500.A15A4/2299

The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State

Sir: I have the honor to report that the sudden announcement of the withdrawal of the German Government from the Disarmament Conference, on October 14, appears not to have been unpremeditated, and not to have been occasioned solely by the address of Sir John Simon before the Conference, on that day. Following a brief announcement of the Government’s intention, carefully prepared manifestoes were issued by the German Government and by the Reich Chancellor, the latter being communicated to the press by the Minister for Propaganda.94 In the evening the Chancellor elaborated his manifesto in a radio address to the German nation. The texts of the manifestoes, as they appeared in Wolff’s Telegraphisches Buero, with their translations, are attached hereto,95 as are also the text of the Chancellor’s [Page 282] radio address,96 as it appeared in Wolff’s, and a translation thereof, which the Embassy received from the Press Section of the Foreign Office.

After repeating the familiar expressions that Germany had faithfully carried out the terms of the Treaty of Versailles “with downright fanatical fidelity”, that Germany was not responsible for the World War, and that the National Socialist movement had saved Germany, and Europe as well, from Bolshevism, the Fuehrer capped a denial of the stories of atrocities during the Nazi “revolution”, by asserting that “in no country in the world are law and order better maintained than in present-day Germany”. He then denounced the propaganda activities of German political refugees, and deplored the attitude of certain foreign elements towards the Reichstag incendiary trial. In this connection, he pointedly contrasted what world opinion would be if Germany were to hold “an investigation comedy” in connection with a similar case in England.

Thus far in his address, the Chancellor’s expressions give rise to the suspicion that the sudden action of the Government in withdrawing from the Conference was motivated somewhat from internal considerations.

After paying a designed tribute to the expressions contained in Daladier’s disarmament speech at Vichy, on October 8, 1933 (see despatch No. 197 of October 11, 193396), the Chancellor made a bid for French rapprochement, and stated that Germany was prepared to “banish the idea of force from their (France’s and Germany’s) mutual relationships”. He said further that “in future there will be for Germany no more territorial conflicts between the two countries. After a return of the Saar Basin to the Reich it would be insanity to think of a war between the two countries.” The Nazi detachments, he maintained, were not intended “to demonstrate against France”, but were “necessary in order to keep Communism in subjection”, and this providing of the “national community with visible expression and effective protection” could not be regarded as a menace in the face of the rest of the world, armed to the teeth.

The foregoing would appear to indicate that Herr Hitler considers direct negotiations with France to offer more possibilities of success than continued negotiations at Geneva. After the return of the Saar Basin to Germany—which the Chancellor coolly treats as no longer even open to question—the latter is prepared to turn a peaceful countenance to the West. Nothing is said of Germany’s Eastern policy (on which, however, Goebbels made some illuminating remarks, reproduced [Page 283] below) which to Germany is as burning an issue as the equality question, and which again would bring France into conflict, and no declaration of pure intentions was forthcoming. Perhaps the organized legions of “unarmed” Nazis are not a threat to peace, but anyone who has seen the thousands on the march, on any Sunday, in any part of Germany, doubts the correctness of the qualification “unarmed”; and considering that the training of an army begins with the “School of the Recruit”, the supplying with arms of the regiments already in being is but the last relatively small step in the formation of a finished army.

As regards re-armament, the Chancellor said: “If the world sanctions certain weapons for all nations, then, on principle, we are not prepared to allow ourselves to be excluded from this as an inferior nation … Germany does not demand any offensive weapons, but only those defensive weapons which are not forbidden even in future but are sanctioned for all nations. And in this case, too, Germany is ready from the start to be satisfied quantitatively with a minimum …”97

These statements appear to indicate that Germany does propose to rearm.

In the course of his remarks to foreign press representatives, on October 16, Foreign Minister von Neurath amplified and clarified some of the statements contained in the Chancellor’s radio address. A summary translation of these remarks is enclosed herewith. The Minister stated that the delegates at Geneva were not surprised by the German action, as the Germans had pointed out the consequences they would have to draw if German equality were not recognized, and that Sir John Simon’s speech had been disappointing to the Germans, inasmuch as they had been led to hope that this speech would be conciliatory.

Regarding German armament, he maintained that Germany would accept any prohibition of weapons, as long as the prohibition was general, but she claimed the same number of restricted weapons as did the other Powers, and unlimited quantities of all weapons not prohibited or restricted. In this statement, the Foreign Minister far exceeded the expressions of the Chancellor.

In an address at Honnef a/Rhein, on October 16, on the occasion of the unveiling of a memorial to the German participants in the fight against the Separatist Movement, Reichsminister Goebbels declared: “The sole reason for Germany’s quitting the arms conference and the League was that she is no longer willing to be treated as a second-class nation. This is not a demonstration against peace, but for peace.” Germany, he continued, wanted no war, but she wanted a peace of honor; she wished to humiliate nobody, but she also did not wish to [Page 284] be humiliated. She was prepared to draw a line under the past, but she wished others also to be prepared to do so. In conclusion, he said: “If we are denied honor and equality, we will not let ourselves again be seen at the conference table.”

