Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford.

No. 72.]

Sir: Your telegram dated October 26, conveyed to me a very full and clear summary of the reply of the Government of Spain to the representations which my instructions of the 16th July last directed you to make to it concerning the situation in the island, of Cuba, the relation of this country and Government thereto, the views of this Administration touching the policy necessary to be followed in that regard, and the earnest desire of the United States to render effective assistance toward a speedy, just, and honorable termination of the devastating war.

While a detailed and formal reply to the note so addressed to you on October 23 by His Excellency Don Pio Gullon, the new minister of state, naturally demanded that extended consideration due to its importance which could only be given with the full text thereof in view, your summary of its purport afforded a sufficient basis for the provisional response which I telegraphed to you on the 6th instant, supplementing your own acknowledgment as reported in your cable dispatch of November 1. I therein took pleasure in saying that this Government discerned in the Spanish reply hopeful indication of a change in the policy of Spain toward the Cuban situation; that the scope and effect of the reforms to be decreed, which it appeared were to be supplemented in all the most important particulars by enactments of the Cortes, remained to be seen; that as evidence of sincerity in the direction of reforms an immediate alteration in the treatment of noncombatant Cubans would be an effective guarantee; that the pledge of Spain to conduct the war henceforth humanely involved no change dependent upon legislation or decree, and that the recent substitution of commanders in the island admitted of the instant abandonment of the policy of depopulation, concentration, and destruction that had brought death and suffering to the innocent and aroused the sentiment of humanity throughout the world.

Within a few days past I have received the text of Señor Gullon’s note of October 23, as well as the remarkable and earnest declarations of the principles and purposes of the Liberal party now in power as contained in the manifesto issued by its honored chief, Señor Sagasta, on the 24th of last June, to which Señor Gullon appeals in evidence of the [Page 604] consistent and sincere purpose of reform which animates the new government of Spain. At the same time the most encouraging signs come to me, alike from the Peninsula, from Cuba, and from the honored representative of Spain at this capital, of the singleness and earnestness of purpose wherewith the home Government and its responsible agents in Cuba are laboring to bring about an instant change in the order of things in that island which has so long distressed this Government and the generous and sympathetic people of the United States. From the ground of abstract policy and announced programme the declared purposes of the enlightened men to whom the destinies of Spain have been confided are passing to the domain of realization. Therefore, in responding to the Spanish note, it behooves me to regard the questions it involves, not merely in the light of assertion and argument, but in the presence of attendant facts, in order that I may render due justice to the sentiments and course of Spain in this conjuncture.

The reply of Señor Gullon deals not directly with my instruction to you of the 16th of July last, but with the purport thereof as communicated by you to the late minister of state, the Duke of Tetuan, at San Sebastian, first in oral conference and later by your note of September 23, in which you textually embodied the material parts of my instruction. That you have well performed your task, that in your conferences with the representatives of the Spanish Crown you have wisely dwelt upon the truly elevated purposes of friendliness toward Spain and the sovereign instincts of humanity that prompted the utterances of this Government, is evident from the frank reception accorded to your communications, as shown by the reply now before me. The President, conscious of the responsible mission which a great free people has imposed upon him, and of the moral obligations he has assumed before his countrymen and before the world to follow only the paths of rectitude and justice in directing the relations of our State with its fellows, charges you to reaffirm, if need be, on any fitting occasion, his earnest declaration of desire for peace and good will between the United States and Spain.

