No. 223.

Mr. George F. Seward to Mr. Fish.

Sir: It is well known that the principles on which our intercourse with China has for many years been conducted have been clearly defined by the mission of Mr. Burlingame, and that this demonstration of them has drawn forth grave remonstrances from the mass of foreigners on the spot. The principles referred to appear authoritatively in the Seward-Burlingame treaty and the Clarendon-Burlingame correspondence; the views of the merchants in the addresses which they presented to Mr. Ross Browne.

I may state the former as follows: The United States and Great Britain desire to acknowledge the perfect independence and general sovereignty of China within her own borders, and to conform their intercourse with her to the usual courses**, that is to say, they will respect [Page 340] her territory and they will not use force or threats of force to urge her on in the path of progress, nor will they allow force to be used in the settlement of disputes and claims, excepting as they would when dealing with a western state.

To these fundamental principles the merchants take exception at length. The sum of these objections is founded in the following sentences, which I extract from the documents mentioned:

We believe that not only is there a right on the part of western states to insist on steps that will further the cause of civilization in China, but a clear duty in that direction; and that the advancement of China without anarchy and rebellion cannot be had by waiting until her own government is content to move. Lord Clarendon has laid down rules of action for our ministers and consuls and our community, which would prove entirely inadequate if any crisis occurred demanding extraordinary measures.

The questions thus stated may be defined as follows:

1st. How may western states best promote the cause of civilization and good government in China?

2d. How may they best protect the legitimate interests of their peoples in that empire?

The one may be concisely termed the question of progress, the other that of dealing with the central government. I shall treat them separately and in the order above given.

When the merchants say that western states have the right, and add that it is their duty, “to insist on steps that will further the cause of civilization in China,” they seem to go a long way. If it is their right they may support that right by force of arms. If it is their duty it may be their duty to use arms. There was a time when European potentates defended the claims of discoveries to and over great districts, and the peoples inhabiting them. Discovery was enough to vest the title to sovereignty, and lest the two greatest defenders of the faith should thus come into collision the outside world was divided between them.

To Spain was awarded the regions of eternal youth, which the fancy of the age believed to exist in the golden West. The East, scarcely inferior to Europe in wealth and civilization, was awarded to the mariners of Portugal. France and England as well adopted the theory, and contentions arose out of it which led even to acts of war and woe. To this day the nations of Europe would not hesitate to assume jurisdiction over islands of the sea, or of districts not already taken possession of by western states or advanced in power and civilization. It is only a few years since one of the greatest men of France, M. Guizot, then secretary for foreign affairs, in explaining the circumstances under which the French mission to China of 1844, a peaceful one, was being sent out, declared that if the interests of France should demand it the government would not hesitate to seize an island on the coast of China. At a later date France has pushed conquests in Cochin China. Russia is at this moment extending her domains in Asia. England never fails for an excuse when it is desirable to assume authority over the outlying states of her Indian territory. Even America, when it suited her purpose, asked for access to the ports of Japan. She used soft words, but a great fleet gave emphasis to them.

In fact moderation has ever been observed when there has been the ability to command respect. When this has not existed the interests, or supposed interests, of greater states have never halted. Conquest and aggrandizement have been the rule, and the observers of the rule have not yet disappeared.

It is true that generally the purposes of western states are at the present time more or less cloaked and covered over. When it was the [Page 341] aim of Napoleon to extend the Latin power, he waited until Mexico seemed to ask for a foreign ruler. When Great Britain wished to open several of the ports of China in 1839, the seizure of a quantity of opium was made the excuse for a war which accomplished the result. No concealment was. made, however, when, in 1857, it was concluded that to sustain friendly relations with China access to the capital was indispensable. Townsend Harris argued with the Japanese for privileges broader than those granted to Commodore Perry, urging that what he asked as a favor would soon be demanded from behind the hostile armaments of England and France. Nor are the advocates of the use of force destitute of arguments. It is not well to attribute the movements of the mercantile classes in China, for instance in the direction of progress, to self-interest alone. The merchants know full well that they are likely to be benefited by the extension of steam navigation, to opening of coal and other mines, the construction of railroads and telegraphs. But it is when they come to consider that these measures are desirable chiefly in the native interests, and are persistently rejected by the government, that their belief rises to the height of strong political conviction, and they lose no opportunity to impress their ideas upon the world.

I have lived for many years among foreigners in China. I believe that no higher-minded, more honorable merchants than those engaged there can be found in any land. I doubt whether, the members of any mercantile class in the world are superior to them in origin and education. You will have noticed the ability and earnestness with which they discuss the great problems working out on the Asiatic coast. The views held may often be mistaken ones; but this occurs through no lack of good disposition. It is rather due to the special circumstances by which they are affected and the intensity of their convictions.

It has not been my fortune to agree always in their views. I have no hesitation, however, in paying them the tribute which I do. I conceive that I am acting wisely when I review my own in deference to their opinions. And highly as I respected the speaker, and much as I sympathize with the generous views which he has enforced in America and Europe, I deprecate Mr. Burlingame’s words when he calls them “opium dealers.” In truth, foreign merchants in China are not opium dealers. The opium traffic is confined to a small number of mercantile houses and to Asiatic traders. From it the mass of merchants are as free as they are from participation in the coolie trade or in the African slave trade. So far as the acquaintance with the soberly-held ideas of the leaders of commerce is concerned, I esteem my residence at Shanghai more favorable than life at the isolated capital of China. I attribute not a few of Mr. Burlingame’s disparaging remarks to the fact that he lived at the capital, and only at rare intervals came in contact with his countrymen at the ports.

