Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

163. Talking Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency¹

No. 34

Washington, August 7, 1967

THE U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST

(1) QUESTION: Why has the United States always supported Israel against the Arab states?

ANSWER: It has never been U.S. policy to support Israel against the Arab states. Like the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and a majority of the members of the United Nations, the U.S. favored the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948.²

But the U.S. certainly did not support the Israeli use of force against Egypt in 1956.³ The basic U.S. policy has always been to work for the peace and stability of the area.

(2) QUESTION: What about the Middle East crisis which began in May 1967? Didn’t the United States support Israel from the outset?

ANSWER: In this crisis, as before, the U.S. has opposed acts of hostility and acts likely to lead to war—the infiltration of terrorists, the closing of the Strait of Tiran, the menace of mobilization, the encouragement and support of an arms race in the area.⁴ The U.S. did everything in its power to find a peaceful solution to the crisis before fighting broke out. It used its influence with all involved in an effort to prevent the outbreak of fighting.

When the fighting started, the U.S. made every effort to obtain a cease-fire, and then to move toward a more durable peace. That course is in the equal interest of the Arab states as well as Israel.

(3) QUESTION: What about the widespread reports that American and British warplanes helped the Israelis in the fighting?

ANSWER: In the first hours of the war, the Israelis destroyed most of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces. Arab leaders, particularly in Cairo, were unwilling or unable to admit this great loss. So the story of U.S. intervention was invented as an excuse.

Jordanian leaders have admitted there was no evidence of foreign intervention, and other Arab leaders are gradually coming around to making the same admission.

It is noteworthy that the USSR, which—through observer vessels—maintains a constant vigil in the Mediterranean, never became a party to those false charges.

(4) QUESTION: What about the USS Liberty,⁵ then, and U–2 photographs? Didn’t the U.S. use its highly sophisticated scientific and electronic equipment to spy for Israel, and to disrupt Arab military communications?

ANSWER: These stories grew out of the first tales of intervention by U.S. aircraft. They are equally untrue.

As for the USS Liberty, it seems likely that if the Liberty had been helping the Israelis, the latter would have been aware of its presence and would not have attacked it.

There were no U–2s involved. There was no U.S. jamming of communications. To quote Ambassador Goldberg: “. . . no United States soldier, sailor, airman, ship, airplane or military instrument of any kind—including radar jamming—pertaining to the Armed Forces, or to any agency of the United States, intervened in this conflict.”⁶

(5) QUESTION: Even if there was no direct U.S. military intervention, President Johnson did help Israel. He urged President Nasser not to start the fighting. Then the Israelis struck first. Wasn’t this an American-Israeli plot?

ANSWER: The United States, both publicly and privately, urged all parties to keep from starting hostilities. As to who actually fired the first shot, we have only the claims of the two sides. Each says the other started it.

The staff of the U.N. Emergency Force, as impartial observers, might have been able to determine who was the aggressor. But the U.N.E.F. had been removed from the border at Egyptian request.

(6) QUESTION: You will admit, though, that the United States gave Israel large amounts of military equipment—especially in the period just before the fighting started—and encouraged Israeli aggression in that way?

ANSWER: In the past few years, seventy-five per cent of all arms flowing into the Middle East have come from the Soviet Union. The United States and Europe have each supplied about one-eighth of the region’s weapons.

Soviet arms, worth over $2,000 million, have gone entirely to Arab states. U.S. and West European arms went to both Israel and the Arab states.

The U.S. has always urged a limitation on arms shipments to the Middle East, and has provided arms only to prevent an imbalance in military capabilities. Over half of U.S. weaponry in the Middle East has gone to Arab states.

There were, incidentally, no significant U.S. shipments to Israel just before the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, the bulk of U.S. arms sold to Israel has been surplus World War II equipment.

(7) QUESTION: What about economic assistance to Israel?

ANSWER: The U.S. has provided economic assistance totalling over $1 billion to Israel. In recent years the level of assistance has declined as the Israeli economy grew stronger.

