No. 283.
Mr. D. W.
Stevens to Mr. Evarts.
United
States Legation,
Tokei,
Japan, December 7, 1878. (Received
January 11, 1879.)
No. 13.]
Sir: Referring to my No. 11, in relation to the
departure of Mr. Hanabusa, on the Japanese man-of-war Hi Yei Kwan, for
Corea, and the rumored probability of difficulty between that country and
Japan on account of the imposition by the Corean authorities of a tax upon
imports and exports, I have the honor to inform you that on the 19th instant
Mr. E. M. Satow, Japanese secretary of the British legation, left Nagasaki,
in
[Page 613]
Her Majesty’s ship Egeria, for
the island of Quelpart, on the Corean coast. The ostensible object of Mr.
Satow’s mission was to thank the Coreans for their kind conduct toward the
crew of the British merchant vessel Barbara Taylor, to which I alluded in my
No. 11. I have learned from a trustworthy source that Mr. Hanabusa’s
departure was hastened on receipt of the news of Mr. Satow’s intended
journey, and that the Japanese Government ascribe to the dispatch of the
Egeria another, or, at least, an additional object to that made public. It
does not seem probable, however, that Mr. Satow can, at the most, do more
than report to his government the condition of the Japanese colony at Fusan,
and, perhaps, the attitude which the Coreans would presumably assume should
advances be made for the object of concluding a treaty with them.
There has been a decided change in the tone of the Japanese press with
reference to the Corean question since last I wrote upon this subject. I
inclose an extract from the Nichi Nichi Shinbun, the semiofficial organ of
the government, in which the writer argues that the independence of Corea is
necessary to the well-being of Japan; that friendly relations should be
maintained with the Coreans, and that, while they must not be allowed to
continue their obstructive policy, every effort should be made to induce
them to enter into a just tariff convention, by which the interests of both
countries will be promoted. The demand for immediate redress for the alleged
violation by Corea of the treaty rights of Japan, which lately seemed to be
the general sentiment of the press and people of the capital, has given
place to milder counsels, and there now appears to be a disposition to avoid
anything more violent than diplomatic remonstrance.
A curious feature of the discussion which has arisen upon this question in
the foreign and native press, is the allusion made by certain of the English
editors to Russia and her relations with Japan. The Russian bugbear, if I
may be allowed the expression, has on this occasion been paraded before the
Japanese with a solemnity which would be impressive were it not
ludicrous.
Japan is warned of the imminent danger in which she stands from her proximity
to Russia, and it is intimated, by no means ambiguously, that in these
perilous times Great Britain is her natural friend. The manner in which
Russia is thus made to do duty on all occasions and under any pretext was
amusingly illustrated by a recent article in the Japan Weekly Mail, a
journal generally considered the exponent of the cultured English class in
Japan. Speaking of the rumor that the Russian Government is about to
dispatch several men-of-war of improved armament, &c., to these waters,
the editor of the Mail gravely remarks:
These news are more threatening to Japan than to England. We can
increase our squadron in the Pacific and China seas with ease and
give our commerce the requisite protection. But if Russia choose to
seize Yezo or the Tsushima group as “a base of operations,” how do
the Mikado’s advisers imagine they could stop her?
The fact that the relations of Russia and Japan are most friendly, and that
there is not even the shadow of a probability that Russia will perpetrate
such an act of gross treachery and injustice as that intimated, seems to
have no weight with writers like the editors of the Mail. While, of course,
the manifest bias and inconsequence of such assertions are their best
answer, it is to be regretted that their constant repetition has led certain
writers of the native press to indulge in reflections upon a friendly power
which are as discreditable to their good sense as they are to their
fairness.
I have, &c.,
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[Inclosure in No. 13.—Translation from the
Nichi Nichi Shinbun (from the Japan Gazette), November 27,
1878.]
