No. 222.
Mr. Fish to Mr.
Frederick F. Low.
No. 9.]
Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1870.
Sir: It has been decided to authorize
negotiations to be had with the authorities of Corea, for the purpose of
securing a treaty for the protection of shipwrecked mariners, and to
intrust the conduct of the negotiations to you. Should the opportunity
seem favorable for obtaining commercial advantages in Corea, the
proposed treaty should include provisions to that effect; but the
President principally aims in this mission to secure protection and good
treatment to such seamen of the United States as may unhappily be
wrecked upon those shores.
The inclosed copies of the treaties concluded with Japan at Kanagawa in
1854, and at Yedo in 1858, will serve to point out the kind of
protection which you will seek to secure as well as the commercial
articles which it may be desirable to enter into. These copies, together
with the copies of dispatches from Consul General Seward, which are
inclosed, indicate fully what you are to endeavor to obtain.
Little is known of the shores or internal waters of Corea, or of the
[Page 335]
people who inhabit that
country. Before leaving to carry out these instructions, you will
endeavor to gather all the information on these subjects that can be
obtained in Pekin. Some political connection exists between China and
Corea, which may make it advisable for you to secure, in advance, the
good will and, possibly, the good offices of the Pekin government. You
will, of course, do whatever can be done in that way.
Admiral Rogers will receive instructions, a copy of which has been
forwarded you in my No. 8 from the Navy Department, to place at your
disposal accommodation upon the flag-ship, and to accompany you himself
upon this mission, with a display of force adequate to support the
dignity of this Government. You will maintain entire frankness and
unreserve with Admiral Rogers, conferring freely with him in every stage
of the negotiations.
In arranging the time for carrying out these instructions, it is also
desirable, if possible, to secure the presence and coöperation of Consul
General Seward, who has had great experience in oriental character, and
who has also made a study of this question. Admiral Rogers has
instructions to take that officer with him in case he returns to China
before you go. It is not supposed here that you will be able to comply
with these instructions before next year, in which case Mr. Seward will
probably be at his post.
It will also be necessary in making your arrangements to consult the
convenience of Admiral Rogers, and to defer to his superior knowledge of
the best season for navigating those waters.
The Department relies upon you, in fulfilling these instructions, to
exercise prudence and discretion, to maintain firmly the right of the
United States to have their seamen protected, to avoid a conflict by
force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor, and to seek in all
proper ways the harmonious and friendly assistance of the Chinese
government.
You will keep an account of your necessary expenses in carrying out these
instructions, and draw upon Messrs. Baring Brothers & Co., of
London, for the amount thus expended, and furnish the necessary vouchers
therefor.
INCLOSURES.
1. Treaty between the United States and China, concluded July 3,
1844.
2. Same between same and same, concluded June 18, 1858.
3. Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. W. H. Seward, No. 281, April 24,
1868.
4. Same to same, No. 282, April 24, 1868.
5. Same to same, No. 292, May 25, 1868.
6. Same to same, No. 294, July 3, 1868.
7. Same to same, No. 317, October 14, 1868.
[Inclosure No. 1 will be found in the United States Statutes at
Large, vol. 8, page 592.]
[Inclosure No. 2 will be found in the Statutes at Large, vol. 12,
page 1023.]
[Page 336]
Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.
No. 281.]
United States Consulate
General,
Shanghai, April 24,
1868. (Received June 24, 1868.)
Sir: Mr. Frederick Jenkins, a citizen of
the United States, formerly interpreter to this office, gives me the
following information:
There are now in Shanghai four Coreans and a bishop for Corea, of the
Romish Church. These persons have been sent here by the Corean
government. The purpose is to make inquiries concerning the state of
feeling existing toward Corea in regard to the alleged murder of
French priests and of the crew of the American schooner General
Sherman, with a view to determine whether it will be wise for the
Corean government to send an embassy to America and Europe to
explain those occurrences, and to make desired treaties of amity and
commerce. Mr. Jenkins expects to sail with these persons for the
Corea in a few days, and believes that the result of the report of
the commissioners and of his visit will be the sending of an
embassy, as proposed. He expects to return to Shanghai in about a
month, and that ambassadors, as indicated, will come with him.
Mr. Jenkins further informs me he is told the priests were executed
in punishment for schemes of theirs at the court.
