American Peace Commissioners to Mr. Hay.
Our Commissioners desire definite instructions as to Philippine Islands as soon as practicable. The following statements embody individual expression of their views upon the subject.
| (Signed) | Moore. |
(1) Holding the view that the Philippine Islands group is likely to prove a burden rather than a benefit to the United States, I would minimize our holdings there to the lowest point consistent with our obligations. This view I undertook to express in my telegram of October 25. Our advantage is a naval and commercial base in the East. More than this we should not seek. Our obligations seem to require us to take Luzon and islands so near as to be essential thereto. Assuming that the President and Cabinet have determined to take the whole group, then I believe we will be justified in paying lump sum, say fifteen millions, recognizing that we are dealing with a bankrupt people; that Spain loses her colonies, the revenues of which are charged with outstanding debts, and parts with a considerable portion of her revenue-producing domain. I would assume no part of the so-called Cuban and Philippine Islands bonded debt. Rather than fail to secure treaty of peace I think demand for whole group might be so modified as to let Spain keep Mindanao and Sulu group without conditions, paying same sum as above indicated. These islands with money payment would be a substantial concession. In that alternative we might secure one of the Caroline group as naval station and at the same time safeguard our interests and people there.
| (Signed) | Day. |
(2) I favor taking the entire group and paying $10,000,000 in gold, a fair estimate of debt properly chargeable to the Philippine Islands. If necessary to secure a treaty, and I believe it is, I would take Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, alsoPonape, of the Carolines, paying from $5,000,000 to $10,000,000. I would require: First, free interchange of products of islands for consumption there; also that products of other islands in group intended for export from Manila be admitted free, with distribution of goods imported into Manila to other islands without additional duties. Second, the right of entry into such ports of the Philippine Islands as are not ceded upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise in relation to port and customs charges, while Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in the ports of any territories in their Pacific islands ceded to the United States. Third, charges against American vessels for entry into Peninsular ports of Spain no higher than imposed on Spanish vessels in American ports. Fourth, in all ports of these islands remaining under Spanish rule our citizens shall have all questions at issue tried before an American consul or other duly qualified American officer. Fifth, all persons held by Spain for political acts performed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Ponape, Guam, or the Philippine Islands to be immediately released. Sixth, absolute freedom of religion in the Philippine Islands, Ladrones, and Caroline Islands. Seventh, United States shall have the right to land cables on any of these islands, and the tolls for messages [Page 946] on our trans-Pacific cables, or interisland lines shall be regulated by the Government of the United States. Eighth, United States shall have the right to extend its submarine cables from Puerto Rico via the Canaries to the coast of Africa or Spain, and thence to any Spanish Mediterranean island. Apply so many of these articles as may be necessary if the entire Philippine Islands group is taken.
| (Signed) | Frye. |
(3) The undersigned begs to say that, while adhering to the views expressed in his telegram of the 26th October, he is of the opinion that it is immensely important to the country that we should not separate without the conclusion of a treaty of peace. A renewal of the state of active war, even if Spain’s resistance be continued feeble or none at all, would compel us to seize with the strong hand all of her colonial possessions. This is not a rôle that is desirable for the United States to assume. We have achieved all and more than we went to war to accomplish, and Spain has conceded it in a protocol. The same protocol left the fate of the Philippine Islands to be determined by a treaty to be thereafter concluded between the two countries. The stipulation was not that it should be determined as the United States should dictate, but by a treaty between the parties. This necessarily leaves it open to a negotiation which must result in an agreement, which implies a quasi freedom of consent by Spain as well as by the United States. If that consent can not be obtained we are relegated to the state of active war which the armistice suspended, and the sword will again be drawn and the conquest completed; though Spain makes no physical resistance, she will state her case to the world as having consented to do all that she promised to do in the protocol, but that she could not subscribe to terms which she had no right to expect. It would, in the opinion of the undersigned, be most unfortunate if the United States should feel compelled to abandon the high position taken at the beginning of the war and, instead of crowning their triumphs by setting an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory, act the part of a ruthless conqueror. Believing that the result of a failure to obtain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of the whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be deprecated as inconsistent with the traditions and civilization of the United States, I would be willing to take the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, and I would, to that end, make such reasonable concessions as would comport with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and prostrate foe. I mean that I would prefer the latter alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind as to the policy of taking the Philippines Islands at all.
