No. 447.
Mr. Lowell to Mr. Evarts.

No. 192.]

Sir: I have the honor to inclose a copy and translation of so much, (about half) of a dispatch of General Martinez Campos, to the prime minister, as relates to the civil and diplomatic part of the pacification of Cuba which he accomplished. It was presented to the Cortes during their recent short session, mainly devoted to a discussion of the speech from the throne. It has an historical interest of its own, but beyond this is of value as illustrating the character of a man who is now, and perhaps for some time will be, at the head of affairs in Spain. The style is sometimes almost as intricately confused as in one of Cromwell’s speeches, but good sense, good feeling, and honest purpose are conspicuous throughout.

The position of General Martinez Campos when he became prime minister, was very analogous to that of General Grant, when he first became President. In Cuba he had been to all intents and purposes absolute, and found it easy without in any way compromising himself, while it made him popular, to concede theoretical reforms, the responsibility of realizing which would fall on the government at home. Coming into power with no knowledge of civil affairs or of administrative details, he found himself surrounded by men grown gray in the profession of politics, who raise objections and create difficulties, and who would be very glad to help him on the way to ruin if they found him too self-willed to be their tool, or too honest to be their accomplice.

Professedly, the new cabinet is of the same party and carrying out the same policy with that which it in part displaced. Senor Cánovas del Castillo supported it during the late Cortes in a very able speech, but there are said to be profound divergences of opinion, and even personal animosities, between the former and present official leaders of the Liberal-Conservative party. The divergence is said to be especially great concerning the reforms necessary in the island of Cuba. There is every reason to believe that the present prime minister is sincere in his opinions on this question, and resolved to carry them out in practice. This he perhaps cannot do with the existing Cortes, the members of which were returned in the interest of the former administration.

It remains to be seen whether the Martinez Campos cabinet, after the changes which the new minister of the interior is making in the provincial governors, who practically decide most of the elections, will have strength and courage enough to dissolve the Cortes, should they prove unmanageable, and appeal to the country. In any event the Cuban [Page 944] question will be the important one of the next session. Should General Martinez Campos prevail in carrying out his views it will give him great strength, and he has personal qualities which might insure him a long tenure of office and of propularity.

* * * * * * *

I have, &c.,

J. R. LOWELL.
[Inclosure in No. 192.—Translation.]

Extract from La Politico, of July 18 and 19, 1879.

Most Excellent Sir: Although I informed your excellency by telegram of the terms I had indicated to the president-elect of the Cuban revolution, Don Vicente Garcia, I feel bound to set forth to your excellency in greater detail this affair, in which if I have won the approbation of the government of His Majesty, it has been owing to the deferent attention, and never enough to be appreciated confidence, which they have shown to me.

Finding myself on the 18th of December in the Sierra Maestra of Cuba, inspecting the encampments there, which have been so fatal to the fourth brigade of that division, on account of its hygienic conditions, I received a telegram from General D. Manuel Cassola, in which he informed me that the prisoner D. Esteban Duque de Estrada, some time ago liberated, had manifested to him the desire of some important leaders, and some members of the congress, to enter into negotiations with a view to peace.

Although at some distance from Cuba, I embarked that very night for Santa Cruz in order to speak with Estrada, to communicate with Cassola, to decide on the spot and for myself what would be proper.

I have reported to your excellency the doings of Mr. Pope in the month of May, the distrust with which he inspired me, and my persuasion that he was an unprincipled adventurer. In spite of this I permitted him to go to the enemy’s camp, because I was confident that with all his untrustworthiness, he would serve to open for us a way to relations which, if leading to nothing immediately, would bear fruit later. I was not mistaken in my reckoning; those unofficial relations procured us the surrender of Don Estiban de Varona, with the permission, as he told me, of the then president, D. Tomás Estrada, and the capture of the latter’s kinsman, Duque de Estrada.

The moment Varona reached Manzanillo he put himself in communication with the leaders of those bands discouraged by fatigue, and at times by hunger, without resources, and who, desiring peace, did not dare to surrender, not only through fear of the treatment they might receive from us, but through distrust of each other. A few interviews and an armistice, which in a narrow, neutral ground permitted our soldiers to mix with the insurgents, and the discovery by the latter in our troops not only the generous character of the Spanish army, but also how well the country people were treated in the towns, at last broke their resolution, and the desire of peace made itself so manifest that the leaders agreed to send a committee to their government to try for it.