In an interview granted the Berlin correspondent of the London Daily Mail, Dr. Goebbels, according to Wolffs Telegraphisches Buero of October 17, remarked, in reply to a question as to whether Germany was now commencing to re-arm, that this was not the case as Germany adhered to her treaty obligations. She demanded, however, that the other signatories of the treaty fulfill their obligations in a like manner. Asked concerning the contradiction between Hitler’s recent remarks on relations with France and anti-French passages in the Führer’s book “My Struggle”, the Minister for Propaganda said that the offer of friendship which Hitler now made to France was indicative of the fact that the Nazi Party was capable of evolution. Germany’s attitude towards France had changed for quite some time, and if Germany got the Saar District back she would have no further territorial differences with France. As regarded Poland, Goebbels stated that Germany assuredly could not regard the Polish Corridor98 as a permanent institution, but she was of the opinion that there was no problem in Central Europe which would justify or make necessary a new war. Germany desired the return of the Corridor, but was convinced that this was a matter for negotiation. This might appear impossible at present, but many an apparent impossibility had been realized in Europe in the last few years. The rise of the Nazi Party to power, he concluded, had been one of them.

As was to be expected, German press comment concerning Germany’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference was uniform. In general, Germany was depicted as a much-abused nation which had met only with rebuffs in her effort to assert her just rights at Geneva. Because of the definite postponement of disarmament and the one-sided treatment of Germany, there was no longer any other way out than to quit the Conference, especially since, according to the Berliner Boersen Courier of October 14, “in place of right, force and power moved against defenselessness.” It was contended that, had Germany given way, after having categorically stated her standpoint she would have been in danger of not having been taken seriously by the world.

Sir John Simon’s speech was regarded as having precipitated the German exit. England’s policy was always against the strongest nation on the Continent, wrote the Berliner Tageblatt on October 15. In 1914, this was Germany, and England would hinder Germany’s return to this status, in every way.

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By the press in general Hitler was regarded as a master strategist who had dissipated the thick clouds of inimical diplomacy which had hung over Germany. With one blow he had shattered the foundations of international diplomacy. Also, by the withdrawal of Germany, the League had suffered the worst blow that it had ever sustained. It could now become the real ruler of small nations and take the former place of Metternich as the policeman of Europe. With Germany removed as the fictitious center of negotiations, the armed Powers now would be opposed to each other. However, Germany could not be blamed for this state of things. She desired peace most ardently, and the Fuhrer’s radio address had been an appeal to the world to heal its wounds, and not invite new ones.

Great stress was placed on the seriousness of the situation for Germany. She would be maligned and threatened on all sides, every means would be availed of in an attempt to humble her, and a struggle without precedent would begin about her. However, every German could feel an inner satisfaction at the fact that he was being led in the path of courage and honor, and it behooved him to stand steadfastly behind the Führer. In the last analysis, however, the statesmen of Europe would have to see that Germany’s distress was also their distress, and that the disruption of Germany meant the disruption of all Europe as well. Germany was united as she had never been before. She was willing to enter into any disarmament negotiations which were premised on her equality and honor, but she had said her say, and it now behooved the other Powers to indicate a future course of procedure.

It is the evident desire of the German press to represent to its readers the German position as being strong. With such headlines as: “America Stays Out of Purely European Questions”, and “American Policy of Complete Exclusion from European Politics”, the impression is created that America is disinterested in the new development and that no pressure is to be apprehended from the United States. Similarly, reports of the allegedly “quiet reception” in Paris of the German move are intended to serve the same purpose.

In leaving the Disarmament Conference because it considered its claims to equality to have been evaded, and because it saw no disarmament convention acceptable for signature by it as a possibility of the near future, the Hitler Government has taken a step which appears to meet the approval of the German people. Not only is the revision of the Treaty of Versailles a tenet of the Nazi Party, but it has been the objective of successive German Governments since the signature of the Treaty.

A certain amount of dissatisfaction undoubtedly exists in the ranks of his party, the Reichstag fire trial has become a farce, and the long-vaunted reduction of unemployment and the improvement in economic [Page 286] conditions have so far failed of great practical realization. It may thus be assumed that domestic political considerations made Hitler feel that a diversion was desirable at this juncture. Withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference offered a major step in German policy which might be regarded as involving the least menace of immediate danger. At the same time, arousing as it does the sense of honor and the nationalistic sentiment of the people, making possible an appeal by the Government to the people to rally to the support of the Fatherland and the institution of a plebiscite to which no patriot would respond in a negative sense, this step provides an excellent opportunity for the Government to consolidate its domestic position.

Also, the Chancellor may believe that, having achieved no success through multilateral negotiations at Geneva, he has the possibility of accomplishing more by direct negotiations. Perhaps considering that the Powers opposed to Germany at Geneva are not united, Hitler’s conciliatory remarks concerning France may be taken to indicate that he proposes to begin along this line, at the expense of England, whose attitude is professedly regarded here as having been the direct cause of Germany’s leaving the Conference.

As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to see just how such rapprochement with France is to be effected.

Please read this despatch in connection with despatch No. 211 of October 1799 and 218 of October 18,1 going forward in this same pouch.

Respectfully yours,