Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.
General Merritt brings statements from General Greene, Surgeon Bourns, Major Bell, Admiral Dewey, Colonel Jewett, personal opinions [Page 919] of Belgian Consul André, at Manila, and correspondence of our military officers with Aguinaldo. Needless to summarize the statement of Greene, who is in Washington. Bourns several years in the Philippine Islands and opinion much relied on by Merritt. Thinks if a few ambitious insurgent chieftains could be disposed of, masses of natives could be managed by United States. Considers natives incapable of self-government because of lack of good examples, lack of union in Luzon and throughout archipelago, and existence of race, tribal, and religious differences. Natives united against Spain. Strong feeling against monastic orders, but not against church itself. Natives in Luzon are Catholics and well disposed toward the Jesuits. Islands as whole rich and productive; climate good as any in tropics.
Major Bell estimates insurgent forces upwards 20,000. Aguinaldo the most popular leader, but maintains control with difficulty. Some of his leading men dishonest and many wealthy natives opposed to him. Natives of Manila generally opposed to insurrection. Petty chiefs get money by blackmail and booty. Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt to reorganize a colonial government, but want native republic under American or other protectorate except Spanish.
Admiral Dewey sends only copy of report sent to President by Greene.
Colonel Jewett thinks natives would submit to any just, firm government, but unfit for self-government. Insurrection did not aim at national independence. Spain can not in the near future protect life and property in Luzon, nor could insurrectionary government sustain itself there. United States territorial form of government not practicable at present.
Belgian consul, according to Merritt, who gives much weight to his opinion, is intelligent man, wealthy, and largely interested in business and discloses business man’s point of view. Consul says United States must take all or nothing. If southern islands remained with Spain they would be in constant revolt and United States would have a second Cuba. Spanish Government would not improve. Power and corruptions of officeholders would continue. Spanish governors would still protect monks in their extortions. Insurrection began among lower classes, who make good soldiers. Since arrival of American forces certain members of native upper classes have joined rebels. Native character insincere. Upper classes include usurers, pawnbrokers, and keepers of gambling houses, who will not risk their capital in rebellion, and who would be glad to have American protection against insurgent demands for money. Rich natives treat laborers inhumanly. Custom on plantations all over islands is to get workmen into debt and then hold them practically as slaves, and even transfer them with estates. Spanish Government always tolerated and protected this system. Enormous difference between even best educated natives and white men. * * Chinese natives join sordidness and craftiness, and are rapacious pawnbrokers. Spanish natives join presumption to duplicity. On (the) whole natives inferior and unfitted to rule. Their only example the monks and Spaniards. United States should have pity on them (and) show them something better. Under United States islands would increase in wealth and soon return any money laid out. Even Spanish merchants desire American protection. Natives do not desire independence. Present rebellion represents only half of 1 per centum of inhabitants. Only 30,000 rebels. Luzon only partly held [Page 920] by them. The monks want to get away. Natives will resist Spaniards, but submit to United States.
General Anderson, in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June and July, seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. General Merritt reports that Admiral Dewey did not approve this correspondence and advised against it. Merritt and Dewey both kept clear of any compromising communications. Merritt expresses opinion we are in no way committed to any insurgent programme.
Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt said insurrection practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and religious differences between the inhabitants of various islands. United States has helped rather than injured insurrection. Under no obligation other than moral to help natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish rule, even with amnesty. Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards did better in future than in past. Insurgents would fight among themselves if they had no common enemy. Thinks it feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies. Natives could not resist 5,000 troops. Revenues of Luzon, leaving out cock-fighting, gambling licenses, and poll tax, would more than pay expenses of government. No burden of any kind on United States and we would help the island. Chinese half-breeds the most enterprising element in ‘the islands. Thinks we hold Manila by conquest and that the protocol did not affect the capitulation. He considered that the surrender was virtually a surrender of the Philippine Islands. He thinks it practicable and unobjectionable to hold Luzon alone where most of the rebellious feeling exists. He knows, however, little of conditions in other islands. It would require more (force?) to take and keep whole group than Luzon. Horrible stories told of monastic orders which hold most of the land in the island and oppress native tenants. Friars want United States to transport them to Honkong. No religious tolerance in the islands. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of priests in Luzon. The United States might have conflicts with the church, but not with the people.