This committee obtained some guarantees from the president, but the irreconcilables were too strong for the government, and the committee were subjected to the law which imposed the penalty of death on all who should treat with us except on the basis of independence.

In spite of the assurances which Varona gave me, your excellency will recollect that I cherished no hope of result with Camugüey, that I believed that it was not yet time, that his presumption was not sufficiently humbled, but that I was confident that the greater part of the guerrilla parties of Manzanillo, and perhaps of Bayamo, would disband.

In spite of the obstacles which arose in the business, the result answered my expectations, though I will not conceal from your excellency that the government of the insurgents, by its treatment of the committee, contributed not a little to deepen the dissentions that existed among them. But that act of brute violence met with a prompt chastisement in the capture of the president of the executive council, and the death of the speaker of the congress, which delayed more than forty days a meeting for the choice of a new one, and the very active pursuit to which they were exposed, in spite of the rains which lasted longer than usual. The idea of peace introduced into their camp, which they had the baseuess to attribute to me, though they asserted that I proposed it through weakness, began to take root among the masses, and the impulse from below upward reached the head, a natural result of assertions disproved by our pursuit.

This was the state of things when, on the 21st of December, I talked with Duque de Estrada, and not trusting in the method, although I had no private or official letter [Page 945] to authorize my conduct, and even feared that another assassination would make the negotiations abortive, I ordered operations to be suspended between the sea, the river Sevilla, and the roads from Santa Cruz to Hato Potrero, and from that point to Brazo; that is, a seventh part of the Center. This was a serious measure. I was conscious of the objections to it; nothing positive authorized me to give assurances that this neutrality would be respected. I knew that it would give an opportunity for attacks [on me] by many; but if I wished to arrive at an understanding it was necessary to run the risk; and I believe that, holding such a position and command as mine, it behooves not to consider the personal annoyances which may result from failure, but the benefit which may redound to our country from success. The loss would be all my own; all the advantage my country’s.

Concert and meeting and consequently agreement were impossible if our troops continued operations. I fixed no period, but limited myself to declaring that the termination (of the armistice) should be announced three days beforehand. I reserved to myself the right of lengthening or shortening it, because to keep fixing periods and then extending them is, in my opinion, discreditable and a kind of higgling unworthy of soldiers.

I will not deny, your excellency, that I then expected that at the end of a few days-they would tell me that they wished to treat on inadmissible terms. I labored at that time under two mistakes: I believed their number smaller and their presumption greater than it was. I had studied the pro and the con, as is commonly said. I was not neutralizing more than a small part of the war (three hundredths), and it was accordingly prosecuted with the greatest activity when the matter began to improve, and the soldiers to come out of the hospitals. In the neutralized territory the contact of the insurgents with our soldiers was most advantageous for us, because the meeting of the weak with the strong, of the hungry with him who has resources, of the naked with the clothed, of Mm who has no place of shelter with him who has camps and sutlers’ shops, cannot but weaken the resolution of the former; the courteous treatment which had been ordered was sure to undermine the officers; the news of the suspension of hostilities where the congress was, and the negotiations with it, must have a decided influence in other departments.

What was lost, then, in case these conferences were broken off? On the part of the country nothing, and this is proved by the great number of surrenders which took place at this time. Much was gained for the future by dividing them; the three tendencies of the hostile camp, peace, autonomy, and independence defined themselves—for your excellency knows that in moments of danger the most opposite wishes unite, and that if a respite is given, they reappear again in greater strength.

So it happened here. In Sancti Spiritus some begged that the decision of the congress might be waited for, and I granted them a place of meeting, where I furnished them with supplies, and in that encampment cheers were given for peace and for Spain, and they embraced our officers. In Bagamo whole bands surrendered together; in Holguin and in Tunas they avoided any fighting; and in Cuba, Maceo made superhuman efforts to raise their spirits, summoning all to the last soldier, and attacking with an energy and success worthy of a better cause; but even in the midst of this desperate effort he did not wish to shut the door of the future, and, what he had not done for ten years, after a bloody advantage in which he kept possession of the field, he buries the dead, praises their valor, and sends back to us a few wounded and prisoners who escaped the fury of the combat.

All the advantage was on our side, we were always gaining ground. If any one lost it was I, for treating with rebels unsuccessfully lessens the credit, and there would not have been wanting those who would have talked of lost time, as if operations had not been going on everywhere else.

