Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 5, 1898

[Confidential.]

Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.

Department of State,
Washington, March 1, 1898.

No. 147.]

Sir: The President’s message to Congress at the opening of the present session very fully set forth the information possessed by this Government touching the situation in Cuba, both as to its actual condition and its future prospects, and presented as much in detail as was possible under the circumstances the views and policy of this Government in regard thereto.

Since that time I have refrained from writing you instructions on the subject, partly because the benevolently expectant attitude of the Government of the United States with regard to the happenings in Cuba continued unaltered and partly because the changing lights thrown upon the situation from week to week made definite appreciation and comment impracticable.

Two months have now elapsed since the installation at Habana of the autonomist government of Cuba. More than two months have now passed since the substitution of Marshal Blanco for General Weyler and the adoption of a modified rule of conduct in the prosecution of hostilities against the Cuban insurgents. During this time the Department has sought to keep itself well informed of the actual situation and its immediate probabilities through our various agencies in Cuba. So far as my opportunities of observation and knowledge go, I am as yet unable to discern the favorable advances which were gladly anticipated from the changed order of things.

I review the present situation briefly for your confidential information, solely to aid you in appreciating any statements which may be made to you and in shaping your own discreet course.

First, as to the condition of the war in Cuba. The testimony which reaches me is concurrent as to the absence of any substantial success of the Spanish arms. No change has supervened in the conduct of hostilities on either side save that fewer regrettable excesses on the part of the Spanish troops are now reported. Indeed, their operations have not appeared during the past three months to have been as energetic as before. Few encounters are reported. Whether this be due to the reduced numbers of the Spanish forces through the sickness and casualties incident to all wars and to the return to the peninsula of troops who have served their time, or to the decreased productiveness of the island itself, due to the destruction of the normal source of supply and attended by enhanced difficulty of keeping up an effective commissariat, is a matter of conjecture. Both these general causes may perhaps effect the situation. It is reported that many of the troops have been widely scattered throughout the plantations ostensibly for the purpose of their protection, but being in fact billeted upon the interior estates in much larger numbers than heretofore and drawing their subsistence from the already impoverished resources of the interior country. Meanwhile the insurgent forces continue to control a large part of the eastern region while making demonstrations and forays in the westward parts without substantial check. The recent expedition of General Blanco to the central district appears to have been barren of military results. On the whole, inaction rather than activity has marked the last three months’ conduct of the war.

In the second place, the autonomist government of Cuba appears to have been extended from Habana to several of the principal cities and districts of the island with every disposition to place departmental and municipal authority in the hands of native Cubans or of Spanish residents known to be favorable to the scheme of autonomy. There can be no ground to doubt the entire good faith of the Spanish Government in thus installing and extending within limited areas the decreed system of autonomy. While its operation is thus restricted to narrow fields and is still in a period of transition, it may be premature to judge how far it effectively supplies a remedy for the evils under which the Cuban administration has admittedly labored for many years past. Besides being thus circumscribed in its operations, the financial problem appears to confront the autonomist government with considerable urgency, and indeed no other condition would well be expected in view of the wholesale destruction of the resources of the island within and of the diminution of its external commerce.

Thirdly, as for the effect of the offer of autonomy upon the insurgents in the field, it must be confessed that no hopeful result has so far followed. Beyond a few isolated submissions of insurgent chiefs and their following no disposition appears on the part of the leaders of the rebellion to accept autonomy as a solution. On the other hand, the hostility of the Spanish element in Cuba to this or any form of autonomy is apparent, so that the insurgurated reform stands between the two adverse fires of hostile oppostion in the field and insidious malevolence in the very centers of government. That the latter form of opposition would be reduced and eventually overcome in proportion as autonomy proves a success may well be admitted; that autonomy is of itself, and unaided by military success, capable of winning over the insurgent element remains a doubtful proposition.

