The Governor of Pennsylvania to Mr. Sherman.

Sir: In accordance with your request, I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of the report of James Martin, esq., high sheriff of Luzerne County, Pa., relating to the riots which took place in Luzerne County, Pa., on September 10, 1897. I also inclose copy of the report of Brig. Gen. J. P. S. Gobin, who commanded the Third Brigade of the National Guard of Pennsylvania at Hazleton during the riots. Also copy of the report of Gen. Thomas J. Stewart, adjutant-general of Pennsylvania, relating to the same subject.

I note with satisfaction your telegram now before me, assuring me that the report of Sheriff Martin will not be made public until after the trial of himself and his deputies.

Very respectfully, etc.

Daniel H. Hastings,
Governor of Pennsylvania.
[Inclosure 1.]

Mr. Martin to the Governor of Pennsylvania.

In reply to yours of the 13th, and also the communication addressed to you by the Hon. John Sherman, Secretary of State, asking for facts and information about the conflict that took place at Lattimer in this county on the 10th day of September, 1897, between myself and deputy sheriffs and a mob of strikers, I respectfully submit the following:

On Friday, the 3d day of September, there was a mob of about 2,000 men who went around the different mines in that region about Hazleton and drove the men from their work and compelled them to join the ranks of the mob, and if they refused they were clubbed and beaten and made to join. On Saturday, September 4, 1897, the Lehigh Valley Coal Company notified the sheriff’s office—I being away at Atlantic City at the time—that they would hold the sheriff responsible for any more interference at their mines. My attorney, Mr. Ferris, told my chief deputy, Mr. Wall, to wire me at once, which he did, and I came on Sunday the 5th of September. On Monday morning, September 6, Labor Day, Mr. Lathrop, superintendent of the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, sent for me to meet him at his office, which I did at 9 a.m. I also met Mr. Stearns, superintendent of the Cross Creek Coal Company, and Mr. Lawall, superintendent of the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal Company. Mr. Lathrop and Mr. Stearns then notified me that they would [Page 69] hold me responsible for any more interference with their mines. My attorney, Mr. Ferris, was present ax the time, and he and I agreed that, under the circumstances, it was my duty to go to Hazleton and see that there were no more violations of the laws of the State. I left for Hazleton on the 10.15 train, and on arriving at Hazleton I met at the depot Mr. Zerby, assistant superintendent of the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, and Mr. Piatt, superintendent of Pardee & Co., and from them I learned the state of affairs, and that the mob that caused all the trouble on Friday, the 3d, were from Schuylkill and Carbon counties, so I had telegrams sent to Sheriff Scott, of Schuylkill County, and Sheriff Stetzer, of Carbon County, to meet me at Hazleton Monday afternoon. We all agreed to issue a proclamation and have it printed in the Hazleton papers. Our proclamations were published in the Hazleton Sentinel on Monday evening, September 6, 1897, and in the Plain Speaker and Standard, Tuesday morning, September 7, 1897, and we also had a lot of handbills printed, which were posted around the mines on telegraph poles and in every conspicuous place in the neighborhood.

On Monday evening, just before I went to supper, I received word that a number of men had watched and beaten a Hungarian laborer while returning from work at Cuyle’s strippings. The man was so badly beaten that he died in a day or two at the hospital.

That afternoon I saw some good citizens and told them that I wanted a number of good citizens to act as deputy sheriffs in assisting me in maintaining the peace, and to protect life and property, and also to see that every man who wished to work would have the privilege of doing so.

So Monday night I made arrangements to meet them and as many more as they could recommend to me in a storeroom on Broad street, Hazleton, about 8 o’clock. When I arrived there, being accompanied by Sheriff Stetzer of Carbon County, there were 87 men who were willing to act as deputies, and I swore them in as such. There was a report that evening that a mob was going to start out for the purpose of stopping any mines that were working.

So I ordered the deputies to report at 5 o’clock on Tuesday morning. At 5.30 a.m. I went to the storeroom and a number of deputies were there, but nothing occurred until about 8 a.m., when I received word that a mob was forming at Crystal Ridge Colliery for the purpose of stopping the men that were working at the strippings there.