It is gratifying to note that the Spanish Government appreciates at its just value the vital interest this Government and people have and feel in the prompt cessation of the Cuban struggle which, as his excellency observes, although it be for Spain more painful and costly than for any other State, is also of importance and prejudicial to the American nation alike, because the disasters of such a civil strife are so nearly felt and because of the losses occasioned to our commerce, our industries, and the property of our citizens by an indefinite continuance of a contest of this character. It is to be remembered that the instructions under which you acted were penned while the destinies of Spain and Cuba were controlled by a Government which, during nearly two years and a half, had been engaged in the fruitless endeavor to reduce the revolted Cubans to subjection by sheer force of arms, not by the legitimate resorts of war as it is understood in our day, or indeed by the means defined by all publicists since international law sprang into being, but by methods destructive to every rational interest of Spain and Cuba and injurious to every association that links both to the outside world. Its aim appears to be, not the conservation of the fairest dependency of Spain under conditions of contentment and prosperity, but to conquer the peace of the desert and the tomb.

[Page 605]

It behooved me then to rest the case of the United States, not alone upon the sentiments of humanity, but upon the material considerations importing irremediable injury to paramount national interests, should that disastrous state continue, considerations which as history shows have constrained the suffering on-lookers to mediation, and even intervention, when longer forbearance has ceased to be a virtue. Our action rested no less upon moral right than upon the all-controlling sentiment of humanity. Our forbearance was testified by thus approaching anew the same Peninsular Government which had repelled our kindly overtures in the past. Our repeated offer was, indeed, tendered to that Government on the eve of its quitting power, and even then it was fervently hoped that it might be heeded in the spirit of sincere friendship which prompted it, and might gain in weight and acceptability by the circumstances that an added year of war in Cuba had demonstrated the futility of the policy theretofore decreed by the Spanish Government, and that it was proffered by a new Administration which had taken office in this country under conditions imposing upon the Executive the onerous responsibility of adopting a definite policy toward Spain and toward the Cuban war.

It is a gratifying augury that the consideration of our fresh proposals should have fallen to a government which by its liberal antecedents, its views and convictions in regard to the conduct of the war formed while in opposition to the late Administration, and its uttered pledges of amelioration and reform in the mutual interest of Cuba and of Spain, was so well fitted to understand the true motives of our conduct and the earnestly impartial friendliness that prompted our course. Under such circumstances it was not for a moment apprehended that the just grounds of our representations to Spain would be misconstrued or controverted. The record of the Liberal party and the stand taken by its leaders, with the indorsement of its rank and file, were an assurance that such would not be the case. The event has justified the accuracy and wisdom of our forecast.

This Government, on the other hand, appreciates to the full the embarrassments which must necessarily surround an administration new to office, assuming the complex functions of government at an hour of grave national peril, inheriting from its predecessor the disastrous legacy of an internal conflict, the conditions of which had been acerbated by the harsh and futile conduct of the war hitherto. It understands that the reversal of all that has been done is no sudden growth, to spring up in a single night; that the fair structure of a just and prosperous peace for Cuba is to be raised with thoughtful care and untiring devotion, if Spain is to succeed in the accomplishment of the tremendous task upon which she has entered. It comprehends that the plan, however broadly outlined, must be wrought out in progressive detail; that upon assured foundations, upon the rock of equity and not upon the shifting sands of selfish interest, must be builded, stone by stone, the enduring fabric of regenerated Cuba. It sees this broadly outlined plan in the declarations of the present Spanish note which announces that, in fulfillment of the resolute purpose to draw closer, with ties of true affection, the bonds which unite the mother-land with its provinces beyond the seas, it is determined to put into immediate practice the political system sketched by the present president of the council of ministers in his manifesto of June 24; that this involves joining to military operations, uninterrupted, energetic, and [Page 606] active as circumstances may demand, but ever humanitarian and careful to respect all private rights as far as may be possible, political action frankly leading to the autonomy of the colony in such wise that under the guaranty of Spain shall arise the new administrative entity which is to govern itself in all affairs peculiar to itself by means of an insular council and parliament; that such institution of true self-government shall give to the Cubans their own local government, whereby they shall be at one and the same time the initiators and regulators of their own life while remaining within the integral nationality of Spain, and that to realize these ends of peace with liberty and self-government the mother country will not fail to lend, in due season, the moral and material means in aid of the Antillean provinces by cooperating toward the reestablishment of property, the development of the island’s inexhaustible sources of wealth, and by specially promoting public works and material interests which shall bring prosperity in the train of restored peace.