Fourthly, the condition of the island in its financial and productive aspects has not changed for the better. It is rather, if anything, worse. The endeavors of the representatives of the peninsular authority and the domestic autonomist government to relieve the destitution and distress which prevail have been abortive. The policy of concentrating the rural population in and around the garrisoned towns, while leaving their fields and homes to decay and destruction, has worked its inevitable result. Day by day the condition of the reconcentrados becomes more pitiable, while day by day the power to relieve them, however good may be the disposition to do so, decreases with the exhaustion of the resources of the island itself. From Matanzas, Sagua, Santiago, and other principal centers of reconcentration the same appalling tale of misery, suffering, and death reaches me. The authorities are confessedly powerless to relieve the situation. Even the excessive diminution of the number of these unfortunates by death, estimated by conservative Spanish authorities to amount to about 50 per cent of their number since the policy of the depopulation of the interior was inaugurated does not make it easier to relieve the survivors, for the exhaustion of means to do so more than keeps pace with their diminished numbers. Our consuls report that even the Spanish army itself suffers from this paralysis of means and supplies, and if it be admittedly impracticable to keep up the commissariat and pay the soldiers of Spain, it is not rational to suppose that the condition of the unfortuate reconcentrados can be materially relieved, especially if reliance is placed on the private charity of the already straightened islanders.

The decrees permitting the sufferers to return to their plantations and resume their agricultural labors have been barren of result. Their fields are waste. The few estates which, under the guard of troops, have endeavored to resume operations do not afford lodgment for a tithe of the destitute. These are mostly women and children, or old men incapable of field work. Even could they return to their homes they could not till the soil and plant and raise crops, nor support themselves until the harvest should mature. That form of relief has proved wholly inadequate.

The distressing situation of the reconcentrados has appealed very strongly to the generous heart of the American people, and under the initiative of the President every effort has been made to organize and apply systematic relief through private donations here and distribution by the available channels in Cuba. However generously our countrymen have responded to this appeal, their efforts can relieve but a very small portion of the suffering, and that only within the narrow limits of the larger towns and their immediate surroundings. The work of relief is being earnestly pressed, but it is painfully insufficient to meet the situation.

In obedience to resolutions of the Senate and House, selections of the consular correspondence regarding the present situation in Cuba have been made, but I can not at present say when they will be submitted. It is sufficient for my present purpose to inform you that the reports of the consul-general and the several consuls in Cuba substantiate the pitiable tale of suffering and death, of impoverishment and destruction of resources, and of substantial lack of change in the military situation which the press has published to the world. The only redeeming feature of the situation is the advance made in the district of Cienfuegos, where less destitution exists than in other departments, and where, under heavy guard, many of the mills have resumed operations.

I append for your further information copy of a careful and valuable report made to the Secretary of the Navy by Commander G. A. Converse, commanding the U. S. S. Montgomery, which, recently visited the port of Matanzas, in which is recited the situation in that province.

This instruction, as I said before, is written for your confidential information and it is not expected that you will communicate any of its statements to the Spanish authorities, but you will bear these facts in mind in your intercourse with them.

Respectfully, yours,

John Sherman.

(Inclosure, from Navy Department, February 24, 1898, with accompaniment.)

P. S. I also append, for your further information, copy of a report from the commander of the Maine, Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, which has just been received.

(Inclosure No. 2, from Navy Department, February 26, 1898, with accompaniment.)

[Inclosure 1 in No. 147.]

The Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State.

Navy Department,
Washington, February 24, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit, for your information, a copy of a report from the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Montgomery, from Matanzas, concerning the condition of the population of that province.

Very respectfully,

John D. Long, Secretary.

[Subinclosure.]

Commander Converse to the Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. Montgomery,
At Sea, Lat. 22° 39′ N., Long. 78° 9′ W., February 6, 1898.

Sir: Complying with the instructions contained in the Department’s telegram of the 3d instant, I have caused as thorough an investigation as time and circumstances would permit to be made of the condition of the people of Matanzas, with the view of ascertaining the nature and extent of the destitution at present prevailing, and respectfully report as follows:

2. The total population of the province of Matanzas in December, 1897, was estimated to be 253,616. From statistics gathered from the best authorities (official and semiofficial) the total number of deaths in the province due to starvation and the diseases incident thereto have been 59,000. The number of people in the province now in a starving condition is estimated at 98,000, and this number is rapidly increasing.

3. The present population of the city of Matanzas is variously estimated to be from 50,000 to 60,000 (including the reconcentrados). In the city of Matanzas there have been between 11,000 and 12,000 deaths (ascribed to starvation and incident diseases) during the past year, and the rate is increasing daily. In October, 1897, there were 974 deaths, in November 1,260, and in December 1,733. Reports from the cemetery show that at the present time the daily death rate averages 46.