The General Sherman trouble is explained as follows: That vessel had
reached a point in the interior on a river, of which he does not
know the name. Several of the crew went ashore and became embroiled
in a row growing out of the wrongful treatment of some women, and
were arrested. A force was then sent from the Sherman, which rescued
the men and took them on board, together with two native officers,
who, it is supposed, the master intended to hold as hostages. This
excited the people, and they attacked the vessel, killing eight
persons and capturing the others, who are still held.
Mr. Jenkins says that this information is known only to the
ambassadors and himself, to a Jewish merchant who has visited the
Corea several times, and by whom the commissioners were brought to
him, and to one other person who has necessarily been spoken to in
order to arrange for the charter of a steamer to proceed to Corea.
He assigns as reasons why he has been approached, the belief of the
Corean government that the proposed embassy would be more favorably
received in America than elsewhere, and should be sent there first;
and the fact that he is familiar with the Chinese language, which is
the written language of Corea. He is unable to explain how it
happens that the Corean government is now employing confidentially
the Romish bishop, one of a class they have so severely treated. He
expects to bring back with him those of the crew of the General
Sherman who are still living.
The Shenandoah has lately sailed from Cheefoo for the Corea to make
inquiry regarding the crew of the General Sherman, information
having been previously received which indicated that some of the
number are living.
It is difficult to say whether anything will be accomplished by her
commander. Mr. Jenkins says that the Coreans now here declare that
the visit will be useless.
Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William II. Seward.
No. 282.]
United States Consulate
General,
Shanghai, April 24,
1868. (Received June 24, 1868.)
Sir: My dispatch No. 281, herewith, offers
information touching the General Sherman case, which has heretofore
engaged your attention. It is a subject for congratulation that it
is likely to be satisfactorily explained and any necessity for
hostile action averted. It is also satisfactory, if true, that the
Corean government is anxious to enter into treaties with the western
powers. The empire is independent, although it sends complimentary
tribute to Pekin. The population is said to be about six millions,
or one-third that of Japan. The climate is mild for the latitude.
The people are described as peaceful and industrious. In my opinion
there is no sufficient object attainable to render it advisable to
use force, or even the show of force, to procure a commercial treaty
with the Coreans. It may be considered, however, that the interests
of our shipping require that at least a treaty providing for the
kind treatment of shipwrecked people should be entered into. But if
the Coreans are prepared to go to the extent of opening up their
country to our merchants, this opportunity is not one that should be
lost.
I respectfully propose, therefore, in case the proposed embassy be
not concluded on, and it shall still seem desirable, on the receipt
of your instructions, that authority be given me to request of
Admiral Rowan the use of two vessels of war, (one like the
Shenandoah or Iroquois, the other smaller,) to employ one or more
interpreters, and to proceed to the Corea in order to ask an
official explanation of the Sherman affair, and
[Page 337]
to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of
amity and of commerce similar to those now existing with China and
Japan, or such other lesser treaty as may be expedient and
attainable without the exercise or show of force.
If unsuccessful—and I am inclined to believe that the exercise of a
degree of discretion and patience would insure a more or less
complete success—the undertaking could do us no harm.
Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.
No. 292.]
Shanghai, May 25, 1868. (Received July 13,
1868.)
Sir: I have the honor to advise you that
the United States steamer Shenandoah, which left this port for Corea
on the 18th of March last, has returned to Cheefoo. The commander
had intercourse with officers at different points on the coast, but
learned nothing to corroborate the reports which have been prevalent
here that some of the crew of the General Sherman are still living,
and that the government is disposed to send an embassy to western
states. Mr. Jenkins has also returned. He had frequent communication
with the Corean officers, and virtually confirms the information
brought by the Shenandoah. Whatever causes may be at work in Corea,
I am now led to believe that no negotiations, hot supported by a
considerable show of force, would be likely to be successful.
Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.
No. 294.]
United States Consulate
General,
Shanghai, July 3,
1868. (Received September 8, 1868.)
Sir: On the 24th April I had the honor to
advise you, in my dispatch No. 281, that I had received information
from Mr. F. Jenkins which indicated that some of the crew of the
schooner General Sherman were still living and held in custody in
Corea, and that the Corean government was anxious to enter into
negotiations for treaties of amity and commerce with the several
western powers: and on the 25th May I had again the honor to inform
you, in my dispatch No. 262, of the visit of the Shenandoah to
Corea, and of the return of Mr. Jenkins and that their further
information indicated that there was no reason to believe that any
of the crew of the Sherman were still surviving, or that the Coreans
were desirous of entering into relations with western states as
alleged.