I confess that I should think less of western civilization and of western manhood if it were not pushing and aggressive in China. Take the average American or Englishman used to well-kept roads and streets, to well-policed towns, to the comforts, conveniences, and advantages of steamships, telegraphs, and railoads, to all the benefits of lands where private rights are perfectly respected, education is diffused and the blessings of a high civilization are found, and put him down in China, where there is not one carriage road; where there are no sewers nor lamps in the towns; where telegraphs and railroads are unknown, and steamers only where foreigners have forced them, a country which seems to possess the fewest possible elements of accord with the enterprising West, and he would be unworthy of the Anglo-Saxon blood which runs [Page 342] in his veins if he should teach himself the Chinese habit of thought, and sit down to believe with the immobile mass around him, that whatever is is best. I can use no stronger language than that of Mr. Browne, when he says:

Whatever errors may be committed through misconception of facts or excess of zeal, the cause of progress is one which appeals to the highest sentiments of the Christian world. I look upon the movements, therefore, as abounding in promises for the future. The best friends of China will undoubtedly be those who can induce her to strengthen her organization, and render herself able and worthy to maintain her position.

If it is asked, then, what are the arguments of this pressing mercantile class in favor of the use or the demonstration of force, the answer is ready: “The advancement of China without anarchy and rebellion,” they say, “cannot be had by waiting until her government is ready to move.” “The presence of foreigners is a protection and blessing to the people; this presence is their only chance of improvement save through desolating wars. It is in all probability the chief cause of the existence of the present government, and perhaps of any government in the country.”

This idea was expressed by me, more guardedly, however, six months before the date of the memorial, (vide my dispatch No. 345:)

It is manifest that the growing intercourse between Chinese and foreigners in this and in other countries is bringing new forces into action in this empire. We have already seen Japan revolutionized in consequence of similar intercourse. The effect on the immensely greater mass of Chinese society is slower but very certain. The people aremoving, and unless the government keeps with them, or in advance, new forms of administration or variations of existing forms will be sought in a revolutionary way.

I confess that when I wrote the above, I entertained the idea that the government would keep in advance, or, at least, with the movements of its people. This belief had been shared by leading foreigners in China. Mr. Hart, inspector general of maritime customs, who lives at the capital, and whose relations with the government are more intimate than those of any other foreigner, shared it. Mr. Burlingame was full of it. Sir Rutherford Alcock entertained it so far that he supported the mission which was to go out expressly to gain the assurances of western powers that they would bide China’s time and not force progress on her. We hear now from Mr. Hart, from Sir Rutherford, from the other ministers, from the merchants, and from Mr. Browne, that this was a mistake.

Mr. Hart says:

Some forty officials in the provinces, and perhaps ten at Pekin, have a glimmering notion of what the foreigner means when he speaks of progress; but of those ten, not one is prepared to enter boldly on a career of progress or to take the consequences of even a feeble initiative.

Sir R. Alcock says:

There is no evidence here of a desire for progress. If any hopes are built upon its existence, therefore, I fear there is nothing but disappointment in store for those who indulge in them. Projectors of telegraphic lines, railroads, and other plans for the sudden development of the resources of this country are but losing their time, while the government have shown no disposition to entertain their projects. I think it is in the interest of all who are so occupied, that they should know the truth, and not be deluded by false hopes and expectations of changes which are still in the dim distance.

Mr. Browne says:

All that the rulers of this empire desire is to be left free to work out their own destiny in their own way, and that is simply retrogression and relapse into barbarism. They make small concessions to avert greater ones; the whole struggle is against making any at all. I state this not in the way of deprecation, but as an incontrovertible fact which we are bound to confront. It is a subject for sympathy rather than [Page 343] complaint. A vast empire with an industrious and inoffensive population is in many respects worthy of esteem, in maintaining an unequal struggle to preserve its ancient systems against the combined powers of the world.

This is unmistakable language. And it is not different from the declarations which reach us from, other sources. From the merchants, the professional men, and the officials at the ports, even from the highly intelligent class of foreigners who are managing the maritime customs department of the empire, we hear the same language, “China never has, and never will progress except under pressure.”

A distinction is to be held in view here. Mr. Burlingame asserts with emphasis that China does progress. He recites as evidence that foreign trade increases from year to year. He quotes the fact that the Chinese are building several arsenals. He calls attention to the existence of the customs establishments. The so-called Pekin University points his moral. In glowing language he declares that China invites Christendom “to plant the shining cross on every hill and in every valley of her broad domain.” I hold with him that China is progressing. Bu the case is not such as persons not acquainted with the circumstances would understand from his language.

There is, in truth, progress in China. It is, however, that which has been forced on the empire and does not come from, a spontaneous desire for improved methods. Trade developes there as it will in any land where scope for effort is given. We have forced China to give us her teas and silks, subject to certain defined rates of duty. We have forced her to accept opium, cotton goods, &c., subject to similar duties. The law of supply and demand has been strong enough to work out the development which we have seen. The government has done nothing, excepting, of necessity, to foster trade. It is not many years since the governor of the province of Kiang-see was dismissed from office because he said: “I conceive it my duty to weigh well the advantage and disadvantage of this or that order of proceeding, and if any measure be beneficial to China and practicable, and does not violate law, I will assuredly not abide in the smallest degree by standing prejudices.” But these are the only works of progress which they are undertaking, and one object they have in view is to strengthen existing institutions for a possible conflict with foreigners. The customs establishment is one of the most promising features of the progress of China. This was, however, urged on China by France and England, to protect the lien which they had acquired upon, the revenues of the state, and China, finding that she derived a better result from the aid of foreign ers than she could when only natives were employed, and perhaps con sidering that she might pit foreigners against foreigners, has retained the service and extended it. The Pekin University can only be said to have an existence. Missionaries may, in virtue of treaty stipulations, travel and reside in any part of the empire. These stipulations were, however, wrung from the Chinese by war, and they are deterred from discrediting them by the fear of war. Unoffending missionaries are frequently driven from places where they have attempted to locate themselves, and the record of murdered ones is a long one.

