Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 7, 1874

No. 308.
General Schenck to Mr. Fish.

Legation of the United States,
London, July 18, 1874. (Received August 4.)

No. 590.]

Sir: With reference to Mr. Moran’s Nos. 478 and 498, I have the honor to forward herewith two copies of the report of Commodore Goodenough and Mr. Consul Layard on the offer of the cession of the Fiji Islands to the British Crown,” just presented to both houses of Parliament by command of the Queen, together with a report, taken from the Times of this morning, of the proceedings in the House of Lords last night on the subject of this annexation.

I am, &c.,

ROBT. C. SCHENCK.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 590.]

Report of Commodore Goodenough and Mr. Consul Layard on the offer of the cession of the Fiji Islands to the British Crown.

Pearl, at Levuka, Fiji, April 13, 1874. (Received June 10, 1874.)

My Lord: In the instructions issued to us by Lord Kimberley, desiring us to inquire and report on the offer of cession of the Fiji Islands to the British Crown, we are informed that four possible modes of action are open to Her Majesty’s government:

(1.) To invest the British consul with magisterial powers over British subjects settled in the Fiji Islands.

(2.) To recognize the government which now exists in the islands, and which has already been dealt with, a de facto government.

(3.) To establish a British protectorate over the islands.

(4.) The assumption by Her Majesty of territorial sovereignty over the islands, and, as a necessary sequence, the constitution within them of some form of colonial government.

2. The objections to the third mode, which had appeared so strong to Her Majesty’s government, we find to be even stronger than is suggested by our instructions. We have received evidence of the dislike with which it would be received by British residents, and we, therefore, do not suppose that your lordship will wish us to dwell further upon it.

3. As, in our opinion, the only remaining alternative lies between the assumption by Her Majesty of territorial sovereignty over the islands, and to invest the consul with magisterial power over British subjects settled here, we will at once proceed to consider the second mode of action suggested by our instructions, and to give your lordship a sketch of the establishment of the present form of government in these islands, from which we believe that your lordship will conclude, with us, that it is very far indeed from being likely that any government can be established here which is, in any sense, native or indigenous, or which could become tolerable to the native or white planter.

4. In order to reply to an objection which might be made that the Sandwich Islands and the Tongan Islands are examples which may be quoted of success in native government, we may remark that, in each of these cases, a superior native chief succeeded in establishing his supreme rule before the advent of any number of Europeans; in each case missionaries preceded the trader of planter, and were able to instill a considerable amount of self-respect and culture into the natives; and in neither case has there been so rapid and sudden an influx of foreigners as in Fiji. In the Fiji Islands this great influx of settlers took place from and since the date of Colonel Smythe’s report to Her Majesty’s government. The fact of Colonel Smythe’s mission, before his report was made known, gave British settlers a hope of annexation to Great Britain; and the faithful account given by Dr. Seemann of the fertility of the islands, and their suitableness as a new area for cotton-planting, stimulated the immigration which followed.

5. Fiji was still at that time, and up to a much more recent date, without any one head, as may be seen from Colonel Smythe’s report, Mr. Thurston’s correspondence on the Polynesian land question, 1888, and other documents. The chief of Ban was, however, besides being the undoubted ruler over a large area, the most influential personage over the group generally, and so continued up to August, 1871. Up to this time the white settlers generally, throughout the different districts, had sought to extend their own influence, and to maintain order, by preferring some local chief before all others, and then enabling him, by presents of arms or cloth, and other things, to extend his influence, so that he might be the judge of all native disputes brought before him, and also the medium through whom purchases of land might be made. They, of course, adhered to the chiefs who were already the most powerful, by birth or by the issue of native wars, and Cakobau’s power, among others, was greatly due to this influence.

6. One chief alone was always an exception to this rule. Maafu, the Tongan, whose antecedents have been reported to the foreign office, made a position for himself, assisted, it is true, by one or two Englishmen, who attached themselves directly to him. He was frequently stopped in his career by the influence of the British consul, and but for this he would probably have been before now the principal chief of Fiji.

7. From about 1865, various attempts were made at different parts of the group, under the influence of whites, to establish the first principles of government; and Cakobau, Maafu, and one or two other chiefs were assisted by English secretaries—or perhaps we should say instructed by English secretaries—to draw up and issue constitutions. Thus there were constitutions of Ban of 1865 and 1867, laws of Tovata of 1837, and others; the secretaries to these chiefs being, in nearly every case, respectable and, in some cases, able men. There were, however, considerable districts beyond the boundaries of Ban or of the Tovata; and, as yet, no administration of justice had been attempted beyond the native magistracy of local chiefs.

8. The feeling of the white population that it was absolutely necessary to erect, some sort of central government, under which law-courts for the recovery of debt and repression of crime could be constituted, now increased, and in 1869 the native chiefs seem to have been stimulated by the whites to send to Her Majesty’s consul petitions for British protection. Various associations of whites were made, which, in turn, tried to erect a republican form of government, and obtain annexation to the United States, without success; and the first actual concession of legislative powers to whites appears to have been the granting of a charter by Cakobau to the white residents of Levuka, to make improvement in the local settlement by enacting byelaws for imposing tines, &c. It is dated 21st November, 1870. This, however, was altogether insufficient for the purpose of inaugurating what was wanted, namely, a court of law; and the first successful attempt at the formation of a general government was made very shortly after.

9. At this time Cakobau’s direct sovereignty was limited to Ban, to part of Oval an, great part of the Rewa, and several central islands. His influence extended westward to Ba River on the north and to Suva on the south side of Viti Levu, far less, altogether, than half of Viti Levu, or a third of the group. It had appeared to be the interest of every one to uphold and extend that authority and influence; and both the claim of the United States for £9,000, and also the action of English authorities, had contributed to make him the principal chief of Fiji.

10. As we have said, the whites, throughout the group, had been anxious for a general government, but the merchants of Levuka, to whom many of the planters were in debt, were naturally the most eager for the establishment of courts of law; but the immediate cause of their proceeding to active measures was the fact that a new line of steamers was advertised to run from Australia to San Francisco, and that it was most desirable to induce them to call at Levuka on their way. Some of the principal merchants subscribed to light Levuka harbor and to survey the northern entrance to the group, namely, the Nanuku Passage. They were further desirous of securing to the steamship company a small subsidy, and were at once met by the difficulty that they had often met before, that the co-operation might be promised, for this or any other scheme, but could not be secured.

About this time, viz, May, 1871, a Mr. Sydney Burt, who happened to have come here from Sydney, was Cakobau’s commercial agent; a Mr. G. A. Woods, formerly colonial surveyor in New Zealand, was employed in determining positions for placing a light for the navigation of the Nanuku Passage; and a Mr. Drew was Cakobau’s secretary. The resident whites seem not to have understood how to set to work to constitute themselves into a government, and seem to have combined with Mr. Woods and Mr. Burt to get Cakobau recognized as King of Fiji, and, under his authority, to form a ministry of seven persons, comprising two native chiefs, two principal merchants, Mr. Sagar, Mr. Woods, Mr. Burt.

11. These persons (for neither the chief Cakobau nor other native understood anything about it) assembled the foreign residents in Levuka by notice, and there read a speech, purporting to be from Cakobau, who was present, and announcing the nomination of his ministers and his intention to govern under a constitution by their aid.

12. It is greatly to be regretted that the gentleman who occupied the post of Her Majesty’s consul at this time was not fitted, either by his knowledge of the islands or by a legitimate influence with the chiefs, to direct the course of affairs. The influence and authority, which should of right have been exerted by him at this moment, were not used to keep the chiefs and the British residents from making great mistakes. Had Mr. March possessed that influence and authority, we believe he might, on the one hand, have given such advice to the chief as would have insured his selecting trustworthy persons as ministers, and, on the other hand, have induced all residents to give the support to the laws, now for the first time introduced, as would have insured their ready acceptance.

The mistake now made, and which has led to many subsequent ones, was that the whole public, native and foreign, were taken by surprise. A general government was started without the general consent; and, consequently, although the whites in all parts of the group were induced, by their strong desire for a government of some sort or other and by fair promises, to adhere at first to what was then started; yet both whites and natives have held themselves free to disown and oppose the government so constituted whenever they thought fit, and to ask for its dissolution. But for the interference and influence of the house of Hennings in one direction, and that of Captain Chapman, of Her Majesty’s ship Dido, in another, there can be little doubt that both Maafu, chief of Lau, and Tui Cakau, chief of the northern part of the group, would have separated from the government of Cakobau before this; and an organized resistance to the government on the part of the planters of Ba, Nadi, and Nadroga (the west extreme of Viti Levu) might possibly have been successful had it not been for Captain Chapman’s intervention in February, 1873.

13. There can be no doubt that the personal unpopularity of Mr. Woods, who made himself the leader of the government movement, as well as an unnecessary and arbitrary assumption of authority by him, had something to do with the resistance offered to the government; but the chief cause of distrust among the whites was the subsequent spectacle of an extravagant expenditure of money on an elaborate form of constitutional government, which sensible men felt to be unsuited to the country. There was, beside this, a residuum of ill-disposed men at Levuka, who objected to all law, and who took advantage of the indifference of the respectable to make themselves prominent. These were a small fraction and entirely distinct from the body of planters and merchants who form the real bulk of the settlers.

14. This government having, however, made good its start, proceeded to invite white delegates, to consult with them, and also with the chiefs, who were induced to come down and adhere to the general government. The white residents consented, and sent delegates; and it is clear, from what has followed, that the idea in their minds was that the chiefs were to govern their own people, and that the whites were to invite the confidence of the people abroad by showing themselves capable of self-government, by developing the resources of the country, and by showing that the administration of laws could be secured. Such a body of delegates as was here assembled could not be expected, on the one hand, to understand much of law or constitutions; or, on the other, to have any particular predisposition in favor of natives. Their main motive was, of course, to advance their own interests, and, in matters beyond their immediate interests, they were easily led to abandon the country to an active and energetic man like Mr. Woods.