During the same period the U.S. provided economic aid to Arab states as well. For example, our economic aid to the U.A.R.—over $1.1 billion—was greater than to Israel. Other Arab states: Algeria $202 million, Iraq $59 million, Jordan $562 million, Libya $208 million, Morocco $591 million, Lebanon $103 million, Saudi Arabia $47 million, Sudan $127 million, Syria $80 million, Tunisia $516 million, Yemen $43 million. These figures emphatically refute a notion of partiality in giving aid.

(8) QUESTION: The U.S. may be able to deny its military and economic collaboration with Israel, but there is no disguising U.S. championship of Israel in the U.N. Why has the U.S. led the effort to defeat U.N. resolutions demanding immediate Israel withdrawal from the territory Israel has gained by its aggression?

ANSWER: The U.S. believes that withdrawal of Israeli forces is an essential element in any Middle Eastern settlement. But, as a practical matter, such withdrawal can hardly be expected in the absence of arrangements which would assure a more stable situation in the area than existed before June 5, 1967. Ambassador Goldberg, chief U.S. representative at the U.N., spoke of what the situation would be if such an unconditional withdrawal took place:

“Once again opposing forces would stand in direct confrontation, poised for combat. Once again, no international machinery would be present to hold them apart. Once again, innocent maritime passage would be denied. Once again there would be no bar to belligerent acts and acts of force. Once again there would be no acceptance of Israel by her neighbors as a sovereign state, no action to solve the tragic refugee problem, no effective security against terrorism and violence.

“Once again, in short, nothing would be done to resolve the deep-lying grievances on both sides that have fed the fires of war in the Middle East for 20 years.”⁷

(9) QUESTION: What about the much-proclaimed U.S. policy of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East? Or does that guarantee really only apply to Israel?

ANSWER: It applies to all nations in the Middle East. But territorial integrity is best guaranteed by a genuine peace. The U.S. hopes there will be found the basis for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. That can only be a peace which rests on respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all the states in the area, justice for the refugees, a status for Jerusalem which protects the deep religious interests of the whole world, the assurance of maritime rights, and an end of the arms race in the Middle East.

(10) QUESTION: How can you expect the Arab states to recognize Israel?

ANSWER: The fact is that Israel does exist. It would be extremely difficult for the Arab states to assume normal diplomatic relations in the light of all that has happened. But a start must be made, and it can best be made at the root of the problem. That is the claim of some Arab states that a state of war continues with Israel, and that they have the right to the status of belligerents under international law with respect to Israel.

The claim of belligerent rights works both ways. If Egypt claims belligerent rights, it can hardly deny belligerent rights to Israel. Egypt cannot claim the right to mass overwhelming military forces on Israel’s borders, issue threats of liquidation, exclude Israel from the Suez Canal, blockade the Gulf of Aqaba—and then deny Israel the right of countermeasures. Surely, the time has come to see if better ways to resolve these differences can be found.

(11) QUESTION: How can you urge the Arab states to recognize Israel when you refuse to recognize the People’s Republic of China?

ANSWER: The two cases are not the same. Israel’s existence has been recognized by the United Nations from the first. With Communist China, it has been quite another case. The regime has been branded an aggressor by the United Nations for its part in the Korean war. Communist China has shown little inclination to change its bellicose ways since then. And Peking outspokenly defies and denounces the U.N.

(12) QUESTION: Isn’t it true that Jewish voters in the United States dictate American policy toward the Middle East?

ANSWER: There is no doubt that many Jewish Americans have an interest in the welfare of Israel. And, like any other interest group, they try to see that U.S. Government policy takes their views into account. For that matter, so do the large oil companies which have investments in Arab states. But American foreign policy represents a national consensus, not just the wishes of a single interest group.

(13) QUESTION: Isn’t the United States trying to keep the Middle East in a state of neocolonialism? Isn’t it U.S. policy to retard Arabs’ progress for the sake of U.S. business interests, especially oil interests?

ANSWER: It doesn’t seem reasonable that the United States would spend over $3 billion in economic aid to the Arab nations if it wanted to keep them in an underdeveloped condition.