Instead of a picture of hopefulness, the merchants there draw of China one of despair: “We claim,” they say, “that China as she stands is as low in civilization as she is in wealth and power; that her history teaches us little worth knowing, except maxims of morality, long reduced by western nations to actual practice, but by China neglected and forgotten; that her present state, so far from being an example, is a warning of the results of a false system and a vicious policy.” And [Page 344] again they say: “It is almost impossible for ns to convey to our fellow-countrymen at home a just idea of the utter inability of the Chinese to comprehend any motives for forbearance other than our own powerlessness or a fear of their growing strength. It is our candid opinion that if the British and American governments were in a position to estimate all the dangers that are involved in their new policy, they would abandon it at once, in a state of alarm at its probable consequences.”

If we grant that the merchants and the others quoted are right in their estimate of the Chinese disposition and character, and if we acknowledge the force of the descriptions which we continually read of the imperfection of Chinese systems of thought, of religion, and of government, it will be difficult to refrain from giving unqualified sympathy to their ideas. If China is weak and worthless and perverse, we must say, with the American moralist, “that while western governments are bound to act a friendly, just, and generous part toward China, they cannot forego the advantage of the moral influence of their greater material powers;” and, with the British memorialist, “It is our earnest wish that when you (Mr. Browne) return to the United States you may endeavor to enlighten the public mind upon the real issues that are raised by the existence of foreign intercourse with China, and upon the most efficient means of introducing western civilization into this vast empire;” and, with Mr. Browne, “Instead of attributing to the Chinese either capacities or motives irreconciled with their whole history, and with their present condition and limited intelligence, it is our duty to enlighten and elevate them. But it is not by pandering to their superstitions and their weaknesses that this is to be done. The strong hand of pressure may be more humane in the end than flattering.”

I cannot regard the condition of China so hopeless as do the high authorities I have quoted. What are the facts?

In the year 1840. there was no contact between China and the people of the west, excepting the very limited intercourse carried on by a few merchants at Canton. The empire was self-contained. To the northward were great deserts; to the westward, impassable mountains; to the southward, vast stretches of tropical jungles; and to the eastward, the Pacific. Within these boundaries dwelled a people whose numbers were estimated at 400,000,000. The neighboring states and districts—Corea, Loochoo, Assam, Siam, Burmah, Thibet, Mantchooria, Mongolia—paid voluntary tribute to her. The Emperor was surrounded with the halo of deity. What wonder can we have that the state, prosperous beyond any of her neighbors, should be called “The Central Flowery Kingdom,” and that the Emperor should assume to have received, the “commands of Heaven to sway, with paternal care, the peoples of all lands.”

The troubles of the merchants at Canton in that year brought on the war of 1842, which led to the opening of four other ports to trade, viz., Amoy, Foochoo, Ningpo, and Shanghai. But the access of foreigners to the empire was confined to those ports. There were given no rights to reside or even to travel in the interior. Diplomatic representatives were forbidden to go to the capital. Matters went on thus for fifteen years, when at last the treaties of Tien-tsin, exacted by arms, gave foreigners rights which were broad in comparison with those they had previously held, but were still far short of the privileges which are extended in any western state. Practically those treaties confine the foreign merchant to a dozen or so ports, and beyond these the intercourse of foreigners with natives is occasional and inconsiderable. The treaties of Tientsin have existed twelve years. They take away from China a part of [Page 345] her natural sovereignty. They give, in some directions, greater privileges to the foreigner than the native has possessed. They introduce into the land an alien race, bent on trade and on proselyting plans. They introduce, or seem to do so, an obnoxious drug, which destroys the stamina of the people; introduce it in such quantities that the state can barely produce tea and silk enough—valuable commodities—to pay for it.

I assume, and the candid observer at a distance will not be likely to dispute the point, that if China, during these twelve years, has even passably well discharged her duties under the treaties; if she has even passably well accommodated herself to her new, very strange, and very irksome relations, she has done much. And if she has not egregiously failed in the performance of her new obligations, and has only partially accommodated herself to her new relations, I consider it reasonable to hope that she will soon begin to appreciate the benefits which free intercourse with western states is sure to bring to her, and to expect that at no very distant day we shall see telegraphs and railroads stretching everywhere across the land, steam vessels plying on all her waters, coal and other mines yielding forth desired riches, and the whole land rousing itself from a lethargy which has seemed that of ultimate decay.

I am prepared to say that I believe now, as I did two years ago, and as did the most prominent men in China at that time, that she will attain peaceably these, results. I believe that it will be so, but more than this I cannot say. We cannot unravel the future and learn what is mingled in its web. We can only exercise our judgment as to what is the tendency and direction of existing forces, and the character of results to be worked out under novel conditions.

If China were a state now as she was formerly, self-contained and self-poised, if no forces were at work within her borders excepting those originated by her own character and disposition, nor any outside interference or intercourse were to be expected, I should say that she might go on in the future much as she has in the past. Dynasty might succeed dynasty, periods of misrule and anarchy might give place to those of good government and order, to be succeeded again by eras of pain and difficulty. The great pendulum of time might continue to swing backward and forward, bringing with it, as heretofore, prosperity and prostration. That has been the course of events in China for many centuries, and so might continue indefinitely.

But there are other forces at work in China than those original with her people. These forces are of the strongest, and they are so defended and supported that they are left very free to work out normal results. The bad dispositions of rulers may retard but they cannot stay them, the natural qualities of the people may hinder but they cannot bar their course. They are forces which will accommodate themselves greatly to existing systems if not opposed, but if blind efforts are made to check them they will sweep away whatever opposes. Institutions of government, nay, whole races of men, will go down before them hereafter, as they have heretofore, whenever the inevitable is not recognized but blindly combated.