15. The delegates framed a constitution, and under the constitution a parliament was elected, and sat in 1872 and 1873, There was not, nor was there likely to be, any deliberate intention of injuring the natives, but it was, perhaps, inevitable that a body of men sent up to guard the interests of white constituents should ignore the existence of a native, except as a payer of poll-tax, a possible laborer and a consumer of imported goods. The interests of natives were undoubtedly ignored to this extent—that, they ‘were left to shift for themselves, and as, on account of the imposition of the poll-tax, they had a right to have been, but were not, protected from the old-fashioned irregular imposts of native chiefs, they have suffered considerably by the inauguration of a new government. Their chief sufferings seem to have arisen from the power of the chiefs to force their people to labor, and also from the action of the government in giving over prisoners of war to white planters to labor, in consideration of yearly contributions to the treasury; but perhaps that which shows most clearly the evil of white domination was an act of the legislature of July, 1872, which authorizes the putting of Fijians to hard labor on conviction of non-payment of poll-tax, the hard labor being a service on the plantation of a white settler.

It is right to say that though this act passed the house, it was objected to by some of the planters, who felt it to be a policy which would bring them into collision with the natives.

Under this act, as well as under a regulation by which prisoners of war were hired out to planters, natives have been consigned to temporary slavery, and the spirit of the imperial kidnapping act has been violated.

16. The body of self-appointed ministers continued in power up to March, 1872, without giving satisfaction either to whites or natives; but now Mr. Thurston, who had been acting at one time as Her Majesty’s consul and had the confidence of all parties, was asked, in the absence of Mr. Woods at Sidney, to take the chief place in the ministry. He consented, but on the return of Mr. Woods, that gentleman managed to retain his post as premier, to the great dissatisfaction of the white population.

17. To the continued want of frankness in financial matters on the part of the ministers, which was, of course, and rightly, ascribed to their inability to produce a satisfactory account, was now added a series of mismanaged native affairs, which threatened to embroil the whites with the natives to a greater extent even than the whites, by occasional strong measures against trespassers and by disputable land transactions with native chiefs, had embroiled themselves.

18. Still, Mr. Thurston’s having taken office might have led to a better state of things, had it not been for Mr. Woods’s continuance in the ministry, and also, it must be said, the continued bad success of planters with their cotton-plantations. With cotton at the high prices of 1888 and 1869, the majority of the people would have cared little how” they were governed, or how much public debt was contracted.

Throughout the group more and more dissatisfaction was felt, and the dissatisfaction was met by defiance instead of by conciliation. Mr. Thurston seems to have been animated by the sincerest desire to maintain order and the administration of law, but seems to have insisted on making the theoretic unity of Cakobau’s kingdom (an unity which was only brought into existence by the good will of the white planters) a foundation on which he sought to rest the exclusive right of Cakobau and his ministers to govern in the interest of the native population. A parade of this theory was not likely to advance their practical interests or to gain the assistance of the whites. Although the theory might deserve to be regarded with sympathy, we cannot find that, in practice, the native policy since pursued has in any way contributed to the comfort or welfare of the natives, who have openly come to us, on our journey about the coast, to complain of the impossibility of their living under the white government.

19. The state in which we find the islands is, then, the following:

A native chief has been raised to supreme power by the white population. In working a constitution under him the latter have found themselves, as a matter of fact, the disposers of the interests of the natives. A ministry, which at first rested upon the support of the whites, has, by raising an armed force, felt it possible to make itself independent of them, and has sought to govern the country en the theory of preserving native interests and treating whites as aliens. In the course of two years they have spent £124,000, and are £87,000 in debt.

The most respectable white merchants and planters have assured us of their inability to meet this debt unless an influx of capital takes place, the whole capital now invested in the country being about £250,000.

The chiefs have been induced to assume the responsibility of the debt, but could not possibly meet it, and, we feel, do not understand their liability. In the attempt to meet it the people would be reduced to worse slavery than has ever been the case before.

20. This is the state to which the government of the islands has now been brought, and we beg to reply in answer to the questions put to us by your lordship under this head.

• Q. (1.) To what extent is the actual government acknowledged throughout the islands by either the natives or by the white settlers?—A. The present government is acknowledged throughout the islands by the natives and whites; but that which we ound on our arrival was only able to keep its position by the aid which it received from the presence of one of Her Majesty’s ships. But for our influence at this moment, Maafu would probably separate himself from the government and draw the chief of Tavinni, Tui Cakau, with him.
• Q. (2.) Whether the resistance which has recently been offered to it is grounded upon a belief that it is not properly constituted, and has no sufficient title to the power which it affects to exercise, or to an objection to the persons now constituting the administration, such as would be removed by the substitution of persons possessing in a greater degree the confidence of the inhabitants?—A. Resistance seems to have been offered to it at first both on account of objections to the persons assuming posts of ministers, namely, to Mr. Woods and Mr. Burt, and also on account of the way in which they assumed those posts; and latterly, on account of personal objections to Mr. Woods and Mr. Thurston, and their extravagance and arbitrary acts. We do not think that the objections to the last form of government would be removed by the substitution of other persons, as the confidence of the settlers has been thoroughly shaken in all attempts at self-government, and we know of no persons in the impoverished state of the community, who are capable, by their trustworthiness, knowledge, and independence, to undertake the posts of permanent and nominated ministers satisfactorily.
• Q. (3.) Whether there is a reasonable prospect that a government so constituted will possess stability, and will be able to preserve order and to punish crime?—A. There is no reasonable prospect that a native government can continue to preserve order. It is, indeed, impossible for it to do so.
• Q. (4.) What securities would the Fijian government, if recognized, be prepared to give that slavery should not, in any form, directly or indirectly, exist in the islands; that kidnapping, whether carried on in ships under the Fijian flag or under other flags, should, as far as lay in their power, be effectually repressed; and that laborers imported from other islands should be humanely treated, and should only be employed in accordance with contracts freely entered into by them?—A. We have, however, asked King Cakobau’s ministers the questions to which your lordship directed our attention. Though we have received no reply, we have no doubt whatever that an affirmative one would be given by the King and chiefs.

21. Should Her Majesty’s government, however, determine on the continued recognition of a native government here, assisted by white advisers, with a view to full recognition hereafter when it can justify its claim to such recognition, then we are of opinion that Her Majesty’s consul must, for the preservation of order, be furnished with discretionary power to exert magisterial authority, and to open a court, for which the following staff would be required: An assistant judge, a law secretary, four policemen, a gaoler, a boat’s crew of natives. It would also be desirable to obtain from Cakobau a perpetual lease of his right to the island of Ovalau, so as to place it under municipal authority of ‘white residents under Her Majesty’s consul, although customs-duties should be payable to the Fijian government. Moreover, it would be necessary in such a case to send a ship to visit the islands frequently, and to employ a small vessel, constantly, if the consul found it necessary to use his discretionary power.

22. Your lordship will understand the necessity for this when we say that we are of opinion, after due inquiry, that, if Cakobau were to die, or if Her Majesty’s government do not resolve on accepting the offer of cession now made, a struggle for power would begin among the chiefs, which the whites, unaided by one of Her Majesty’s ships or other evident force, might find it impossible to direct to a peaceful issue.

23. We may, therefore, reply to questions in this branch of our inquiry:

• Q. (1.) Whether the government now holding power in Fiji would acquiesce in such an arrangement, or could properly be required to accept it?—A. The advisers of Cakobau might possibly object to such an arrangement, having an extravagant idea of their rights and responsibilities, but could properly be required to accept it, as the safety of many of Her Majesty’s subjects would be in the balance.
• Q. (2.) Whether the settlers of British origin would submit to such consular jurisdiction, or could be compelled to do so?—A. The settlers of British origin would gladly submit to the consular jurisdiction, and could be compelled to do so by the force above described, cases beyond the consul’s power to deal with being removed to the supreme court at Sydney, in the same way that the consular courts in China and Japan used to work with the supreme court at Hong-Kong.
• Q. (3.) In the event of such jurisdiction being established over British subjects, what would be the position of other persons of European origin not being British subjects?—A. The United States consul possesses magisterial powers already, and has used them until he found the local courts established. German settlers are all dependent on houses of business in Sydney, and would in all cases submit to arbitration of their consul or jurisdiction of the British consul. They are reasonable and law-abiding people.
• Q. (4.) What would be the status of vessels owned by British subjects in Fiji, and whether, in the event of such vessels being placed for any reason under the Fijian flag, Her Majesty’s government could practically refuse to recognize them, as having thereby acquired any rights or immunities which they would not possess if they remained under the British dag?—A. We think that Her Majesty’s government could interfere with such vessels were they infringing any British act, supposing that the consul had sufficient assistance; and we are sure that it would be necessary to do so.

24. If Her Majesty’s government do not finally determine to annex these islands, the only course to be pursued is, in our opinion, to give to Her Majesty’s consul the large discretionary powers and assistance above spoken of, with which he would have no difficulty in controlling the employment of Polynesian laborers, as Her Majesty’s consul is now endeavoring, but without magisterial powers, to do. By the employment of one of Her Majesty’s ships most of the plantations have been visited, and some abuses have been remedied.

The great majority of the planters have been gratified by these visits, which Commodore Goodenough has reported to the lords commissioners of the admiralty, and have been glad to see the abuses (which have not been frequent) dealt with in a summary manner.

We here feel it due to the great body of planters to say that, with regard to food, clothing, and houses, the Polynesian laborers are far better off than when on their native islands.

25. We submit to your lordship that, in the event of the refusal of Her Majesty’s government to annex these islands, the discretionary power above spoken of should be conferred upon Her Majesty’s consul without delay, as it is impossible to predict what may take place from day to day; and we think that this fact, taken in conjunction with the very brief sketch which we have given of the origin of the government here, furnishes the justification and necessity for giving such powers. But we need not point out that the use of these powers, and the interference of Her Majesty’s consul in Fijian affairs, which the use of such powers would bring about, would amount to a protectorate, and would be a protectorate of an undefined and inconvenient character.