Myself and Mr. Piatt and Mr. Hampden, superintendent of coal and iron police, and Mr. Eby took a special train and ran up to the mines. When we got there, there was a mob of about 150 men who were just commencing to throw stones at the men in the strippings. I ordered them to stop, and read the riot act to them and ordered them to disperse. They all had clubs from 3 to 5 feet long and looked very threatening. After I had them dispersed I went among them and explained who I was and what my duty was, and told them that they were doing wrong, and breaking the laws by interfering with the men at work. One young man said that they would stop the men anyhow. I told him if I heard him say that again I would arrest him and put him in prison, and he did not say any more in my hearing. That afternoon I left for Wilkesbarre at 2 p.m. After I left, a mob went to Lattimer and started to drive the men from their work, when the deputies arrived and drove them away.

On Wednesday morning I went to Drifton and swore in a number of deputies for the purpose of protecting the property of the Cross Creek Coal Company and other property around Drifton, Freeland, Jeddo, Eckley, and Stockton, and also to protect those who wanted to work. After that was done, I went to West Hazleton and made some inquiries in regard to the situation. I was not known there and I went into a barroom and there I met an old Irish gentleman from McAdoo, aid from him I learned that a mob was coming from there that afternoon for the purpose of stopping the works. He also told me that he had come to West Hazleton as he did not want to go with the mob, as he was afraid there would be trouble. He also told me that his boys had left home so that they would not be compelled to march with the mob. He also said that all the English-speaking people were hiding away in the woods, or else left for some other place through the night. They were afraid to stay home, as the foreigners had announced their intention that they must go along with them.

After dinner Mr. Samuel Price, one of my deputies, came and told me that the mob was marching to Stockton, so I told him to get a train at the Wyoming Street Depot, and I and the deputies took the train for Stockton. When we reached Hazleton shops there was great excitement, and the people were running in all directions. I ordered the train stopped, and I got off and asked some workmen who were gathering up their tools why they were so excited, and they said that the mob was coming, and, not knowing who I was, told me that I had better get out of the way or they would take me along with them. As soon as the workmen gathered up their tools they would run off so as to be out of the way of the mob, so great was their fear. Rhone Trescott was with me, and I said to him that I did not feel it my duty to stop the mob if they were within the city limits, but the mayor’s. [Page 70] We telephoned the mayor, but he was sick. I had Mr. Trescott point out the city line to me, and, as they had not yet got to the city, we went to the city line, about 100 yards from where we were, to meet them. Just as we got there we met the mob. I ordered them to stop, and read the riot act and ordered them to disperse. While we were talking to them the chief of police and one or two of his men came. We finally got them turned for home. Then Mr. Trescott, Mr. Blanchard, and I walked around the outskirts of the city, and when we came to the main road a gentleman told me that the mob was going to stop the work at Crystal Ridge Colliery. Mr. Trescott and I cut through the woods and arrived at the colliery before the mob. I had sent word to the deputies to go to Crystal Ridge. After I arrived there I waited about ten minutes for the mob to put in an appearance.

I went up to the railroad to meet them again, and I ordered them to disperse. They refused to do so right away, but wanted to go ahead. One young man had gone to the breaker, and he came back and told them that they must go back as there were too many deputies there for them that day, but they would come tomorrow and stop the works. I told them it was wrong for them to do so, but they said that they did not give a damn, they would do so anyhow. I then warned them that they had better not try.

On Thursday morning I was notified that the mob intended to march again, and that they were going to stop Beaver Meadow mines first, so I took the deputies over there. While-there I met Sheriff Setzer, and we got word that a mob was forming, and that they intended to march. We waited until about 11 a.m., when the report came that the mob was coming. The mob got to Beaver Meadow before they were stopped and turned back. One of the mob had a gun, and some of the deputies ran to catch him. The man ran, and as he ran he turned and fired a shot at us, then some of the deputies fired some shots, but I don’t think they tried to shoot him. There were about 300 men in the mob. After that we waited around there all day, expecting that they would come back, but they did not. That evening I went to Wilkesbarre.