Mr. Hanabusa, chief secretary of the foreign office, the envoy to Korea,
left by the corvette Hi Yei Kwan. Previous to his departure the Korean
Government imposed heavy internal taxes on imports and exports with the
intention of causing the cessation of trade with Japan. The merchants in
Fusan were much distressed by this new system of levying taxes, and the
general notice of Japan has been given to the discussion of measures how
best to deal with the Koreans. One opinion is that, as the Korean
authorities attempt unreasonably to compel Japanese to retire from their
country and to stop all communication by the imposition of taxes, we are
justified in threatening them by a display of force, or to compel them
to agree to our proposals in regard to the tariff in order to protect
our interest and advantages. Others take quite different views, urging
that, as Korea is a young country, she does not know what trade
means—whether it is advantageous or injurious—and the Japanese may
endeavor to lead the obstinate Koreans to follow the example of more
civilized nations. Thus, owing to differences of opinion as to what
should be done, there is also a wide difference in opinion as to the
mission of the envoy, now on his way to Fusan.
We consider that, although the purpose of the envoy is not known, as
diplomatic affairs of this sort are kept secret, it may be the object of
the government to compel Korea to conform to proposals from us that are
supported by a threatening parade of force. This may be, but tariff and
trade regulations to promote and preserve mutual benefit and convenience
are expected to be arranged by a conference to take place between the
envoy and the Korean authorities. We understand this from the reason
that, as far we are concerned in Korea, Japan and that peninsula have
most important influences on eastern countries, and we must endeavor to
avoid any jealous misunderstanding between Japan, China, and Korea, in
order to preserve the most friendly relations. The new system of levying
taxes adopted by the Korean authorities is not for the purpose of
protection, but merely to stop trade. As it is an extraordinarily heavy
tax, it must be reduced more or less, but we do not desire to compel the
Koreans to adopt a tariff of the lowest rate merely for our own
advantage. The general condition of trade in Fusan for the past year
shows it to be very dull, although a few kinds of imports and exports
are increasing on a small scale. It is therefore hopeless that Korea
will become a treasury for Japan in the future. Notwithstanding we
cannot abandon this poverty-stricken country if only for the reason that
it lies in a position of the utmost importance for Japan, it must not be
annexed or occupied by any other power. With this necessity before us,
it is most prudent for us to conduct our negotiations in a manner
calculated not to inspire the Koreans with hostile feelings towards us.
Since the years of Bunroku (1591–’95), in which Hideyoshi made an
expedition to Korea, the Japanese and Koreans have been unfriendly; and
the latter nation was compelled to sign the treaty of frendship with us
against their wish. Let us consider the general feeling and condition of
Japan twenty years ago. What aversion had we shown to foreigners? What
opposition did we show to trade? On these considerations, we can,
without difficulty, found an opinion upon the action of Korea with
regard to foreign intercourse. Therefore we have a right to expect that
a tariff should be framed for the convenience of both parties, as was
done here by the late Mr. Town-send Harris, minister for the United
States. This should be explained to the Koreans, for it is an important
matter for us at present to let the Koreans know thoroughly our views on
the subject.
As we have pointed out in the Nichi Nichi Shinbun of previous dates, the
Eastern question has gradually advanced further east, reaching the
center of Asia, and it will appear in Korea in the future. For several
years Russia intended to add Turkish empire to her dominions and to
possess Constantinople. The reason why Russia is so greedy for
possession of the Ottoman capital is that the city is so situated as to
command the Mediterranean Sea, and it would give Russia opportunities to
attack Southern Europe. Korea is the Turkey of the east of Asia, and
Fusan is Constantinople. If it falls into the hands of Russia, and her
land forces can join the naval transports and navy at Fusan, Russia will
then have no difficulty in advancing toward Japan on one side while she
can also threaten China on the other. Since 1856 she has extended her
dominions in the north of China, and added various provinces in Central
Asia, but as she has possessed no good harbor in the east, she cannot
satisfy her voracious and savage greed in that direction. In winter
Russian harbors in Europe are frozen up, and her men-of-war are locked
up for more than half the year. Napoleon Bonaparte said that if he
permitted Russia to possess Constantinople, he should secure another
ally; but that ally would soon become the sole ruler of the world. From
that time no change in the possession of Constantinople has taken place,
the integrity of this important position being secured by the treaty of
Berlin. If Russia takes possession of Korea in the east of Asia she will
be a robber. This matter is a most important question to eastern
countries, all of which will suffer by Russian aggression.