In taking this advanced position, the Government of Spain has entered upon a pathway from which no backward step is possible. Its scope and magnitude may not be limited by the necessarily general and comprehensive character of the formula whereby it is announced. The outcome must be complete and lasting if the effort now put forth is to be crowned with full success, and if the love and veneration of an ever-faithful and happy people is to reward the sacrifices and endeavors of Spain. No less is due to Cuba, no less is possible for Spain herself.

The first acts of the new Government of Spain lie in the laudable paths it has laid out for its own guidance. The policy of devastation and extermination that has so long shocked the universal sentiment of humanity has already been signally reversed, and I am informed by the Spanish minister in this capital of the measures proclaimed by the new commander in chief of the Spanish arms in Cuba, whereby immediate relief is to be extended to the unhappy reconcentrados, fresh zones of cultivation are to be opened to them, employment upon the estates permitted, transportation furnished them, and protective boards at once organized for their succor and care.

I am likewise advised that by a recent decree of the Governor-General the resumption of agricultural operations and the harvesting of crops shall be promoted and efficiently protected by all possible means, civil as well as military. I learn that the grinding of cane and the renewal of industrial operations in the interior districts is to be encouraged, especially in respect to those impoverished estates which, through the destruction of crops, the prohibition of labor, the deportation of their tenants, the withdrawal of military protection, and the enforced cessation of their revenues, have incurred increasing arrears of taxation. I hear, with profound gratification, that the new commander has proffered broad amnesty to participants in the insurrection, and that the scope of this clemency is to be even further enlarged to cover those convicted of political offenses. It is reported by you that within a few days the Madrid Government will promulgate a scheme of home rule for Cuba. Being necessarily in ignorance of the details proposed, I await the outcome with encouragement and hope, although, of course, unable to commit this Government in advance to the plan itself, the scope and effects of which remain to be learned.

In these things I cheerfully realize that the new Government of Spain has already given, in the first few weeks of its existence, earnest of the [Page 607] sincerity of its professions and evidence of its conviction that past methods are and must needs be futile to force a peace by subjugation without concessions adequate to remedy admitted evils, and that such methods must inevitably fail to win for Spain the fidelity of a contented people. With such convictions unhesitatingly expressed, and with such a herculean task before her so humanely and so auspiciously begun, Spain may reasonably look to the United States to maintain an attitude of benevolent expectancy until the near future shall have shown whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to American interests, so intimately bound up in the welfare of the island, is realizable. It is the sincere hope and desire of the President that such a condition of lasting benefit to all concerned may soon be brought about. He would most gladly share in the belief expressed in the liberal manifesto of June 24th that the speedy and energetic application of the principles and governmental measures therein advocated will be powerful to stay the course of the evils that have afflicted Spain and to bring her near to the pacification of her colonies.

Having made these declarations touching the proclaimed policy of the Liberal party toward Cuba and the measures already adopted and to be forthwith devised to render that policy effective, the minister of state takes up that part of your note of September 23 which states that the President feels it his duty to make the strongest possible effort to contribute effectively toward peace, and his excellency remarks that your note makes no suggestion of the means of which the President might avail himself to attain that end, besides noting your silence as to the important measures on several occasions indicated by the Spanish Government. Your omission to treat of these points is sufficiently explained in your concluding statements that the President has no desire to embarrass that Government by formulating precise proposals as to the manner in which the assistance of the United States can be effectively rendered, and that all that is asked or expected is that some safe way may be provided for action which the United States may undertake, with justice and self-respect, so that the settlement shall be a lasting one, honorable and advantageous to Cuba and equitable to the United States, to which ends this Government offers its most kindly offices. For the realization of this friendly offer you invited an early statement of some proposal under which this tender of good offices may become effective, or, in lieu thereof, satisfactory assurances that peace in Cuba will, by the efforts of Spain, be promptly secured.

