Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

98. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 5, 1990, 10:15 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

Baker-Shevardnadze Ministerial in Washington
First Small Group Meeting: Arms Control

SUBJECTS

• START, Defense and Space, CFE, CSBMs, SNF, Nuclear Testing, Chemical Weapons, Open Skies, Non-Proliferation, Naval Arms Control, Compliance

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
  • Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor to President
  • Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State, T
  • Ronald Lehman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
  • Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
  • Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
  • Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary, PM
  • Dennis B. Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
  • Margaret DeB. Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State, PA
  • Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
  • Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
  • Arnold Kanter, Senior Director, NSC Staff
  • Steven Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISP
  • Gen, William Graves, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • James P. Timbie, Special Advisor to Under Secretary Bartholomew
  • Alexander Vershbow, Director, EUR/SOV (notetaker)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Yuriy Dubinin, USSR Ambassador to the U.S.
  • Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Advisor to the President
  • Aleksey Obukhov, Head, USA & Canada Administration, MFA
  • Yuriy Nazarkin, USSR Ambassador to the Nuclear and Space Talks
  • Major General Aleksandr Peresypkin, General Staff
  • Oleg Grinevskiy, Ambassador to CFE Negotiations
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Head, Policy Planning Administration
  • Sergey Batsanov, Head of USSR CD Delegation
  • Gennadiy Gerasimov, MFA Spokesman
  • Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Head, USA & Canada Administration
  • Teymuraz Stepanov, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze
  • Vitaliy Churkin, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze
  • Viktor Prokofiev, MFA interpreter (notetaker)

At the Secretary’s invitation, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze opened the discussion. He said he wanted to emphasize that after Malta and after his talks with Secretary Baker in Wyoming and Moscow, our work to define mutually acceptable solutions had picked up speed. In a nutshell, he could say that major differences had been eliminated regarding the ABM and defense problems, SLCMs and ALCMs, mobile ICBMs, telemetry encryption and non-deployed missiles. Now we could address the remaining issues; this had, in fact, shaped the agenda for this ministerial. He proposed to lay out the issues on which the Soviets believed we needed to make further decisions.

START: ALCMs and SLCMs

Regarding heavy bombers and ALCMs, Shevardnadze said it now seemed that what we should do is focus on the key issue, the 600 km range cut-off. He had already informed the Secretary many times that, without agreement on a 600 km range limit, all other understandings that had been reached between the two sides on ALCMs would make no sense. In Moscow he had given the necessary clarifications and arguments as to why the Soviets had raised this issue in such a fundamental fashion. He would not repeat these arguments now, but only say that the Soviet side could not possibly change its position. In Moscow the sides had reached basic agreement on most aspects of the ALCM issue and he could confirm that now. At the same time, Soviet experts had some additional ideas that he thought should be acceptable to both sides. These could be discussed in the working group. In fact, an initial discussion had taken place the previous day.

Shevardnadze said that, regarding the “sliding rule,” it would be necessary to reach agreement on numerical levels. The Soviets believed that for the United States there should be a maximum of 90–115 heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs. On this basis we could find a final solution. He reiterated that we should have our experts work on these issues. He just wanted to emphasize again the importance of all elements of the Wyoming package as well as the importance of the 600 km range factor. All these issues had to be discussed in detail. The experts could then report their results back to the Ministers later in the day.

The Secretary said that, before Shevardnadze turned to SLCMs, he wanted to respond in light of the in-depth exploration of this issue they had had previously. He understood that Shevardnadze had no authority on the ALCM range issue. The Secretary said he had no authority to move either. As he had said in Namibia, this might be an issue that would have to be resolved by the two Presidents.

The Secretary went on to say that we thought the paper presented by Marshal Akhromeyev the previous day raised a question as to whether the agreements reached in Moscow continued to apply. We could have our experts meet, but a number of the things in the papers walked back agreements that had been reached in Moscow and were reflected in the agreed elements of common ground. We understood that, unless we could resolve the range question on a satisfactory basis, the whole package deal could not be considered agreed. But, to be frank, our view in Moscow was that we had agreed on all issues except for range. The Secretary then quoted from the Joint Statement to this effect: “On ALCMs, agreement was reached on all remaining issues with the exception of the range threshold.”

