File No. 763.72112/219
The British Ambassador (Spring Rice) to the Counselor for the Department of State
Washington, October 25, 1914.
[Received October 26.]
Dear Mr. Counsellor: With reference to the case of the Rockefeller I think it would be opportune were I to make some remarks on the general question of contraband and the attitude of the British Government.
You are doubtless aware that in the last few weeks there has been a marked increase of the export of certain articles, as compared with previous years, to those neutral countries which are in direct communication with the belligerent nations. I will choose, among many, the single instance of mineral oils, and the returns for the month of September. Whereas the value of United States exports of the principal articles for that month as compared with September 1913 have decreased from 107 to 74 million dollars, or 30 per cent, the export of gasoline, naphtha, etc., has increased from 20 to 23 million gallons, or 15 per cent, and of fuel oil from 36 to 58 millions of gallons, or 61 per cent.
I need not point out that the course of the present war has shown the immense importance of the motor, the airship and the submarine, all of which are consumers of mineral oil. I may add that there is reason to believe that mineral oil in all its forms may be used for these purposes. A large proportion of the exports of this country has been consigned to neutral ports and according to evidence in our possession has been transmitted from them to a belligerent country. As you are aware, the Supreme Court of the United States in 1863 considered vessels as carrying contraband, although sailing from one neutral port to another, if the goods concerned were destined to be transported by land or sea from the neutral port of landing into enemy territory. It then decided that the character of the goods is determined by their ultimate, and not their immediate destination, [Page 329] and this doctrine was at the time acquiesced in by Great Britain, though her own trade was the chief sufferer.
On the other hand the neutral countries concerned, who are anxious, in the interests of their neutrality, to avoid being used as bases for hostilities by either belligerent, are now making arrangements which will give sure guarantees that articles which may be used in war shall not be reexported. In a word they are anxious to prevent their ports from becoming the back door of either belligerent. When these arrangements are complete, it is to be confidently hoped that trade between neutrals will be subject to little or no hindrance.
But it is of course essential in the interests of free and undisturbed trade between neutrals, that every security possible should be provided in order to enable belligerents to form a speedy and sure judgment as to the neutral destination of goods which may be used for peaceful or warlike purposes. In the case of the Rockefeller, which was bound for a port in the near neighbourhood of the chief naval port of a belligerent, the oil she carried was consigned to order and there was therefore no guarantee that it would not be forwarded to the enemy. She was accordingly detained until proof was afforded of the neutral destination of her cargo and the intention of the neutral government to prevent reexport.
It is to be hoped that for the future adequate precautions will be taken in order to show the real destination of goods consigned to neutrals which, if transshipped to a belligerent, might be used for belligerent purposes.
I may observe in conclusion that although the British Government have detained cargoes of contraband in order to make sure that they are really intended for neutral countries, and, have retained some cargoes such as copper destined for Krupp’s ammunition works, they have not yet taken a single cargo without paying for it, and have allowed every cargo really destined for neutral countries to proceed to its destination.
I am [etc.]