The assurances tendered on behalf of the Liberal Government of Spain lie in the line of this latter alternative. His excellency’s note is silent as to the manner and form in which the Government of the United States might exert good offices. His excellency limits himself to suggesting coincident but separate action by the two Governments, each in its domestic sphere, whereby, as he says:

Spain shall continue to put forth armed efforts, at the same time decreeing the political concessions which she may deem prudent and adequate, while the United States exerts within its borders the energy and vigilance necessary to absolutely prevent the procurement of the resources of which from the beginning the Cuban insurrection has availed itself as from an inexhaustible arsenal.

And thereupon his excellency proceeds to discuss at some length the supposed shortcomings of the United States as to the manner of fulfilling [Page 608] the neutrality laws in the territory of the Union and as to the scope and sufficiency of those laws.

This labored arraignment could scarcely fail to be received with mingled pain and sorrow by a Government which, like ours, inspired by the highest sense of friendly duty, has for the last two years and more endured almost insupportable domestic burdens, poured forth its treasure by millons, and employed its armed resources for the full enforcement of its laws and for the prevention and repression of attempted or actual violation thereof by persons within its jurisdiction. The Spanish reply appears to be unaware or heedless of the magnitude of the task which this Government has performed and is still performing with the single purpose of doing its whole duty in the premises. To give a proof of this I need but cite the work of our Navy toward the enforcement of the municipal obligations of neutrality. Since June, 1895, our ships of war have without intermission patrolled the Florida coast. At various times the Raleigh, Cincinnati, Amphitrite, Maine, Montgomery, Newark, Dolphin, Marblehead, Vesuvius, Wilmington, Helena, Nashville, Annapolis, and Detroit have been employed on this service.

Starting with one ship having Key West as its headquarters, the number on continuous duty was gradually increased to four, without counting additional service performed as special occasion demanded at other seaboard points. At the present time a vessel with headquarters at Pensacola patrols the coast from the northwest as far south as Tampa, another with headquarters at Key West patrols the coast from Tampa around to Miami on the east side, and a third with headquarters at Jacksonville patrols the Atlantic coast from Miami to Georgia. The action of these regularly stationed ships is at all times concerted. Their commanders are ordered to communicate directly with one another, with the United States district attorneys in Florida, with the custom-house officials in that State, and with the commanding officers of the several revenue cutters likewise on duty in that quarter. Acting upon the information thus received, they take such immediate action as they may deem advisable or necessary in order to prevent the violation of the neutrality laws.

In addition to this stated detail on the Florida coasts, vessels belonging to the North Atlantic Station have been sent at different times to the various Atlantic ports north of Georgia at the request of the Spanish minister and the Department of State or upon receipt of information from the Department of Justice or the Treasury Department concerning reported filibustering expeditions. Many hundreds of official letters and telegrams record the orders given to these vessels and the action had by their commanders. It may be asserted, in short, that every vessel of the Navy which could practically be employed in the shallow waters of the Florida coast has been detailed for this work, while for a time two revenue cutters were transferred to the Navy Department to assist, besides the efficient cooperation of the regularly stationed cutters under the orders of the Treasury Department.

No less degree of activity has marked the operations of the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice. Every means at lawful command have been employed by them in cooperation to enforce the laws of the United States. Alertness in every regard has been peremptorily enjoined upon all officials, high and low, and has been sedulously practiced by them.

[Page 609]

In the light of these undisputable facts, and with this honorable record spread before him, the President is constrained to the conviction that nothing can be more unwarrantable than the imputation of the Government of Spain that this Government has in any wise failed to faithfully observe and enforce its duties and obligations as a friendly nation. In this relation it may be proper, if not indeed imperative, to inquire what those obligations are.

