File No. 763.72/2992
The Chargé in Germany (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 6.]
Sir: Supplementary to the telegrams bearing on the political situation in Germany, which I am regularly transmitting to Washington in accordance with the directions contained in the Department’s telegram No. 3456 of October 5, 1916,1 I have the honor to communicate to the Department below a résumé of the political developments which have occurred in this country during the last three weeks, with particular reference to the question of a possible resumption of indiscriminate submarine warfare on merchant vessels in violation of neutral rights on the high seas.
The submarine question had appeared to be in abeyance and matters between the United States and Germany on a temporarily quiet footing when, on September 29, came the unexpected anti-American outburst in the press, based on the report of the death of the American aviator Rockwell in the service of France. The Foreign Office had for a long time been able to suppress all articles in the press tending to inflame public opinion against the United States and it appears that this outburst was forced past the Foreign Office censor by the military representative at the daily press conference, who gave out the material regarding Rockwell and the French corps of American aviators and permitted it to be published before the Foreign Office could interfere. As full advantage was taken of the item as a basis for scathing comment on the neutrality of the United States, it seems probable that the whole incident was a carefully timed political move on the part of the adversaries of the Chancellor in order to stir up public opinion against the United States and thus to weaken the Chancellor in dealing with the submarine issue in the coming deliberations of the Reichstag. There [Page 301] is no doubt that the Chancellor and the Foreign Office were greatly perturbed over the incident and that they took immediate steps to suppress all further comment in the press. I am aware that the Chancellor referred the matter to the Emperor himself.
At about the same time we received information from various sources that the Admiralty Staff were hastening their preparations for a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine warfare, as they hoped and apparently expected that the political situation would develop in a way to permit them to carry out their plans in this direction. This information, together with reports of a pessimistic nature from many sources regarding the increasing strength of the Chancellor’s opponents in the Reichstag and of the champions of the reckless submarine warfare, led me to send my confidential telegram No. 44121 of October 1. On September 29 and 30 well-informed persons here were of the opinion that a grave political crisis was impending.
The situation did not, however, develop as was expected by the Admiralty. After the Chancellor’s opening speech in the Reichstag on September 28, 12 days were spent by the Budget Committee of the Reichstag in secret session for the purpose of considering foreign affairs, and it was during these sessions that the Chancellor succeeded in coming at least to a temporary agreement with the leaders of the various political parties. On such information as I was able to obtain regarding the general trend of these deliberations I based my confidential telegrams to the Department Nos. 4417 of October 2d, 4433 of October. 5, 4436 of October 6, 4442 of October 7, 4439 of October 7, 4450 of October 9, and 4478 of October 14.2
The meetings of this committee were strictly secret, members of the Reichstag not belonging to the committee being excluded. The principal witnesses before the committee were the Chancellor (Von Bethmann-Hollweg), the Secretary of State for the Navy (Von Capelle) and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Von Jagow). The principal topic of discussion was the submarine issue and whether to take up the submarine warfare in its extreme form, thereby involving neutrals in the war, or not. The opponents of such action, I may add, are the Chancellor, supported by the Emperor, Helfferich (Minister of the Interior), Von Hindenburg (Chief of the General Staff), the Foreign Office, and what appears to be a majority in the Reichstag, including the Socialists, the People’s Progressive Party, a few of the National Liberals, and most of the Center Party. Its advocates are the Navy in its entirety, including of course Von Tirpitz, the former Secretary of State for the Navy, a probably large percentage of the Army, the Conservatives, including the Free Conservatives, and most of the National Liberal Party in the Reichstag, and above all the majority of public opinion, which has been carefully educated by the press to regard the indiscriminate submarine warfare as a sure means of causing England’s defeat.
At certain phases of the discussions the leaders of the various parties in the Reichstag were called before the Budget Committee [Page 302] and allowed to state the views of their respective parties in regard to the matter.
One of the strongest speeches in support of the Chancellor appears to have been made by Helfferich, who elaborated the importance of avoiding a break with the United States, first, on account of the necessity of retaining American financial cooperation after the war, secondly, on account of the effective closing of the frontiers of the neutral countries contiguous to Germany which would result from the combined pressure of England and the United States, thus putting an end to the importation of supplies which still enter Germany in certain quantities across those frontiers. Helfferich’s speech, in fact, may be regarded as the turning point of the political crisis, as indicated in my telegram No. 4417 of October 2.