26. We now offer a reply to your lordship’s questions under the head of the last of the four courses which are open to Her Majesty’s government, viz, the acceptance of the cession of Fiji now offered.

• Q. (1.) Whether Cakobau and the other native chiefs, and the native population generally, as well as the white settlers, desire and would acquiesce in the establishment of the authority of the British Crown over the islands? Full inquiry should be made as to the power and authority of the chiefs to make over the sovereignty.—A. We inclose a paper showing the express wish of Cakobau and other chiefs as to annexation to Great Britain. They have full power and authority to make the cession; and, were we to add anything to this we should say that the lesser chiefs and people are more anxious for annexation than the high chiefs. Some of the latter have fears of their old rights of levying contributions of food, mats, and oil, &c., being taken away without recompense. But we find generally an unwillingness to dissent from an opinion of the superior chief. We have taken the greatest pains to insure our obtaining a real record of the actual wishes of the chiefs and people, and we consider the above-named document is as accurate a representation of that wish as can possibly be obtained. The white settlers are unanimous in their wish for annexation.
• Q. (2.) What form of government is it proposed should be established in the islands, in the event of their becoming British?—A. We have not only endeavored to frame our own opinion as to what would be the best form of government for these islands, but have also consulted the principal planters and others, and we find the general wish; of the great majority to be in favor of that of a Crown colony.
• Q. (3, 5.) Is it supposed, having regard to the numbers and nationality of the white residents and of the native population, that responsible government, as it exists in the neighboring colonies, would be appropriate to Fiji; and if so, is there among the settlers a sufficient number of persons qualified to supply the materials for an elected legislature and for an executive government composed of members of that legislature?—A. (3.) We do not consider that responsible government in any form would be suited to Fiji, nor do the people, white or native, desire it. On the contrary, feeling the recent failure of representative and responsible government strongly, they unanimously wish for an executive appointed from England.
• A. (5.) Although some of the inhabitants of Levuka think that a plan of representation, akin to that now in existence in West Australia, would be best suited to the circumstances of the group, the majority of the planters outside Levuka, who are generally in small isolated groups and at a distance, are in favor of the stricter form of Crown Colony, in which the legislation is composed, as in Singapore and Ceylon, of various officers of government, natives, planters, and merchants.
• Our own recommendation is in favor of this plan, and it is obvious that it is more desirable from two points of view: first, on account of the absolute necessity that the governor should take upon himself the duty of the defense of the interests of the less intelligent natives against the inevitable pressure of an increasing white population; secondly, because the best and most industrious planters will not be found, at first, to be willing or able to sacrifice their time for the public good, and the choice of a representative of the planting community would probably fall on a merchant or other resident of Levuka, who would be rather a delegate or advocate for the district which he represented than a representative of the general requirements of the country.
• Q. 4. How, if at all, would the natives be represented in the legislature?—A. It would be advisable to give the native chiefs a strong representation in the government, to the extent of equal, or nearly equal, numbers with the white unofficial members in the legislative council. Their good-will would thus be gained, and the government would be fortified by their knowledge of their districts.
• Q. 6. What would be the probable expenses of the government?—In the appendix we give a sketch of the government and its expenses, which should suffice to begin with, leaving the improvements and enlargement of departments to follow on an increase of population. An estimate of the revenue and expenditure of the present government is also appended.
• Q. 7. What is the actual revenue now levied by the existing government? What are the sources from which it is derived? To what extent and in what manner can it be increased, and what amount of revenue can reasonably be calculated upon as permanent?—A. In appendix (Nos. 14 and 15) we give the actual revenue and expenditure of the government up to 31st December, 1873, distinguishing the sources from which the revenue is derived; but it must be remembered that this has changed continually, and that the “native taxes” have always disappointed the government.
• The customs duties may be increased from 7½ per cent, ad valorem on certain articles to 10 per cent., and the following spirits from 6s. 6d. to 12s. a gallon; wine, from 4s. to 6s. a gallon; tobacco, from 25 per cent, ad valorem to 50 per cent.
• We think that a small tax on uncultivated land should be re-imposed, after a survey has been made, and that the tax on cultivated land should be a local tax for the support of roads, bridges, piers, and wharves within the province where collected. Both these have been lately taken off.
• Q. 8. In what hands is the control over the revenue and expenditure to be lodged; especially how far such control, in any circumstances, be exercised from this country?—A. The control of such revenue and expenditure would be lodged in the hands of the governor in council, subject to the ultimate approval of the secretary of state; and it would only be necessary that control should be exerted by the secretary of state in cases of the contraction of a fresh loan or the undertaking of operations, public works, &c., which would necessitate a loan and a large expenditure.
• Henceforth Fiji will probably be at a distance of forty days from England by mail, a lapse of time which would not seriously interfere with obtaining the authority of the secretary of state.

27. We append a statement of the whole indebtedness or liability of the country. We have informed the white residents of the amount, and they have declared to us, more or less formally at different places, their willingness to acknowledge their responsibility for it, as well as for the expenses of a future government.

28. We have been so fortunate as to obtain the assistance of two gentlemen, namely, Mr. Carl L. Sahl, a gentleman connected with mercantile firms in Sydney, and Mr. Thomas Horton, manager of the Fiji Bank, in the investigation of the accounts, and they have given us a report, which we inclose.

29. The greater part of the debt, in fact almost all, has been contracted for the purposes of the white settlers, and the portion which alone can be set to the account of natives has been used far more for the benefit of the native chiefs (and principally Cakobau) than for that of the actual people. The guarantees for the debt in general are laid upon the revenues of the country, the public lands of the country, and the private lands of the King; and we consider that the contribution of such lands, on the part of Cakobau and others, would be a sufficient share of the guarantee to fallen the natives. They contribute also to the revenue by their labor.

30. The extent of public land is, as will be seen, very small, and the chief security for one portion of the debt is what has been, called the private lands of the King, but which are not strictly private. King Cakobau has rights of seignory over them, and is powerful enough to be able to remove and satisfy the population, but it is not more than a powerful lord of the manor. It would neither be just nor wise to allow the mortgagee to foreclose, but if the Crown could purchase any of them hereafter by private agreement it would be advantageous to do so.

31. With regard to the validity of the engagements entered into with the lenders of the money, as much as was borrowed by the issue of debentures was borrowed in due and legal form under an act of legislature. The debt to the Fiji Bank was incurred when that bank took up treasury notes. The whole of the charter to that bank is matter for dispute, inasmuch as there was no power to grant it, and also that the preamble gives as reasons for the illegal power exerted, that which is not fact, however much the framers of that preamble may have believed it to be so. Still we think that the advantages offered to and taken by the Fiji Banking Company were not so excessive as to invalidate, morally, its claim to confirmation, save and except the exclusive privilege of banking and exemption from taxation, both of which are detrimental to the public interest, and should not be confirmed. The company is styled “The Fiji Banking and Commercial Company, limited.” As a commercial company or agency it would have power to buy land and import merchandise. There is, therefore, a very strong objection to the latter part of Article 13, which confers to one company or firm the exclusive privilege of exemption from every duty, tax, and impost—a privilege equaled only by that formerly enjoyed by the East India Company.

32. The circumstances connected with the loan of £25,000, issued at Sydney, which produced £18,500, should be more fully related, in order that your lordship may have an opportunity of forming an opinion upon them.

On the 25th July, 1872, a bill (No. 31) which had been introduced into the legislative assembly of Fiji, was passed, empowering government to contract a loan of $250,000 on pledge of public lands.

In pursuance of an authority given under this act, Mr. Woods, then premier, went to Sydney and endeavored to float the loan. The amount raised was to be used to take up former debentures to erect public buildings, and to engage in reproductive works. Mr. Woods found it impossible to place more than $125,000, or £25,000, at 80 to 90 per cent., and could only float that sum by pledging all of what was considered Cakobau’s private lands, as well as whatever existed of public land.

The persons who negotiated the loan seem to have had doubts of the freedom of any land to be devoted to such a purpose, and asked certain questions of Mr. Woods, who, on the 7th September, 1872, made the following replies:

• Q. If the proposed security for the loan consists of land, can you show that such laud has been specially reserved for such purpose?—A. The whole of the public domain is free of liability, saving and excepting 5,000 acres in the island of Ovalau. No lands have yet been sold by the government of Fiji.
• Q. Describe the position and character of such land, with plans and full particulars. Also state when and by whom it was surveyed.—A. The territory of the kingdom of Fiji is comprised in seventy-two islands, containing an area of 4,450,000 acres approximately, out of which 800,000 acres are alienated to white corporations and settlers, and 600,000 acres are held privately by His Majesty the King, his chiefs and people, leaving a balance of over 3,000,000 acres of land, about 500,000 acres of which consists of barren and unfruitful lands, such as mountainous and rocky lands that cannot be cultivated. The lands have not been trigonometrically surveyed; they have been roughly surveyed and examined to test the accuracy of the admiralty and American surveys, and those surveys were found correct approximately last year by the New Zealand and admiralty surveyors, invited by the King and people to proceed there to survey and test the capabilities of the islands.

33. We have requested Mr. Woods to explain to us how he could give the negotiators to understand that large areas of public land existed, over which the security was to extend, and he, in reply, read to us a resolution of the privy council (composed at that time of Cakobau and other chiefs and the white ministers) which recites that the chiefs agree that measures shall be taken to restrict the native occupiers to the lands which they require for cultivation, and that all remaining lands shall pass into the hands of the government. If any attempt were made, even now, to proceed upon such a resolution, the greatest distress and disturbance would be the result. To proceed upon it would be to revolutionize the country and to attack the best known and most keenly felt right of the Fijians; and the resolution can only be looked upon as an attempt, by a number of white men, looked up to by their native colleagues as supremely wise in these matters, to create a property on paper which did not exist in fact, and could not be created without engaging in unjust war.

But when an attempt was made by the ministers, through Mr. Woods, to act upon the paper title thus created, another responsibility was incurred.