4. Within the city limits there are at present about 14,000 people absolutely without food and clothing. Of these 11,000 live in the streets of the city and are wholly without homes or shelter. The remaining 3,000 live in three small villages, located on three hills, just beyond the built-up portion of the city. Each village contains about 1,000 persons, who live in small huts constructed of palm branches. These 14,000 (known as “reconcentrados”) are people who have been driven into the cities from their country homes, which have been destroyed by the operations of the war. Most of them are women and children, and they are all emaciated, sick, and almost beyond relief, unless they could have the benefit of regular treatment in the hospitals. They are dying in the streets for want of food, one body having been passed by myself on the occasion of my official visit to the civil authorities and another having been seen by other officers of the ship.

5. The distress is no longer confined to the original reconcentrados (the laboring country people, most of whom have already perished), but has now extended to the better classes, who before the war were in moderately comfortable circumstances. Those now begging in the streets are, for a large part, well-to-do people or their children, and the citizens of Matanzas are themselves beginning to suffer for the actual necessaries of life, having drained their resources to supply the urgent needs of the 30,000 or more reconcentrados who have been quartered upon them.

6. The citizens of Matanzas have established three places where they issue rations. The ration usually consists of cooked rice and fish, which is served in tin pans, each pan containing a spoon. The filled pans are regularly arranged for distribution among the limited number (100) who have previously been admitted to the waiting room. Admission is obtained by a system of tickets, which entitle the holder to 1 ration. Each of the 3 places feeds 100 people at a time, and each supplies 3 meals daily, so that every day about 900 people receive a meal. It is needless to add that this supply is entirely inadequate for the large number (14,000) of destitute, starving people within the city limits.

7. The only other public relief is that given to poor, sick children by the management of the emergency hospital, which is under the direction of the volunteer fire department of the city. Here 80 children are daily treated and furnished with nourishment, under the direction of four of the city physicians.

8. The Spanish authorities have rendered some assistance to the starving, and on two occasions gave $1,000 toward the relief fund. This was but a small amount, but it is said to have been all that the Government could give.

9. Many of the citizens regularly feed at their homes numbers of those starving in the streets, but this will soon be no longer possible.

10. The United States consul has rations sufficient to last about two weeks, when the fund appropriated by Congress will have become exhausted, and then the sufferers will include many American citizens who have hitherto received relief from the consulate. A petition addressed to the Secretary of State and signed by 60 American citizens, setting forth in detail their urgent need for immediate relief, was delivered to the consul for transmission to the State Department on the 5th instant.

11. As far as could be ascertained, Matanzas needs a supply of food for 40,000 people for at least one month. Condensed milk for children and invalids, and quinine, sulphate of magnesia, nitrate of potash, and other medicines are desirable. The people in the streets are in urgent need of clothing, as many of them are entirely destitute and others only partially covered with filthy rags.

12. The urgent necessity of immediate relief and assistance can not be exaggerated. Whenever the officers of the Montgomery landed they were constantly followed by clamoring crowds of starving men, women, and children, importuning them in the most heartrending manner for food, for the want of which they are dying.

13. The foregoing information has been derived from my interviews with the civil officers of the province and city; from the United States consul, Mr. Brice; from the United States vice-consul, Mr. Brinkerhoff; from Mr. Dubois, manager of the Matanzas and Havana Railroad, and from Lieutenant-Commander Beehler, of this vessel, who personally visited the small villages in which the reconcentrados are quartered, the parts of the city most frequented by them, and the various places provided for furnishing the relief.

Very respectfully,

G. A. Converse,
Commander, United States Navy, Commanding.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 147.]

The Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State.

Navy Department,
Washington, February 26, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department of State, a copy of a letter, dated the 8th instant, received in this Department from the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Maine, at Habana, Cuba, in regard to the suffering among many of the inhabitants of the island of Cuba, resulting from conditions of poverty and destitution.

Very respectfully,

John D. Long, Secretary.

[Subinclosure.]

Captain Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. S. Maine (1st Rate),
Habana, Cuba, February 8, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report, in conformity with the Department’s telegram of February 4, 1898. The telegram reads: “Report by mail the condition of the people, being particular about destitution.”

2. Doubtless the Department is aware that my information has been derived from the opinions of others rather than from my own observations. Nevertheless my efforts while in Habana have been confined almost wholly to the cultivation of good relations with the people, both Spanish and Cubans, and to the investigation of conditions on the island from different points of view. I have met representatives of all classes, but chiefly intelligent sympathizers with the insurrectionists, and I have entertained in my cabin probably 200 people from time to time.