On Friday, September 10, I went to Drifton, where I met the deputies. We took the train and went to the lumber yard, so that we could be in easy communication with any part of the trouble. We stayed there till about 1.20 p.m., when I received a dispatch saying that a mob was at West rlazleton stripping, and had driven the men from their work. I ordered the train stopped, and we got to West Hazletou about 1.40 or 2 p.m. I was unable to get to the head of the mob, but struck it well toward the rear. I ordered them to halt behind where I met them and read the riot act, but they kept on shouting “Come on,” and kept waving their hands. I also heard a man say, “No stop, s—b—so I arrested him. I then hurried along through the mob and kept ordering them to stop, but they paid no attention to me, but kept right along shouting and waving their hands to everyone they could see. When I got to the head of the mob I ordered them to stop again. Some ran on both sides of the road, but I got them stopped. I then read the riot act again, and by this time the deputies had caught up to me. They then told me that we could not stop them; that they were going to Lattimer mines to stop it. I had to call several deputies with their guns to assist in keeping them back. I thought then that there would be serious trouble, as some of them had picked up stones, and it looked as though they intended to strike me or some of my deputies. We were there about half an hour. I tried to get them quiet, so that I could talk to them. I went among them and asked them who could talk English. When I found a man who could talk English I would explain what was my duty, and would tell them that they were breaking the laws of the country, and that we could not allow them to do so, when he would try and explain it to the rest of them. I could hear them say, “Him be a and we stop Lattimer mines.” I told them that they must not do so. I told them that I could arrest them for what they had done and what they were doing and for what they had declared their intention of doing, but that I did not want to do so.

I begged them to go home and not cause any more trouble. I think that some of them wanted to do so, but it looked to me, by the way they acted and talked, as if the majority wanted to keep on and stop Lattimer mines at any cost. They also told me that to-morrow they would all bring guns along, and we would see whether we would stop them then, and that if we shot they would shoot, and called me and the deputies all the vile names they could think of. I left them here, but warned them that they should not undertake to stop any more mines. We went on up the street, the deputies and myself, and then some one reported that they were marching again. I said that I could not help it as I was tired out and was not able to meet them again. I then ordered the deputies to take the car and we would go to Lattimer and meet them again. When we got to Harleigh, about 2 miles from Hazleton, I ordered the car stopped until the mob came along to see which way they would go. When they arrived at Harleigh they halted. When they saw the car with the deputies they got off on one side of the road, and some of them sneaked away through the woods, and I saw some that were trying to leave the mob get’ called back, and when they would not come back some of them would run after [Page 71] them and bring them back to the mob. We waited on the hillside at Harleigh to see which way the mob would go, and when we saw them start up the Lattimer road I ordered the car to proceed. When we arrived at Farley’s hotel we got out of the car and walked up the railroad toward one of the Lattimer breakers. There I met a number of deputies who had been placed there to see that the men who were working there would not be interfered with. We stood on the railroad expecting that the mob would come that way; when they saw us they went up the wagon road toward Lattimer village and another breaker at Lattimer. I then ordered the deputies to take the car again to head them off before they reached the other mines, which we did. When the car arrived at Lattimer village we left the car again and I told the deputies to stand on one side of the road and to keep cool and not get excited. I said I would go out and stop the mob again and see what they intended to do. I said if they say they are not going to do anything I may let them go on and we will go along with them. I then started out to meet the mob, and I took the riot act out of my pocket, and I walked out between 40 and 50 yards away from my deputies to meet the mob. When we came close together the front column walked slow so that the back column closed close together with it. I ordered them to halt and asked them what they were going to do, and a number shouted out: “We stop Lattimer mines.” I then started to read the riot act and they kept pushing ahead and against me, when a young man back in the fourth column said: “Go ahead; him——; him no good; we stop Lattimer mines.” I then reached my hand and caught him with the intent of placing him under arrest, and when I did, some seven or eight of them took hold of me; some of them struck me with their lists, while two of them pulled revolvers, and one of them made a dig at me with a knife. I then pulled my revolver, when one big fellow gave me a blow on the cheek and knocked me on my knees. I would have been knocked down on my back but the crowd was too close around me, so that there was no room for me to get down, and while we were struggling I heard a shot followed closely by a second and then a number of shots together. Those who were attacking me were shot, and I was then unable to recover myself, and there is no doubt in my mind that if the deputies had not shot just when they did I would certainly have been killed. While I was struggling with part of the mob on one side of the road in the ditch where they had pushed me, the part on the other side of the road with a whoop and a yell rushed on toward the deputies, who, no doubt fearing that their lives were in danger and that I was about to be killed, tired, the result being that 18 men were either killed or mortally wounded, and a number of others wounded, all of whom have or will recover. Some of the men that were killed were from 5 to 8 yards from the deputies, and a large number of the mob had passed me by at least 25 yards toward the deputies. The mob numbered about 700 or 800. The number of deputies was 80. When I recovered myself, I raised my hands and shouted to the deputies to cease firing, which they did. The whole firing lasted less than one minute. A few of the men were shot in the back but this can be accounted for by the fact that they were circled around me and had their backs toward the deputies. The mob was composed of desperate men who, in my opinion, would halt at nothing to further their ends. The deputies were all good, reputable citizens, most of them being property owners. They were men who had good, sound judgment, and possessed no desire to shed blood but were compelled to take life to protect their own, and we had no desires or intentions whatever to wantonly kill or wound any person. Most of the mob lived at Harwood and Cranberry, about 6 miles from the scene of the shooting.