During these secret discussions it was announced in the press that a confidential memorandum written by the Admiralty Staff and submitted to the Chancellor on the subject of the economic effects of an indiscriminate submarine warfare on England’s commerce had been distributed surreptitiously to the political leaders, in order to influence them in demanding by resolution in the Reichstag that the submarine war be adopted. An official statement was later published to the effect that this memorandum was simply a work on England’s political economy as affected by submarine warfare, sent by the Admiralty to the Chancellor in February last marked “Confidential, not for publication,” and described as a purely economic memorandum prepared for the use of the Admiralty.
It is of course not generally known what arguments were used by the Chancellor in the secret sessions of the Budget Committee to keep them from voting to open the discussion in the Reichstag with a view to calling on the Government for a renewal of the extreme form of submarine warfare. It is, however, rumored that he was able to hold out some hope that peace might be arranged if Germany did not go forward with this policy at the present time and that it was on this basis that the party leaders agreed to let the matter drop for the present moment.
At any rate the committee voted 24 to 4 against a general discussion of the submarine issue in the Reichstag and, when the open session came, what had promised to be a debate of great acrimony, with the possible result of a vote of lack of confidence in the Chancellor, was reduced to a few mild speeches by the leaders of the Conservative and of the Socialist Labor Parties, that is the extreme right and the extreme left, who had refused to accede to the resolution of the Budget Committee and spoke on the submarine issue, but without effect. Westarp, the leader of the Conservatives, said that while his party regarded a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine warfare as absolutely necessary, he would refrain, in the public interest, from stating their reasons therefor. The general sentiment of the Reichstag was that the decision should be left in the hands of the highest military authorities, namely the Emperor and Von Hindenburg.
It is now generally felt that confidence in the Government has been largely restored as a result of the proceedings in the Reichstag and that, as I predicted in my telegram No. 4439 of October 7, the political atmosphere has for the moment been cleared.
[Page 303]The Navy as a whole is convinced that the submarine warfare must be taken up again and pushed to its extreme form in order to save the situation, and it is reported that a round-robin letter, signed by all the officers of the Navy, has been addressed to the Emperor calling upon him to adopt this method of warfare in order that the war may be won. Admiral Scheer, who, since the battle off the Skagerrak, has been the dominating personality on the active list of the Navy, supports the rücksichtslos war, as does Von Tirpitz, who in his retirement is said to have more influence on the minds of naval officers than anybody else in Germany. Admiral Scheer is reported to have twice petitioned the Emperor for the taking up of the active submarine warfare against commerce in its extreme form. In his second letter on this subject I am reliably informed that he wrote the following:
It is true that if operations to be inaugurated take a favorable turn, the enemy may be considerably injured, yet there cannot be the slightest doubt that even the most fortunate result of a high-sea battle cannot force England in this war to peace; the disadvantages of our military-geographic situation as compared with that of the island power and the great material superiority of the enemy will not allow us to overcome the blockade directed against us or to overcome England itself, even if the U-boats are all available for military purposes. A victorious ending within a foreseen time can only be achieved by destroying the English economic life, i. e., by using the German U-boat against the English commerce.
I am constrained according to my conviction and duty to counsel Your Majesty against employing any weaker method, not only because it does not correspond to the character of the weapon and the risk to the U-boats, which is in no proportion to the gain to be achieved, but because in spite of the great conscientiousness on the part of the captains of the U-boats it is not possible for them to avoid incidents in English waters, in which waters American interests are active, incidents which are liable to humiliate us and would force us to recede, if we cannot hold through to the fullest extent . . .
It is as yet impossible to predict what will be the result of this letter and the petition of the officers, but they should be given careful consideration from the point of view of the effect which they may have on the Emperor and in connection with my various telegraphic reports indicating that the Chancellor’s present strength depends largely upon the support which he is receiving from the Emperor in his attitude towards the submarine issue.