It is to be borne in mind that Spain insists that a state of war does not exist between that Government and the people of Cuba; that it is engaged in suppressing domestic insurrection that does not give it the right, which it so strenuously denies itself, to insist that a third nation shall award to either party to the struggle the rights of a belligerent or exact from either party the obligations attaching to a condition of belligerency. It can not be denied that the United States Government, whenever there has been brought to its attention the fact or allegation that a suspected military expedition has been set on foot or is about to start from our territories in aid of the insurgents, has promptly used its civil, judicial, and naval forces in prevention and suppression thereof. So far has this extended and so efficient has the United States been in this regard that, acting upon information from the Spanish minister or from the various agencies in the employ of the Spanish legation, vessels have been seized and detained in some instances when investigation showed that they were engaged in a wholly innocent and legitimate traffic. By using its naval and revenue marine in repeated instances to suppress such expeditions, the United States has fulfilled every obligation of a friendly nation. Inasmuch as Spain does not concede, and never has conceded, that a state of war exists in Cuba, the rights and duties of the United States are such as devolve upon a friendly nation toward another in the case of an insurrection which does not arise to the dignity of recognized war.

As you are aware, these duties have been the subject of not infrequent diplomatic discussion between the two Governments, and of adjudications in the courts of the United States, as well during the previous ten years’ struggle as in the course of the present conflict. The position of the United States was very fully presented by Mr. Fish in his note of April 18, 1874, to Admiral Polo de Bernabe. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875; pp. 1178 et seq.)

What one power in such case may not knowingly permit to be done toward another power, without violating its international duties, is defined with sufficient accuracy in the statute of 1818, known as the neutrality law of the United States.

It may not consent to the enlistment within its territorial jurisdiction of naval and military forces intended for the service of the insurrection.

It may not knowingly permit the fitting out and arming or the increasing or augmenting the force of any ship or vessel within its territorial jurisdiction, with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of the insurrection.

It may not knowingly permit the setting on foot of military expeditions or enterprises to be carried on from its territory against the power with which the insurrection is contending.

Except in the single instance to be hereafter noticed, his excellency the minister of state does not undertake to point out any infraction of these tenets of international obligation so clearly stated by Mr. Fish. Did any further instance exist the attention of this Government would have been called to it.

[Page 610]

With equal clearness, Mr. Fish has stated in the same note the things which a friendly government may do and permit under the circumstances set forth.

But a friendly government violates no duty of good neighborhood in allowing the free sale of arms and munitions of war to all persons, to insurgents as well as to the regularly constituted authorities, and such arms and munitions, by whichever party purchased, may be carried in its vessels on the high seas without liability to question by any other party. In like manner its vessels may freely carry unarmed passengers, even though known to be insurgents, without thereby rendering the government which permits it liable to a charge of violating its international duties. But if such passengers, on the contrary, should be armed and proceed to the scene of the insurrection as an organized body, which might be capable of levying war, they constitute a hostile expedition which may not be knowingly permitted without a violation of international obligation.

Little can be added to this succinct statement of Mr. Fish. It has been repeatedly affirmed by decisions of our courts, notably by the Supreme Court of the United States. In the case of Wiborg v. The United States, 163 U. S. Reports, p. 632, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller repeats, with approval, the charge of the trial court, in which it is said (p. 653):

It was not a crime or offense against the United States under the neutrality laws of this country for individuals to leave the country with intent to enlist in foreign military service, nor was it an offense against the United States to transport persons out of this country and to land them in foreign countries, when such persons had an intent to enlist in foreign armies; that it was not an offense against the laws of the United States to transport arms, ammunition, and munitions of war from this country to any foreign country, whether they were to be used in war or not, and that it was not an offense against the laws of the United States to transport persons intending to enlist in foreign armies and munitions of war on the same trip. But (he said) that if the persons referred to had combined and organized in this country to go to Cuba and there make war on the Government, and intended when they reached Cuba to join the insurgent army and thus enlist in its service, and the arms were taken along for their use, that would constitute a military expedition, and the transporting of such a body from this country for such a purpose would be an offense against the statute.