Answering questions of Senator Davis, Merritt said several million dollars fell into American hands on capitulation of Manila. Spanish authorities extorted $2,000,000 from bank in March and never repaid it; probably spent this money or carried it away before the capitulation. Friars are mostly imported Spaniards. Native priests are popular, and probably in sympathy with insurgents. Filipinos treated prisoners well, but did not feed them well; this was unnecessary. The natives he has seen in Manila capable of assisting the United States in governing could be numbered on his fingers, but the number might increase. So far they had had no training. The islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao dependent more or less, strategically and commercially, on Luzon. This (is) his understanding, but he did not give much attention to the subject and his opinion not valuable. Manila the distributing center. Had not given consideration to the place at which Spain would set up her power if we took Luzon. Spain might govern other islands if she did not continue abuses. General Merritt thinks that if United States attempted to take possession of Luzon or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are divided and his opposition would not amount to [Page 921] anything. If the islands were divided, filibustering expeditions might go from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant danger of conflict with Spain.
In answer to questions of Senator Fry, Merritt said insurgents would murder Spaniards and priests in Luzon and destroy their property if the United States withdrew; United States under moral obligation to stay there. He did not know whether the effect of setting up a government by the United States in Luzon would be to produce revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their government. Some of the revolutionary leaders in Luzon might try to stir up rebellion in the other islands, but it would be difficult for them to fit out expeditions without our knowledge. There would be danger between the United States and Spain as there is between Germany and France over Alsace-Lorraine. Spain would want to recover what she had lost. Would not say that United States should take all or none; thought United States could not abandon Luzon. It would simplify things if United States took whole group, but whether it is not a larger undertaking than we choose to have on our hands is a question in his mind; and if there was a way of comprising it by holding on to Luzon and other such contiguous islands as we desire, thinks it would be wise to do it; would have no confidence in Spanish guarantees.
Answering questions of Mr. Gray, Merritt said consequences in case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph made it doubtful whether United States would be morally justified in withdrawing. Our acts were ordinary acts of war, as if we had attacked Barcelona, but present conditions in Philippines were partly brought about by us. Insurgents not in a worse condition by our coming. Spaniards hardly able to defend themselves. If we restored them to their position and trenches they might maintain themselves with the help of a navy when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a responsibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be sentimental. He thought it would be an advantage if the United States would change its policy and keep the islands. He thought our interests in the East would be helped by the cheap labor in the Philippines, costing only from 20 to 80 cents a day according to skill. United States might hold Luzon alone, but it would require larger force to protect Luzon if other powers held other islands, though it would require a larger force to protect all the islands than to protect Luzon. Thought we could manage the religious question, but it would be unwise to let Protestant missionaries go there except as educators, and that not immediately.
Answering questions of Mr. Reid, Merritt said he considered capture of Manila practically capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey’s victory we armed insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was overestimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants with Dewey’s cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing this to continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his principal followers, if allowed to do so. Spanish guaranties worthless unless enforced by bayonet. To take Luzon alone would expose us to Spain’s efforts to recover what she had lost. If disorders broke out in other islands, either through Spanish misgovernment or through attempt to sell to other countries, the effect upon our possessions in Luzon would be disastrous. Prosperity of Manila has arisen partly from its being [Page 922] the capital and entrepôt of the group. If we took Luzon alone and powerful European countries got other islands the trade would be deflected from Manila. A strong power holding Cebu or Iloilo would develop it at expense of Manila. Manila would become less valuable, but even in this case he thinks revenues would be sufficient to pay all expense of administration, including army and navy. Revenue of whole group would be more than adequate for government. Native forces might be used for military purposes if recruited about a nucleus of a regiment or two of our own troops. Natives glad to serve in army and could undoubtedly be depended on. A military government, following the English example of utilizing natives as far as possible, would be best for the present.
Answering Judge Day, Merritt said he had no knowledge of how natives outside Luzon would act toward United States. Thinks Luzon would be self-sustaining, except in case of foreign interference, but even then would be self-supporting.
Answering Senator Gray, Merritt said he thought the natural advantages would cause commerce to flow through its accustomed channels. It would be better for the other islands (and?) Luzon to be in the possession of a highly civilized power than to remain in their present condition. The capitulation of Manila on file in the War Department was made a part of General Merritt’s statement.