Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay.

No. 846.]

Sir: I confirm your telegrama of the 6th instant, and report that on yesterday I had a conference with Prince Ch’ing on the subject-matter thereof.

I handed to Prince Ch’ing a memorandum embodying your instructions and the expectations of the President, a copy of which I inclose. I said to him, in substance, that it was generally understood what the proposed terms of the Manchurian agreement were, but that we had no authoritative knowledge; that if the terms as understood should be agreed upon China’s territorial integrity would be endangered, her sovereignty impaired, the treaty rights of other nations violated, and her ability to meet her international obligations diminished. He then briefly outlined to me the demands which Russia was making. They were substantially as reported in my telegram of the 3d instant. He said he agreed with my views as to the results to be reasonably expected from a compliance with the Russian demands, and that he should endeavor, in whatever agreement was finally reached, to preserve the sovereignty of China and respect all treaty and international obligations. He assured me that instead of taking nearly three years to evacuate Manchuria he should insist upon its being accomplished in one, and that while limiting the number and kind of Chinese troops to be kept in the territory during Russian occupancy, this matter should be left to China’s judgment and control after the evacuation, and that after turning back to China the Shan-hai-kwan, Ying Kou and Rain-ting railroads the Chinese Government should itself decide how it should be guarded, and whether or not a bridge across the Liao River should be constructed. Also, if upon investigation it should turn out that Russia’s expenses of repair and maintenance of the above-mentioned railroads were included in the general indemnity allowed by the final protocol, then they should not be paid again; otherwise, reasonable compensation should be agreed to.

I asked him if the proposed agreement did not provide for exclusive privileges of railway and mining development. He replied it did not, but that later negotiations might be entered into to reiterate the agreement heretofore entered into with the Russo-Chinese Bank; that these would give Russia, when new railroads were to be constructed or mines opened, the first right to build or open, but that these would only be given after conference with, and approval of, the Chinese authorities. He also said that if he could not secure Russian consent to these modifications he would confer with me again before signing.

Under all the circumstances I can see no serious objections to the terms which he suggests for the general agreement; but if the understanding as to a separate agreement concerning exclusive railway and mining concessions, as it would seem, really makes a part of the main agreement, it is quite as objectionable as if it was formally included therein. I am bound to add that I have very serious doubts about his ability to secure the consent of Russia to the terms he proposes.

I have, etc.,

E. H. Conger.
[Page 273]
[Inclosure.]

Memorandum left by Mr. Conger with Prince Ch’ing on December 11, 1901.

The President of the United States, having heard reports to the effect that China was about to sign a convention with Russia which would materially affect the sovereignty of the former in the Manchurian provinces, and which would apparently impair very seriously the treaty obligations of China with other powers, as well as injure the commercial interests of the United States in the region mentioned, has sent Mr. Conger, the United States minister at Peking, the following cable dispatch.a

  1. Printed, ante.
  2. Printed, ante, page 271.