Mr. Woodford to the President.
Madrid, March 29, 1898.
Dear Mr. President: Yesterday afternoon, March 28th, I had official interview with Minister Gullon. Read to him the summary of report by American naval board on the loss of the Maine, and left with him an official note giving such summary and stating the position of [Page 719] the United States. I reported this interview officially to Secretary Sherman in my dispatch to the State Department, No. 194.1
I then asked the Spanish minister for foreign affairs for a conference this afternoon between himself, Señor Sagasta, president of the council, Señor Moret, and myself. Last evening I received his reply, appointing such interview for 4 o’clock this (Tuesday) afternoon at the president’s office. The conference has been held. I spoke to them through Senor Moret as interpreter and opened by reading to them the following statement:
The President instructs me to have direct and frank conversation with you about present condition of affairs in Cuba and present relations between Spain and the United States.
The President thinks it is better not to discuss the respective views held by each nation. This might only provoke or incite argument and might delay and possibly prevent immediate decision.
The President instructs me to say that we do not want Cuba.
He also instructs me to say, with equal clearness, that we do wish immediate peace in Cuba. He suggests an immediate armistice, lasting until October 1, negotiations in the meantime being had looking to peace between Spain and the insurgents, through the friendly offices of the President of the United States.
He wishes the immediate revocation of reconcentration order, so as to permit the people to return to their farms, and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, the United States cooperating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.
I then paused, and waited for President Sagasta’s reply.
He said that he agreed with you in thinking any discussion of the respective views held by the two nations to be inopportune and useless at such a conference.
He spoke first of the condition of the reconcentrados, calling my attention to the fact that this condition was inherited from the old ministry; then stated that the present government is arranging to furnish employment for such as are able to work, and to supply the necessities of the feeble men and of the women and children. He made no serious objection to the United States assisting in this work of charity, and gave me to understand that this part of your request would be promptly and satisfactorily met.
He then mentioned the loss of the Maine, and expressed his appreciation of the manner in which you had presented the subject to Congress, and added that he believed your method of dealing with this question would enable the two Governments to examine and adjust the matter in some way honorable and fair to both nations.
He then took up the question of the armistice, saying that he is in thorough accord with you in desiring early and honorable peace. He suggested that there are difficulties in the Spanish situation here in the Peninsula which I, as a stranger, could hardly understand, which made it almost impossible for the Spanish Government to offer such an armistice, but that if it were asked by the insurgents it would be at once granted; that the insular congress would meet on May 4, when the insular government could make such a proposition; that only six weeks would intervene before that time, and he hoped that the United States, which had waited so long, would now wait for these few weeks; that the offer of autonomy had been accompanied by firm declaration that Spain would employ military operations in aid of civil reforms; that these operations are now being successfully conducted, and that he [Page 720] hoped that the rebellion would be largely reduced before the Cuban Congress met.
I replied substantially that the sober sense of the American people insisted upon immediate cessation of hostilities; that the recent speech of Senator Proctor, who is one of the most conservative and reliable of our public men, had so convinced American public sentiment that longer prosecution of the war must now be prevented.
I then asked them for an answer to the two suggestions which I had made, and upon their saying that they would give the matter careful consideration, but that they must have full time for deliberation, I told them, with all possible kindness of manner and courtesy of language, that I hoped to have a further interview with them on Thursday afternoon of this week, March 31, when I trusted I should receive satisfactory reply to my suggestions.
They as politely demurred to the brief space of time, when I told them that I had intended to leave your requests with them in writing, but in order to avoid all appearance of compulsion I would not do so, but should hope on Thursday afternoon, in an adjourned conference, to receive satisfactory proposals from the Spanish Government on the line of your requests.
They reluctantly agreed to meet me on Thursday afternoon at the president’s office.
I then sat down at Señor Sagasta’s desk and wrote the following telegram, which I have sent to you in cipher:
Madrid, March 29, 1898.
President McKinley, Washington:
No. 60. Have had conference this afternoon, Tuesday, with president of the council, the minister for foreign affairs, and minister for colonies. Conference adjourned until Thursday afternoon, March 31. I have sincere belief that arrangement will then be reached honorable to Spain and satisfactory to the United States and just to Cuba. I beg you to withhold all action until you receive my report of such conference, which I will send Thursday night, March 31.
Woodford.
I had Señor Moret read this telegram and translate it twice to his colleagues, so there could be no misunderstanding as to its language and meaning.
Madrid, March 30, 1898.
I wrote thus far yesterday afternoon after the conclusion of our conference. Last evening Senor Moret called at my residence, and said that he thought I had made positive and favorable impression on President Sagasta’s mind; that the ministers would meet in council to-day for discussion; that a further meeting would be held to-morrow, March 31, under the presidency of the Queen, and that he hoped satisfactory adjustment would be reached at our adjourned conference to be held Thursday afternoon.
This (Wednesday) morning I get cipher dispatch from Secretary Day, instructing me that it is of the utmost importance that the conference be not postponed beyond to-morrow, and that definite results be then reached. I have just telegraphed him in cipher that there will be no delay beyond Thursday, March 31, and that if definite results are not then reached I shall close negotiations.
I have obeyed your instructions literally in stating to President Sagasta and his colleagues that you do not want Cuba. But I ought, with all respect and in the entire frankness with which you have permitted me to write you, to say that my judgment grows more strong each day that we shall probably have to accept the ownership and the responsible [Page 721] management of Cuba in order to establish permanent peace in the island. I have written you fully in the letters [Nos. 43, 44] which Mr. MacArthur will hand you at Washington some day this week explaining how and why my judgment has been changed in this regard from the view which I held last autumn, and even until early winter.
I am sure that you will give due consideration to what I have written so frankly and so fully, and you know how loyally I will try to carry out your views and wishes so long as I hold the trust with which you have honored me.
Faithfully, yours,