Let us consider the advantage these forces have in. China.

The treaties as they stand give the people of western nations the following privileges:

1. To approach with their ships, to land or lade merchandise, to reside, &c., &c., &c., at twelve ports on the coast.

2. To navigate the Yang-tse River so far as Hankow, six hundred miles, and to reside, &c., &e., &e., at that and at three other cities on the river.

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3. To travel under a system of passports in the vessels or other conveyances of the country, for purposes of business or of pleasure, to all parts of the empire.

4. To send or take foreign goods into or bring foreign-owned produce from the interior under a system of transit passes. The utility of this is that they are thus enabled to pay a certain definite commutation, fixed at one-half of the external tariff charge, in lieu of the taxes which are levied, under the peculiar economy of the empire, on merchandise in transit, at barriers established along the rivers, canals, and highways.

Under these treaties, communities of foreigners have grown up at all the places where they are allowed to live, and the trade of the empire centers chiefly at these points. The carrying trade between the ports and cities opened has been transferred to foreign bottoms. The Chinese in their most distant marts have come to know, and more or less to use, foreign fabrics, and these are so much esteemed that in some districts, at least, whatever is best is known not as “superfine” but as “foreign.” They are continually witnessing the voyages along their coast or on their rivers of the sailing craft of the west, with which their own vessels compare so unfavorably, and of great steamers which cannot but be regarded by them as marvels of human ingenuity. They see at the ports that foreigners live in houses of imposing size and appearance, in circumstances of ease, convenience, and luxury unknown in their own modest dwellings. They observe that these foreign communities are well ordered, and must mark with astonishment the perfected arrangements of the streets, and of the wharves and docks. They have occasion to go into the foreign courts of law and learn that the maxims of morality and of fair-dealing taught by their own sages, but nowhere in their land greatly observed, are therein enforced. They witness great vessels of war, any one of which would be able to combat an army, lying quietly in their ports, a spectacle, elsewhere unknown to them, of power held in check by perfect moderation. They see the forces of foreign states leagued with their own to suppress internal disorders. They see an important branch of the national revenues honestly administered by foreign employés. They find that, when taught, they can themselves manage skips, steamers, and machinery, and can even construct them.

The forces which have been thus fostered and defended, and have accomplished so much, are, then, those which, proceeding out of high stages of civilization, have effected amelioration in the condition of the human race in Europe and America, and are destined yet to arouse from their lethargy or overthrow the Asiatic and African races. There is no staying them. Whatever may be the manner in which results will be worked out in the various lands of the globe, that those results will be accomplished no one in whose veins courses the quicker blood of the west entertains a doubt.

The Chinaman is noted, moreover, for his sobriety, his industry, and his peaceableness. No people, excepting one which needs the least control, could present to the world the spectacle which China has for centuries. In the west, until now, the existence of greatly extended states has been impossible. China, without other than the simplest means of communication, and unblessed by a good government, has been one and undivided. Without extraordinary branches of industry, and no external commerce, she has given her people the means of sustenance. A more quiet peasantry does not exist. And while the people are thus docile, careful, and thrifty, the theory of government is in many respects admirable, and men of intelligence and breadth of views, according to [Page 347] their lights, exercise, or do from time to time exercise, the sovereign control.

It would require much time to offer an explanation of the Chinese governmental system. It is certainly, in theory, despotic. Practically, however, it is liberal. The Emperor represents all authority and power. The viceroys are his lieutenants; they are sent to their respective districts, instructed to collect the revenues and to administer the laws; they are given no imposing military support. The task assigned them is to govern so that the ancient systems may be supported and the people made content. Their conduct is not greatly scrutinized so long as no murmurs come up. But when the people complain, the unsuccessful ruler must make way for another. The result is a system which is democratic in its working, if not in its salient features, and one well calculated to bring good men to the management of affairs.

As to the ability of the leading men in the state, I need only to allude to what has been said of late by such men as Cushing, Bruce, and Burlingame, to refer to the history and literature of China, and to recall the names of Confucius and Meng-Tse, Gengis-Khan and Keeblai, Kung-hi and Kien Lung. Of a state thus constituted, it is premature to declare that she possesses no capacity to assimilate herself to new conditions.

But however bad may be the condition of China, however necessary for her own salvation it is that she should move forward in a career of progress, and however little hope there may be that she will move without pressure, that is to say, without the use of threats or force, fulfilling all the conditions of the arguments which are advanced by the merchants ami by Mr. Browne, I assume that neither the United States nor England, nor any other state, will use force or threats.

It is our disposition to deal with China as a sister and sovereign empire. We have made treaties of amity and commerce with her. We send to her diplomatic representatives and receive hers. We have come to consider that the rules on which we conduct intercourse with the states of Christendom shall be those which shall guide us in our intercourse with China. We are led up to this conclusion by the simplest reasoning. The states of the west have learned nothing of China since they gained access to the Tartar capital which has been of sufficient significance to shake their sense of duty and their preference in this regard. It is easy to deride the advanced liberalism of the age, and to stigmatize the policy which acknowledges broadly the right of any people to work out its destiny freely and independently, as a deliberate sinking of practical ideas and methods, and there may be great truth in the criticisms. But the fact remains that one of the doctrines of the political faith of the age is that all intervention is harmful and should be avoided.* We may advise respectfully and discreetly, or we may [Page 348] warn earnestly, but we must confine ourselves to representation, unless our rights are touched. Nor can I imagine that if this is so, and the use of power is forbidden us by the spirit of the age, we can satisfy ourselves or retain our dignity if we use threats, direct or implied.

