Peace Commissioners to Mr. Hay.
Differences of opinion among Commissioners concerning Philippines are set forth in statements transmitted herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint commission almost immediately.
Day.
Information gained by Commission in Paris leads to conviction that it would be naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken tends to this effect. As instructions provide for retention at least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We therefore ask for extension of instructions.
Spain governed and defended these islands from Manila; and with destruction of her fleet and surrender of her army we became as complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession. The Ladrones and Carolines were also governed from the same capital by the same governor-general.
National boundaries ought to follow natural divisions, but there is no natural place for dividing the Philippines.
There is hardly a single island in the group from which you can not shoot across to one or more of the others. Scarcely another archipelago in the world in which the islands are crowded so closely together and so interdependent. Military and naval witnesses agree that it would be practically as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part. [Page 933] Some say easier; all say safer. Agree, too, that ample and trustworthy military force could be raised among natives, needing only United States officers and a small nucleus of United States troops; also that islands could be relieved from oppressive Spanish taxation and yet furnish sufficient revenue for the whole cost of administration and defense.
Great danger must result from division. Other islands, seeing benefits from our government of Luzon, are sure to revolt, and to be aided and encouraged by natives of Luzon, thus repeating, in more aggravated form, our troubles with Spain about Cuba. Visayas already in revolt. Division would thus insure lawlessness and turbulence within gunshot of our shores, with no prospect of relief unless in Spanish sale of islands to unfriendly commercial rivals, which would probably happen if we hold the most important—Luzon—and release the others.
Generally expected now that this would be attempted the moment we released them. If such sale or transfer is to be made at all, would be less dangerous to our interests if done by us rather than by Spain. If we do not want the islands ourselves, better to control their disposition—i. e., to hold the option on them rather than to abandon it. Could then at least try to protect ourselves by ample treaty stipulations with the acquiring powers.
Commercially, division of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept. Present prosperity of Manila depends on its being natural center of import and export trade for the whole group. Large part of its business derived from Iloilo, Cebu, and other points in south. To yield these to unfriendly rivals would be to provide beforehand for diversion of business from our own possessions.
Moral obligations not to return Manila and Luzon to the oppressive power from which we have relieved them applies also to the rest of the archipelago, since Spanish power there is now broken and can not be restored without our consent. We believe public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to retain whole of the Philippines, and would prefer that to any other solution save the impossible one of restoration of Spanish power over all the islands.
If a division should be insisted on, the only one that seems to us admissible would be by a line from the Straits of San Bernardino, south of Masbate and north of Panay, to the northeast corner of Borneo, leaving to the United States all to the westward, including Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan. This would control the China Sea, and give excellent ports of call along the whole line from Borneo to Hongkong. But it would throw away the Visayas, including the best sugar, hemp, and tobacco islands. These contribute a large part of Manila’s trade, and are inhabited generally by a people nearly as easy to manage as those of Luzon.
We are convinced that much injustice has been done inhabitants in published accounts of their character. Even the Mohammedans of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, if left enjoyment of religious liberty and given freedom from oppressive taxation, would be found less intractable, in opinion of the experts, than under the rule of Spain; while the others would be comparatively easy to control, and glad to welcome strong and just rule of United States.
(Signed) Cushman K. Davis.
William P. Frye.
Whitelaw Reid.
[Page 934](2) I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the entire Philippine group. In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory permanently held must be taken as war indemnity, and with due regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents. Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We can not leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to their unaided resources, either to form a government or to battle against a foe which, unequal to us, might readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This is particularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group.
Only experience can determine the success of colonial expansion upon which the United States is entering. It may prove expensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is tried with ignorant and semi-barbarous people at the other side of the world. It should, therefore, be kept within bounds. Accepting Luzon, strategic advantage, as shown by high naval authority, may require cession of that part of the group lying north and west of a line drawn through San Bernardino Strait, south of Luzon to San Bernardino Islet, and thence by the Naranjos Islands and certain courses and distances to Tambisan Island, on the northeast coast of Borneo, conveying to the United States Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, and various other islands, thus controlling the entrance to China Sea, with additional harbors and ports of call.
The objection that other islands will be acquired by European powers without regard to our interests can be obviated by treaty stipulation for nonalienation without the consent of the United States. There should also be stipulations for absolute freedom of trade and intercourse among all the islands of the group. This gives us practical control of the situation, with a base for the navy and commerce in the East, and responsibility for the people to whom we owe obligation and those most likely to become fit for self-government. It affords an opportunity for lessening the burden of colonial government, with room for further expansion if desired. It does not leave us open to the imputation of following agreement to negotiate with demand for whole subject-matter of discussion ourselves.
(Signed) William R. Day.
(3) The undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take Philippines in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of country declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers, a greatly increased military establishment, immense sums for fortifications and harbors, multiply occasions for dangerous complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap, no area for homes for American citizens—climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth. New and disturbing questions introduced into our politics, church question menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity—injury. Undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to insurgents is paramount [Page 935] to our manifest interests. Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at conclusion of war. On contrary, interest and auty would require us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz. No place for colonial administration or government of subject people in American system.
So much from standpoint of interest. But even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgar greed for territory which Europe has inherited from mediaeval times. Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word. Third article of protocol leaves everything concerning control of Philippines to negotiation between the parties. Absurd now to say that we will not negotiate, but will appropriate whole subject-matter of negotiation. At the very least, let us adhere to President’s instructions, and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other islands—above all, let us not make a mockery of the injunction contained in those instructions, where, after stating that “we took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations,” and that “we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest,” the President, among other things, eloquently says: “It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action.” This and more, of which I earnestly ask a reperusal, binds my conscience and governs my action.