A case for opinion was submitted to Sir William Manning, of Sydney, New South Wales, by the negotiators of the loan, and Sir William Manning gave an opinion, of which the following is an extract:

“The first of Mr. A.’s points is that he is not aware of the existence of any crown or public lands sufficient and competent to form the subject of the mortgage on public lands which forms part of the securities. This of course depends upon matters of fact upon which I can have no knowledge. But it is clear that if Mr. A. be right, then the act (No. 17, cap. 2) on the subject of the disposal of the Government lands is a baseless enactment, while that (No. 31) by which the loan was authorized, ‘on the pledges of such of the public lands as the King might assent to,’ was equally baseless, and was a positive snare to the contemplated lenders; and so also the statement made to the lenders by the authority of the Government, as to the existence of large areas of public lands over which the security was to extend, was a falsehood and a delusion.”

We cannot do otherwise than concur in Sir William Manning’s opinion, and we add that the area “of public lands, which is now, after great efforts have been made by the chiefs, nominally 450,000 acres, was in 1872 only about 10,000 acres, exclusive of 5,000 acres already mortgaged; also that the right and power of government over this land was by no means undisputed.

34. We now pass to the consideration of the force which would be necessary to be employed for the preservation of life and protection of property. We have found in the employment of Government a force of 750 men under 18 Europeans of all classes. The former are natives of Fiji, with the exception of a few Tongans. They drill and march well, and are stated by Mr. Swanston (late minister for native affairs) and other Europeans who were with them, to have shown courage and steadiness in a mountain campaign last year, (1873.)

The only purpose for which they are likely to be called into play is to subdue the remaining mountaineers, and to enforce the payment of taxes. The whole native population is estimated at 140,500, and the mountainers at 20,000; and the whole force employed last year was 12 to 18 Europeans, (officers and volunteers,) 160 drilled natives, and from 1,000 to 3,000 auxiliaries. This force was found to be sufficient to pass without a check to the heart of the mountain tribes, with but slight loss, and to capture and burn all the villages they passed.

35. We do not consider that for ordinary purposes a larger force than 300 native police would be required, under 6 Europeans. The necessity for the employment of so large a number as 750 has been urged upon us by the ministers, who, although they rested their right to govern upon the theory of their being a native government and the protectors of natives, have yet found it necessary to exhibit military force at the collection of taxes. This ought to, and would, be unnecessary under a proper government, and the numbers named above might be diminished to 300; or, if kept up would be sufficient for a larger white population, employing a much greater number of laborers than at present. Among these it may be expected that crimes would increase with an increase of numbers.

36. The subjugation of the mountaineers and their partial removal to other parts might be a necessity during one of the first years of a colonial government, and this would very easily be effected by mustering and drilling about 400 men in November, and giving instructions to the friendly towns farthest inland to provide food by growing extra yams, &c. This force should begin its work in May, and would completely, and with ease, remove all the remaining mountain villages, which are likely to give trouble, in a single short campaign, always supposing that the approach by more friendly methods were rejected. Fijian soldiers, with a small number of Europeans as leaders, would be ample for this purpose. A few of the naval and marine officers on the station could well undertake the command of such a temporary force, and satisfactorily conclude the campaign with a minimum of bloodshed, and, the object being to make the interior secure to future settlers, the expense might be borne by Her Majesty’s government.

37. The cost of the police force of 300 men should not exceed £3,000 a year. Besides the police force, it would be well to have two small colonial vessels for mail and police purposes; and for the first two or three years, one of Her Majesty’s schooners would be of great assistance to the executive for the regulation of the labor-traffic. This vessel would be available for visits to the New Hebrides, where twenty to twenty-five English settlers are already established, who have no consular officer or other supervision.

38. We think that the commission of the governor of Fiji should give him authority over the persons and acts of British subjects in the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands, or the islands of the Pacific south of the equator and west of the meridian of 168° west longitude, (except New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands, which are under the French Hag.) This would be very satisfactory to Englishmen living in those islands, who would then be able to refer their disputes to the courts of Fiji, and would be able to register vessels and take out licenses to carry laborers in a regular way, whereas they are now doing so either by stealth or through the fiction of a French flag and registers obtained from New Caledonia.

Your lordship will remember that the abuses in the labor-traffic have taken place through the rapacity of the ship owner or master, and should not be laid entirely or chiefly to the account of the planters, who, as we have before remarked, treat their laborers, for the most part, kindly.

In the New Hebrides group of islands, laborers are easily hired to go from one island to another, although they cannot be persuaded to work-on the island of which they are natives; and a distinct set of licenses is required for this inter-island traffic. The experience of the Fijian colonial local officers would enable them to regulate such a traffic. The formation of a center of law and order could not fail to have a good influence in this part of the South Seas, where the number of adventurers in various pursuits is yearly increasing; and, in consideration of the duties to be performed by the executive and courts of law, some assistance might be given by the imperial government to the future colonial government of Fiji.

39. We have made the native tenure and ownership of land in Fiji the subject of attentive study; and have obtained from Mr. John B. Thurston, and also from Mr. C. R. Forwood and other gentlemen, explanations and papers on this subject worthy of consideration. These will put before your lordship the state of native tenures, prior to whites coining here. Purchases have been made from natives to a large extent, as will, be seen by an accompanying statement, but there remain still considerable tracts of unoccupied lands, though, as is said with perfect accuracy by Mr. Pritchard, formerly Her Majesty’s consul in Fiji:

“Every inch of land in Fiji has an owner. Every parcel or tract of land has a name, and the boundaries are defined and well known. The proprietorship rests in families, the heads of families being the representatives of the title. Every member of a family can use the land attaching to the family. Thus the heads of families are the nominal owners; the whole family are the actual occupiers. The family land maintains the whole family, and the members maintain the head of the family.”^*

40. In order to make a purchase secure and beyond the possibility of dispute, present customs would require the assembly of the following persons, viz: The great chief or his representative, the lesser chiefs, and the principal men of the adjacent town. These should walk over the land, define it, and conclude the sale on the spot. The natives should then build a house or plant yams for the purchaser, in recognition of his lordship over the soil.

The strict value of the rights of each party to this agreement varies according to the power of the chiefs in different parts of the group. In some places the chief would be strong enough to make the sale alone, and to give possession to a foreigner, receiving all the purchase-money and removing the natives by force to other lands; but, in general, as things now stand, if the purchaser were to deal with the great chief alone, he would only buy his rights as lord of the manor, or whatever they might be, and would not acquire exclusive possession of the soil.

On the other hand, were he to purchase from the people without consulting the superior chief, he would not be recognized by the latter, who would probably try to sell over his head.

Since the formation of the government here in 1871, regulations for the issue of Crown grants have been made and acted upon. Mr. Thurston has asked that the Crown grants already issued may be confirmed, but we are of opinion that each case should be examined afresh on its own merits. Apart from the question of the legality of these Crown grants, which is more than doubtful, we know of the issue of a Crown grant on very disputable grounds. Not more than twenty such grants have been issued.

41. We are informed by the existing government that at one of the early meetings of the chiefs in council after the formation of the present government, a resolution was agreed to by which all the natives were to be gradually confined within limits of land sufficient for their support, and that all lands outside these limits were to be considered government property; but nothing has followed this resolution. We mention it again because we wish to point out the dangers which would have resulted had it been carried into effect. To interfere with the possession of land in this way would be to attack one of the oldest and best-understood rights of the natives, and would entail the prosecution of a most unjust war.

No chief had either the right or power to dispose of the land of the lesser chiefs and people, without their consent, in this wholesale fashion. It is true that much of the land is uncultivated and unoccupied; but, of course, the natives who could show just claim to it have a right to its disposal. The only sense in which the resolution above referred to could be acted upon would be the following, and that only in future years, namely, that after a liberal appropriation of land to a town or village, a small tax should be laid on the unoccupied remainder laid claim to, with the option of selling to government on valuation, and this could only be done if the same principle were applied to the unoccupied land of white proprietors.

Many portions of land now claimed by whites are still held on doubtful tenure, and are in dispute, either with natives or with other whites, and these doubts arise either from the incomplete manner in which the purchase was first made by whites, or from the very incomplete survey taken of the islands when the purchases were made; there being some instances in which the purchase was made from the wrong persons, and others in which the title-deeds of adjacent properties set forth that their boundaries extend along lines drawn at right angles to the shore. Thus where the shore is irregular, a segment, common to both properties, is included in each title-deed.

42. Hence it will be evident that the first step in the land-policy of a colonial government will be the accurate survey of the islands; and we suggest that the hydrographic portion should be completed by Her Majesty’s government, if the local government, undertakes the cadastral survey.

43. Replying, then, to the questions which your lordship has proposed to us:

• Q. (1.) Whether the title to land is fully vested in the King and chiefs?—A. The title to the land is not fully vested in the King and chiefs.
• Q. (2.) Whether there are any tribal rights or local customs which affect or limit their power to grant and dispose of it?—A. Their power is limited by custom, though, the limits have often been disregarded where a powerful chief has been offered a sufficient inducement by a European, as well as in course of native customs and vasus.
• Q. (3.) Whether it is proposed that unalienated land shall be absolutely surrendered to the Queen, or shall continue to remain in the hands of its native owners until conveyed to private purchasers?—A. It is proposed that certain lands shall be conveyed to the Queen, but that all other land should remain in the hands of the native owners until private purchasers, or the Crown itself, become the possessors, in the mode we have above indicated for future consideration. It would be most desirable that no purchase should take place from natives, but through the intervention of the Crown, as in New Zealand.
• Q. (4.) On what terms and conditions is land now occupied or owned by white settlers?—A. For the most part, the land held by white settlers has been purchased. But there are exceptions to this rule, in case of land which is called the private property of Cakobau himself, and also in the case of the land under authority of Maafu, in the Windward Islands. This is held by Europeans on long leases of forty to fifty years.
• Q. (5.) What proportion of the land in the islands is in such occupation, and what amount remains available for future settlement?—A. The proportion of land in the possession of whites is given in an inclosed schedule, which we have had corrected from a table prepared by the government. Most of the best lands have, of course, been already secured, though not all cultivated; but there remain large areas of good soil, fit for coffee, cotton, sugar, &c., in the hands of natives, in addition to the large acreage of first-class land conveyed to Europeans, but uncleared, (as shown in schedule,) much of which would be sold, on annexation, to clear the remainder from incumbrance, and to obtain capital for renewed enterprise.

