File No. 763.72/2460
The Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State
No. 2451
Berlin,
February 14, 1916
.
[Received March
6.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit to you
herewith three copies of the memorandum of the Imperial German
Government on the treatment of armed merchantmen, dated February 8,
1915 [1916], which formed the subject of my telegrams No. 3467, of
the 9th,1 and No.
3474, of the 10th instant.2 There are likewise enclosed a translation of
the text of the memorandum and a copy and translation of the note verbale from the Imperial Foreign
Office, dated February 10, 1916, with which the memorandum was
transmitted to me.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure—Translation]
The German Foreign Office to the American
Embassy
III a 1909/26921
Note Verbale
The Foreign Office has the honor to transmit herewith to the
Embassy of the United States of America three copies of a
memorandum of the Imperial German Government on the treatment of
armed merchantmen, with enclosures, and to request that the
Embassy be good enough to bring the essential contents of the
memorandum to the knowledge of its Government by telegraph,
informing it at the time that the order to the German naval
forces mentioned in Section IV, No. 1, of the memorandum will
not be carried into effect until the 29th instant, in the
interest of neutrals already on board armed merchant
vessels.
Berlin
,
February 10, 1916
.
[A translation of the memorandum referred to in the foregoing
note verbale was forwarded to the
Secretary in the Ambassador’s telegram No. 3474, of February
10 (see ante, pp. 163–65); the
exhibits mentioned therein, with the exception of Exhibit 8,
which is a Drill Book and therefore only of military
interest, follow.]
[Exhibit 1]
Declaration of the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Winston
Churchill, at the Session of the British
Lower House of March 26, 19133
I turn to one aspect of trade protection which requires special
reference. It was made clear at the second Hague Conference and
the London Conference, that certain of the great powers have
reserved to themselves the right to convert [Page 188] merchant steamers into cruisers,
not merely in national harbours, but if necessary on the high
seas. There is now good reason to believe that a considerable
number of foreign merchant steamers may be rapidly converted
into armed ships by the mounting of guns. The sea-borne trade of
the world follows well-marked routes upon nearly all of which
the tonnage of the British mercantile marine largely
predominates. Our food-carrying liners and vessels carrying raw
material following these trade routes would in certain
contingencies meet foreign vessels armed and equipped in the
manner described. If the British ships had no armament, they
would be at the mercy of any foreign liner carrying one
effective gun and a few rounds of ammunition. It would be
obviously absurd to meet the contingency of considerable numbers
of foreign armed merchant cruisers on the high seas by building
an equal number of cruisers. That would expose this country to
an expenditure of money to meet a particular danger, altogether
disproportionate to the expense caused to any foreign power in
creating that danger. Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found,
will be covered and met by British ships of war, but the proper
reply to an armed merchantman is another merchantman armed in
her own defence.
This is the position to which the Admiralty have felt it
necessary to draw the attention of leading shipowners. We have
felt justified in pointing out to them the danger to life and
property which would be incurred if their vessels were totally
incapable of offering any defence to an attack. The shipowners
have responded to the Admiralty invitation with cordiality, and
substantial progress has been made in the direction of meeting
it by preparing as a defensive measure to equip a number of
first-class British liners to repel the attack of armed foreign
merchant cruisers. Although these vessels have, of course, a
wholly different status from that of the regularly commissioned
merchant cruisers, such as those we obtain under the Cunard
agreement, the Admiralty have felt that the greater part of the
cost of the necessary equipment should not fall upon the owners,
and we have decided, therefore, to lend the necessary guns, to
supply ammunition, and to provide for the training of members of
the ship’s company to form the guns’ crews. The owners on their
part are paying the cost of the necessary structural conversion,
which is not great. The British mercantile marine will, of
course, have the protection of the Royal Navy under all possible
circumstances, but it is obviously impossible to guarantee
individual vessels from attack when they are scattered on their
voyages all over the world. No one can pretend to view these
measures without regret, or without hoping that the period of
retrogression all over the World which has rendered them
necessary, may be succeeded by days of broader international
confidence and agreement than those through which we are now
passing.
