Office of the Historian

File No. 763.72/433

The Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State

American Embassy,
Berlin, August 14, 1914, 3 p.m.
[Received August 15, 7:30 p.m.]

[Telegram]

The following was communicated personally to me by the Emperor in writing:

For the President personally.

1.
His Royal Highness Prince Henry was received by His Majesty King George V in London who empowered him to transmit to me verbally that England would remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent involving Germany and France, Austria, and Russia. This message was telegraphed to [Page 61] me by my brother from London after his conversation with His Majesty the King and repeated verbally on the 29th July.
2.
My Ambassador in London transmitted a message from Sir Edward Grey to Berlin saying that only in case France was likely to be crushed England would interfere.
3.
On the 30th my Ambassador in London reported that Sir Edward Grey in the course of a private (sic) conversation told him that if the conflict remained localized between Russia—not Servia—and Austria, England would not move, but if we mixed in the fray she would take quick decisions and grave maneuvers; in other words, if I left my ally Austria in the lurch to fight alone England would not touch me.
4.
This communication being directly counter to the King’s message to me I telegraphed to His Majesty on the 29th or 30th, thanking him for kind message through my brother and begging him to use all his power to keep France and Russia, his allies, from making any warlike preparations calculated to disturb my work on mediation, stating that I was in constant communication with His Majesty the Czar. In the evening the King kindly answered that he had ordered his Government to use every possible influence with his allies to repudiate taking any provocative military measures. At the same time His Majesty asked me I should transmit to Vienna the British proposal that Austria was to take Belgrade and a few other Servian towns and a strip of country as a main mise to make sure that the Servian promises on paper should be fulfilled in reality. This proposal was in the same moment telegraphed to me from Vienna for London quite in conjunction with the British proposal; besides I had telegraphed to His Majesty the Czar the same as an idea of mine before I received the two communications from Vienna and London. As both were of the same opinion I immediately transmitted the telegrams vice versa to Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide the question over and was happy at the peaceful outlook.
5.
While I was preparing a note to His Majesty the Czar the next morning to inform him that Vienna, London and Berlin were agreed about the treatment of affairs, I received a telephone message from His Excellency the Chancellor that in the night before the Czar had given the order to mobilize the whole of the Russian army which was of course also meant against Germany, whereas up till then the southern armies had been mobilized against Austria.
6.
In a telegram from London my Ambassador informed me he understood British Government would guarantee neutrality of France and wished to know whether Germany would refrain from attack. I telegraphed to His Majesty the King personally that mobilization being already carried out could not be stopped, but if His Majesty could guarantee with his armed forces the neutrality of France I would refrain from attacking her, leave her alone and employ my forces elsewhere. His Majesty answered that he thought my offer was based on a misunderstanding and as far as I can make out Sir Edward Grey never took my offer into serious consideration. He never answered it. Instead he declared England had to defend Belgium neutrality, which had to be violated by Germany on strategical grounds news having been received that France was already preparing to enter Belgium and the King of the Belgians having refused my petition for a free passage under guarantee of his country’s freedom. I am most grateful for the President’s message.1

Wilhelm
Gerard
  1. see footnote, ante, p. 42. ↩