As for American business interests, it would be more profitable for them if the Middle East progressed more rapidly. American business invests more money, and earns greater profits, in developed areas. For example, the U.S. business investment in Europe now runs to over $13.5 billion. The American investment in the Middle East, oil and all, is slightly over $1 billion.

(14) QUESTION: If that is so, then why does the United States always support feudal and reactionary Arab states against the progressive ones?

ANSWER: First, the United States cannot dictate the system of government for any other state.

Second, some of the so-called progressive Arab states have allowed doctrinaire, and often out-dated, political theory to obstruct development of fruitful relations with the United States. When these artificial barriers have not been raised by the Arab states themselves, the U.S. has always been willing to enter into a mutually beneficial relationship. U.S. economic assistance to the area shows this. So do U.S. commercial relations. Proceeds from the sale of oil can be the basis of economic development—as is the case in Kuwait, for example.

(15) QUESTION: Actually, isn’t the U.S. merely using the Arab states as pawns in the “cold war”?

ANSWER: One of the eventualities the United States hoped to avoid was the splitting of the Middle East into two camps, along East-West lines. For one thing, the big powers cannot decide the dispute between Israel and the Arab states. Both President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have stated this clearly.

For another, when the nations of the Middle East look to the big powers for war materials and political backing in their military adventures, they are merely putting off the time when a peaceful settlement must be made.

Finally, the intrusion of big-power considerations into regional disputes can seriously jeopardize world peace.

(16) QUESTION: Nonetheless, the United States is a big power, and does have responsibilities in the Middle East. How does the U.S. propose to carry out those responsibilities?

ANSWER: If you mean that the big powers have a special responsibility to see the peace is preserved, then the United States is carrying out its responsibilities in the Middle East.

The United States has consistently supported the kind of peace settlement to which both sides could find it possible to subscribe. This program has been listed in many ways. Perhaps these ten points cover it as well as any:

(a) Withdrawal of troops; this action to be firmly linked to

(b) an end to the state of belligerency,

(c) acceptance of Israel’s right to exist,

(d) renunciation of the use of force in the region,

(e) free passage for all nations through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba,

(f) regional economic development,

(g) limitations on the regional arms race,

(h) resettlement of the Arab refugees,

(i) establishment of an effective U.N. presence until peace treaties are written, and

(j) some kind of international mediation procedure.

(17) QUESTION: When the U.S. advocates limitations on arms, it really wants to keep the Arab states in a permanent condition of military inferiority to Israel—isn’t that right?

ANSWER: The basic position of the United States is that arms and arms races have no place in the settlement of Middle East problems. The U.S. hopes that the major suppliers of arms could cooperate in a program of arms limitation, and public registration of arms shipments, which would permit the allocation of scarce resources now spent on arms to the vital requirements of technological and economic development of the area.

Then there is also the danger that Arab leaders will find they have bargained away a sizable part of their independence in exchange for Soviet arms.

(18) QUESTION: What about the Arab refugees from Palestine?

ANSWER: Secretary of State Rusk proposed that the refugees have a free and private choice of their future. The U.S. is firmly opposed to permanent eviction of the refugees, and to barring their return.

It is probable that not all would want to return to the Palestine area—especially if they were offered an opportunity for resettlement, with the required financial backing, in other Arab states.

It should be remembered that the United States has contributed over a third of a billion dollars to Palestinian refugee relief since 1950. This is about 70 per cent of the total funds made available for this purpose. So it cannot be said that the U.S. is not interested in the welfare of the refugees, or in a permanent solution of their problems.

(19) QUESTION: The U.S. didn’t vote for condemnation of the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem by the U.N. General Assembly. Does this mean the U.S. concurs in the Israeli annexation?