The reason I stopped the mob before they came to the breaker and mines was that I was notified by the superintendent, Mr. Drake, that they would hold me responsible for any interference with their mines. I knew very well that if the mob got to the breaker they would surely attempt to stop it, and then if we undertook to arrest them that there would be serious trouble, and I have no doubt that some innocent blood would have been shed, and there is no doubt in my mind that the loss of life would have been greater.

Another reason was that I thought I could get them stopped, and that I would have a chance to talk and reason with them, and that I might possibly get them to turn back and go home; but I saw as soon as I met them that they had no intention of allowing themselves to be stopped. I most positively deny that there was any wanton and malicious killing of anyone, and I further say that I do not know whether those who were killed were American citizens or subjects of a foreign country. What I do know is that they were a mob who were violating the laws of the country; and further, their friends have seen fit to have me and the deputies arrested for murder, and we are under heavy bail for the same. I would think that if any foreign country though that any of its subjects had been killed unlawfully that it would wait to see what the decision of our’ courts would be before taking action in the matter. I feel that the Austrian Government is rather premature in the matter. I do not think it right and fair for any foreign country to be allowed to try and prejudice our case at the present time; and furthermore, if our act and actions [Page 72] were wrong, our courts and the American people are the proper parties to say so, and they will not he afraid to do so, without the interference of the Austrian Government.

Respectfully submitted.

James Martin,
Sheriff of Luzerne County, Pa.
[Inclosure 2.]

Sheriff’s proclamation.

It having come to ray knowledge that a certain condition of turbulence and disorder exists in the neighborhood of the city of Hazleton, in the county of Luzerne, by reason of which acts of disorder are said to have been committed, and men forcibly prevented from pursuing their daily avocations, and the peace of the community seriously disturbed:

Now, therefore, notice is hereby given to all good citizens to refrain from all tumultuous and unlawful assembly and from all acts of disorder or violence, and from all acts interfering with the liberty of other citizens, or tending to a breach of the peace.

Notice is further given that all such acts of disorder and lawlessness will be summarily repressed and punished in accordance with the laws of the land.

James Martin,
High Sheriff of Luzerne County.
[Inclosure 3.]

General Gobin to the Governor of Pennsylvania.

Sir: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your favor of October 1, instant, inclosing a copy of the letter of Hon. John Sherman, Secretary of State, relating to the inquiries of the Austrian consul as to the collision between striking miners and the sheriff of Luzerne County and his deputies at Lattimer, Luzerne County, September 10, 1897. I note your request for a report of such facts as I may be possessed of in connection therewith, and respectfully present the following:

I arrived at Hazleton, adjacent to the scene of the trouble, at 7.30 a.m. of the 11th, the day following the conflict. From all available sources I endeavored to gather information, and believe the status to have been as herewith stated. This, I may state, was further impressed upon my mind by visitations to the place and other surroundings after the excitement had subsided and the military were in full control of the situation.