The desire to treat having been excited, and having told Estrada my own opinion concerning the island, and what I believed that of the government to be, judging by the private correspondence which was going on between me and the minister of Ultramar, I went to Havana to inform General Jovellar, to put myself in accord with him, and to hear his valuable counsels. That officer was, as he had been since the war began, in full agreement with me, and explained to me the embarrassed state of the treasury, the arrears of pay continually increasing, and the difficulties we should find ourselves in if the war was not ended before June. I made a tour of inspection through Las Villas and Sancti Spiritus, to see for myself the execution of my orders, and was satisfied that nothing more could be asked of the army. Pancho Jimenez had attempted an effective stroke, but as he had not the means, the destruction of part of his band, and the definitive dispersion of the rest were the consequence.

I returned to Principe to bring matters to a head, and because I thought there had been time to come to an understanding and to pass from a purely confidential character to a semi-official or official one, and having had an interview at Chorrillo with Messrs. Luaces and Roa, commissioned from the so-called commander-in-chief of the Center, Goyo Benitez, to General Cassola, who by my orders had announced to him the renewal of hostilities on the 20th, I was able to satisfy myself of the well-nigh [Page 946] general desire to come to a definite result, and of the impossibility of it by reason of the dispersion of the bands, and above all because it was not yet known whether Vicente Garcia would accept the presidency, nor what his aspirations and projects were. Believing in their good faith, I appointed the 10th of February as the day before which terms must be proposed, and permitted a commissioner to start for Sancti Spirit us and another in search of Vicente Garcia, but I reduced the neutralized territory to about eight leagues square on the banks of the Sevilla, setting a cordon of posts and sentinels all around it.

In fixing on the 10th February, I was thinking of the meeting of the Cortes on the 15th, and wished to give definite news to the government of His Majesty, so that they could in the royal message parry the attacks of the opposition, and if they did not approve of my conduct they could remove me from command, since I had neither consulted them nor given an account of the steps I had taken.

The reasons I had for acting thus are three: Not to solicit from the government an authorization which could not be understanding given at so great a distance; second, to assume all responsibility myself, leaving them in entire freedom; and, third, not to give rise in Spain to hopes that might prove illusions.

Some time before the first steps had been taken toward a conference between Vicente Garcia and General Prendergast, but since the former had been chosen president of the executive council, he thought that he could not be present at it, and sent his commissioners to Banchuelo (Tunas), to which place the general came. There, after long debates, I being in direct communication by telegraph, I answered all questions, and fixed as a limit the terms which I reported to your excellency the same day, 30th January, neutralizing the road between Tunas and the camp of the congress, so that messages and reports might pass, because we had unfortunately severely wounded their commissioner, who bore my safe conduct, which prevented the order for meeting from reaching Vicente Garcia in time.

On the 5th he asked for an interview with me, which could not take place on the 6th at San Fernando owing to a mistake; and on the 7th he came to see me, with seven other leaders and some of his officers, at Chorrilla. He presented himself in a very proper way, and I received him kindly, Generals Prendergast and Cassola being present at the conversation, which lasted seven hours. Those who took part in it manifested their desire for peace: they agreed that though they might prolong the war it would be the ruin of the country (Cuba); that in their present condition they could not conquer; that the happiness of Cuba was possible under the government of Spain; that the terms were not ample enough; and, above all, that the oath they had taken not to treat except on the basis of independence rendered all agreement null; that there was no provision in their constitution for such a case, and it was necessary to appeal to the people. All my arguments and those of the generals were unable to convince them.

Vincente Garcia told me that, to facilitate a prompt pacification, he had that day come and taken the oath of office. The definitive result was that I answered them that I did not make the terms more liberal because they had already received the sanction of the government; that I could not extend the period without receiving at least a moral guarantee that, in case those of the East and of Villas did not agree, the majority of Camaguey would accept; and we parted with the greatest courtesy.

I cannot express to your excellency the anxiety in which I was left. My presumption was that they were to be trusted; that the reserve they had shown was due to the character of the natives of this country, and to their want of confidence in Spain, which cannot easily be effaced; at the same time recognizing as one cause the oath they had taken, and the desire not to be accused of treachery by their companions, who still stood to their arms.

But these were nothing more than my presumptions; nothing more than my knowledge of the unfortunate state in which they were. There was the conviction that hatred of Spain was rapidly disappearing; there was the certainty that the favorable movement came from below upwards with a terrible pressure; but after all there was nothing but conviction and faith in myself; there was not a proof nor a material fact to confirm these; and when I entered on this line of thought doubt took possession of my mind.

