Mr. Woodford to the President.
Madrid, February 26, 1898.
Dear Mr. President: I had an interview yesterday with Messrs. Gullon and Moret at Mr. Gullon’s house. It was then arranged that the Ruiz case should be adjusted, without further official correspondence and in friendly manner, between Mr. Polo de Bernabé, the new Spanish minister, and Judge Day at Washington. The minister leaves to-night via Gibraltar and should reach Washington by March 10. This arrangement is what Judge Day suggested might be desirable before I left Washington, and is according to the instruction of [the] [Page 665] State Department No. 125, dated February 8. I have telegraphed Secretary Sherman.
As the suggested commercial treaties and the Ruiz matter will be settled at Washington, I think that I have now secured the practical adjustment of every important matter that has been committed to me up to date.
Autonomy cannot go backward. It must go forward and its results must be worked out in Cuba. There is the storm center.
The four essentially important things about yesterday’s interview with Messrs. Gullon and Moret are these:
- I.
- They have now decided to work in harmony together and Mr. Gullon will help Mr. Moret actively in the matter of the commercial treaties.
- II.
- I had good opportunity to press on them, as I had already urged upon the Queen, my belief that the Cubans got most of their supplies from points outside the United States. They admitted that our patrol of our coasts is now very efficient and that recent supplies had gone from Belgium, Jamaica, etc.
- III.
- As hitherto reported, they can not go further in open concessions to us without being overthrown by their own people here in Spain. This is what made it difficult to get prompt and satisfactory settlement of the De Lôme matter, and induced them to accept his resignation before permitting me to have an interview. I got Judge Day’s telegram on the morning of the 10th, and within an hour had this telegram translated and was in telephonic communication with Gullon’s office. He would not see me until the afternoon. The council of ministers (which is usually held late in the afternoon) was called at 11 o’clock this morning, and he did not see me until 4 in the afternoon. It is evident that they heard from De Lôme on the 9th.
- IV.
- They want peace if they can keep peace and save the dynasty. They prefer the chances of war, with the certain loss of Cuba, to the overthrow of the dynasty. They know that we want peace if we can get such justice for Cuba and such protection of American interests as will make peace permanent and prevent this old Cuban question from continual resurrection. I told them positively that I regarded the Spanish note of February 1 as a serious mistake; that I should advise all possible delay in answering it; and that whether our answer should be pleasant or disagreeable must depend entirely on practical results in Cuba.
While I do not think that they can make any more direct concessions to us and retain their power here, I do begin to see possible ways by which they can make further concessions to Cuba through the insular Cuban government and so, possibly, avert war. * * *
Faithfully yours,