These principles sufficiently define the neutral duties of the United States, which have been faithfully observed at great expense and with much care by this Government. If any such military expeditions have been knowingly permitted to depart, that fact is not called to the attention of this Government by the Spanish note. This Government is aware of none such.

The only instance of an alleged culpable expedition mentioned in the note of his excellency the minister of state—if indeed it may be termed a military expedition or enterprise within the prohibition of the statute—is that of the Silver Heels, which is described as having “left New York in spite of the previous notification of His Majesty’s legation at Washington and before the eyes of the Federal authorities.” This case was instantly investigated by the superior authority, even before any oral complaint in that regard had reached this Government from the Spanish legation. From the accompanying copies of the statements furnished to the Department of Justice by the United States marshal and his deputy you will perceive that this vessel would undoubtedly have been apprehended but for the officious control of the Spanish agents whose instructions were obeyed in the matter.

A large part of the reply of his excellency the minister of state is devoted to the discussion of a hypothetical change of attitude toward the combatants involving the recognition of their belligerency. As [Page 611] this Government, with the largest attainable knowledge of all facts and circumstances pertinent to the case, has not yet determined upon that course, I do not see that any useful purpose could be subserved by argument upon the stated premises. Neither do I discern the utility of discussing the circumstances under which a case might arise for considering and acting upon the thesis advanced by his excellency on the authority of the argument before the tribunal of Geneva that it is the duty of a nation to amend its laws if inadequate for the fulfillment of its international obligations of neutrality, or to offer any comment thereon further than to observe that the inadequacy of our neutrality laws is not admitted, nor is it proved by Spain in the light of the precedent to which appeal is had, inasmuch as the doctrine of Geneva was only applicable and applied to the case of a public war between recognized belligerents, a case which Spain does not concede to exist in the present instance.

Whatever just and humane measures may attain to a contented and recuperative peace in Cuba can not but win our admiration, and any progress toward its attainment can not but be benevolently viewed. In this path of kindly expectancy, and inspired now as always by the high purpose of fulfilling every rightful obligation of friendship, the United States proposes to persevere so long as the event shall invite and justify that course. I can not better close this instruction than by repeating and affirming the words with which you concluded your note of September 23, “that peace in Cuba is necessary to the welfare of the people of the United States, and that the only desire of my Government is for peace and for that sure prosperity which can only come with peace.”

Respectfully yours,

John Sherman.
[Inclosure.]

statement of john h. m’carthy, united states marshal, in re “silver heels” case.

On the 16th of October, 1897, about 3 o’clock p.m., a telegram was received from the Department of Justice notifying me of an intended “filibustering expedition to Cuba reported preparing to leave the port of New York,” upon receipt of which my deputy, Lewis L. Kennedy, consulted with the United States attorney, and upon his suggestion saw Mr. Thornhill, of the Pinkerton Detective Agency, who undertook, with the knowledge and on behalf of Dr. Congosto, Spanish consul at Philadelphia, to furnish me with information concerning the movements and purposes of the schooner. It was stated that the schooner probably would not move until night, as they were obliged to wait for a portion of the cargo to reach New York by the Bridgeport boat, and then be transferred to the schooner. It was further stated by Mr. Thornhill that they had reason to believe that the Silver Heels was to take an additional cargo and probably some men out at sea, and that her course in leaving New York would naturally be from Pier 39 through East River, Buttermilk Channel, and the Narrows.

