40. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to Secretary of State Rusk 1

SUBJECT

  • Reaction to the President’s Speech on Vietnam

The Johns Hopkins speech and its peace and economic development proposals have drawn continuing world-wide press response [Page 120] which is being sustained by initial unofficial Communist reaction and the military episodes of the weekend.2

Most free world commentators agree on the constructive intent and potential of the speech, seeing in it a manifest of U.S. purpose in bringing an honorable peace to Southeast Asia. New U.S. air strikes have, however, underscored the President’s determination to support the struggle in South Vietnam while pressing for negotiations.3 Tokyo Shimbun expresses “regret” that the U.S. must continue bombing North Vietnamese targets. “Although President Johnson on April 7 made several proposals to bring peace to Southeast Asia,” the paper laments, “the Communist side has not given them a thought.”

A feeling that the speech will endure in its broad applications, regardless of immediate Communist reaction to its proposals, is visible in much comment. Thus, in Australia, yesterday’s Melbourne Age terms it “a cautious opening for peace,” and the Sydney Morning Herald judges that “the speech by itself didn’t constitute a diplomatic initiative, but it did delineate the very broad area in which initiatives by any of the nations with interests in the Vietnam war would be acceptable.”

Durability of the economic development idea is widely forecast. To some writers it has prospective relevance to much of the world in its politico-economic implications. Thus today’s Vienna Kurier declares that “the Soviet Union should be very interested in President Johnson’s plan,” which could “be a model for the settlement of many similar problems in the developing countries. Perhaps it would even constitute a new kind of guarantee of world peace in general.”

Following are some regional features of comment.

In the Far East, non-Communist papers have almost unanimously hailed the message, calling it well-balanced, timely, and a progressive step. The onus falls on the Communist side, papers agree, to make a next move. Editors debate whether the policy it expounds is really new, or merely a clarification of standing U.S. attitudes. They also argue about the wisdom of talking and fighting at the same time, and whether the Viet Cong must be included in discussions.

On the Hainan episode,4 Tokyo’s Yomiuri is highly critical, feeling that the peace hopes held forth by the speech have been “wrecked.” [Page 121] Manila papers sharply criticize the Communists for their negative reactions.

In Western Europe, praise is general. Papers speak of the President’s “frank and generous offer” of talks without conditions, and his “Marshall Plan5 for Southeast Asia.”

Many observers felt that the President had radically changed Washington’s basic stand by the “unprecedented gesture” of offering to negotiate directly with governments which are not recognized by the U.S. As the Daily Express put it, “President Johnson has met his first major challenge on foreign policy with a firm decision in favor of peace.”

The massive aid program suggested for Southeast Asia was granted almost universal support, though a few carping voices were heard. “A great concept,” said Radio Stuttgart’s commentator; “a major contribution” to the economic development of the area offered without “political domination,” said the Daily Telegraph. Many remarked on the general approval the plan was certain to receive in the “third world” of Asian and African countries and praised the President for answering the 17-nonaligned nations so quickly.6

The President was said to have offered “the Hanoi government—and China, too—a face-saving approach to the conference table.” West Berlin’s Der Taggespiegel remarked that the aid program suggested would give North Vietnam “an opportunity to free itself from the unwelcome Chinese embrace.”

Reaction to the alleged rejection by Hanoi is not yet available.

In the Near East and South Asia, the Cairo press has been highly critical, but since yesterday there is a marked shift of editorial expression toward hope that the peace-talk proposals may be fruitful. Editors warn this country not to overestimate the depth of the Sino-Soviet rift. The Lebanese press gives grudging approval at best, questioning the President’s motives but welcoming his initiative.

Indian press reaction has been overwhelmingly favorable, voicing a sense of relief and hope. The peace proposals are seen as leaving “a [Page 122] broad scope for optimism.” The proposals are seen to prove that the U.S. wants peace and not war. Writers call upon the “non-aligned” nations for speedy implementation of the proposals advanced by the seventeen nations.

Reported Israeli comment is all favorable. Turkish and Greek reaction is mixed. The Pakistani press has generally held to news coverage.

Latin American reaction has been markedly favorable. Papers have featured the President’s invitation to the Soviet Union to share a development effort. Typically, Bogota’s Tiempo asserts that the speech “reflects a clear and affirmative desire for peace, putting a solid floor under whatever future discussions may be launched.”

African papers have given substantial news coverage to the speech, and only quite limited comment. Criticism centers on the idea that the President’s suggestions were largely a response to unfavorable world opinion.

After apparent initial hesitation Moscow output attacked the speech as a “propaganda exercise” which reflected no change in U.S. policy in Vietnam. Pravda on April 10 took the lead in attempting to refute the “official” U.S. assertion that the President sought “unconditional discussions” on Vietnam. Pravda commentator charged that the speech contained no word about any U.S. intention to halt the “aggression” and asked whether U.S. leaders really think that negotiations are possible “under bombings.” Similarly, the President’s proposals for economic development of Southeast Asia are dismissed as “pure propaganda” to divert the attention of world public opinion from their “just wrath” over American aggression in Vietnam.

Other East European capitals generally followed a similar line with only Belgrade still “encouraged” by evidence of a more “realistic and sober” U.S. policy.

Peiping and Hanoi continue to voice strongly negative attitudes toward the President’s proposals.7 Hanoi’s Nhan Dan yesterday castigated the offer of “unconditional” talks as “submission” to the U.S., and reiterated Ho Chi Minh’s earlier demand that the U.S. leave the south. The DRV rejects the President’s aid offer as an effort to buy the peoples of Southeast Asia. Both Peiping and Hanoi continue to press demands for U.S. withdrawal.

Donald M. Wilson 8
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Reference: Office of the Assistant Director For Research Analysis: Research Programs Files, 1961–1966, Entry P–89, Box 3, Deputy Director’s Office, 1965–1966. No classification marking.
  2. On April 7, Johnson delivered a speech at Johns Hopkins University entitled “Peace Without Conquest.” For text, see Public Papers: Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394–399.
  3. Reference is to U.S. airstrikes made against targets in North Vietnam in early April. (Jack Langguth, “U.S. Strikes Again in North Vietnam,” New York Times, April 6, 1965, p. 1)
  4. Reference is to the April 9 clash between U.S. and Chinese military jets over Hainan Island in the South China Sea.
  5. In March 1948, the U.S. Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act that approved funding a comprehensive program, first articulated by Secretary of State George Marshall in a June 5, 1947, speech and called the “Marshall Plan,” for the rebuilding of Western Europe in the wake of World War II. For text of the address, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. III, The British Commonwealth; Europe, pp. 237–239.
  6. On April 1, Rusk received an appeal to President Johnson from 17 nonaligned countries for immediate negotiations and a political solution to end the war in Vietnam “without any preconditions.” Johnson’s April 7 speech was interpreted by these nations as the U.S. response to their appeal. For additional information about the original appeal and the Johnson administration response, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965, footnote 2, Document 228, and Document 245.
  7. An April 15 Intelligence Memorandum from Denny to Rusk summarized North Vietnam’s response to Johnson’s April 7 proposal and the North Vietnamese “basis” for negotiations. ( Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam January–June 1965, Document 255)
  8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.