Mr. Gage to Mr. Day.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d ultimo, inclosing a translation of a note, dated the 9th ultimo, from the French ambassador, in relation to the reciprocity treaty with France negotiated under section 3 of the act of July 24, 1897.

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You state that a question has arisen as to whether “cordials” were intended by the reciprocity agreement of May 28, 1898, to be included in the clause prescribing the rate of duty on “brandies or other spirits manufactured or distilled from grain or other materials.” The French ambassador contends that “cordials” were and are comprehended in the clause in question.

The French ambassador admits the distinction made in the two paragraphs of the tariff act between “brandy and other spirits,” on the one hand, and “cordials” on the other; but claims that this distinction “disappears” in section 3 of said act as a result of the omission from that section of the words “and not specially provided for,” as used in paragraph 289. There is a further difference of opinion as to certain estimates of duty considered in the negotiations.

Since the receipt of your letter the Department has accorded a hearing to the secretary of the French embassy, at which time the subject was fully discussed, and the most careful consideration has been given to the views of the ambassador.

Section 1 of the tariff act requires that the rates of duty prescribed in the schedules and paragraphs of said act shall be levied, collected, and paid upon ail imported articles mentioned therein, unless they are otherwise specially provided for in said act. Paragraph 289 imposes duty at the rate of $2.25 per proof gallon on “brandy and other spirits manufactured or distilled from grain or other materials, and not specially provided for in this act.” Section 3 reduces the rate to $1.75 on “brandies and other spirits manufactured or distilled from grain or other materials.” The treaty provides that the rate shall be $1.75 “on brandies or other spirits manufactured or distilled from grain or other materials.” This provision of the treaty is identical with that in section 3, and differs from paragraph 289 only in the substitution of the word “or” for “and” after brandy. There can, therefore, be no question as to the suspension of the operation of paragraph 289 with respect to merchandise therein named imported from France during the continuance of the treaty; but there the suspension stops. The treaty does not affect paragraph 292. The articles therein enumerated are not “otherwise specially provided for,” within the meaning of section 1. Duty must, therefore, be imposed on such articles at the rate prescribed in said paragraph 292.

The omission of the words “and not otherwise provided for” from section 3, and from the treaty, does not enlarge the scope of the brandy clause of the treaty. Even if those words did not remain in paragraph 289, and equivalent words were not in section 1, cordials, liqueurs, etc., would still be subject to duty at the general rate by reason of their specific designation in paragraph 292. This is not a new construction. The courts have repeatedly held that where Congress has designated an article by a specific name, and imposed a duty upon it, general terms in the same act, though sufficiently broad to comprehend such article, are not applicable to it. The following are some of the cases in which this principle has been enunciated by the Supreme Court: Homer v. Collector, 1 Wall., 486; Movius v. Arthur, 95 U. S., 144; Arthur Stephani, 96 id., 125; Arthur v. Rheims, id., 143; Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 id., 482; Robertson v. Glendenning, 132 id., 158; Am. N and T. v. Worthington, 141 id., 468; Bogle v. Magone, 152 id., 623. In Arthur v. Rheims the court said:

The general words of the act of 1872, no doubt, are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the case before us. Artificial flowers are a manufacture of which cotton is the chief component, and, were that all, would be entitled to the deduction asked for. But it is true, also, that they are dutiable under the law of 1864, not as a manufacture [Page 304] of cotton, but specifically, co nomine, as artificial flowers. It has been held in many cases, as that of almonds and dried fruits, the canary birds, and at the present term in the case of thread laces and of chocolate, that when an article is intended to be made dutiable by its specific designation it will not be affected by the general words of the same or another statute which would otherwise embrace it. This rule applies both to statutes reducing and to statutes increasing duties. Giving it such application here, we must hold that artificial flowers are not entitled to be classed as a manufacture of cotton, which is entitled to the reduction provided for by the act of 1872.

However desirous this Department might be of concurring in the opinion of the French ambassador, it could not, in view of the foregoing considerations, decide otherwise than that the articles specified in paragraph 292 of the tariff act are not included in the provision for brandy or other spirits in the treaty in question.

Respectfully, yours,

L. J. Gage, Secretary.