This portion of Luzerne County, which I shall term the Hazleton district, is in the midst of an anthracite coal deposit of great magnitude, extending into the counties of Carbon and Schuylkill, within a short distance to the south, and remote from the county seats of all the counties. It has been for years the scene of violence and disorder. Much of the work being done is stripping and removing the coal from the outcrop or washing the culm banks. This has brought into the district a large proportion of unskilled labor, and from the best information I could obtain 70 per cent of the population are foreigners, of almost every nationality, the greater majority unnaturalized. These people live in patches and are exceedingly clannish. Nearly all carry some kind of weapon, and fights are frequent and fatal between them. In the last six years over 250 murders were committed.

In the latter part of August or the beginning of September the employees at —— colliery quit work, owing to some difficulty with the superintendent. Other workings followed in sympathy, but there was no general strike. In fact, there appeared to be no general ground for a strike, and no grievance which enlisted the combined action of any considerable number of the workmen. As it continued, however, agitators appeared, marching parties began to assemble and move upon collieries and workings, and drive the workmen from their places. The officials of these operations called upon the sheriff of Luzerne County to protect their properties from these trespassers and their men from this interference. The sheriff, whose office is at Wilkesbarre, 50 miles away, proceeded to Hazleton, summoned and swore in a large number of deputies, who established headquarters at that town, and were organized into three companies. Each man armed himself with such weapons as were obtainable, some of them with repeating Winchester rifles.

At different times, previous to the 10th of September, marching parties, intent upon visiting certain operations, had been turned aside by the mayor of Hazleton, or the sheriff, but excitement and unrest naturally resulted. During it all a number [Page 73] of collieries continued working, their men indicating no desire, at least so far as known, to quit work. Among these was the large operation at Lattimer. On the morning of the 10th the body of men, variously estimated at from 300 to 600, started from Harwood with the avowed purpose of visiting Lattimer and compelling the men there to leave their work. They were met at West Hazleton en route by the sheriff, who commanded them to disperse, and read, or attempted to read to them, the riot act; they refused to listen and passed on. On the move they compelled persons whom they met to join their force, taking one lad of not over 17 from a wagon he was driving and placed him in the ranks. This boy subsequently lost a leg in the mêleé at Lattimer. The sheriff hastily proceeded to Hazleton, summoned his deputies, and took the street cars to reach a point to head off the marchers. The posse reached Lattimer in advance of them, and were lined up on the sidewalk, parallel to and facing the road, the right toward the marching strikers. In the rear of the posse were several houses, the property of the Lattimer proprietors. The marchers soon made their appearance, headed for the Lattimer colliery. As they came near the sheriff stepped out in the road in front of them with a paper in one hand and a drawn revolver in the other and commanded them to halt. Several of the marchers surrounded him with cries of defiance, and a struggle, apparently for the revolver, ensued. While this struggle continued the greater portion of the column pushed on, the rear men crowding the front ones forward. As they were passing the line of deputies they jeered and hooted. The head of the column had almost reached the left of the line when a single shot was fired, from where I have been unable to determine. It was the signal, however, for a general fusillade from the center and left of the line of deputies, the right being unable to fire for fear of injuring the sheriff still struggling with the crowd in their immediate front. It was in no sense a volley, simply spasmodic acts of firing. The results of this fire at such close quarters, with the crowded condition of the marchers, was such that almost every shot took effect, and the heavy list of casualties naturally followed. A stampede in every direction immediately took place, and the affair was ended. I do not believe it lasted beyond thirty seconds.

No order, apparently, was given, and I have been unable to learn of a single gun being reloaded. A number, particularly in the right company, were not fired at all. The fact that some men were shot in the side or back, eleven wounded being so reported in the hospital, is as readily attributable to the fact that some of the men had passed a portion of the firing line as that they were fired at after they dispersed or were retreating.