45. We can add nothing to the excellent report of Dr. Seemann on the capabilities of the soil. His predictions have been amply fulfilled by experience.

The natives have cultivated nothing but their own food and a few necessaries for centuries past, but Europeans have grown cotton with success, until the heavy fall in price, which has reduced many of them to absolute poverty, and has prevented their embarking in new industries.

A single sample of ten tons of sugar has been produced and sent to Australia, and two mills are now being erected, three more having been ordered. Every planter is making an experiment of a small acreage of cane, of which there are several indigenous varieties of good quality; and men who have experience of cane-growing in Queensland and in the West Indies have pronounced a very favorable opinion on the quality of the Fijian cane. There can be no doubt whatever that sugar will be the chief industry of the best lands of Viti Levu, Taviuni, and Vanua Levu, while cotton remains the staple produce of the Windward and smaller islands.

We have been assured by representatives of good houses in Sydney, that they are prepared to advance money to planters for the cultivation of sugar, and to erect crushing-mills immediately, if it were known that the government would be taken by Her Majesty. On the other hand, we are assured by many planters that if the country be not annexed, they will not obtain advances and will be obliged to leave the islands.

46. Your lordship will observe that though a large area of land (854,958 acres) is owned by whites, yet only 16,524 acres are under cultivation. This cultivation employs a population of 1,500 whites, and, therefore, we may suppose that if the whole were under cultivation, about 25,000 whites would be employed, and that the laborers, all or nearly all of whom must be imported from other parts, would increase to 200,000 or 260,000.

The lands not yet cleared include a great portion of the very finest soil, both on the Reiva River and also on Taviuni, admirably fitted for sugar-plantations; also other land well adapted for coffee and spices.

47. In connection with this subject we have considered the possibility of an English population retaining a healthy condition in these islands. We inclose a report by Dr. A. B. Messer, staff-surgeon of Her Majesty’s ship Pearl, by which it will be seen that there is at present no disease in the islands, except dysentery, which, in many cases, is distinctly traceable to the influence of insufficient animal food and immoderate use of spirits. Families of British subjects are numerous, and although it cannot be said that children are so strong as in more temperate climates, yet they are healthy. Many settlers follow their employment as planters, overseers, and laborers all day in the open air, but we have not heard of a case of heat-apoplexy.

48. Tables of shipping and commerce, made out in the government offices, are appended to this report.

49. We have nothing to add to the statements previously made to Her Majesty’s government, and published in England, on the subject of the claim of the United States against King Cakobau—a claim which was unfairly made and unfairly pressed, and which has led to speculations of a questionable character.

50. The Melbourne association, called the Polynesia Land Company, has been put in possession of 90,000 acres of, not the best, but, generally speaking, fair land. It claims 110,000 acres more.

A copy of a charter from King Cakobau to the agents of the company is inclosed, together with a resolution of the cabinet.

It appears by published papers that the promoters of the scheme were fully warned by Mr. Thurston, then acting British consul, of the inability of Cakobau to carry out the engagement which he entered into with them, and of the futility of his promises. It seems fair, however, that the subscribers of the £9,000, which was actually paid to Cakobau, should not lose, and that a commission should settle by arbitration the amount of land to be handed over to complete what is due to the company. Very little of the land given to it is as yet occupied.

If about 20,000 acres of fair land were handed over in addition to that already held, we think that the actual subscribers would probably be fairly remunerated, though it is, we think, a matter on which only a duly-qualified commission should pronounce an opinion.

The whole of this matter (that is the Polynesia Land Company) has been treated of in the report of Colonel Smythe in an excellent article on Fiji by Captain Hope, R. N., in Blackwood’s Magazine for July, 1869, and in an appendix to “Fiji and the Fijians,” by the Rev. James Calvert, Wesleyan missionary.^*

It is impossible that there can be a second opinion as to the injustice of the claim of citizens of the United States to the sum of £9,000 exacted from Cakobau.

51. With regard to the imposition of a land tax, we find that taxes on land have already been levied and assented to, those lately in force being 10 per cent, on assessed annual value of lands of absentees, and 2½ per cent, on assessed annual value of lands of residents. But we should add that, with a scattered group of islands such as this, it would meet the wishes of residents, and seem just that all taxes on cleared lands should be local, and for the maintenance of local public works, all of which should be under local boards, and that the tax on uncleared land alone should go to the general treasury. The tax on uncleared lands would thus decrease as the prosperity of the country increased, and would merely be an inducement to holders to sell their land to those who intend to be actual occupiers. The land tax could not be reckoned on as a large contribution to the public revenue.

52. Your lordship has particularly directed us to ascertain and point out what position the chiefs would bold if the islands were brought under the British government.

We have made very lengthened explanations to Cakobau and others of the native chiefs, and have ascertained, both from themselves and from independent whites well acquainted with their habits and modes of thought, especially Mr. Thurston, what their real wishes would be.

We inclose a statement of those expectations, made out by Mr. Thurston in the names of the chiefs. The latter understand little or nothing of these matters and of amounts of money, nor do they nor can they foresee the effect which the advent of a colonial government and the increase of foreign population will produce on the old native customs and respect paid to them.

The chiefs are obliged to trust their future to Her Majesty’s government, (in Cakobau’s own words to us, “He trusts in the generosity and justice of Her Majesty’s government,”) and they ask white advisers to hell) them to secure their interests, which in this matter Mr. Thurston has faithfully represented.

The old position of the great body of natives toward their chiefs is one of undefined serfdom, moderated by certain customs. A chief has food brought to him and to his followers, and has always been accustomed to exact contributions of mats, oil, &c., from those who look to him as their head. These contributions, which are necessarily vexatious, because uncertain and arbitrary, have been and are still made at the present time, and are greatly valued by the chiefs as perhaps the greatest proof of superiority they can show. We have endeavored to explain to them that this could not be allowed to continue in force under a British governor; but we doubt whether our assurances are either fully believed or understood. The idea is still new to them, and it is certain that the system can only be altered for one of direct salaries very gradually.

Any abrupt general change in this direction would weaken the authority of the chiefs, who are now, and should be for some time to come, the rulers of their own people under the central government.

The old system should, in short, be allowed to exist on sufferance, unacknowledged, but, except in the case of extreme exactions, not interfered with. To abolish it would be to take away the foundation of social order. It will die out as the European population increases.

53. There can be no doubt that, of necessity, the authority and ease of a chief’s position must vanish unless he is utilized in the administration of the government of the natives, and that, even when he is thus made use of, he will gradually lose many of his old privileges.

From this point of view it does not seem to us that the sums asked for the chiefs, which may at first seem large, are excessive.

It is certain, that they must gradually lose their customary tribute, and unless there be something to replace this, which is of great value as being such a forcible and evident proof of chieftainship, their authority must suffer.

54. In explanation of the item of £1,000 asked for Cakobau to purchase a vessel, we may explain that two vessels which he once possessed have been lately wrecked, and that it is his great desire to have another, as he alone of all the higher chiefs is without one.

55. We think that the continuance of £2,000 a year to Cakobau’s successor should be contingent on his doing the duties of native governor of Viti Levu.

56. The white persons referred to in this stipulation for compensation are, (1st,) Mr. C. St. Julian, the present chief justice. He was formerly law-reporter for the Sydney Morning Herald, in Sydney, and was specially invited to come here on assurance of an income of £750 a year. He was not educated for the bar. We do not think it would be advisable to retain him in his post, but we think that on account of his services, and as he cannot return to his former position in Sydney, he is entitled to some consideration; (2d,) Mr. T. H. Garrick, associate judge of the supreme court, has been regularly called to the bar. He was invited to come here on assurance of a salary. He might be advantageously employed under government, but we do not think he has any claim to compensation, if not so employed, beyond a fair allowance for loss of time in seeking other employment.

57. Your lordship will observe that there is no mention made in this paper (Appendix No. 2) of Maafu, who was and is still the chief of the Windward Islands, and it is necessary here to explain the omission.

Maafu, as your lordship may be aware, is a Tongan chief, who came to Fiji about 1848, and who has by tact and force made himself master of the windward part of the group. There can be no doubt that had it not been for the influence of white men, and for the direct interposition of the foreign consuls and ships of war, Maafu would before this have been the principal if not the sole chief of Fiji.

His rule in his own district is more absolute than that of any other chief, and he shows greater ability than others in governing his people, as well as in the management of his property.

The Fijian chiefs have always been jealous of his influence and position. They sought to make use of British influence to get rid of him in 1862, and are now again most desirous of having him turned out of the country, thinking no doubt that they will be able to make use of our presence here to do so.^* In his own district, however, he is greatly looked up to, and is not disliked by the lesser chiefs; and he is respected and liked by the white planters.

Some time since we explained to Mr. Thurston, as King Cakobau’s adviser, that Her Majesty’s government could only look upon those people as chiefs whom they found actually exercising authority as such, and there can be no doubt that Maafu is a chief, and the undisputed chief of the Windward group of islands.

He was not present at the signature of the document containing the offer of cession, as he had quitted Levuka before the offer was made; but he had already given us a paper, confirming his spoken wish and opinion, that the islands should be offered to Great Britain.

We think that he would be the proper person to retain in the position of chief of Lau, or the Windward group, though he has not attempted to make terms for himself.

He has hitherto been in nominal receipt of £800 a year, and has probably made much more than that by contributions from natives. We think that he should receive as much as Ratu Abel or Tui Cakau, if an English collector and magistrate be appointed to assist him.