The question was most serious. Should they persist in their choice of a new government by popular election, and I in not conceding a longer delay, then the pacification would be postponed, the war continued with the fury of despair, and I become an accomplice in the failure of peace. If, in virtue of my convictions, I conceded what they asked, a change of ideas might take place in the mass (of insurgents), and I should have lost a month and a half of operations in the best season of the year, equivalent to more than three months in the rainy season, to three thousand soldiers killed, to six millions more dollars spent, and to another effort on the part of Spain.

I leave to the consideration of your excellency the alternative in which I found myself. It was the traveler lost in the midst of the woods and lighted only by flashes, which served but to lead him further astray. I had the fate of my country in my [Page 947] hands, for your excellency knows better than I the consequences which an error of mine would have brought upon Spain; and I assure your excellency that my personal position was my least anxiety. I can say it now—I did not believe that I should be able to overcome the opposing elements here.

The country and the King had rewarded me beyond my deserts, and I could not refuse myself to the sacrifice, for such it was to me. I dissimulated with all, even with the government, even with my most intimate friends. I had only one hope, the thought that Divine Providence is stretching its protecting hand over Spain, and that to this I owe my good fortune, that it was my duty to expend the fame and popularity I then enjoyed for the common good, and that to arrive at a good result I ought to overcome difficulties in silence, and put forward only the favorable circumstances. I arrived in Cuba, and my ignorance of the state of things end the first successes carried me very far, for we always receive with delight what natters our wishes. I was impressionable, and thought the work more easy. In a short time, encountering almost insuperable obstacles, seeing them increased by a fatal season, finding myself without soldiers (they were all in the hospital), resources failing, for the loan was rather a relief than a solution, my courage sank at times, and, above all, when I saw that deceitful hopes led public opinion to expect a speedy issue; I saw that my reputation was wasting away in vain projects and illusions, and that, considering everything, I was, perhaps, the only person who could accomplish the undertaking with the least delay. I can assure your excellency that until I had on my shoulders the responsibility of my country’s well-being I had never known what anguish was; until I saw my mistakes I had not lamented the narrowness of my understanding. To decide rightly where only one’s own fortune is at stake imports little; to decide rightly or to err when that of one’s country is at stake is very grievous, is horrible, and I hope I may never pass through such risks again.

This explained, I need not attempt to make your excellency understand my hesitations on the 8th, which could not be removed by my colleague in command, D. Joaquin Jovellar, notwithstanding his devotion and friendship for me, because he was far from the scene of events.

On the morning of the 9th I removed to Zanjou, the point nearest the enemy’s camp, and at twelve next day Messrs. Rosa and Luaces presented themselves with a letter from Yicente Garcia accrediting them in their mission. These gentlemen stated to me that the executive and congress having met, had informed themselves of the result of the interview we had held on the 7th, and after a long discussion had agreed on the impolicy of continuing war, and on the impossibility of treating in which they found themselves, because they were not empowered to do so, and it would be illegal; that they were bound to give an account of the whole to the people; but that, considering the pressure of circumstances, they would resign and appeal to the people and troops gathered there; that this took place, and that a committee of seven persons (five of them irreconcilables) was chosen by popular election in order that negotiations might go on. The committee discussed and modified my terms, and submitted the result to the people, who accepted it unanimously under condition that the States of the East and Center should be heard. The people being asked if they were for peace, answered almost unanimously in the affirmative. Asked afterward if the war should be continued in case Oriente or Villars would not accept peace, three-quarters were in favor of peace even then, and the other fourth for war.

In view of this I went on to discuss the conditions, and, there being no difficulty except about the first, I consulted General Jovellar by telegraph, in the presence of the commissioners, and had the satisfaction of letting them see the identity of opinion of the two authorities. There remained the question of time to be allowed, which I proposed to leave to the government of His Majesty, and they returned to their camp to submit the modifications.