ANSWER: The United States has made it clear that the U.S. will not accept Israel’s unilateral action as a determinant of the future of Jerusalem.⁸

The Israeli Government has said that its arrangements for the administration of Jerusalem were not an annexation. It seemed to the United States that the proposed U.N.G.A. resolution, which condemned annexation and called for its recision, was not directed to the situation on the ground.⁹

Ambassador Goldberg summed up the U.S. position this way:

“During my own statement to the General Assembly on July 3, I said . . . the safeguarding of the holy places and freedom of access to them for all should be internationally guaranteed and the status of Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided not unilaterally but in consultation with all concerned. These statements represent the considered and continuing policy of the United States Government.”¹⁰

(20) QUESTION: How do you feel about what happened in the June–July 1967 emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly, then?

ANSWER: The U.S. didn’t seek the emergency session. The U.S. didn’t think that the U.N. Security Council had exhausted all its possibilities for action in the Middle East crisis. It seemed doubtful the General Assembly could make a helpful contribution. Once the session was called, however, the U.S. sought to encourage resolutions which had a realistic prospect of helping to bring lasting peace.

The General Assembly, in its capacity as a “town meeting” of the world, did crystallize a certain state of world opinion. The General Assembly refused to name a single aggressor. In effect, it expressed opposition to territorial change achieved by force. It demonstrated the strong international interest in the holy places of Jerusalem. The General Assembly couldn’t agree on the way peace should be achieved—but it did indicate that peace was a more desirable goal than the mere return to the armistice situation.

On balance, the emergency session was not the failure some see it to be.

(21) QUESTION: The United States has never been more unpopular in the Middle East. What are you going to do about it?

ANSWER: The U.S. doesn’t consider popularity per se as its most important goal in the Middle East. Naturally the people of the United States resent the false allegations that the U.S. was in collusion with Israel during the hostilities. The U.S. regrets the decision of some Arab countries to break off relations on the basis of these charges. These factors necessarily influence American attitudes toward the states concerned.

The U.S. hopes that the adverse effects will be redressed quickly, so that normal relations may be re-established. Boycotts and other forms of retaliation are only self-defeating.

What is needed is the realization throughout the Middle East that peace and regional economic cooperation are vital to the area now.

(22) QUESTION: Will the U.S. be willing to supply economic aid to the Middle East again?

ANSWER: The U.S. interest in economic development of the region, and of all the states in it, has not been affected by what has happened in the 1967 crisis. The U.S. will not be vindictive in its approach to those who have broken relations, nor will the U.S. engage in any reprisals.

The American hope is that conditions of amity and security may soon enable the U.S. to resume the types of peaceful, constructive assistance it has rendered in the past. The U.S. would join with others in international programs of regional development for the Middle East as soon as political conditions permit such efforts.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1967–1967, Entry UD WW 108, Box 4, Government Agencies—State, Department of, 1967. No classification marking. Marks sent a copy of the Talking Paper to Harriman under cover of an attached August 9 typewritten note informing him that the Talking Paper had been “released for us in all posts on the U.S. position in the Middle East.” The note indicates that copies of the Talking Paper were also sent to Walt Rostow and Eugene Rostow. (Ibid.)
2. For further information regarding the U.S. position on the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. V, Part 2, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa.
3. Reference is to the Suez Crisis in 1956, in which Israel, as well as Great Britain and France, attacked the UAR in response to Nasser’s move to nationalize the Suez Canal.
4. On May 22, President Nasser announced that Israeli vessels would not be permitted to pass through the Straits of Tiran. (Eric Pace, “Cairo Acts to Bar Israeli Shipping in Gulf of Aqaba,” New York Times, May 23, 1967, p. 1)
5. Reference is to the June 8 attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli boats and planes. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 219.
6. The quotation is taken from Goldberg’s address to the UN General Assembly on June 20. (“Goldberg: ‘New Foundation for Peace,’” Washington Post, June 21, 1967, p. A1)
7. Ibid.
8. See Robert Young, “U.S. Assails Israeli Annexation,” Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1967, p. 1.
9. For further information on the United States position on the UNGA resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 344.
10. The quotation is taken from Goldberg’s statement made on June 14 prior to the Fifth Emergency Special Session on the Middle East of the UN General Assembly on June 17 and 18. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1967, pp. 148–151.