3. As to existing conditions, I have found that the disagreement between Spaniards and Cubans is surprisingly small. Variance of opinion appears to be chiefly in regard to causes.

4. The Spanish view concedes great poverty and destitution, but with blame to the insurgents for beginning the war, persisting in its prosecution, and for preventing initially the grinding of the cane. I will illustrate at first by individual statements:

5. A Spanish lady, all of whose relations have been and are now with the Spanish army, who is intensely Spanish and without sympathy with Cuba in this struggle, the widow of a Spanish officer who died in this war, and whose two daughters are engaged to Spanish officers, said to me frankly: “Captain, it is my belief that half of the people of Cuba have died in this struggle; but the insurgents are to blame for it. They brought on the war.” I have heard no statement quite so appalling from any insurgent source. From various sources come the statements, and with surprising agreement, that since the beginning of the insurrection 500,000 Cubans have emigrated or died through one cause or another immediately connected with the insurrection.

* * * * * * *

5. While in the act of dictating the foregoing, I received a visit from a leading Spanish manufacturer of Habana, who has been in the island forty years, and who is really Spanish in his sympathies. He was accompanied by a very intelligent Swiss, who speaks English very well and has been on the island nine and one-half years and is intensely pro-Spanish. I propounded a series of questions to these gentlemen, and they answered me very frankly.

6. The Swiss stated that 500,000 people, or one-third of the population, had died in Cuba since the beginning of the present insurrection. I then asked specifically if the Spanish manufacturer held the same view. The manufacturer, without qualification, replied that he did, but he also claimed that the deaths were due to a condition of war brought on without sufficient grounds by the insurgents, and that the insurgents were, therefore, primarily responsible. Even these statements give larger figures in respect to deaths than have been given to me by any Cubans.

7. I asked these two gentlemen if they did not include in their estimate those Cubans who had emigrated. Both replied that they did not. The Cuban assertions as to the number of reconcentrados who have starved varies from 200,000 to 400,000. The lowest figures given to me by anybody, Spanish or Cuban, is 200,000.

8. I conversed to-day with an American from Boston, who has been in Cuba for six weeks for the purpose of purchasing tobacco lands in Santa Clara province. He has traversed the route between Habana and Santa Clara five times. He has even gone beyond Santa Clara, which is 260 miles from Habana. He has been arrested several times by both Spaniards and Cubans. He presented me with a table showing in one column the number of reconcentrados collected at various towns and in another column the number of them that have died. It was professed that the figures found in the columns are derived from Spanish registers in the several towns or from Spanish notaries.

9. Since they were not obtained at first hand, and since, according to his statement, General Lee has compiled statistics from the same places, I do not include his table, but will reserve it. The personal observations of this gentleman are valuable. He stated that in the towns that he visited all along the route, the condition of the reconcentrados was to the last degree horrible. They were in sight dying everywhere in the towns. The death and suffering had become so common that it had failed to excite general commiseration in the locality concerned.

10. In one place he followed on horseback a cart in its rounds to pick up the dead. He saw ten dead put in the cart. He states that the revocation of the Weyler edict has but little beneficent effect in its application, because reconcentraaos are not now permitted to go outside the “limited zones of cultivation” encircling the towns without permits from the authorities, and the permits are limited to a number of days.

11. His accounts and figures tend to confirm the statements made to me by Spanish and cited in the first part of this letter. He states that nearly all of the suffering people are Cubans (white people), principally women and children; that the negroes appear to be able to resist the hardships of the period far better than the whites. I have cited of this gentleman’s testimony only such points as appear to be confirmed by the general tenor of remarks made to me from various sources.

12. I shall now give the views to be derived from the general mass of information gathered by me here, excluding statements made by all enthusiasts, and also by all newspaper correspondents, the latter on no other ground than that the Spaniards claim that it is, in the main, unfair. It seems to me impossible that the conditions of poverty, destitution, and death asserted in the previous paragraphs should not follow directly from the condition of the present war in this country. It is a guerrilla war on both sides, and in a country where the physical characteristics are ideal for the purpose. It is a war of blockhouses and marauding or scouting bands. The Cuban policy is to tire out the Spaniards and to prevent such agricultural operations as will provide revenue to the Spanish Government.