While they were absent I reflected maturely, and resolved on my part to concede a delay until the end of the month. The considerations which moved me to this were my not wishing to compromise General Jovellar, because if, contrary to all appearances, there were a change, he would remain disposable to relieve me in command if the government disapproved of my conduct, or the opposition and public opinion pronounced against me in case of failure. I not considering as such the continuance in the field of Maceo, as I was then inclined to do, having heard of the capture of the convoy of Florida, with 12,000 percussion caps, a case of medicines, and some loads of tinned meat, with a loss to us of one officer and 28 soldiers killed and 5 wounded, and of the defeat of a column of 200 men of the regiments of Madrid and Asturias in Juan Mulato, with the loss, as was then believed, of 100 men, though I know now it was not above 50, and of the commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Cabezas.

The commissioners returned in the afternoon of the 10th with the definitive terms, which I accepted, and a copy of which I inclose, and I at at once granted the delay, and then to facilitate matters, without their asking it, I ordered the generals in command to suspend offensive hostilities in the whole territory of the war.

The insurgents desire peace so sincerely that the commissioners elected for each [Page 948] state are the most influential and intelligent persons in it, and that your excellency may he sure of it I will give their names: For Cuba, Major-General Maximo Gomez, Brigadier-General Rafael Rodriquez, Major Enrique Callazo; for Bayamo, Major August in Castellanos, Ensign José Badraque; for Las Villas, the deputies Spoturno and Marcos Garcio, Colonel Enrique Mola and Don Ramon Perez Trujillo; for Tunas and Holguin, Vicente Garcia.

These elections are guarantees of good faith. Concerning Sancti Spiritus and Villas, with the exception of the thirty men of Cecilio Gonzalez, I harbor no doubt, only an outlaw or two and the runaway negroes will be left in the field, isolated, without flag and without arms. In Principe, possibly, a gathering or so of what are called planteados, who obey no one, and whom the very insurgents have almost exterminated.

In Bayamo the leaders who remain have given assurances that they will consult with the commissioners and are calling in their scattered followers. In Tunas and Holguin, Vicente Garcia has every kind of influence. In Cuba, Maceo respects only Maximo Gomez, and all affirm that he will obey the dispositions of his government. I am not confident but he will be left reduced to the last extremity without the bands of Edwardo Marinol, Limbano Sanchez, Martinez Freire, and Leite Vidal, and only a part of the people of his brother Antonio Maceo, Guellermon, and Crombet will follow him. In any event parties of banditti will remain in those mountains.

This is, in conclusion, a loose narrative of what has happened and of my present impressions and hopes. It only remains to set before you a sketch of the motives of my policy, and the reasons on which I have based my conduct in these sixteen months. I have not always been right, but I have tried to correct my mistakes the moment I became aware of them.

Since the year 1869, when I landed on this island with the first re-enforcements, I was preoccupied with the idea that the insurrection here, though acknowledging as its cause the hatred of Spain, yet that this hatred was due to the causes that have separated our colonies from the mother country, augmented in the present case by the promises made to the An till as at different times (1812–’37 and ’45), promises which not only have not been fulfilled, but, as I understand, have not been permitted to be so by the Cortes when at different times, their execution had been begun.

While the island had no great development, its aspirations were confined by love of nationality and respect for authority; but when one day after another passed without hopes being satisfied, but, on the contrary, the greater freedom permitted now and then by a governor were more than cancelled by his successor; when they were convinced that the colony went on in the same way; when bad officials and a worse administration of justice more and more aggravated difficulties; when the provincial governorships, continually growing worse, fell at last into the hands of men without training or education, petty tyrants who could practice their thefts and sometimes their oppressions, because of the distance at which they resided from the supreme authority, public opinion, until then restrained, began vehemently to desire those liberties which, if they bring much good, Contain also some evil, and especially when applied to countries that have so peculiar a life of their own, and are without preparation for them. A people sometimes vehemently desires what is not best for it—the unknown—and when everything is denied, aspire to everything. So it happened here. I do not blame the captains-general nor the government of that epoch. They thought they were acting for the best; but they were separated from the people, and had about them only partisans of the status quo, and very few of progress, and even these, persons of heated imagination, but cautious, did not make manifest their ideas, and even applauded acts which were carrying the ship on the reef, like those inhabitants of England who kindled bonfires to attract ships.

The 10th of October, 1868, came to open men’s eyes; the eruption of the volcano in which so many passions, so many hatreds, just and unjust, had been heaped up was terrible, and almost at the outset the independence of Cuba was proclaimed. The concessions which General Lersandi then made were of no avail; the triumph of Bayamo was not deadened by the heroic resistance of the garrisons of Tunas and Holguin; the army was very small, and they believed victory easy. Many Spaniards believed that autonomy should be granted; and who knows what might have followed if those masses had been well led, and had not quarreled with the natives of the Peninsula.