Indeed, I consider that such pressure as the merchants and Mr. Browne advocate is virtually impossible. A British minister using it would be discountenanced by the executive, or, should the executive by any chance support him, Parliament would not be unlikely to expel the executive. The same result cannot happen in America, but no administration careful to respect the sentiments of the people, as wise administrations ever are, would consent to support a representative pursuing such a course.

This feature of the case has received apparently no consideration in China. Men there have seemed to devote themselves to the elucidation of the problem: What policy on the part of western states would most surely, rapidly, and safely build up the prosperity of the empire? They have forgotten the essential requirements of any policy, viz., that it shall conform to the spirit of the age and the requirements and limitations of representative government.

The question seems a broad one, until we reach this point. It narrows at once here. The western statesman will do all that he can touching China when he sets before her rulers, discreetly and with tact, the arguments which are so ready to his hands in favor of material progress and of liberal institutions, and points out the dangers which will be incurred by the government in holding rigidly to old ideas and practices, while the people are being educated by contact with foreigners to more liberal and advanced views.

I have so far kept in view the ideas of the merchants as to progress in China; shown what those ideas are; indicated that they are, or may not be, altogether in accordance with the facts; and that, whether so or not, they are not likely to receive support.

My treatment of the matter which remains to be considered will not be different, and my conclusions will not be less positive, although in this, as in the question of progress, I shall endeavor to do as full justice to the arguments advanced on the mercantile side as I can, having reasonable regard to brevity.

The policy of dealing with the central government is the one supported by those who believe that, having treaties with the government of China, executed on a basis of equality, and having representatives at the capital, and having ourselves received her representatives, we are bound to discuss and settle disputes which cannot be disposed of by consular negotiations only at the capital, and in conference with the imperial authorities. That such is the desirable course, I presume no one will be found hardy enough to deny. The divergence arises on the question whether the policy is a practicable one.

The British memorialists say, “Lord Clarendon has laid down rules [Page 349] of action for our minister, our consuls, and our community, which would prove utterly inadequate if any crisis occurred demanding extraordinary measures,” and “we cannot but admire the unanswerable vindication by Sir Rutherford Alcock of his and our views, which is contained in Ms dispatch to Lord Clarendon of the 5th February last.”

Sir Rutherford, then, may be considered the speaker for the merchants as well as for himself. Before quoting, however, from his dispatch of February, referred to, I will briefly state the circumstances which called it forth.

On the 22d and 23d of August, 1868, a British missionary named Taylor, and a number of others, men and women, also missionaries, who had settled at Yang-tchoo, near Chin-kiang, were attacked by a mob, who had for several days threatened them. The houses in which they lived were somewhat damaged, and some injuries, fortunately none of a grave character, were inflicted on members of the mission. The animus of the mob will be seen when I state that a house, in the upper rooms of which some ladies of the party had taken refuge, was set fire to and they were forced to jump from the windows to save themselves from the danger of death by burning. The missionaries had been but a few weeks in the city. It would appear that they had conducted themselves with discretion, and when the indications of danger became manifest they were careful to inform the authorities and to request protection.

On hearing of the difficulty, Mr. Medhurst, British consul at Shanghai, within whose district Yang-tchoo lies, an officer of deservedly high reputation and of the longest experience, proceeded to the spot and made efforts to secure the punishment of the offenders, and reparation for the damages done and injuries inflicted. He was unsuccessful, and reported the case to his superior at Pekin. Sir R. Alcock, with his accustomed vigor and rapidity, laid the matter before the Foreign Office: with what success may be seen from his own statement, as follows:

The result has been so far satisfactory that it has been determined to institute a searching and honest inquiry, on the spot, into all the circumstances, and I am assured the punishment of those responsible for any wrong done shall surely follow, together with compensation to the missionaries and their restoration to the places from which they have been ejected.

Sir Rutherford, for reasons which he afterward states, did not credit the professions of the Foreign Office, and, instead of waiting to learn what the result would be, he called upon Admiral Keppel “to give such effective support to Mr. Consul Medhurst in the demands he will be instructed to make, as may, I think, avert the necessity for any more active measures of coercion. Should this hope unfortunately not be realized, I am satisfied there is no alternative consistent with a due regard for British interests in China but to direct the consul to place the matter in your hands, in order that you may take such further measures as shall be found necessary to compel the local authorities to meet our demands and do full justice in accordance with the instructions I am assured they will receive from the central government.”

In accordance with his instructions, Mr. Medhurst, in due season, proceeded to Nankin, the residence of the viceroy of the district, with the men-of-war Rodney, Rinaldo, Slaney, Bebra, Dove, and Icarus. The first act of this fleet was to inform the commander of a Chinese corvette, the Tien-chi, found at anchor near Nankin, that “he must not weigh without permission, on pain of having a prize crew placed in charge.” This was followed by a demand for the temporary transfer of the Tien-chi. Mr. Medhurst adds: “I need scarcely say that the required order was granted without delay,” although he tells us that the Chinese opposed the demand with “much vehemence.”

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Having completed some preliminary negotiations with the viceroy, the fleet dropped down the river to Chin-kiang, near Yang-tchoo, and from there two of the smaller vessels, with three hundred marines, proceeded up the Grand Canal to the city of Yang-tchoo itself. The marines were landed there and quartered in the city. The negotiations went forward, the demands were all substantially complied with, and Mr. Medhurst and the flotilla returned to Shanghai with éclat.

The British government, however, conceived that the course taken was unsatisfactory, and thus instructed their envoy:

Mr. Medhurst very properly reported to you from the first what had happened to the missionaries, and the course which he proposed to pursue; and afterward, when he failed in overcoming the reluctance of the viceroy to afford redress, he, as in duty hound, placed the matter in your hands.

