEFENDING THE U.S. STRENGTH
IMAGE
The basic U.S. strength image, which USIA has taken some pains to maintain over the years,
is in danger of erosion. The fundamental problem—the strain on
American manpower and supplies from the Vietnam effort—is inherent
in our national decisions. But the way we speak of this problem can
and should be improved.
The current hazard to the national strength image comes from two
sources—an ostrich policy on transfers of men and equipment from
Europe to Vietnam; and the continuing domestic commotion over
shortages and delays in the Vietnam effort. It is submitted that
these hazards could be met by abandoning the present information
policy of defensive secretiveness and adopting a positive and
forthcoming policy.
The secretiveness on Europe-to-Vietnam transfers, a problem area we
are just getting into, is especially harmful. When the news leaks
out—as it has just done on the withdrawal of 15,000 men from
Germany4 and the removal of three air squadrons from Italy and
Turkey—the United States image is hurt in two ways: (1) our general
credibility and our pledged word to NATO is compromised, as the withdrawals follow two
years of official U.S. reassurances that no major combat units would
be removed from Europe; (2) our strength image suffers because the
impression is created that desperate need is forcing us to abandon a
firm prior commitment to preserve U.S. forces in Europe.
How to correct this? First, we need to place announcements of our
various actions in the positive perspective of our world primacy in
military strength, about which too little has been said in the past
year. Second, the announcements of withdrawals from Europe, or
answers to charges of shortages, should be frank and forthcoming.
Once we have re-established the image of our overwhelming total
strength, the details will fall into proper perspective and we will
not need to be so defensive.
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A list of points which could usefully be made, both in high-level
official statements and in USIA
output, might read something like this:
(1) The U.S. military strength is far and away the world’s
greatest.
(2) The U.S. is deliberately refraining from using its tremendous
nuclear power, in Vietnam or anywhere else. U.S. nuclear forces
are kept under constant control to prevent war by accident.
(3) The U.S. is using in Vietnam only its non-nuclear forces,
deployed at greater distances and with greater mobility than
ever before achieved by any nation.
(4) The U.S. and the South Vietnamese are fighting a carefully
limited war, thinking out each move to avoid escalation and
frequently spelling out its aims to encourage a settlement.
(5) Despite these self-imposed limitations, the U.S. and South
Vietnamese forces are winning in Vietnam. (NOTE: This fact
should be pointed up much more than we have been doing,
preferably in scholarly, military-analyst terms.)
(6) The U.S. will need to draw on its very large NATO forces in Europe from time
to time to meet special needs in Vietnam. This will be
temporary, will leave the great majority of U.S. forces in
Europe untouched, and will probably include ___________,
___________ and ___________ (as many specifics as
possible).5