Ulu Lakeba, the chief named in Mr. Thurston’s paper accompanying the offer of cession, is simply a chief of the island of Lakeba, and has acted hitherto under Maafu, against whom he dares not do anything.

It is true that Maafu is a Tongan and a stranger, and that he did not inherit his land, but acquired it by force, stratagem, and judicious alliances; but, except that Cakobau is a Fijian, and therefore of the same blood as the rest of the people, his position in, and claims over, the Yasawas or Leeward group are no better than those of Laafu over the Windward Islands.

It would please the Fijian chiefs to see Maafu expelled, but the rights of the latter in Lau are as good as many of theirs elsewhere, and his personal government of his own portion of the group is much more real and evident than that of any other chief in Fiji.

58. The system under which the local government is at present carried on in the provinces is the following: It does not seem to have contemplated doing more than the collection of taxes and the rough administration of justice.

The islands, up to the beginning of this year, were divided into twelve provinces, and in each province a native chief was appointed as governor, with an European secretary. The secretary received £200 a year, and the governor (contingent on his getting in all his native taxes) was to get £300 a year. An unpaid warden of each province was appointed from among the white planters, many of whom were made justices of the peace and sat on the bench with native colleagues.

About January last the government endeavored to establish commissioners with more complete control over the districts than the wardens had had; these commissioners were to be paid £300 to £400 a year. They were to have complete civil and military control over natives and foreigners, and to hold a court assisted by a native colleague.

We do not think this scheme advisable or necessary with the present limited population. We consider that the establishment of a stipendiary magistrate in the more thickly populated districts, and the renewal of the issue of commissions of the peace to white planters in other parts, would be sufficient for the maintenance of order.

59. Your lordship has asked for a statement of the moral condition of the native population, and has adverted to the crime which existed at the time of Colonel Smythe’s report. The improvement since that time has been very great indeed. Of the 140,500 which constitutes the outside limit of the native population, 120,000 have lotued, namely, professed a wish to become Christians and have accepted a Christian teacher. They are docile and fairly intelligent, and are physically stout, well-built men, of larger frames than the inhabitants of the New Hebrides or Solomon Islands, and quite equal, if not superior, to the inhabitants of the groups of islands to the eastward. There can be no fear whatever of a collision between them and white planters. Among these the practices of cannibalism, strangulation of widows, and infanticide have wholly ceased. Among the Kai Colos, or mountain tribes, who are variously stated as numbering 10,000 to 20,000 people, it is believed that these practices still continue, though there are some families who have never, from time immemorial, followed the custom of eating human flesh. The Kai Colos are confined to the mountains of Viti Levu only.

Our estimates of numbers have been taken from missionary sources. The chairman of the Wesleyan Mission Board, the Rev. Frederick Langham, who has very kindly assisted us on several occasions, has told us that the returns of attendants at church worship number 113,000. These returns, which are sent in by native ministers and teachers, are in fact a census, as every person in a “lotued” town goes to church and every woman takes her child. The estimate arrived at from this source is the same as that given us by Mr. Thurston, and appears more definite and exact than could be expected.

60. We cannot speak of the missionary body, which has labored for some thirty-eight years among these people, without recording our admiration of the zeal, intrepidity, and devotion which have characterized their work here. It is to the influence of their teaching that the great progress which we have recorded is due. We have visited the schools and training-institutions which they have established, and have found them to be thoroughly well-conducted and adapted to their purpose. We have been informed that it is intended to erect a school for sons of chiefs, in connection with the training institution at Navuloa, and we heartily commend such an establishment to the protection of the future colonial government, should Her Majesty think fit to accept the cession now made.

61. The estimate of the numbers of Kai Colos is a very uncertain one, and we believe it to have been overestimated. The Rev. Mr. Langham thinks that they may number about 7,000. These tribes are scattered, have continual quarrels with each other, and are not in the smallest degree dangerous, although their depredations might become annoying. They have been very rarely visited by white men. We have before pointed out that they should be visited by an armed force and should be summoned to “soro,” or give in their allegiance to the government, and that teachers should be sent among them.

62. We may mention here that, during 1873, some of these Kai Colos were taken prisoners, were tried for treason and rebellion, and, after being sentenced to penal servitude for periods of from three to seven years, were offered to planters as laborers, under certain regulations, for a hire which was to be paid to government. This was considered by Commodore Goodenough as a form of slavery, and he issued warning to British subjects, which stopped the hiring of these men. They remained as prisoners in various districts, living in temporary huts; and allotments of land, on which they can build and plant, must be found for them, as it might be unsafe for them to return to their own villages. They number about 1,000 men, women, and children.

Under old native customs such prisoners as these would have been allotted to the victorious party as domestic slaves for life. Under this government they have been allotted to work for a fixed period as field-hands.

63. Commodore Goodenough has sent to the lords commissioners of the admiralty a chart of the Fiji Islands, upon which all the latest information has been collected by Navigating-Lieutenant Henry Hosken, of Her Majesty’s ship Pearl; the emendations to the hydrography having been taken from his own observations and those of Mr. Cox, commanding the Wesleyan missionary vessel Jubilee; and the greater part of the topography from a map constructed by Mr. J. B. Thurston, from his own observations. We have shown upon this chart the places we have visited, and we request that copies of it may be appended to this report when the chart is printed.

64. We have now given replies to the questions put prominently forward in our instructions; and, in conclusion, we beg to assure your lordship that we can see no prospect for these islands, should Her Majesty’s government decline to accept the offer of cession, but ruin to the English planters and confusion in the native government.

As a crown colony, we think that Fiji would certainly become a prosperous settlement.

In addition to the great advantages of soil and climate which we have enumerated, the geographical position of Fiji has caused it to be chosen as a place of rendezvous for the steamers performing the mail service from California to New Zealand and New South Wales.

With the single exception of the beautiful and fertile island of Tavinui, the coasts abound in secure and admirable harbors, well known to the residents, and only requiring the continuation of an accurate survey to make them accessible to strangers.

We have the honor to be, my lord, your lordship’s most obedient humble servants,

• JAMES C. GOODENOUGH,
  Captain and Commodore 2d Class, Commanding Australian Station.
• E. L. LAYARD,
  Her Majesty’s Consul for Fiji and Tonga.

To the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 590.]

the fiji islands.

House of Lords, Friday, July 17.

[From the Times, Saturday, July 18, 1874.]

The Earl of Carnarvon, on rising to call attention to the report of the commissioners on the cession of the Fiji Islands to the British Crown, said:

My Lords: I wish, in the first place, to make a sort of explanation in reference to what might otherwise appear to be an intentional departure from an engagement. I asked a few evenings ago to lay the papers connected with this subject on the table of your lordships’ house in sufficient time to enable noble lords to read them before I made my statement. I promised to do so; but since then I have found that, owing to some mistake, they were not delivered to your lordships till this morning. That being so, however inconvenient it might have been to defer my statement, I would not have proceeded with it without the consent of noble lords who have taken an interest in these islands. It is owing to their forbearance I now proceed to make a statement to your lordships, which I will endeavor to render as brief as possible. Your lordships are aware of the geographical position and character of the Fiji Islands, Their history and present state may be shortly described. It is some twenty years since they were colonized by English settlers who had come from adjacent colonies. Some of these colonists bought land and set about improving the places in which they now live; but, as is sure to happen in all such cases, jealousies sprang up and difficulties were experienced, and from time to time appeals have been made to this country to take the islands under its direct protection. The first formal proposal for a cession dates back, I think, to 1859. At that time Consul Pritchard, acting very much on his own authority, encouraged and indorsed a cession of those islands. I think Lord John Russell was colonial secretary then, and he declined the offer. In the following year Colonel Smythe, a very distinguished officer, was sent out to inquire as to the advisability of annexing those islands. He drew up a report, which is now in print, and in which, on the whole, he gave his opinion against our accepting the cession. Two years after, in 1862, the offer was definitely declined. Time passed, and in 1870 a conference of Australian colonies was held, a noble lord who took a great interest in this subject presiding over that conference. The opinions then expressed were very favorable to annexation. In 1871, a formal oiler being then made, it was again declined by my noble friend, the Earl of Kimberley, who was then at the colonial office. In 1872 the offer was once more renewed, and my then noble friend, in consequence of the interest which was then felt in the matter, sent out two commissioners, whose report is now on the table. I should here state that from about the year 1865 repeated attempts had been made in the islands themselves to establish some form of government. In 1871 a constitution was established, and it was, I think, a constitution not at all fitted to the circumstances and the people. It was an imitation of the system of government in this country, and the machinery of a constitution was applied. With the government in operation, a certain number of white settlers came to the head of affairs. No doubt that form of government was established with the view of securing the pre-eminence of the white settlers over the natives. But, as is often the case in such attempts, that wish was frustrated. Those at the head of affairs having armed a native force, oppressed the white settlers, and pursued a course of still greater oppression toward the natives—oppression so great that it drove some of those people to commit suicide. There were disorder and confusion all around. Such was the state of things when the commissioners appointed by my noble friend arrived there, and there can be no doubt their presence at such a time was beneficial. Immediately before their arrival there had been a change of government; but this second government succeeded no better than the first. After several meetings, at which fresh offers were made, the commissioners brought matters to an issue, and ascertained that the unanimous feeling of the settlers was in favor of a cession of the islands to this country. I do not mean to say that the report of the commissioners is, in my opinion, an altogether satisfactory one, I do not think the calculations of the commissioners are so reliable that we can trust to them on all important points, and I do not think the mode in which the cession is proposed to be made is one to which your lordships would be disposed to accede. But the report is before us, and we must deal with it, and it is my duty to lay before your lordships the view which Her Majesty’s government take and the decision at which they have arrived. The question is, what course ought to be taken? In considering this I wish to draw attention to no fewer than four considerations. The first is that of the different alternatives in the form of a government; the second is the probable objections to a cession; the third is the reasonable arguments which may be urged in its favor; and the fourth is the conditions of acceptance if a cession is to be accepted. As to the alternatives, I see four. One of them was indicated in the dispatch of my noble friend to the commissioners. I refer to the establishment of consular courts—a plan which has been tried in Japan and China. Now, at best, such courts only exercise a feeble and inadequate control. In the case of these islands, such a plan could be regarded as no more than a stop-gap at best, and ultimately it would be necessary to substitute another form of government. The second alternative is one which seems to have found favor with my noble friend opposite, though there has been a somewhat doubtful experience of it in other instances. I allude to the annexation of those islands to some of the neighboring Australian colonies, to be governed by the colony to which it was annexed. When my noble friend suggested that, no doubt he had before his eyes one or two precedents which had not been successful. The colony of South Australia does at this moment hold a dependency in a district of North Australia, at a thousand miles’ distance by land, and the difficulties of government arising from such a distance by land are not less than would be the difficulties arising from a distance of a thousand miles by sea. There was another instance—that of a new colony in South Africa, the government of which was to have been administered at the Cape. However, that scheme has never been carried out, and the new colony was still administered by the colonial office. There is an objection to this plan on another ground. As it seems to me those colonies in Australia are not yet arrived at a state of development which would fit them for administering the government of fresh colonies. Their own institutions are not arrived at such a stage that they could conveniently or in a satisfactory manner discharge such a trust. That is my view of the matter. The third alternative is to at once make the islands a crown colony. I can only say that if we are to accept them no form of government can be entertained for them but that of a crown colony. Looking at the past history and to the future of those islands, I should say that a crown colony of a rather severe type is the foini that should be adopted. There remains the fourth and last alternative, namely, leaving the islands to themselves. My lords, I think this last alternative is simply impossible under present circumstances. Civil war in those islands has been prevented only by the presence of one of the ships of the royal navy. There are English settlers there in such numbers, English capital is so largely embarked, and English interests are so much involved in the peace of the islands that it would not be safe to fold our arms and say we should not interfere. But, my lords, I must now state some of the difficulties. In an interesting description of those islands written by a botanist and geologist who visited them, I fine; the author states that in no place ever visited by him had he found it harder to arrive at the truth than he had in the Fiji Islands. Having myself read a good deal about them, I agree with the author as to that difficulty. Again, there are obvious practical difficulties. There ar 200 islands, and the native population is 160,000. Of these, 140,000 are in a state of comparative civilization, but the same cannot be said of the remaining 20,000, who live in the mountains. Experience teaches us that there are considerable difficulties of government when there is a small colony of settlers surrounded by a large native population; but I think the problem is not so difficult in this case as in others which I could name. The natives are scattered over 200 islands; they are divided in feeling by certain local jealousies, and with the exception of the 20,000 mountaineers, they are a milder and gentler class of natives than those with whom we had to deal in New Zealand. The old and barbarous customs are dying out. A few years ago widows were strangled, whole villages were massacred, and cannibalism was practiced. That is al gone. Idolatrous temples have been demolished, and in the great square where idolatrous orgies were celebrated a Christian church has been erected. I am bound to point out that great difficulty lies in the question of land. The public land is small in extent, and the private land is complicated by relations and claims which no doubt are very perplexing, and many of the titles of the white settlers did not rest on indisputable foundations. If the cession of those islands be accepted, one thing is clear, namely, that the Crown must have a right of pre-emption in all lands. The land must follow the rule which has been adopted elsewhere, and grants of it must be made from the Crown. All parties must be prepared to give up something, and they can be reasonably called upon to do so, because from the moment English sovereignty is established the value of land will be not doubled, but quadrupled or quintupled. My lords, there is another difficulty. The commissioners report that the debt of those islands is not less than £87,000. How that enormous sum has grow up I do not know. I do not know even the original price of the stock issued. All I do know is, that in the course of two years so reckless was the financial administration of the government there that £124,000 was spent, and a debt of £87,000 remains as a legacy. If there should be a cession, Her Majesty’s government must prepare themselves for a full inquiry into the financial question with a determination to act in accordance with the demands on the revenue of the islands. The calculations of the commissioners are not as satisfactory as I could have desired. Indeed, I think they are illusory, but I entertain very little doubt that by a prudent financial policy the revenue of the islands may be made sufficient for their requirements. The first few years will be years of difficulty, but there is no reason to doubt that at a later period the resources of the islands will be sufficient for all wants. It only remains for me to point out some of the principal reasons that would seem to indicate that it might be advisable to accept a cession. The geographical area of those islands is not very large; but they are of exquisite natural beauty. Members of this house have seen them and travelers have described them. No frost ever comes there. The temperature is at all times comparatively mild. The internal resources of the islands are considerable, for the soil is very productive. Then look at the position of these islands. They are in the track of all ships passing between the New World and the still newer world of Australia. They possess unquestionably fine harbors, and one of them would be a desirable intermediate station for the coaling of steamers running between America and Australia. In the next place-though I do not advance this as the sole argument on which this cession rests—we should not forget the labor trade which has grown up in the seas off these islands. Bishop Patteson, a true martyr, offered up his life in an effort against that atrocious kidnapping trade, and no government, whether it sits on this side or the other, can view with anything but deep interest everything that offers a means of putting down that iniquity. [Hear, hear.] Those islands, though they do not cover the whole area of the kidnapping trade, rise, as it were, in the center of it.

I am loth to use words which seem too strong for the occasion, and therefore I hardly like to say that England has a mission to extend her policy of colonization in this part of the world; but, at all events, it does seem to me that there is an indirect duty which lies upon us as far as we can to take under our protection a place into which English capital has overflowed, in which English settlers are resident, in which, it must be added, English lawlessness is going on, and in which the establishment of English institutions has been unsuccessfully attempted because they were of such a character as not to be suited to the circumstances of the case. [Hear, hear.] I cannot deny the fact that there is a strong wish on the part of almost all the adjoining colonies that these islands should be taken under English sovereignty. Not only is this so, but I have received from New Zealand and New South Wales cordial offers of cooperation in any efforts which may be made to carry out the policy of annexation, and I believe, further, that the last-named colony would be ready to bear a fair share of the burdens which would be involved, if those burdens could be properly and legitimately placed upon it. I hope it may be possible, if this cession is accepted, to take advantage in some degree of that co-operation; but while repeating that I do not think it would be possible to annex these islands as a dependency to any existing colony, I must express my opinion that such an offer as the one I have just mentioned—an offer which is almost new in the history of the world—should be heartily recognized and cordially dealt with. [Hear, hear.] We ought at least to express satisfaction that an English colony is willing to come forward and volunteer its help in hearing the common burdens of the empire, and so to show that in this, as in other respects, there is a real partnership in the great empire of which we are all members. [Hear, hear.] On this general review of the circumstances, your lordships will not be surprised to hear that it is the feeling of Her Majesty’s government that they cannot decline the duty of accepting these islands. If they do not decline they accept, and it then becomes important to know how this is to be done. The view of Her Majesty’s government is that there is but one single condition on which the cession can be accepted. The condition is that in all material and essential respects the cession should be absolutely unconditional, and that we should have full freedom to administer the affairs of the islands. [Hear, hear.] It would ill-consort with the dignity of the Crown that conditions should be annexed to any such cession. I must mention that in the appendix to the report of the commissioners there is a communication from Mr. Thurston, the so-called prime minister of Fiji, in which he specifies no less than seventeen conditions on which the cession was to be made. I will not go through these conditions in detail, but will simply say that they are wholly impracticable. [Hear, hear.] Among the conditions are one to secure hereditary rights in matters of administration and government, another for the appointment of a certain number of Fijian chiefs to the council, and yet another stipulating that Her Majesty’s government should assume without inquiry the existing liabilities of Fiji. Difficult as the task of governing these islands must be in any case, the task would be made simply impossible if the conditions were to be accepted, and therefore Her Majesty’s government are only prepared to accept an unconditional cession of the islands. [Hear, hear.] With that view, while fully appreciating the exertions of the commissioners, Her Majesty’s government feel that we have now arrived at a new stage of these negotiations, and that we should hardly require these gentlemen to go back and conduct these negotiations to a final settlement. We therefore propose to instruct Sir Hercules Robinson, the governor of New South Wales, to proceed at once to Fiji, restate the whole case, explain the difficulties in the way of the cession on the terms proposed by Mr. Thurston, and place the matter fully, fairly, and candidly before the chiefs and the white population. The tried ability, administrative experience, and great personal and local experience of Sir Hercules Robinson point him out as the fittest representative of the crown in the peculiarly difficult and delicate circumstances in which he would be placed. [Hear, hear.] It has, curiously enough, been my lot this year to propose to Parliament two colonial policies, one with regard to the Gold Coast and the other with regard to Fiji, both touching territory abroad on a considerable scale, and which, if they differ in many respects, yet agree in this, that each of them has to be dealt with not upon general considerations but on the special merits of the individual case. Whether your lordships agree or disagree with me in what I have said, I hope you will do me the justice to acknowledge that I have not concealed or colored anything. I have endeavored to lay the whole case, pro and con, as fully as possible before the house. I do not deny that there will be difficulty in the way of carrying out the scheme I have laid before your lordships, but at the same time a choice must be made in this as in many other things. I believe the difficulties, when boldly faced, will not be found very considerable, provided the cession comes to us untrammeled by unworkable conditions, and although I am quite aware of the magnitude of the task, I shall not be afraid to encounter it. [Cheers.] Viscount Canterbury, referring to the earlier history of the settlement of Fiji, said that though Englishmen had gone there in defiance of the recommendations of British authorities, and had sworn allegiance to the native kings, they had not failed to invoke British protection as subjects of the crown when occasion arose. It had been stated that the commissioners obtained” an offer of the cession of the islands. If this correctly described the circumstances of the case, he could not help thinking that the commissioners went beyond their duty, which was simply to obtain information for the guidance of the government in any policy they might decide upon adopting. It was a remarkable fact that one of the most influential chiefs in Fiji—Marku—of whom it was said that the other chief “had always been jealous of his influence and position,” was not mentioned by the commissioners as among those who assented to the arrangement they proposed, and the question was whether he would consider himself bound by it. When he (Viscount Canterbury) first read of the offer which had been made he attached great importance to it, hut now, on further consideration, he was not disposed to do so. As he understood the present state of affairs, the government were prepared to accept an offer which had not been made, and were not prepared to accept an offer which had been made. He quite admitted that if the cession were to be accepted the best form of constitution for the islands was that they should become a crown colony, with considerable power to the executive in the carrying on of the government. Considerable difficulty would, he feared, be experienced with respect to the land. The commissioners stated that of the 5,500,000 acres of land in Fiji there was not an acre which had not an owner. The question of the land was at the root of this application to the British government to take possession of the islands. He noticed a striking inconsistency in the report of the commissioner for in one part it was stated that the settlers were totally unable to take upon themselves the payment of the debt while in another part it was stated that provided the British government would take possession of the islands the settlers would undertake not only to provide for the debt, but also to make provision for paying the costs of the governor of the islands. It was not because he underrated the importance of the duties that attached to a great power, nor because he was willing to abandon those duties out of consideration for pounds, shillings, and pence, nor because he weighed safety and profit against the honor and duty of this country, but because he thought that under existing circumstances the acceptance of the sovereignty of Fiji by this country was not a matter of duty, and would confer upon the British Empire advantages in no degree equivalent for the difficulties that the acceptance of the sovereignty would involve, that, he felt bound to protest against this proposal for annexing those islands.