At about 10.30 p.m. a warrant was placed in my hands for John Doe and Richard Roe, captain or master, and mate, respectively, of the schooner Silver Heels. My deputy stated to me that he had suggested proceeding at once to the schooner with a sufficient force of men and making the arrest, but that the consul and Mr. Thornhill had objected to that course on the ground that there would be no means of ascertaining the identity of the captain and mate, and that, as they said, the captain and mate would, in all probability, deny their identity and possibly represent some members of the crew as the officers of the schooner. I at once saw Mr. Thornhill and advised the course originally suggested, but as he and the consul urged so strongly that we make the arrest in midstream, where the identity of the officers in command [Page 612] must be apparent, and upon his undertaking to furnish me with information and keep me informed as to the movements of the schooner, I acceded to their request. My party, including myself and eleven deputies, proceeded at once to the revenue cutter Chandler, then lying at her berth at the Barge Office, where we were shortly joined by Mr. Thornhill and a party of perhaps half a dozen detectives from his office.

At my suggestion, my deputy, Kennedy, saw Mr. Thornhill in regard to obtaining some immediate information as to the movements of the schooner, and upon being positively assured upon that point we awaited word of her leaving. At about 12.45 word was received that the schooner had just left her dock and had headed downstream. The cutter started from her dock at once to meet the schooner, and, failing to do so, proceeded to a point opposite Pier 39, where no trace of the schooner could be seen. After steaming a short distance up the river, the cutter turned about and headed for the harbor via the Buttermilk Channel. Search was continued until abreast of Staten Island, when, upon a statement of Mr. Thornhill that he considered further search useless, and upon the assurance of the captain of the revenue cutter that the schooner could outsail the cutter, and as no vessel was in sight, and having no definite information that the vessel had gone in that direction, we returned, stopping on the way at the place where I was informed the steam tug Wise (which was reported to have the schooner in tow) is accustomed to dock. The Wise was not there at the time. This was about 3 a.m. From there we proceeded up the East River again to Pier 39. After ineffectual efforts to obtain information as to the arrival and departure of the schooner Silver Heels, and upon the statement of Mr. Thornhill that further search was useless, we returned to the Barge Office, arriving there about 4 a.m.

statement of deputy lewis l. kennedy.

At about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of October 16 a telegram was received at the marshal’s office notifying me of the reported information of a filibustering expedition to Cuba preparing to leave the port of New York, and requesting me to consult with the district attorney and the collector. I saw the district attorney, and he advised me to go down and see Pinkerton. He had received a telegram to substantially the same effect at about the same time. I went down and saw the Pinkertons, who were the recognized agents of the Spanish Government and acting under the direction of the consul. I found the superintendent or assistant superintendent, Mr. Thornhill, who was at that time speaking with Dr. Congosto, the Spanish consul from Philadelphia. Mr. Thornhill stated that he had an appointment with the collector of the port at about 3.30, I believe, in relation to that business, the Silver Heels, and from there he was going to the office of the counsel for the Spanish consul, and he would come directly up to my office and see the marshal and district attorney, and we could then make such arrangements as were proper.

Dr. Congosto was introduced to me as Spanish consul at Philadelphia. I offered to see Mr. Arthur Baldasano y Topete, Spanish consul at New York, in order to find out if he had any suggestions to make in the matter; but Mr. Thornhill and Dr. Congosto said there was no use in doing that, for he did not figure in the matter. Upon Mr. Thornhill’s assurance that he would see the collector and the counsel for the Spanish consul and report as soon as practicable, or within an hour, to the United States attorney, I left them. Mr. Thornhill reported to the United States attorney about as he had promised, and I saw him and heard from him by telephone several times during the course of the afternoon and evening. Nothing definite was done until about 10.30 p.m., when Mr. Thornhill and Dr. Congosto and a gentleman who, I understand, was from the office of the counsel for the Spanish consul came to the United States attorney and swore to a complaint, upon which a warrant was issued by Commissioner Shields directing the marshal to arrest John Doe and Richard Roe, captain or master and mate, respectively, of the schooner Silver Heels. I did not know their real names and had no means of ascertaining them.

