Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

155. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 15, 1967

A UPI despatch yesterday reported the following:

“Already their big propaganda guns were blasting away at the U.S., Britain and Israel in what London diplomats said would become one of the biggest Soviet propaganda campaigns in years.”

There are other indications that this prediction will be fulfilled.

During the past week, Arab propaganda organs such as Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus have engaged in a vituperative and vicious campaign to discredit the United States. In addition to originating the “big lie” about the U.S. participation with Israel forces,² it has indulged in name-calling and tactics reminiscent of Nazi Germany.

As I have previously reported, we have attempted to meet this challenge by expanding all of our information services and concentrating on the Middle East problem.

Since the press of the Arab world will not print our statements, the Voice of America is the only effective tool available to us. We have doubled the hours of broadcasting in Arabic and increased the French language broadcasting to North Africa. We have emphasized and repeated over-and-over our answers to the Arabic charges and to Soviet accusations. Reports from the affected posts indicate a measure of success.

In evaluating this situation, I call your attention to the following:

1. Emotionally, the Arab world wants to believe the truth of the charges and it is very difficult to overcome their historic deep-seated bias.

2. Because the Arab world today is frustrated by the stunning defeat administered to it by a handful of Israeli forces, they accept the “big lie” and have made the United States a scape goat. U.S. officials engaged in foreign policy matters may become frustrated because the “big lie” will not be completely repudiated despite our most vigorous and intensive efforts. In this frustration, they must not assume that the media are inadequate—radio and press are merely tools, they are not substitute for effective deeds, nor will they overcome historic animosities, or emotional bias.

3. U.S. actions and deeds will speak louder than the words in a shortwave program. Accordingly, it is vital that during the coming months our actions with reference to Middle East problems be presented for the maximum impact on the Arab world. These actions should be announced in such a fashion as to create the greatest attention.

4. The USIA does not make policy—it reports it. However, unless we are fully informed during the time that the policies are being considered, we cannot report to the maximum advantage. We cannot prepare ourselves unless we know the background of the problem and the action well in advance of the public announcement.

5. The actions of the Bundy Committee will be of vital importance in determining how the USIA uses its media resources.³ Unless we are fully informed on the deliberations and decision of this committee, our effectiveness will be diminished.

I am writing to you in this fashion since I fear that we are facing a most critical period during the next several months and I am anxious to avoid misunderstandings on the role which the USIA can play in attempting to resolve these complex problems. It would be helpful if you would instruct McGeorge Bundy and others involved in handling the Middle East crisis to keep me fully informed at all times.

Leonard H. Marks

1. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Agency Reports, Box 135 [2 of 2], United States Information Agency, 1967 [3 of 3]. Confidential. Sent through Kintner, who did not initial the memorandum. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum. Another copy is in Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 32, White House Library, Jan–June 1967.
2. For additional information about the “big lie” and the UAR accusation of U.S. and British support to Israel and involvement in the Six Day War, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 261.
3. Reference is to the Special Committee established on the order of the President following the outbreak of the Six Day War on June 7. The Special Committee, with Bundy serving as Executive Secretary, provided crisis management during and after the war. For additional information see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 149; and Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 91 and 104.