These men had a second time within a few hours been ordered by the sheriff not to interfere with the property or men at Lattimer. Some of them were personally assaulting the sheriff; others with jeers and insults passing the line of his deputies with the avowed purpose of committing violence upon private property and of provoking a breach of the peace upon the employees. The owners of the property and the employers of the men had applied to the sheriff for protection, and in the line of his duty this affair occured as stated. The jeopardy the official was in can only be conjectured, but that he was being interfered with in the discharge of his duty is very evident. The effect which his struggle, in plain view of his men, who stood with guns in their hands for the enforcement of the law, under his orders, is equally difficult to measure.

From the information obtained as to the position of the men I was interested in securing all the facts I could as to the number of repeating rifles in the line. There were quite a number, and only from these and revolvers were a second shot fired, if at all, as I could not ascertain a well-defined instance of a reloading.

Very respectfully, etc.,

J. P. S. Gobin,
Brigadier-General.
[Inclosure 4.]

General Slewart to the Governor of Pennsylvania.

Sir: I have the honor to submit for your information the following report of the assembling of the Third Brigade, National Guard of Pennsylvania, at Hazleton, Pa., for the purpose of supporting the sheriff of Luzerne County in the preservation of law and order and the protection of property.

It appears that on the evening of Friday, September 10, 1897, after a week of disturbance and unrest among the mining population of Hazleton, Luzerne County, and vicinity, a collision occurred between a large body of miners and the sheriff of Luzerne County and a number of deputies whom he had sworn in to support him in the enforcement of the laws, the protection of property, and the security of citizens of the Commonwealth in their rights under the constitution and the laws of the State, In this collision a number of persons were killed and injured, and the situation [Page 74] became so threatening and likely to result in further loss of life and destruction of property that the sheriff, feeling unable to cope with the emergency, telephoned the governor at Harrisburg for assistance. A public meeting of the citizens of Hazleton was also held, at which resolutions were passed showing the necessity of prompt action on the part of the governor and expressing fear that unless the military were sent to that section without delay that great loss of property and life would occur. This request for assistance reached you at Harrisburg about 10.30 p.m., Friday, September 10. The following telegram was immediately sent to the adjutant-general, then in Philadelphia:

“Governor in telephonic communication with sheriff of Luzerne County, who demands troops to quell riot at Hazleton, claiming same is beyond his control. Governor requests you to come to executive mansion first train to-night. Advise when you start.

Lewis E. Beitler, Private Secretary.”

A telegram of similar import was sent to Maj. Gen. George R. Snowdeu, commanding division, National Guard of Pennsylvania, and who was located in Philadelphia. To Gen. J. P. S. Gobin, commanding Third Brigade, National Guard of Pennsylvania, within the territorial limits of which Luzerne County was located, who was known to be in Philadelphia, a telegram was sent directing him to report immediately at Harrisburg. A telegram was also sent to Gen. John W. Schall, commanding First Brigade, the territorial limits of which are the city of Philadelphia and counties of Montgomery, Bucks, Delaware, and Chester, in the eastern portion of the State, advising him to hold the First Brigade in readiness.

General Orders, No. 26, Headquarters National Guard of Pennsylvania, were issued by your order as follows:

Headquarters National Guard of Pennsylvania,
Adjutant-General’s Office,
Harrisburg, September 10, 1897.

“General Orders,
“No. 26.

  • “I. Maj. Gen George R. Snowden, commanding division, National Guard of Pennsylvania, will order on duty immediately such portion of the division as in his judgment may be necessary to support the sheriff of Luzerne County in protecting life and property and securing to the citizens of the Commonwealth their rights and privileges under the constitution and Jaws of the State.
  • “II. Maj. Gen. George R. Snowden will report fully to these headquarters.

“By order of Daniel H. Hastings, governor and commander in chief:

Thomas J. Stewart, Adjutant-General.

Major-General Snowden immediately proceeded to Harrisburg, as did also General Gobin. In the meantime telegraphic and telephonic instructions were sent to the commanders of the organizations comprising the Third Brigade, advising them that that brigade had been ordered upon duty, and that they proceed to Hazleton with their commands fully armed and equipped with the least possible delay.