You, on your part, very properly called upon the central government to afford redress, and her Majesty’s government are glad to recognize in Prince Kung’s letters, and your own comments on them, the fullest admission on the part of the central government of their responsibility, and the readiness with which they took measures that proved effectual for bringing the local authorities, as well as the viceroy of Nankin, to a proper sense of their respective duties, the result being that full satisfaction was made for the outrage complained of.

Thus far the matters followed their proper course. The central government was appealed to for redress against the provincial government, and proved its willingness and ability to obtain it.

But I will not conceal from you that her Majesty’s government would have much preferred that the matter should have been left to the action of the central government, subject, of course, to the view which her Majesty’s government might take of it, if that action were withheld or proved unavailing, than that the aid of her Majesty’s naval forces should have been invoked in order to bring pressure or to inflict punishment on the provincial authorities irrespective of the demand which you had made on the central government for redress.

And afterward sums up as follows:

* * * * The active interference of her Majesty’s naval forces should only be had recourse to in cases of sudden emergency and of immediate danger to lives and property; but when once the matter is removed for diplomatic discussion at Pekin, her Majesty’s government should be left free to determine, if occasion should arise for doing so, what is best to be done to enforce upon the central government the obligations not only to observe treaties, but to compel the provincial authorities also to observe them.

This brings me to Sir Rutherford’s “unanswerable vindication” of his action, and of his views and those of the merchants. Sir Rutherford says:

Some shorter and less disastrous mode of settling wrongs and disputes at distant ports is as much to be desired in the interest of the Chinese nation and government as in that of foreigners, even though it should be less strictly accordant with international law and usage. Against the disadvantages that attach to local actions, even after appeal shall have been made in vain to the government at Pekin, and the objections in principle to which all such extreme courses must be open, both Chinese and foreign powers may wisely, perhaps, set as a counterbalance the avoidance of cumulative wrong leading to the necessity of a war, and entailing costly expenditure on the one side and a perilous loss of authority and prestige on the other.

We need not look to Vattel or Grotius for any sanction to such exceptional action, for the simple reason that they and all other writers on international law deal with principles in their application to civilized states, recognizing a mutual obligation, and governed by similar, or at least analogous, systems of jurisprudence and polity; but when dealing with oriental races and states, ignorant of all the conditions and principles of European polity, a special adaptation of those principles is required to meet the wholly exceptional character of the situation caused by a forced intercourse between races holding totally different views of moral obligation and national policy. The broad principles of justice, of right and wrong, which underlie the international code of nations, must be respected everywhere by civilized states, but an over-scrupulous pedantry in adherence to the rules deduced from these, and forming the system known in Europe as the law of nations, in dealing with an Asiatic race like the Chinese, is only calculated to do mischief, and bring on the very evils it is intended to avert.

Some special modification of rules and principles of international law, as this is understood and recognized by European states, is required in the interest of peace and justice. Local authorities must not be allowed, by persistent misrule and violation of [Page 351] treaties, to bring on their country the horrors of war as the sole means of redressing the wrong, and the only effective means of preventing this, in default of a central government, with adequate power, is to make them feel a personal responsibility for their acts such as their own government ought, but, under present conditions, seems quite unable to enforce. The knowledge that, sooner or later, if justice is denied and instructions from Pekin disregarded, to the injury of foreigners, they will have themselves to deal with a foreign power they can neither defy nor resist, will soon lead to a radical reform in the course of action, and teach them to respect treaty obligations for their own sake if they care nothing either for treaties or the orders of their own government. Such a policy, if carried out with judgment and moderation by the treaty powers, will act beneficially at both ends of the line. The Pekin government will be disposed to take more stringent measures than they otherwise would with their provincial officers to enforce respect for the rights and interests of foreigners, while the officials themselves will become more circumspect not to provoke the inevitable issue of conflict with a foreign power, and all parties will gain largely thereby.

Hitherto the course of affairs has been only too truly described by the memorialists from the ports.

When any wrong or injustice is suffered by a foreigner for which there is no appeal to a public court of justice and a written code of laws, if the Chinese local authorities are not moved, as is too often the case, by the consul’s representations, the only recourse is a reference to the minister at Pekin; and then commences an interminable series of references backward and forward—a see-saw of correspondence on both sides between the ports and the capital—and no final solution is ever arrived at. It may be safely affirmed that such is the experience of all the foreign representatives. I am assured there is no one of these who cannot point to numerous cases which have been so treated for a number of years, despite their best efforts to secure a better result.

Such experience leads infallibly to a conviction that when treaties have been imposed by force upon an unwilling government, as all with China have been, they can only be upheld by the same means. The diplomatic instrument has no binding power with Chinese rulers when its stipulations can be evaded with impunity, or whenever it is believed that the force that imposed them is no longer extant or available. Diplomacy in such circumstances means armed reason. As Carlyle, in his quaint style, remarks, “Diplomacy is clouds, beating your enemies on sea and land,” and the only evidence of power or title to respect, a true oriental freely recognizes. And in order that foreign powers may not have to resort to such rude instruments for proving their title, it behooves them to find means of preventing cumulative violations of treaty, since continued impunity brings with it a conviction of weakness; for, as I have said on a former occasion, it is weakness, or the suspicion of it, which invaribly provokes aggression, and with eastern races is a far more fruitful cause of had faith and danger than either force or the abuse of it. The desire to avoid complications and wars in the far east should suggest, not an unreasoning recoil from the assertion of treaty rights from fear of the troubles it may bring, but a steadfast adherence to such conditions of intercourse as experience has proved to be best adapted to insure respect for engagements.