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Korea occupies an important position in the East. When we have to discuss
the question of the East, we must consider by whom the peninsula may be
governed in order to preserve peace and the balance of power. If it be
found advantageous to leave Korea to govern her own subjects as an
independent state, we must then consider under what conditions she will
exist. Since Russia first began to cast avaricious eyes upon Korea,
several years have elapsed. Glancing back to 1861, the Russian
man-of-war Ashirotte arrived off the coast of the island of Tsushima,
where the Russians landed and formed camps under pretext of repairing
their vessel. This occurred in February. At this time the allied troops
of England and France were engaged in war with China. Russia declared
her resolve to be neutral, but she was ready to enter into alliance with
either of the contending powers whenever she saw it would be
advantageous. In order to prevent Russia from aiding China, it was most
important for England to station her troops at Tsushima or Korea.
Admiral Kazakavitch, commander of the Pacific fleet of Russia, having
heard of this movement, ordered the captain of the Ashirotte to occupy
the island of Tsushima, where the British vessels followed by command of
the minister of England in Yedo. Both the British and Russian vessels
stopped several months in spite of the protests and requests made by our
government to leave the island.*
This occupation was not ordered by the Russian Government. By this
digression we desire to show our readers that seventeen years ago the
island of Tsushima attracted notice, as important as Cyprus has lately
clone in regard to Turkey. In 1862, the Tokugawa Government sent
ambassadors to the treaty powers to require the opening of Hiogo,
Niigata, Osaka, and Yedo to trade, to be deferred owing to civil
disturbances in Japan. When the ambassadors arrived in England, the late
Earl Russell, secretary of state for foreign affairs, persuaded them to
open the island of Tsushima to foreign trade; and we read in the London
Protocol:
“(The envoys of the Tycoon accredited to Her Britannic Majesty announce
their intention) ‘on their return to Japan to submit’ (to the Tycoon and
his ministers) ‘the policy and expediency of opening to foreign commerce
the port of Tsushima in Japan, as a measure by which the interests of
Japan will be materially promoted.’”
On their arrival at Paris, the envoys were advised by M. Thouvenel,
minister for foreign affairs, to do the same, and we do not read in the
treaty of Paris: “On their return, the Japanese ambassadors will
endeavor to induce their government to open Korea to trade”—though these
words correctly represent the verbal advice given to our envoys. When
the envoys went to Russia, they found there quite different opinions,
and Gortschakoff, minister of foreign affairs, said that any such
courses must be followed by severe injury to Japan.
From these we can clearly judge the purpose of these countries. They
differ in opinion, because they desire to promote their own advantage,
not that of Japan. Let us examine what is advantageous and what
disadvantageous to Japan with regard to Korea! As the island of Tsushima
is in a most important position, being close to Korea, there should be
an army and navy stationed there. After that we should teach the Koreans
to understand the benefit likely to arise from opening their country to
trade. The Korean peninsula must not be occupied by Russia or China.
According to the present condition of things the latter country has no
power to do anything in the east. Will, then, the Japanese take
possession of Korea? This we do not think. Not only is the Korea of no
value to Japan, but as it now is it is a perpetual barrier against other
nations.
From this it is clear that the independence of Korea tends to maintain
the balance of power in the East, and is consequently advantageous to
Japan. The most necessary thing to be done by us now is to preserve
friendly relations with the Koreans, whom we can gradually lead on to
civilization and instruct them to enter into treaties with England,
France, and other countries, in order to preserve their independence. As
the peninsula forms an important factor in the great Eastern problem, it
is necessary for the government to make preparations in anticipation of
possible, and indeed probable, events.
