File No. 763.72112/683
The Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs (Salinas) to the Chilean Minister at Washington (Suárez-Mujica)
[Left at the Department of State by the Minister, November 17, 1914.]
[Telegram]
Our minister at Rio de Janeiro informs me that Chancellor Müller has requested of the British Minister the establishment of a neutral zone in the Atlantic from the American coast to the meridian of Cape Verde, in order to prevent the serious disturbances which have [Page 436] been caused to the American maritime commerce by the present European conflict. I have answered him as follows:
This Government has already been seeking means to diminish the disturbances which the activities of the belligerents off the American coasts have been causing to the maritime commerce of the nations of this continent, and had, the first place, considered the idea of fixing a neutral zone within which said commerce would not fee disturbed. Nevertheless, a careful study of the question leads me to think that a measure of this nature will not be accepted by the Government of Great Britain, and that, even though it were accepted by that Government, it would not be productive of any appreciable results in the sense desired. As a matter of fact, it seems doubtful that the British Government would accept a measure which in reality would be of much greater profit to Germany, whose merchant marine is now totally paralyzed, than to England which still maintains a maritime movement of some vitality in American waters. On the other hand, the efficacy of such a measure would have very little weight on the commercial interchange between Europe and America, because the danger would continue beyond the neutral zone, that is to say, in European waters wherein the situation of belligerent ships would remain as it is to-day. Consequently, the advantages of the measure would be restricted to the interchange between American countries. Finally, the enormous extent of the neutral zone would render the surveillance required by our neutral duties still much more difficult and costly than it is to-day, unless the measure were to be a merely illusory one. By reason of these considerations, I believe that every proposition which, like the one formulated by Señor Müller, is intended as a solution in accord with the belligerents, should be carefully studied.
On my part, I have sought a solution, which would restrict as far as possible the activities of belligerent ships in these waters and minimize the inconveniences of the present situation, by means of agreements made directly among the American countries without requiring the acquiescence of the belligerents. I believe that this end would be achieved by regulating the provisioning of war vessels in American ports in the manner indicated:
memorandum
The activities displayed by the belligerent nations in American waters have seriously disturbed the maritime commerce and the economic life of the countries of this continent, and especially of those in South America whose trade is carried almost in its entirety in British or German bottoms.
This situation points clearly to the advisability of American countries adopting measures in modification of the Hague convention, the practical effect of which would be to drive from these waters the belligerent naval forces, or, at least to render more difficult their stay therein, and to restrict the activity of warlike operations. In practice, the enforcement by American Governments of the provisions contained in paragraph 2 of Article 19 of convention No. 13 of the Second Peace Conference, is promoting, contrary to their desire and their interests, naval hostilities off their coasts. In accordance with those provisions, belligerent vessels in every American country are allowed to take sufficient coal to reach the nearest port of their own country, and as such a port is either a British or a German port, the amount of coal taken is always considerable and enables the vessels to make cruises of considerable length. They may likewise renew their supply of fuel under similar conditions in ports of other American countries within the period of three months and, after this period, even in the port where they took their first supply, in accordance with Article 20 of the same convention. In practice, the enforcement of these provisions is inconsistent with Article 5 of the above-mentioned convention, which forbids belligerents to make neutral ports the bases of their naval operations against their adversaries. This inconsistency is easily explained, because evidently the convention had in view conflicts in one continent alone, without bearing in mind the extension of such conflicts to a different continent. The plentiful supply of fuel with which at present the naval vessels of the nations at war are provisioned is the fundamental cause of their presence in these waters.
The same convention affords the means of solving the difficulty. In the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the preamble heading its provisions, the following is set forth:
Fourth. Seeing that it is, for neutral powers, an admitted duty to apply these rules impartially to the several belligerents;
Fifth. Seeing that, in this category of ideas, these rules should not, in principle, be altered, in the course of the war, by a neutral power, except in a case where experience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection of the rights of that power.
It is not, therefore, to be doubted that the American countries are empowered to establish new rules in the present conflict, since the existing ones work to the detriment of their free commerce and even place them in the necessity of rendering to the belligerents an unneutral service, and of thus violating, against their will, their neutral duties. In the opinion of the Government of Chile, such rules might be as follows:
First. To limit the coal to be supplied to belligerent vessels in each American port to the amount necessary to enable them to reach the nearest coaling port in the country nearest to that in which the fuel supply shall have been taken.
This limitation upon the supply of coal would prevent the belligerent vessel receiving it from engaging in warlike operations without running the risk of becoming unable to reach another port in which she could take a fresh supply of fuel.
The effects of the above measure would undoubtedly and rapidly manifest themselves by a diminution in warlike activities in American waters and by a greater tranquillity in the commercial movement.
Second. To establish as a penalty for violations by merchant vessels of the neutrality rules prescribed by each country a prohibition against furnishing fuel to any vessel belonging to the company owning the vessel which has violated the rules.
In this manner a hindrance would be placed in the way of such false declarations as are commonly made by certain vessels with regard to their ports of destination, for the purpose of taking on large quantities of coal which are later delivered to war vessels.
Third. The concentration in certain points of each country of vessels interned on account of violations of neutrality or which should have voluntarily manifested their intention of remaining in the country until the end of the war.
The purpose of this provision is that of saving the American countries the trouble and expense incident to the surveillance of an extensive coast line.
The above provisions would be adopted separately by the different countries, in order to avoid the delays which are inevitable in negotiation of a collective convention, and would be put into force simultaneously on a date previously agreed upon.
The undersigned has discussed these ideas with the Ministers of the United States, Argentina, and Brazil in Santiago, who have expressed their frank approval. Please read this telegram to the Secretary of State, and let me know his opinion.