General Gobin, commander of the brigade, arrived in Harrisburg at 1.30 a.m., Saturday, September 11; reported to you at the executive mansion; was advised that the Third Brigade, which he commanded, had been ordered on duty, and he was directed to proceed immediately to Hazleton, and leaving Harrisburg at 3.25 a.m., he (according to his report on file in the adjutant-general’s office) arrived at Hazleton at 7.30 a.m.

The commanding officers of the various organizations comprising the Third Brigade in the meantime were assembling their troops and proceeding to Hazleton. These organizations are as follows:

Fourth Regiment Infantry, Col. D. Brainard Case, commanding; Eighth Regiment Infantry, Col. Frank J. Magee, commanding; Ninth Regiment Infantry, Col. C. Bow Dougherty, commanding; Twelfth Regiment Infantry, Col. James B. Coryell, commanding; Thirteenth Regiment Infantry, Col. Henry A. Coursen, commanding; Battery C, Capt. John Denithorne, commanding; Governor’s Troop (cavalry), Capt. Fred M. Ott, commanding.

Instructions were immediately given for the shipment from the State arsenal of the camp equipage for the organizations of the brigade. These instructions were given at 12 o’clock midnight. The employees of the arsenal were on duty at 12.45 a.m., the necessary number of teams (7) were ready at 1.40 a.m., and the entire camp equipage of the Third Brigade was loaded on six cars by 6 o’clock a.m. and immediately transported by rail to Hazleton, arriving there at 12.54 noon of September 11.

There was also sent with this camp equipage 40,000 rounds of ball cartridges for caliber .45 Springfield breech-loading rifles; 14,000 ball cartridges, revolver, caliber .38; 10,000 carbine cartridges, caliber .45; 350 rounds of fixed ammunition for 3.2–inch breech-loading rifle.

[Page 75]

The Ninth Regiment Infantry, Col. C. Bow Dougherty, arrived at Hazleton at 7.45 a.m., disembarked on the outskirts of the city, and was ordered by General Gobin into the city limits, where it was posted at Hazle Park.

The Thirteenth Regiment Infantry, from Scranton, Lackawanna County, and vicinity, Col. Henry A. Coursen, arrived immediately after the Ninth and was directed to proceed to Lattimer, the scene of the collision between the miners and the sheriff’s deputies on the evening before, and which is a mining village located about 3 miles north of Hazleton.

The Twelfth Regiment Infantry, under. Col. James B. Coryell, of Williamsport, Lycoming County, and adjoining counties, was immediately upon its arrival located east of Hazleton.

The Second Battalion of the Eighth Regiment Infantry, five companies, under the command of Maj. Emil C. Wagner, arrived shortly thereafter and was directed to proceed to Audenried, a few miles south of Hazleton, and to select a proper position commanding a region about Audenreid, and for the purpose of protecting a large magazine filled with dynamite.

The First Battalion, Eighth Regiment Infantry, Maj. E. C. Watts, arrived at noon and was sent to the position designated for the regiment at Audenried upon the arrival of the Second Battalion earlier in the morning.

Battery C, from Phoenixville, Chester County, and the Governor’s Troop, from Harrisburg, Dauphin County, arrived at 3 p.m. The battery was divided, one-half being sent to the camp of the Eighth Regiment near Audenried; the other remaining in Hazleton near the yards of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, at which point the Governor’s Troop was also directed to encamp, these yards being within two blocks of where the brigade headquarters had been established.

The Fourth Regiment Infantry, Col. D. B. Case, arrived about 4 p.m. in the afternoon of Saturday, and were directed to encamp adjoining the Eighth Regiment Infantry at Audenried.

It was decided to augment the cavalry force by ordering the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry, attached to the First Brigade, on duty. This troop arrived in Hazleton on the evening of Saturday and were directed to encamp adjoining the Governor’s Troop, near the stock yards of the Lehigh Valley Railroad.

The camp equipage was immediately distributed to the various commands and camps were located.