At the date of writing the latter dispatch I had become aware that
the party with which Mr. Jenkins proceeded to Corea had been engaged
in an attempt to take from their tombs the remains of one or more
sovereigns of that country for the purpose, it would seem, of
holding them for ransom. I therefore entered upon an investigation
of the facts with a view to determine the nature of Mr. Jenkins’s
connection with the expedition, and whether I ought to prosecute
him. I regret to inform you that the information gathered by me has
convinced me that it is my duty to do so. The indictment which I
have caused to be prepared I inclose herewith. The trial will
proceed in a few days, and I shall transmit to you a full copy of
the minutes. The consuls of other powers concerned await the result
of my action before determining whether to proceed against their
nationals.
Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. William H. Seward.
No. 317.]
Shanghai,
October 14, 1868. (Received December 7,
1868.)
Sir: I wrote to you on the 28th ultimo,
giving a general statement of my impressions touching the Corean
question. Having now had the benefit of consultations with Messrs.
Browne and Van Valkenburgh and with Admiral Rowan, I propose to
offer some brief remarks bearing on the propriety of our sending a
mission to Corea, and its form. They will doubtless touch
considerations which you have already duly weighed, but perhaps
something may be added which will prove of interest to you.
The first object of a mission would be to procure information of the
loss or destruction of the American schooner General Sherman, and in
case the reports of the wrongful treatment of the crew prove
correct, indemnity or satisfaction therefor. I shall not dwell on
this point further than to say, that it cannot be well to let pass
uninvestigated a matter which there is reason to believe may have
been a very grave outrage on a vessel and persons sailing under our
flag; that all our efforts to procure information
[Page 338]
have hitherto resulted not altogether
satisfactorily, and that there seems no way to procure perfect
information except by direct communication with the Corean
government.
On the other hand, there is something due from us to the Coreans. We
should assure them of our appreciation of their kindness to the
wrecked crew of the Surprise in 1866, and disposed as we are not
only to assert our dignity, but as well our intent to deal justly,
we cannot be indifferent to the propriety of offering to Corea an
explanation of our views and conduct in regard to the recent
expedition of an armed force for the purpose of exhuming and holding
for ransom the remains of one or more sovereigns of that country, in
which one of our citizens has been charged as a leader. It is
satisfactory to know that we have only to ask from Corea proof that
she has dealt as honorably with us in the Sherman case as we have
with her in the latter matter.
The second object is to obtain a treaty. I have hesitated to say that
there is one adequate object to render it perfectly desirable to
procure a general commercial treaty. Commercial intercourse with
states where we take on ourselves the responsibility of protecting
and altogether controlling our nationals, and where the result of
intercourse is the introduction of ideas and forces calculated to
work changes that may not be gradual and benign, but may upturn in a
revolutionary way the existing order of government and even of
society, is not to be inconsiderately sought, But all my reflection
leads me to believe that it will be well for us to make the attempt.
We have three ports of China in the Gulf Pechili much frequented by
our vessels. There are three of Japan on the west coast similarly
available to us. Right down between these juts the Corean peninsula.
The steamers of the northern branch of the Pacific mail line run for
a distance almost within sight of the coast of the peninsula. To the
north of Corea stretch away possessions of Russia, having the river
Amoor as a natural channel and guide of their commerce to the
Pacific. Here are regions of China, Japan, and Siberia, which have
already a considerable trade. Within a year or two coal will be
extensively worked in each, and it will soon be no longer necessary
to bring this indispensable article in the navigation of the present
day around the Cape of Good Hope. Thereupon will follow a
development of trade here, which will, I think, surprise the most
sanguine.
Centrally situated, midway in the long stretch of the eastern Asiatic
coast, with foreign vessels already skirting her shores in very
considerable numbers, Corea cannot hope to exclude foreigners much
longer, nor can it be possible that, with a mild climate and a large
and industrious population, commerce would not, under favorable
auspices, flourish in her cities.
France has been unfortunate in Corea. Great Britain has hardly a
greater interest at stake than we, and no grievances to redress.