| (Signed) | George Gray. |
(4) Our duty not to return to Spain any territory in which we have broken down her rule has been enforced in our instructions from the outset. Furthermore, the right of a nation which has been successful in a war forced upon it to exact an indemnity afterwards for the cost of the war is recognized. Adding pensions and other proper items to this cost, as already tabulated, we have a total of between two hundred and fifty and three hundred millions. Spain is without money or the means of procuring it, and can therefore pay us in nothing but territory. She has so far given us only Puerto Rico. How far does that go toward repaying our outlay in cash, to say nothing of the derangement [Page 947] of business and loss of life? For a standard of valuation we may perhaps refer to the five considerable purchases of territory we have made within a century and the others we have considered. We paid twelve millions for Louisiana, five millions for Florida, fifteen millions for territory acquired from Mexico under the treaty of Guadalupe, including New Mexico, Colorado, [and] California; ten millions for territory acquired in like manner by the Gadsden purchase, and seven million two hundred thousand for Alaska. We once offered seven million and a half for St. Thomas and St. John, and later could have had that whole group for five million. For Cuba we once talked of paying one hundred million, and at another time a hundred and twenty-five million. Taking this last as coming nearest to fixing a standard of value in the present case, we may reckon that Puerto Rico, farther from us, less important to the protection of our coasts, and only one-twelfth size, though with nearly one-half as much population, could not by any possibility be regarded as indemnity for more than forty or fifty million of our just claim. Even if Cuba were added, in its present devastated and depopulated condition, the present valuation of the two would not repay the outlay forced upon us by the war; but we have all along refused to take Cuba. What else has Spain with which to repay us except the archipelago, which lies at our mercy with its capital in our possession? Its area is just about two and a half times that of Cuba; but instead of being near our coasts it is halfway around the globe from us. Some of our people think it worthless to us, and probably few that it could be valued so high as the remaining two hundred or two hundred and fifty million of our cash outlay; but it is an asset of some sort, whether to develop or to dispose of, and we ought now to retain the power to do either as the Government and the people on fuller knowledge may determine. * *
Are at the end of six weeks of fruitless negotiation, one-half [longer] than it took France and Germany to agree upon their first treaty of peace after their last war. This effort suggests to me now the desirableness of our calling time on the Spanish Commissioners and giving notice that we must either make some progress or close the protocol. At the same time, in our own interest, we must shrink from renewing the war, even in name, over our prostrate foe, and must take into consideration the great desirableness of securing a definite and permanent treaty of peace. To do this I would be willing to make some concessions from our just dues, if sure they could not be misinterpreted and used as a pretext for greater delays and further unreasonable demands. I would be willing, as one proposition, under such conditions, and only as a certain means of speedily securing a treaty, to leave Spain Mindanao and the Sulu group, in the southern part of the Philippine Islands—that is to say, the Mohammedan part of the archipelago, being about one-third of it—and take instead all the Carolines and the Ladrones, while making stringent requirements as to the freedom of religion, as well as forbidding Spanish restrictions on trade with the rest of the Philippine Islands. I would not compromise our position on the Cuban debt by doing anything to recognize that of the Philippine Islands, it being apparent that it was used to prosecute the war against insurgents, partly in the Philippine Islands and partly in Cuba; but rather than lose a treaty and resume hostilities I would, as another proposition, be willing to take the Carolines, in addition to all the Philippine Islands; and in return for the Carolines and for past pacific expenditure in [Page 948] them and in the Philippine Islands [I] would be willing to give a lump sum of from $12,000,000 to $15,000,000, providing ultimately for this sum out of the revenues of the islands. And, finally, as a last concession from this second proposition, I would not sacrifice the treaty [for the] sake [of] retaining Mindanao and the Sulu group.
| (Signed) | Whitelaw Reid. |
(5) It is my opinion that the existing situation requires that the United States present without much delay an ultimatum insisting upon the signature of a treaty for the cession by Spain of the entire Philippine Islands archipelago, Puerto Rico, and Guam, and the relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba. I am also of the opinion that we [should] pay no money to Spain on account of her debt or on any other account whatsoever, and that we should so declare in an ultimatum, if necessary. It now appears that Spain has paid nothing for any pacific improvements in the Philippine Islands. They have all been paid for by the proceeds of local taxation of the islands. I believe that one of the purposes of Spain in protracting these negotiations is to entangle the United States with some of the European powers. * * The Spanish Commissioners have reoccupied their first position, that the United States shall assume or be bound for the so-called colonial debt, and it is plain that so long as her Commissioners thus contend the negotiation stands just as it did at its beginning. I do not believe we shall ever get a treaty except as a result of such an unyielding ultimatum.
| (Signed) | C. K. Davis. |