The certainty of triumph blinded them. In its turn public sentiment and patriotism were awakened in us, and the country was divided into two irreconcilable bands, extreme from the first, confiding the triumph of their cause to extermination and the torch; and although in these nine years there have been attempts at more humane systems, they have been of short duration. Public opinion was too strong for governments of whatever politics. Hardly was a governor-general appointed when they weakened his authority by allowing the press to speak of his dismissal; and these officers, not feeling themselves sustained by the government, tried to find some support in a public opinion continually more and more overexcited, and there were times when the war was on the point of being victoriously ended, when a change of commander came to undo all that had been gained to make the insurgents understand that [Page 949] their constancy would save them; and a serious succession of feats of arms raised their spirits, and by the advantage of ground and their familiarity with it, they defeated large columns with hardly a battalion of men. Hunger in the villages swelled the ranks of the enemy. They almost put us on the defensive, and as we had to guard an immense property, the mission of the army became very difficult.

The instability of governments in Spain, the cantonal war first, and the civil war afterward, encouraged our enemies, who began to doubt in proportion, as the throne of Don Alfonso became more firm, and when they found themselves shut up in villas and unable to carry out their project of extending the war to Matanzas and Cardenas. But public spirit had decayed, and the invasion of Spiritus and Villas marked a fatal period. It was our fortune that the military man who commanded against them had not, because a foreigner and because of his character, in spite of his courage, the sympathy of his subordinates, and that the battle of Palma Sola subdued his energy. But the war went on languidly for want of forces, public sentiment growing weaker, and the army remembering too well its reverses. The principle of authority was strengthened, and I believe that, with more resources, we should have triumphed in 1875 and 1876.

The insignificant affairs of the railway of Spiritus, the attack on Villa Clara, Ciego de Avila, and Moron made a great impression on public opinion, which saw in everything, with frightful exaggeration, to be sure, grave and irremediable evils, and the unfortunate carelessness at Victoria de las Tunas came to stamp the position of affairs at the very time when re-enforcements and help were expected from the mother country. General Jovellar was the victim of events, and when perhaps he was about to grasp the laurel of his toils the government decided that I should come.

These, roughly sketched, are in my conception the facts from 1868 to the end of 1876. I on the one hand found myself in an easy position. I brought large re-enforcements; I brought money (not half what was needed); I had a colleague in the captain-general, who lightened me of an immense labor and whose loyal help and prudent counsel were of so great service to me. I had re-established the principle of authority, but had against me a public spirit without life. Nobody had higher aspirations than to save his crop of sugar. In official regions the enemy was thought inferior, but the commanders generally believed it unsafe to operate with less than three battalions; there was no venturing beyond the highways; much was said of positions; displeasure showed itself among the higher officers through jealousy of those I brought with me; the rank and file reckoned the numbers of the enemy, and my first operation was universally condemned and feared. But confidence re-established itself when I presented myself in the camp, and (your excellency permit me the vanity) when they recognized in the commander-in-chief their old general of brigade. Then hope revived, and the operation was as fortunate as I hoped.

I had against me also the exhaustion of the country, the natural want of confidence produced by alternations of fortune, since successes did not encourage our people nor discourage the enemy. I had against me the not holding more territory than that in our immediate occupation, and that, as my war was essentially offensive, I was to make it in what was to me, unknown ground, and where they were at home; and I must carry everything, create everything, protect everything. The burning of a sugar-mill, the taking of a village, was more terrible than the cutting off of a column.

And after all what did we gain by beating the enemy? Little, unless we exterminated them; and extermination was impossible; it was not in my character; it was useless to try to employ it. Neither the fulfillment of duty nor fear of responsibility nor patriotic sentiment obliges me to commit cruelties, to be untrue to my conscience.

The war was one of separation, of independence, with all the horrors of civil war. My problem was to make it a civil war with all the generosities of international wars. The war was without quarter, and I expected to give and not receive it. If it was given there were no difficulty in surrendering; the defeated does not fly so swiftly as when he is trying to escape death; hatred is lessened, fear banished, and comparisons are drawn between the comfort enjoyed in one’s village and the alarms, dangers, and privations which are risked in the field. Not giving quarter to us, the shameful cases of feeble resistance could not occur. Excess of fear makes the soldier a hero.