North Germany, with her increasing commerce and great fleet of
coasting crafts, has yet no determined policy in the East. We are
favorably known, and all the circumstances indicate that an attempt
to open the country may best be made by us.
But whether a general treaty is desirable or not there can, in my
opinion, be no question of the need of one that shall provide for
the safety of seamen and others wrecked or driven on the Corean
coast. Indeed we can hardly consent that it shall remain peculiarly
dangerous to our navigation.
I remarked in the dispatch referred to in the outset, that the
settlement of the Sherman matter, and a treaty of the latter sort,
may, it seems to me, be obtained without great difficulty, but that
a considerable show of force would probably be needed to secure a
general treaty.
If the Coreans were excited by grossly wrong conduct on the part of
the Sherman crew to engage in a struggle with them, we may perhaps
be saved great trouble in this branch of the negotiation, and there
is enough in the general conduct of the Coreans to indicate that
they would not be greatly averse to giving us formal guarantees to
care for persons wrecked, and to arrange measures by which they
could be speedily returned to some hospitable district.
Touching the broader negotiations it may be assumed, generally, that
eastern states have a settled policy toward western powers which is
dictated by fear that intercourse will result disastrously; they
find occasion for this fear in the harsh lessons of the past, and in
the actual condition of a considerable portion of their continent.
And, indeed, China is only just emerging from an internal struggle
which has threatened most severely the controlling power of the
empire, while Japan is, at this moment, in the throes of
revolution—troubles which it would not be difficult to connect with
the introduction of foreigners.
There are arguments which may be advanced to show the Coreans that a
juster consideration of eastern states is prevailing in the west;
that China would not have encountered the rebellion had the
government been at all a wise one, while from the stranger
constitution of Japan the result of war was almost inevitable; that
foreign intercourse is in many ways desirable, and that it is surely
becoming unavoidable. It is indeed doubtful, however, whether there
can be found in Corea men able to weigh
[Page 339]
justly the position of the state, and to bring
about, in face of all preconceptions and of conflicting interests,
the radical changes contemplated.
But it is to be said that these eastern peoples are not unalterably
wedded to old practices and institutions. Japan accepted Comodore
Perry’s peaceful but formidable mission without great opposition,
and of late all parties in that state have vied among themselves in
availing of foreign knowledge and material. China, naturally less
mobile by reason of her continental position, vast territory and
population, has been more consistent in all her history than Japan;
but she has not failed to acknowledge, from time to time, the force
of new ideas and circumstances, and, even with her, sweeping reforms
have been effected by peaceful means working from within. It may not
be altogether visionary, therefore, to hope that such a condition of
affairs may be found in Corea as will render it possible to attain
success without the exercise of force.
But, as intimated, I am disposed to think it desirable, if a mission
is to be sent to Corea, that it should be provided with a number of
vessels. Reasons are so obvious that I will not dwell to review
them. But of course I contemplate only the display of force, not its
use, and not even intimations that it may be used. I know well there
should be no irregular action; and that it will be time enough for
the United States to determine on the exercise of force when
peaceful efforts shall have been exhausted, and all the
circumstances broadly considered.
A mission, then, such as the one I have indicated, will require a
cordial coöperation with the navy. Fortunately this is perfectly
within reach. Admiral Rowan has himself proposed to me that
authority and instructions in our joint names to prosecute the
mission shall be applied for. He has a not large fleet, but one
perhaps sufficient, since Corea is so near at hand, to enable him to
look out for the general interest of the station, and at the same
time to spare a few vessels for the particular purpose. I have
favored this proposition and have now to ask for it your
consideration. While I have indicated one advantage only that would
be secured by this course, I do not wish to say that the expedition
might not be well left in the admiral’s hands. There are numerous
precedents for deputing such authority to a naval
commander-in-chief, and the instances are not few in which that
course has resulted most satisfactorily. Yet I think the admiral
would prefer to be associated with me. And looking to the facts that
such work naturally belongs to my own branch of the public service,
that I have the advantage of a not inconsiderable experience in
matters of eastern politics and trade, and that the negotiation may
cover over a considerable period, it seems well that we should be
associated, and this would be more satisfactory to me. But should
the President prefer to confer the authority upon the admiral alone
I shall, remembering that the general objects, and not individual
preferences or ambitions, are to be consulted, render to him any
assistance within my power that he may wish.