Upon the receipt of the warrant I suggested to the Spanish consul and to Mr. Thornhill that I proceed at once by land with a sufficient force of men to the dock where the vessel lay—Pier 39, East River—and that one or two from the party of officers board the vessel and ascertain who the captain and mate were and arrest them and bring them before the commissioner. The consul and Mr. Thornhill opposed this suggestion strenuously, on the ground that such an action would defeat the purpose for which the warrant was issued. They stated that they had reason to believe that the captain and mate would deny their identity, and that we could not make the required arrest; that they believed they would give us the names of one or two of the members of the crew as captain and mate. They were so urgent in this respect that we yielded. The consul and the superintendent, Mr. Thornhill, undertook to [Page 613] give us all the information upon which we were to act. They said that the revenue cutter Chandler was then being held in readiness at the Barge Office, under steam, awaiting our arrival. We immediately went down to the cutter, taking twelve men, including myself and the United States marshal. Upon reaching the boat, Mr. Thornhill would not consider the proposition to steam up the river and board the schooner from the cutter, which was made to him, he stating that it could not be done for same reason that it was not practicable to go by land, and, further, from the fact that as soon as the revenue cutter got in sight of the schooner that she would know what she was there for, because the cutter was so well known that her purpose could hardly be mistaken.

At the suggestion of the consul our purpose was to steam out into the stream and intercept the Silver Heels before she reached Governors Island, and upon inquiry of Mr. Thornhill as to his facilities for communication between the schooner and the cutter, he informed me that he was in immediate communication. He told me he had three or four of his men covering the schooner, as he called it, and three telephones in the immediate vicinity of the schooner, some one of which, as he stated, must be available at the time the schooner moved. His men were to telephone him direct the first move the schooner made. He said the schooner could not make a move without his knowing it. Shortly after our reaching the cutter, the Spanish consul, Dr. Congosto, came aboard and stayed there for some time, and after a stay of perhaps half an hour, left the cutter. After waiting aboard the cutter for some time we asked Mr. Thornhill again if he was in immediate communication with the schooner. He said yes, he was, and that the schooner could not make a move without his knowing it at once. He said: “We can not afford to have any mistake about it, for it means a great deal to us. My plans are complete for following every move” (or words to that effect).

At about 12.45 a.m. Mr. Thornhill, who had been on the pier alongside the cutter for a few moments, came aboard again with the statement that he had just received word that the schooner had left. We immediately left the dock, and while steaming out into the stream to intercept the schooner he told me that a messenger had just come down from the office, which is at 57 Broadway (the office of the Pinker-ton Detective Agency), and distant perhaps one-third or one-half a mile from the dock where the cutter was; he said also that one of the men who had been watching the schooner had telephoned the office and the messenger had come down to the cutter from there. The cutter immediately steamed out, and failing to see the schooner, steamed up the river toward pier 39. On reaching there, we found no traces of her, and after proceeding a distance beyond the pier, we turned back and headed down, searching the piers on the way. The cutter then went through Buttermilk Channel, which I was informed by Mr. Thornhill was the course the schooner proposed taking. Seeing nothing of the vessel, we proceeded down the bay as far, it was stated, as Bay Ridge, Long Island, and the captain of the cutter stated that with the wind and tide and the then favorable conditions the schooner could make 12 knots an hour to the cutter’s 8, and the schooner under those conditions was independent of the tug and could sail faster without than with it.

I omitted to state that the schooner was supposed to be in tow of the tug P. H. Wise. After a thorough search of the harbor, and upon the advice of Mr. Thornhill, and his statement that he considered it useless to go farther, we returned to New York, stopping on the way back at the Brooklyn side near the Erie Basin, and ascertained from a couple of our men that the Wise was not then at her accustomed berth. From Brooklyn we proceeded once more to pier 39, at which place no definite information as to the schooner could be had, the watchman on one pier stating that a schooner had left there some time in the evening and headed up toward Hell Gate. We then proceeded to the barge office, where we arrived at about 4 a.m.