Señor Romero to Mr. Sherman.
Washington, December 18, 1897.
Mr. Secretary: I have had the honor to receive your note, No. 302, bearing date of yesterday, in reply to mine of the 15th ultimo, in which I made certain observations in relation to your note, No. 295, of the 13th ultimo, in which you declined to grant the extradition of Jesus Guerra, for which the Mexican Government had applied.
In the state which this case has now reached, there is nothing for me to do but to send a copy of your note to my Government, in order that, in view thereof, it may reach such decision as it thinks proper.
[Page 508]I do not think, nevertheless, that I should allow this occasion to pass without stating that, in my opinion, it can not be doubted that when the Hon. Richard Olney, your immediate predecessor, granted, by his notes to this legation, Nos. 137 and 138, of July 9, 1896, the extradition of Inez Ruiz and Juan Duque, who were guilty of the same crimes with which Jesus Guerra is charged, he admitted that the attack on San Ignacio was not a crime of a merely political character, and that consequently those who took part in it were not exempted from extradition by the treaty of December 11, 1861. As his predecessor, the Hon. Walter Q. Gresham, had decided this point in his note of May 13, 1893, in the sense that that attack was not of a merely political character, Mr. Olney did not need to examine the same question, and would have needed to do so only in case he had thought it necessary to revoke the decision of his predecessor, and for that reason he did not enter into special considerations with respect to the attack, but confined himself to issuing a warrant for the surrender of the accused persons, whereby he undoubtedly admitted that the crime with which they were charged was not of a purely political charater.
I understand that the Department of State observes the wise system of maintaining the decisions reached by the Secretaries who have been at its head, and of not revoking them unless new incidents arise or fresh evidence is obtained of a nature so clear and conclusive that if they had been considered by the Secretary who reached the decision concerned, they would have led him to form a decision at variance with that which he did form. In view of this circumstance the Government of Mexico hoped that the decision reached by Mr. Gresham, and upheld by Mr. Olney, would be considered valid in the case of Jesus Guerra, since no evidence or incidents have arisen of such a nature as to change the character of the attack on San Ignacio, which has been considered by your predecessors as not having been a purely political offense.
Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, pronounced March 14, 1896, in the habeas corpus case of Ines Ruiz, Jesus Guerra, and Juan Duque, I must say that I clearly understand that the point which was submitted to it on appeal was to decide concerning the validity or invalidity of the decision which granted a writ of habeas corpus to the accused persons, and which revoked the decision granting their surrender, which had been pronounced by the United States commissioner at San Antonio, and that it was not to determine whether the crime with which they were charged was or was not of a purely political character; nevertheless the statement contained in the extract from that decision which I inserted in my note of November 15, last, in which it is positively stated that the attack on San Ignacio was not of a purely political character, is, in my opinion, not without force, and is entitled to high respect. I frequently see quoted, in decisions pronounced by the courts of this country, declarations made in the “whereases,” and not in the resolutory part of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is a generally recognized principle that those who are guilty of political crimes are not subject to extradition, and the citations contained in your note on this point refer to really political crimes, even though, in case of crimes of this nature, common crimes are incidentally committed; but when, in order to conceal common crimes, political pretexts are invoked, the case is different, and for the very purpose of authorizing the extradition of persons charged with these latter crimes, the provision was Inserted in the extradition treaty [Page 509] signed in the City of Mexico December 11, 1861, between Mexico and the United States, that persons guilty of purely political crimes were not subject to extradition, which, in the opinion of the Government of Mexico, means that when a crime is of a common character, and, in order to conceal it, the attempt is made to make it appear to be a political crime, as in the present case, it is considered as a crime which renders its perpetrator subject to extradition. The treaty signed between the United States and France, November 9, 1843, is the only one containing a clause similar to that of the treaty with Mexico, and the one signed with Belgium April 30, 1874, authorizes the extradition of persons guilty of certain common crimes connected with others of a purely political character. The circumstances that Mexico and the United States are neighbors renders special stipulations necessary with regard to extradition, still more ample than those contained in the treaty with Belgium.
Accept, etc.,