Sir Rutherford then states his belief—

That well-combined measures of pressure, showing, by unmistakable signs, both the will and the immediate power to enforce, if needs be, demands for redress, persistently denied after reference to Pekin, and promises of action from the government, will never fail if brought to hear judiciously against the local authorities, however high their position.

But in order that this pressure may be irresistible, Sir Rutherford condemns unauthorized action, that is to say, the independent action of consuls and commanders of vessels of war, and insists that the power to exercise pressure should be given only to the diplomatic representative of the government. “Thus guarded,” he says, “there is little to fear from any abuse of power, and much to hope from its discretionary exercise being intrusted to the representative at Pekin, should necessity arise.”

During the time that the Yang-tchoo matter was going forward I could not but feel that a mistaken policy was being carried out, and I took the liberty, which perhaps was justified by my long experience in China, to express my views to Mr. Browne; the substance of my argument was that our relations with China are of such character as to bind us to appeal for the settlement of difficulties to the government at Pekin; that there was no good reason to doubt the ability of the government [Page 352] to give redress in that and all similar cases; that the policy of appealing to the government did indeed stand discredited, many appeals for justice having been unsuccessful, but that it was perhaps true that the appeals had been faint or otherwise not forcible. I then recited the circumstances of the empire when the foreign minister went to the capital and for several years thereafter, pointed out the straits and difficulties into which the administration was placed by reason of the rebellions existing in various districts, and the novel character of its relations with western states, and showed how the whole situation had called for a policy of generous forbearance and support from the ministers. I urged that this forbearance had, perhaps, in the best spirit, but unfortunately been carried so far as to engender a feeling of irresponsibility on the part of the government, and of irritation on the part of the merchants, who, finding their grievances always unredressed, came to believe that justice could not be procured from the government. I showed also that the ministers, more acutely alive to the difficulties of China, came to look with annoyance on the exacting character of the views of their compatriots at the ports, and to set them down, as Mr. Burlingame since has, as opium dealers and smugglers, with whom self-interest was everything. I urged that at length the time had come when a more strenuous tone should be adopted toward China; a time when justice should be exacted as well as given.

The central feature of Sir Rutherford’s argument is, that there is no sufficient centralization in China. My argument on this head was the one which would naturally be based on the peculiar constitution of the Chinese government, as explained in an earlier part of this dispatch. I pointed out that to the viceroys is left the control of their respective districts, and that these are appointed and removed from the capital. I urged that this power of appointment and removal was perfectly exercised, and that while there were doubtless many ways in which the government could effect the settlement of disputes, this power of removal was of itself sufficient.

I note in Sir Rutherford’s letter a more or less perfect admission of my statement that the policy which the ministers had pursued at Pekin was not a strenuous one. He says:

It is in truth clear that the central government must find means to compel a greater respect for their own orders on the part of their local authorities throughout the provinces wherever foreigners are found, or foreign powers will be driven to one of two alternatives in self-defense; they must either devise such local means of pressure as shall control and coerce malfeasant and corrupt officials into good behaviour, or hold the imperial government responsible for unredressed wrongs at the ports and elsewhere in a much more direct and stringent manner than has yet been the practice as a general rule.

He adds:

The last alternative is no doubt more consonant with treaty relations and international law than the first.

In these sentences Sir Rutherford admits enough to condemn his theory. We are clearly bound to give the regular proceeding at least a trial. According to his statement it has not been the practice as a general rule to push that procedure to its extreme point. My own opinion is, that that procedure has very seldom been pushed to its extreme, and that the Chinese government, weak as it is, with everything to lose and nothing to gain by a foreign war, will never fail to find a way to do justice when the demand is made with the statement, “Do this or we shall find a way to right ourselves.”

The centralization policy will, however, be adhered to until it is proved utterly inadequate. When this can no longer be a matter of doubt, foreign [Page 353] states will begin to discuss the policy which can be pursued in China, and not till then. Meanwhile all arguments such as this of Sir Rutherford, that the war power of Great Britain should be placed in his hands, will avail little. It is, indeed, difficult for me to conceive that any one can believe that Great Britain or America would consent deliberately to grant such powers to their envoys, not in respect of certain definite issues, but in respect of any and all matters wherein those envoys should consider the use of force desirable. I doubt whether the constitution of either state would admit of the bestowal of such authority. As a citizen of a state which is interested in China, not so much for the value of existing trade as for the possibilities of her future, a state which has no unreasonable ambition in the east, but is intent on preserving there a free field for the enterprise of her citizens, I should hope that no such authority would be granted to any envoy. If it should be the desire of China to stir up hostile feeling against foreigners, how could it be more perfectly effected than by encouraging a disposition on their part to wage petty wars in various parts of the empire. If it should be the wish of any state to effect a conquest, how easy to bring about a general war with China by such fashion of procedure, or to find an excuse for holding this or that district as a “material guarantee” for the fulfillment of treaties.

But although I support the centralization policy, I trust that I recognize its difficulties and dangers. I see clearly that while the subordination of viceroys and other provincial officers is theoretically perfect, they are still greatly independent—the very fact that broad powers are committed to them renders it desirable for the government to treat them with consideration. It is seldom that an officer is degraded unless for cause. If he is an able and ambitious civilian he is sent to a disorderly district, and if there he brings about a better state of things it is well, but if he fails he pays the penalty. If he is an able and ambitious general he is perhaps given civil duties, or he is sent to quell a distant insurrection. If he succeeds the advantage rests with the state, and if he fails it is easy for the government to rid itself of him. When all other courses fail the man of too great prominence is brought to the capital itself and given promotion to one or the other of the great boards of the state, where he has no direct power and is hampered by his associates.