The Earl of Belmore having watched this question for some time with considerable interest, and having had four years’ experience in those parts, had at length arrived at the opinion that the only course open to Great Britain was to annex these islands. [Hear.] In dealing with the four courses which the noble lord, the secretary for the colonies, had said were open to us in the matter, he remarked that the establishment of consular courts in the islands would doubtless be a cheap way of doing what was required; but that that course had not answered elsewhere. Again, the annexation of the islands to one of the Australian colonies would not answer, seeing that the latter had quite enough to do to develop their own resources without being troubled with the government islands 2,000 miles away. The third proposal, that the islands should be governed as crown colonies through a governor, who should be responsible to the colonial office alone, was the best that could be adopted, leaving to a future time, when the number of the white population had sufficiently increased, the consideration of the fourth proposal that the islands should be permitted to govern themselves under an English protectorate. He thought the question of expense should not be allowed to prevent the best man being selected as governor who could be induced to accept the office. It was evident that a great deal of mischief might be done by placing a person, without sufficient experience, tact, or judgment, in a position of responsibility in these islands. The fourth plea suggested was to leave those islands alone, on the ground that those who had gone there had gone at their own risk and in spite of warnings which they had received; but, though perhaps, strictly speaking, they might have no claim to protection, yet it was our duty not to ignore the existence of a British community such as that which was now to be found in Fiji, and it was none the less our duty because those islands had been made the center of many outrages connected with the labor trade. It was no doubt true that the Fijians, finding that Great Britain would not accept the sovereignty of the islands, did apply to the United States, and in this, though they would probably prefer to be governed by one of their own natives, if possible, they were actuated by a desire to obtain a strong government. The question of land was no doubt one of considerable difficulty, and so was also the question of how money had been raised, for that money had in reality been raised upon false pretenses. A regular government and a strong government were, no doubt, required in Fiji for the purpose of dealing firmly, among other things, with the evils of the labor trade, and in the arrangement lately concluded the islanders had been fully instructed upon what terms the cession had been accepted.

The Duke of Manchester congratulated the secretary of state upon the decision to which he had been enabled to come in regard to the annexation of the Fiji Islands. It seemed to be usually our duty and necessity to follow our countrymen when they settled in New Guinea and other places, and no doubt in annexing them we powerfully contributed to their civilization and prosperity.

The Earl of Kimberley said he could not accept the principle that it was our duty to follow British settlers wherever they went, and to annex those countries. He would rather say that every case ought to be considered on its own merits. It would be intolerable if British settlers, landing on unoccupied ground in any part of the globe, could pledge this country to the extension of an empire which was certainly not too small at the present moment. At the same time, he agreed that there might be cases in which it was necessary to add to the territory of the Crown, The decision of the government in a case like the present involved a good deal of responsibility, and as he had seen the papers only that morning he had not been able himself to come to a conclusion. When he was colonial secretary he made a suggestion to the government of New South Wales that they should undertake the government of the Fiji Islands. The Australian colonies pressed the government to annex those islands, and he thought that either New South Wales or Victoria might be willing to undertake the government of those islands. The governor, however, declined to submit that proposal to the legislature of New South Wales, and the suggestion came to nothing, The union, however, of British Columbia to Canada, was one the working of which could not be more difficult than some similar arrangement between the Fiji Islands and New South Wales. Nearly all the settlers in the Fiji Islands had gone from the Australian colonies, and the connection between the two was in many respects very intimate. The important question was how to deal with an offer of cession which had now been repeated, and whether Her Majesty ought to be advised to accept it. Her Majesty’s government had acted wisely in not accepting the cession on the terms proposed in the document laid before their lordships, but the government would not escape from any of the real difficulties by laying down the condition that the cession must be unconditional. It was impossible that we should undertake the government of those islands without some distinct understanding and condition as to the all-niportant question of the land. The people of those islands must likewise have a clear knowledge as to their future rights and condition. Whenever European settlers went to a country in which there was anything like a settled mode of life, difficulties always arose as to the cession of land, and those difficulties frequently led to war. That had been the case in New Zealand and elsewhere, and Her Majesty’s government must feel that if they accepted the cession of the Fiji Islands the rights of land must be most carefully ascertained and guarded. In paragraph 41 the commissioners pointed out this danger, and said that to interfere with the possession of land might entail the prosecution of a most unjust war. This showed the importance of handling the question of the land with prudence. A little further on they pointed out that the title to land in the islands was not fully vested in the King or the chiefs. It was clear that a portion of the land was held in common, that the right to its possession was of an undefined character, and even although the cession might be unconditional, yet Her Majesty’s government would see the necessity of reserving to itself the right of imposing, or agreeing to, or devising, some conditions. If they meant that the land of the whole of the islands should be handed over in unconditional sovereignty, it would almost certainly follow that contentions would arise between the whites and natives as to the rights of land, and such a commencement of the new settlement would be anything but auspicious. He believed there could be no doubt that the white settlers had acquired large tracts of land with very defective titles, so that we should find ourselves immediately involved in questions with the natives as to their future rights to land, and with the settlers as to the lands they already held. If once the Fiji Islands were made a Crown colony, the settlers who now claimed these tracts of land would find that they had got a valuable property, and they would be by no means ready to part with it. With regard to the general question of government, it might be indispensable that the Fiji Islands should be governed on the principle of a Crown colony. He wished, however, to point out that to create a pure and simple Crown colony, in the words of the noble earl, of a “severe type,” would be to do that which in modern times had never been proposed. The tendency of late years had been in the contrary direction. No doubt in Jamaica it had been necessary to recall rights already given, but they all knew that in Jamaica there was not an increasing white population. In Fiji they would have to deal with an active—he would not say a turbulent—but certainly with an adventurous population, gathered from all the neighboring countries. Many of these settlers came from colonies which had been long under a democratic form of government. They would be re-enforced by further arrivals from” Victoria and New South Wales, and it would be a new experiment to endeavor to govern such men by the form of government of a Crown colony, and very difficult to do so. A Crown colony meant a colony of which all the governing officials were appointed by the Crown. It would be what was known as a “Downing-street government,” set up in a country the settlers in which had not always been satisfied with their own democratic form of government. The government would have to discharge the most difficult and important of all tasks—to maintain equal and impartial government between a large body of natives and a small body of white settlers. It might be said it was easy to raise difficulties; but this was the time for raising difficulties, and some of those difficulties certainly were present to his own mind when he drew up the instructions to the commissioners. If this cession were accepted he hoped there would be conditions which should be drawn up in the most careful and explicit manner. He hoped the government would see that the conditions, providing for what they considered right, were plain and simple; for this was a matter in which, when steps were once taken in which the honor of the Crown and the character of the country were engaged, there could be no step backwards. He was therefore glad the government had taken the prudent course of employing that very distinguished officer Sir Hercules Robinson to make the necessary inquiries as to the state of feeling in the islands, and he hoped they would leave him so far unfettered by his instructions that if he could not report that the arrangement might be well carried out the government would not feel themselves obliged to accept the cession. [Hear, hear.]

The Earl of Carnarvon admitted that it would be a very hard and difficult task to hold the balance equally between the small body of white settlers and a large body of natives, but for that very reason he thought a Crown colony was the only form of government under which justice could be done, and the interests of both parties consulted. As regarded the cession itself he could only repeat that the government were prepared to accept it if it were untrammeled by conditions which they considered objectionable. At the present moment, however, he might say there was no cession at all. The inhabitants of Fiji would have full notice, with full opportunity of reconsidering their position and putting the offer in such a form that the government might accept it; but until Sir Hercules Robinson had discharged his mission, certainly he was not in a position to say that the cession had been accepted. [Hear, hear.]

Earl Granville thought it very important that the government should not be in any hurry in this matter. Their lordships had not yet had the opportunity of considering the report which had just been placed in their hands. It certainly would have been better that some public discussion should have taken place before the government formed any final determination on the matter. He did not even now quite understand the state of matters. It was impossible to have listened to this hasty conversation and to have heard what had been advanced pro and con without feeling that there was much to weigh and consider. He repeated, he thought this a matter for mature and very grave consideration. He feared they were taking something like “a leap in the dark,” at a very long distance indeed, and the government should not act hastily, but give more time for consideration. [Hear, hear.]

1. Pritchard’s “Polynesian Reminiscences,” page 242, 1866. Chapman and Hall, London.
2. “Fiji and the Fijians,” by James Calvert: 1870. Hodder and Stoughton, 29 Paternoster How.
3. See “Selman’s Mission to Fiji,” chap. xv.