The entire section of country in and about Hazleton, comprising a large number of mining villages, was in a very high state of excitement. Meetings were being held at which inflammatory speeches were made. Preparations were also being made for the interment of those who were killed in the collision between the mob and the sheriff and his deputies on Fridaay evening, a large number of these funerals having been fixed for Sunday, and in which thousands of the people in the various communities intended participating.

The commander in chief, the major-general commanding the division, the adjutant general, and the attorney-general were constantly on duty at the executive mansion and in close and constant communication with General Gobin at Hazleton, both by telegraph and telephone.

It was estimated that 10,000 miners and employees about mines were participating in the strike, and the dissatisfaction at that time seemed to be spreading into adjoining counties. The situation became so alarming that the sheriffs of Schuylkill and of Carbon counties, both of which adjoin Luzerne County, notified the governor of their inability to preserve order and protect property, and asked for support in the performance of their duties. This request was not complied with, it being believed that the number of troops already on duty would be able to meet any outbreak that might occur and hold it in check until the arrival of the First Brigade, which was being held in readiness in Philadelphia.

After the funerals of the persons who were killed in the collision between the mob and the sheriff and his deputies, and which funerals occurred on Sunday and Monday, the excitement abated in a measure. Meetings were being held, however, and fears were entertained of an outbreak at points at which troops were not at that time located. To meet this tension of affairs the Fourth Regiment Infantry was moved on Wednesday, September 13, from its camp at Audenried to Drifton, a distance of about 9 miles.

Capt. Alexis R. Paxton, Fifteenth United States Infantry, on duty at the headquarters of the National Guard of Pennsylvania, in his report to the War Department, states:

“The disposition of the troops in their camps in and about Hazleton had reference to the occupation of localities where trouble might be expected, and to military considerations. The Twelfth Regiment, which guarded the southern side of the city, was within easy supporting distance of the Eighth and Fourth, if required. In like manner the Ninth, at Hazle Park, could promply reinforce the Thirteenth at Lattimer, should occasion require. The cavalry was immediately at the hand of the commanding general for whatever emergency might occur. The tension of [Page 76] public feeling at the time the troops arrived at Hazleton was very great, but their early appearance and prompt disposition had a highly beneficial effect upon all classes of the community. The funerals of the dead strikers were to take place principally upon the following Monday, and great crowds were expected to join in the funeral processions. It was therefore very important that the troops should be so distributed that the crowds of foreign miners who attended these funerals should realize that in or near all quarters of the community for miles about there was an ample military force to preserve order.”

The Fourth Regiment at Drifton, 6 miles northeast of Hazleton; the Thirteenth at Lattimer, 4 miles north of Hazleton; the Ninth and the Twelfth on the outskirts of Hazleton; the cavalry and artillery on duty in the city, and the Eighth Regiment, 3 miles south of Hazleton, would show that the line of communications between these commands was over 9 miles in length, and the regions in which the disturbances occurred embraced a territory of at least 27 square miles.

The morning reports show that on the morning of the 12th of September there were 2,499 officers and men on duty, and that 91 per cent of the entire strength of the brigade had reported. The highest percentage present at any time was 94.5 per cent, and the total number on duty, 2,615 officers and men.

On September 24 Battery C was relieved from duty; on September 25 the Twelfth and Thirteenth regiments were relieved; on September 28 the Fourth was relieved from duty; on September 29 the Ninth Regiment, the Second Battalion of the Eighth Regiment, and the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry, were relieved from duty.

During the entire tour of duty practice marches were indulged in; the cavalry patrolled the country in all directions, and every opportunity was taken advantage of to display the troops in force throughout the various mining towns and villages, where the greatest amount of discontent and unrest appeared to be. The impression created by the constant presence of large bodies of troops tended to prevent any demonstration in force by the strikers. This section of the State is one of the most populous mining districts within Pennsylvania. The population is made up largely of the foreign element, many of them being unable to speak or understand our language, and who under stress of great excitement are not amenable to argument or reason, and could only be held in check by the presence of a large armed force.

Very respectfully,

Thos. J. Stewart, Adjutant-General.