Although it is evident that the Navy would gladly break loose from the restrictions imposed upon it by the Government, it nevertheless appears, from all available sources of information here, that the U–53, which has been operating off the Atlantic coast of the United States, has so far adhered to the instructions of the Government based on the assurances given us last spring that the submarine warfare would be conducted in accordance with international law and the rights of neutrals on the high seas. I am informed that Commander Rose, of the U–53, is regarded as one of the most reliable officers in the German Navy and that no anxiety is felt as to his exceeding his instructions in any respect. Whether his operations in American waters have already run counter to the assurances given us by the German Government, the Embassy is not as yet in a position to know. The German press has simply announced that nine merchant vessels have been sunk off the coast of the United States.
A statement which appeared in the Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the semiofficial organ of the German Government, on October [Page 304] 12, while not labeled official, has all the earmarks of emanating from the Admiralty Staff. It is as follows:
In the press of our enemies different statements and assertions have been made with regard to the German submarine war on the coast of the United States which must be contradicted.
The English radio-telegraphic service of Poldhu reported under date of October 10 that U–53 had “torpedoed six ships and in several cases sunk them.”
We are informed from authoritative sources that the trade war off the coast of the United States is carried on in accordance with the German prize rules which provide that a merchant ship may be stopped and searched and, after the crew and passengers have been saved, the ships may under certain conditions be sunk. These conditions are, for instance, if the steamer belongs to an enemy, or if it is a neutral steamer carrying contraband of war, the military situation being such as to exclude the possibility of bringing the ship in as a prize. In no case are merchant ships sunk by a torpedo shot without warning.
Reuter further reports from Washington that the American authorities fear the coming of complicated questions of neutrality if submarines operate so close to the American coast that it resembles a blockade.
To this it must be replied that the German naval forces have the right to carry on the cruiser war anywhere upon the open sea, if the waters of neutral sovereignty are scrupulously respected. This is not a question of a blockade, as only enemy ships or neutral ships with contraband of war on board are held up, whereas the declaration of a blockade would include the seizure of all ships steering towards the blockaded coast or leaving it, irrespective of flag or cargo.
The question of the American Journal of Commerce, “Is our coast to be the base for German submarines?” is also superfluous in view of the fact that when the U–53 ran in to Newport she did not make use of her right as a warship to take on fuel supply or provisions. That secret supply stations for German submarines could be established on the coast of the United States, no American citizen with sound sense could believe.
In strong contrast to these complaints stands the fact that since the beginning of the war English cruisers have been standing guard before American ports, New York for instance, which approach the coast so closely that they may be seen with the naked eye from the roofs of high buildings.
As far as can be made out, then, there was about ten days ago a belief in the Admiralty Staff that the political situation was such that the resumption of the rücksichtslos submarine warfare against commerce would be permitted them. The political leaders, however, failed to carry this point against the opposition of the Chancellor and, in fact, receded for the present from their position and gave the Chancellor support in his milder policy. The Navy, therefore, postponed any plans it may have had for taking up an extreme form of submarine warfare and are waiting until the Government is forced to their views, which are that the only way of winning the war is to strike with all their force against the English economic life by way of an extreme form of submarine warfare, i. e., by sinking everything that approaches the English and French coasts.
Whether the issue has been laid in abeyance indefinitely or whether it has been postponed merely for a certain period, say until after the presidential elections in the United States, or longer, it is as yet impossible to ascertain. Only the Government and the political leaders who took part in the deliberations in the secret sessions of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag know. I wish, however, to repeat what I have endeavored to indicate in my various confidential telegrams to the Department, that while the political outlook is for the present moment reassuring, there is no permanent security to be looked for in the situation, in view of the attitude of the Navy, the [Page 305] Conservative Party and its allies in the Reichstag, and the majority of public opinion; and that our Government should therefore be fully prepared for an eventual resumption of the indiscriminate submarine warfare against commerce in violation of the rights of neutrals on the high seas.
I may add that I have kept the Department informed of the trend of public opinion as expressed in the various party organs of the press in my telegrams Nos. 4413, 4416, 4420, 4424, 4430, 4434, 4443, 4449, 4453, 4459, 4466, 4474, 4477, and 4480, of October 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16 respectively.1
The proceedings in the two important open sittings of the Reichstag were reported in my telegrams Nos. 4401 and 4471 of September 28 and October 12, respectively.2
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