My opinion for these nine years had been fixed; it was necessary to develop it. Two roads led to the same end—one slow, progressive, and little conformable to my character, but which was recommended by the circumstances. I at once issued public orders taking the first steps on this road, restricted orders, advancing somewhat more, and in proportion as the progress of the war authorized me, I took another step of policy in accord with General Jovellar and the government of His Majesty.

The second road—that which I would have followed, that which I have several times particulary indicated—was shorter, and I think that my indications were not pointed enough.

For my own part, had the responsibility been mine, free of the Cortes, and empowered to decide for the government of His Majesty, on condition of at once rendering an account, I would have ventured everything. On the 7th of November, 1876, there would have appeared in the Havana Gazette the disembargo of estates, a general pardon, [Page 950] the assimilation of Cuba with Spain, orders to treat prisoners well; and to show that this was not weakness, but strength, there was the argument of my one hundred thousand bayonets. Public opinion I should have little regarded. Perhaps the war might have been ended some time ago. It was policy; but war is made with policy. It was the flag with the motto of liberty. Or take away the flag and give, once for all, the liberty which at last must be given. When we are strong we are able and ought to be generous.

Since considerations of a higher order did not permit me to do this, I advanced by degrees, and after my orders of November, some of which were not approved, at the first positive advantage I gained, which was the breaking up of the bauds of villas, the decree of disembargo was issued, when some progress had been made in other departments, and in the regulation of towns the name of alcalde was introduced through modesty.

I have come now by slow stages to the question of the day, and perhaps some will ask how I offered the terms which I reported on the 30th of January, and will add that better might have been obtained.

At present, I suppose so, but I understand by advantageous terms for the government what contributes to satisfy the desires and aspirations of the people; I proposed the first condition, because I believe they must fulfill it. I wish that the municipal law, the law of provincial assemblies and representation in the Cortes, should be established. For the present we will make use of the laws now in force, and then with the assistance of the deputies, modifications and arrangements can be made to complete them. Technical details will be considered which are beyond my competence. The law of labor is to be settled, the question of labor supply, the necessary changes of property are to be studied, the fearful and unsustainable problem of slavery is to be studied before foreign nations impose a solution of it upon us, the penal code is to be studied and the province of the courts defined, the form of contributions and assessment of taxes determined, and some attention paid to schools and public works. All these problems whose solution concerns the people must be solved after hearing their representatives, not by the reports of juntas, chosen through favoritism or for political reasons. They cannot be left to the will of the captain-general, the head of a department, or the colonial minister, who generally, however competent, do not know the country.

I do not wish to make a momentary peace; I desire that this peace be the beginning of a bond of common interests between Spain and her Cuban provinces, and that this bond be drawn continually closer by the identity of aspirations, and the good faith of both.

Let not the Cubans be considered as pariahs or minors, but put on an equality with other Spaniards in everything not inconsistent with their present condition.

It was on the other hand impossible, according to my judgment and conscience, not to grant the first condition; not to do it was to postpone indefinitely the fulfillment of a promise made in our present constitution. It was not possible that this island, richer, more populous, and more advanced morally and materially than her sister, Porto Rico, should remain without the advantages and liberties long ago planted in the latter with good results, and the spirit of the age, and the decision of the country gradually to assimilate the oclonies to the Peninsula, made it necessary to grant the promised reforms, which would have been already established and surely more amply if the abnormal sate of things had not concentrated all the attention of government on the extirpation of the evil which was devouring this rich province.

I did not make the last constitution; I had no part in the discussion of it. It is now the law, and as such I respect it, and as such endeavor to apply it. But there was in it something conditional, which I think a danger, a motive of distrust, and I have wished that it might disappear. Nothing assures me that the present ministry will continue in power, and I do not know whether that which replaces it would believe the fit moment to have arrived for fulfilling the precept of the constitution.

I desire the peace of Spain, and this will not be firm while there is war or disturbance in the richest jewel of her crown. Perhaps the insurgents would have accepted promises less liberal and more vague than those set forth in this condition; but even had this been done, it would have been but a brief postponement, because those liberties are destined to come for the reasons already given, with the difference that Spain now shows herself generous and magnanimous, satisfying just aspirations which she might deny, and a little later, probably very soon, would have been obliged to grant them, compelled by the force of ideas and of the age. Moreover, she has promised over and over again to enter on the path of assimilation, and if the promise were more vague, even though the fulfillment of this promise were begun, these people would have the right to doubt our good faith and to show a distrust unfortunately warranted by the failings of human nature itself.

