File No. 5315/603–604.
[Inclosure.]
Ambassador Reid
to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
American Embassy,
London, November 9,
1909.
memorandum.
Now that there has been signed and ratified by an unpublished
imperial decree an agreement by which American and British interests
are to cooperate in the financing and construction of the Chin Chou
Tsitsihar Aigun Railroad, the Government of the United States is
prepared cordially to cooperate with the British Government in
diplomatically supporting and facilitating this, so important alike
to the progress and the commercial development of China.
The Government of the United States would be disposed to favor
ultimate participation to a proper extent on the part of other
interested powers whose inclusion might be agreeable to China and
which are known to support the principle of equality of commercial
oportunity and the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese
Empire.
However, before the further elaboration of the actual arrangement the
Government of the United States asks the British Government to give
their consideration to the following alternative and more
comprehensive projects:
1. Perhaps the most effective way to preserve the undisturbed
enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and to
promote the development of those Provinces under a practical
application of the policy of the open door and equal commercial
opportunity would be to bring the Manchurian highways and the
railroad under an economic and scientific and impartial
administration by some plan vesting in China the ownership of the
railroads through funds furnished for that purpose by the interested
powers willing to participate. Such loan should be for a period
ample to make it reasonably certain that it could be met within the
time fixed, and should be upon such terms as would make it
attractive to bankers and investors. The plan should provide that
nationals of the participating powers should supervise the railroad
system during the term of the loan, and the Governments concerned
should enjoy for such period the usual preferences for their
nationals and materials upon an equitable basis inter sese.
The execution of such a plan would naturally require the cooperation
of China and of Japan and Russia, the reversionary and the
concessionaries, respectively, of the existing Manchurian railroads,
as well as that of Great Britain and the United States, whose
special interests rest upon the existing contract relative to the
Chin Chou Aigun Railroad.
The advantages of such a plan to Japan and to Russia are obvious.
Both those powers, desiring in good faith to protect the policy of
the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria, and wishing to
assure to China unimpaired sovereignty, might well be expected to
welcome an opportunity to shift the separate duties,
responsibilities, and expenses they have undertaken in the
protection of their respective commercial and other interests for
impartial assumption by the combined powers, including themselves,
in proportion to their interests. The Government of the United
States has some reason to hope that such a plan might meet favorable
consideration on the part of Russia, and has reason to believe that
American financial prticipation would be forthcoming.
2. Should this suggestion not be found feasible in its entirety, then
the desired end would be approximated if not attained by Great
Britain and the United States diplomatically supporting the Chin
Chou Aigun arrangement and inviting interested powers friendly to
the complete commercial neutrality of Manchuria to participate in
the financing and construction of that line and of such additional
lines as future commercial development may demand, and at the same
time to supply funds for the purchase by China of such of the
existing lines as might be offered for inclusion in this system.
The Government of the United States hopes that the principle involved
in the foregoing suggestions may commend itself to His Britannic
Majesty’s Government. That principle finds support in the additional
reasons that the consummation of some such plan would avoid the
irritations likely to be engendered by the uncontrolled direct
negotiations of bankers with the Chinese Government, and also that
it would create such community of substantial interest in China as
would facilitate a cooperation calculated to simplify the problems,
fiscal and monetary—reforms now receiving such earnest attention by
the Imperial Chinese Government.