13. The native population is an agricultural one. The working people of the agricultural class have never handled much money. They have lived directly from the soil and have been, in the main, content with a mere living. They have never been resourceful. When the Cubans stopped the grinding of cane and made depredations on plantations, generally burning the buildings and gathering subsistence therefrom, and enticing or forcing the men into their ranks, they took the first step in producing the misery which has followed.

14. The deplorable work begun by the insurgents was continued by General Weyler and advanced by him beyond the bounds of recognized warfare and the common sentiment of humanity. The reconcentrados without support from the Spanish Government, at least without due support, were confined to the towns and to the “zones of cultivation” entirely inadequate to support them. It is even said that much of the ground thus conceded was given to Spanish soldiers or usurped by them. The statement is not without weight when compared with the declarations as to the nonpayment of Spanish troops and to the issuance to them of inadequate rations.

15. The next consideration is the increase of pay given to the Spanish officers in the field in Cuba. They receive two and a half times the pay given them when serving in Spain. This would make it to the advantage of officers to adopt lingering methods of warfare, human nature being weak.

16. Another condition of affairs, if true, would tend toward a continuance of the present sufferings. It is in the very air here that there is corruption throughout the administration of the army, extending down to the captains of companies, who are intrusted with the distribution of rations to the men. Of this I know nothing and feel myself in nowise fitted to judge. There is nothing on the surface of affairs known to me to prove it nor anything in the appearance of the gentlemanlike body of the Spanish officers to suggest it. I suggest it simply because common notoriety deals with it.

17. The foregoing chain of conditions could only lead to poverty and destitution when involving a purely agricultural population. It is not surprising, therefore, that no account from any source places the number of deaths among the reconcentrados at less than 200,000. I can see no immediate prospect of relief from the horrible suffering.

18. The storekeeping class throughout the island is almost wholly Spanish. So are the workmen in the industrial trades. The Cubans, as a people, live directly from the soil. They have lost their homes through destruction by one side or another in this strife. They have sacrificed every possession that could be converted into money whereby to provide food.

19. This agricultural population has always subsisted chiefly on vegetables as a food, especially on sweet potatoes or yams, and on sweets rather than on meats. It is not a hardy population. The average Cuban has not nearly the stamina of the average Spaniard. An agricultural Cuban with the seed and implements in hand can raise a crop of one species of yams or potatoes in forty days and of another species in sixty days at any season of the year.

20. It appears that this is the best that could be done if they were allowed to resume their occupations without molestation from either Spaniards or Cubans, but with a continuance of rigorous surveillance on both sides and with charity inadequate to cope with the situation it is believed that the number of deaths will continue to be large. The insurgents show no disposition to allow the sugar estates to continue their operations, excepting under tribute. In cases where the Spaniards allow the operations to go on, the owner of the estate must pay a large number of Spanish soldiers to guarantee protection against the insurgents.

* * * * * * * *

22. Autonomy appears to be truly acceptable only to Spaniards who have raised families in Cuba and whose lives and business are linked with the island. The insurgents demand independence, and the Spaniards who are in Cuba to make money, and in the expectation of returning to Spain, are irreconcilably in favor of the old order of things. At Habana there is a dread of what may happen in the event that General Blanco returns to Habana without having accomplished the object of his eastern tour. It is reported to-day that there are slight indications on the streets of growing ill temper among the people.

23. It is difficult for an American to predict the working of a Spanish mind. The points of view of the two people are widely separated, but we have in the island on one side the local Spaniards refusing to be ruled by Cubans, and on the other side the Cubans refusing to be ruled by the Spaniards. There is an intensely strong feeling on both sides. The Spaniards believe themselves to be the superior people. It is not improbable, therefore, that as a last resort Spain would consent to sell the island to the United States, as affording the best prospect for the Spanish people in the island. It is more than probable that the educated class of Cubans would readily fall in with such a policy.

24. The question of annexation has never been seriously presented to the American people, but should it come up, it could be a strong argument to Spain to point out that she could retire with honor in her present financial condition, by assuring to Spaniards in Cuba the benefit of good government with the United States. This argument would not have prevailed a short time ago, but matters are now approaching a crisis in Cuba. The one question that no one can answer with any certainty is, What will follow the failure of autonomy? Beyond asserting that there will be a change of ministry in Spain, no one will pretend to give an answer.

* * * * * * *

Very respectfully,

C. D. Sigsbee
Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Maine.