While the leading provincial officer has a degree of independence, he has also an advantage in the fact that no representation can readily reach the capital from his district unless it passes through his hands. There are no newspapers. The subordinate officers can only send their addresses to the throne through him. He can, therefore, suppress, alter, or add to the facts of a case and make upon them any special plea which suits him.

To this time a large majority of the leading men of China are hostile to foreigners. The provincial authorities know this, and perhaps feel that their careers depend somewhat on their success in outwitting or circumventing the foreigner. The man too favorable to them is likely to have it brought up as a charge against him at the capital. It is manifest that so long as this spirit pervades the official classes in China, the evasion with which foreign officers seeking to enforce justice for their people will be met, will be constant and disheartening. Those at the capital will often promise redress, trusting to the ability of those in the provinces to misinterpret instructions, or to introduce vexatious delays. Those in the provinces will make references to the capital, knowing that they will receive back vague and uncertain directions, capable of being [Page 354] twisted to suit their purposes, or at least to justify procrastination. The celebrated saying of Philip II of Spain: “Time and I are two,” may be considered as ever in the minds of Chinese statesmen. Time is nothing with them, or rather time is everything. I have known Chinese officers to make promises, for no purpose, apparently, but to gain time to manufacture excuses. The lessons to be learned are obvious.

When there is a dispute brought before a consul by one of his compatriots, he must spare no pains to make a complete investigation of the matter. If possible, he should get a Chinese officer to make with him a joint investigation and record. Failing to procure justice he should refer the case and all the evidence to the capital. The minister will then be in a position to speak positively to the government, and if he has occasion to refer home for instructions, his government will be able to form an opinion as to the merits of the case and to give instructions. And lastly, the home government must not hesitate to authorize demands when there is reasonable occasion therefor. As I have said, such demands, with the alternative of the use of force, will not fail to procure redress of grievances.

There is likely to arise a class of cases where to delay is to yield up property and life, perhaps, to wanton destruction. I have not yet considered these.

One can imagine the individual citizen guiding his life with the most perfect control and moderation. Such moderation, even in well-ordered countries, does not always insure safety. There is no guilt imputed to the man who in self-defense strikes back vigorously. The person who assaults is to be condemned abstractly, but when an emergency arises he may do so without infringing law or right.

Much more is it true that in eastern countries, where prejudices of race and religion exist, the most perfect moderation on the part of foreigners will not secure safety, and that it may be necessary in the interests of humanity to deliver sharp blows. Blood is thicker than water. It is not to be expected that the foreigner or his civil or military representative will stand still in such cases.

I presume there is no government unwilling to recognize the necessities which so arise. They will put their recognition of it as little on paper as possible. They will ever impress the necessity of careful procedure. They will indicate that force may only be used at the peril of the official. They will scrutinize closely the use of it. But they will defend the officer who, in moderation and discretion, and with recognition of his responsibility, has acted with vigor. The representative who cannot so act, when it may be necessary, would indeed be unfit for his post. If I do not dwell further on this proposition the reason is manifest. When discretionary powers are granted, the fact implies the difficulty of making rules.

This dispatch has already exceeded reasonable bounds, and I here leave the subject dealt with in your hands. In doing so I feel conscious that many considerations remain untouched. What I have said, however, will indicate my conception of our true policy in China. Circumstances and fuller information must modify whatever policy is adopted.

And lest I may leave wrong impressions, I shall add that while I have spoken as if there is but one mind among our merchants in the east, practically there are many and divergent views held. The address to Mr. Browne cannot be considered conclusive on this head, though, as evidence, they may seem unimpeachable.

Sir R. Alcock and Mr. Browne, I may say, differ between themselves, and each more or less from the merchants. They are, however, equally [Page 355] earnest in their advocacy of truth and of the interests of China, as they see them.

Of some of the expressions of Mr. Burlingame I have spoken without reserve. My advocacy of the principles which formed the basis of his policy is the best testimony I can bear to my high estimate of his disposition and services.

GEO. F. SEWARD.
  1. I have not chosen to dwell here on the fact that the existing treaties do impair the sovereignty of China; they have been made and accepted, and until China complains of them, or they are otherwise shown to be unnecessary, impolitic, or wrong, we need not greatly discuss them. The proposition as stated touches only matters not dealt with in the treaties or affected by them.
  2. It is no part of my purpose to discuss the merits of this doctrine, but I cannot refrain from quoting here words of Guizot, in his book, “Meditations on the Essence of the Christian Religion:”

    “All attacks upon the liberty of conscience, all employment of force to extirpate or to impose religious beliefs, are and ever have been iniquitous and tyrannical. All powers, all parties, all churches, have held such acts to be not only permissible, but enjoined by the divine law. All have deemed it not only their right but their duty to prevent and to punish by law and human force errors in matters of religion. They may all allege in excuse the sincerity of their belief in the legitimacy of this usurpation. The usurpation is not the less enormous and fatal, and perhaps, indeed, it is of all human usurpations the one which has inflicted on men the most odious torments and the grossest errors. It will constitute the glory of our time to have discarded this pretension; nevertheless it yet exists with persistency in certain states, in certain laws, in certain recesses of the human soul and of Christian society, and there is and ever will be need to watch and to combat it, to render its banishment unconditional and without appeal. Subdued, however, it is. Civil freedom in matters of faith and religious life has become a fundamental principle of civilization and of law. All powers, all parties, all churches have held such acts to be not only permissible, but enjoined by the divine law.”

    In what striking analogy are the assumptions of our merchants when they claim that it is not only the right but the duty of Christian states “to insist on steps that will further the cause of civilization in China.” The merchants, too, are sincere and earnest in their belief in the legitimacy of the usurpation proposed. But this is no more perfect defense with them than with the advocates of the propagation of Christianity by force. The assumption has long since disappeared as between Christian states. It ought soon to be discarded in our dealings with those others.