The not adding another one hundred thousand to the one hundred thousand families that mourn their sons slain in this pitiless war, and the cry of peace that will resound in the hearts of the eighty thousand mothers who have sons in Cuba, or liable to conscription, would be a full equivalent for the payment of a debt of justice.

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The condition of freeing the slaves and Chinese who are among the insurgents has its inconveniences, These would be still greater but for the Moret law, and were not every one conscious that ampler modifications must soon be made. If the granting of the first condition is the fulfillment of a promise, there is as little new in that of which I am now speaking.

The third article of the Moret law expressly directs that fugitive negroes and Chinese shall not be sent back to their plantations, but assigned to the battalions of freedmen, their owners, if not in rebellion, being indemnified, and this was because the government then, as I do now, understood how dangerous the sending back of these slaves would be. They would demoralize the blacks and turn maroons. As to the Chinese, I asked some time ago for a change in the existing law. The negro has been discussed and pitied. He in the end can free himself with the product of his toil. The Chinamen never, and all make him their victim.

The other condition of oblivion and pardon I think is in the conscience of all, and in the character of the Spanish people, which is fierce in combat, and then generously forgives and pardons all, and gives the hand to him who a moment before was an enemy. This generosity is characteristic of our soldiers.

I say it with satisfaction, I proposed the conditions and have not modified them. I proposed at once what I thought just, without higgling, and since I was not dealing with foreigners, but with Spaniards, with brothers, I have given them everything I could without prejudice to any one, without placing them in the position of being peculiarly favored.

It will be asked if I could have obtained peace without concessions, and I will answer that I think I might—that by June I expected to have certainly finished, but that greater numbers would have remained in the woods, which would have been a disturbance to agriculture, a danger for the future; that they would not have struck their flag, which would have attracted those who had emigrated. It is better to convince than crush an enemy. We should have made of Cuba a new colony, with the disadvantage of climate, distance, and inequality of strength. As a soldier, I should have increased my fame, but as a Spaniard I should have felt remorse of conscience. More sacrifices would have been made, and force establishes nothing firmly.

Many accusations, many attacks will be directed against me whenever I return to Spain; much abuse of empty words will be made to censure me. Your excellency, I can answer all, although no orator, and if my policy is blamed by political civilians, I shall have the defense of the inhabitants, and, what is better, of my conscience. I say nothing of the approbation of the King and his ministers; the telegram of your excellency is the highest reward of my conduct to which I can aspire, and I avail myself of this occasion to have the honor of informing your excellency that the support of your excellency and the colonial minister, and the unlimited confidence which the government has shown me, the courage with which they have defended me from all attacks, giving a great prestige to my authority, has made my work easier, and I owe to the government of His Majesty this feeble testimony of my profound gratitude.

What shall I say of General Joaquin Jovellar? His devotion, his disinterestedness, his prudent counsels, his efficacious co-operation, make words, insufficient to express my gratitude.

The Spanish party and volunteers, respecting all orders even when most opposed to their former ideas, helping to relieve the necessities of those but yesterday our enemies, respecting the principle of authority and standing always in arms as a reserve and sometimes in the front ranks, are worthy of praise.

The army, your excellency—I feel more than ever that my style is so poor, and as my words would do no justice to the facts if I tried to relate them, it must suffice to indicate them—has fought whenever it saw the enemy, without reckoning his numbers; has had nothing but its rations and gone unpaid without murmuring; has not seen a town in sixteen months except When in hospital; has seen half its comrades march away to the other world or to Spain, and though cast down, has maintained discipline, has been generous with the conquered, who, being the weaker, employed surprise and ambuscade in fighting us. The Spanish soldier, I say it with pride, may bear comparison with the best in the world.

I will add, your excellency, that many sons of Cuba have fought at our side with heroic gallantry and excellent results, and that we owe to them many of our successes. To the valor of Spaniards they add a knowledge of the mountains, and they equal us in loyalty. This latter quality has been even more brilliant among the many people of color who fight in our ranks. I do not remember a case of desertion among them, and their temperance, subordination, and courage place them among our best soldiers.

I have thought it my duty to report to your excellency not only the facts but my own appreciation of them, in order that His Majesty and his ministers may have sufficient data to form air opinion.

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ASSINIO MARTINEZ DE CAMPOS.