Rather than go over the previous discussions, the Secretary suggested that our experts engage on ALCMs and SLCMs. Range was a difficult issue for the U.S. We had had long discussions in Moscow. We understood the Soviet government’s position, but it was our feeling that we had moved a great deal from 1500 km to 800 km—a change of 700 km.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for his comments. He suggested that they make more specific comments on the sides’ positions after the experts had worked on these problems. But before that he wanted to lay out the Soviet position on SLCMs. Taking into account the agreed elements of common ground from their Moscow talks, the Soviets proposed a package solution:

— Limitations would apply only to nuclear armed SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km.

— All existing long-range SLCMs would be considered to be nuclear-armed.

— Future nuclear SLCMs would be distinguishable from non-nuclear SLCMs on the basis of functionally related externally observable differences.

— There would be a ban on nuclear-armed long-range SLCMs which are MIRVed.

— The sides would proceed from the assumption that the maximum number of long-range SLCMs permitted would not exceed 600. This level would be recorded in a provision of the treaty.

— In addition to the agreed exchange of data on types of surface ships and submarines equipped with SLCMs, the sides would also exchange information on the numbers of SLCMs that a surface ship or submarine of a given type was equipped to carry. These maximum numbers also would be recorded in the treaty or in the negotiating record.

— Verification would be based on measures to be agreed as provided in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement.

In this respect Shevardnadze recalled that in the Secretary’s office,² he had recalled that Joint Statement. The Soviets believed that fundamental issues had been resolved in 1987 and that it was therefore important to go back to that document.

Shevardnadze went on to say that in Moscow the Soviets had made a major concession that made it possible to discuss a final solution to the SLCM question. Specifically, they had agreed that the SLCM accord could be drawn up as unilateral declarations outside the treaty framework. For the Soviet side this was the most difficult and complex decision. It was a step that had been taken by the Soviet side unilaterally. He suggested that our experts reach an agreement on the text of politically binding declarations on SLCMs that the sides would exchange when signing the START treaty. He added that when he spoke of politically binding statements he did not have in mind empty phrases, but rather specific commitments regarding the number and qualitative mix of SLCMs.

The Secretary said our experts could engage on this question. But he would ask that the U.S. experts give the Soviet side a copy of the Joint Statement that had been agreed in Moscow in February. He saw some of Shevardnadze’s suggestions as inconsistent with the agreements reached in Moscow. It was our understanding that the Soviets were now proposing legally binding SLCM limitations in a protocol to the treaty, and that they were also proposing verification measures as well as a provision whereby all current SLCMs would be treated as nuclear-armed. They were also now proposing limits on the number of SLCMs per type of ship. All these issues had been thrashed out in discussions on the proposed declarations during the Moscow ministerial. These were issues that had separated us for a long time and they were all fundamental questions as far as the U.S. was concerned. The U.S. position had not changed; it probably could not and would not change. Our experts could engage on these proposals. But he would repeat that he was worried whether we could do what we needed to do in the seven weeks before the summit. It would be hard to solve these problems if we had to revisit issues that had previously been divisive, particularly when we felt we had resolved them in Moscow. Nevertheless, we should see if there was any way through this minefield at the expert level.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to emphasize again that the Soviets did not want to see any retreat from the Moscow agreed elements of common ground, but certain conditions had to be met. The elements of common ground did not actually reflect the Washington Summit Joint Statement. That document contained very important provisions, especially with regard to verification. Soviet society and the Supreme Soviet, like the U.S. public and the U.S. Congress, were very sensitive to verification issues. Verification had been a difficult problem for the Soviets in the past, yet over the previous year they had made a 180-degree turnaround. Now Soviet people were in favor of a very rigorous system of verification. Therefore, he urged the Secretary to take account of the moral, political and psychological aspects of the negotiations and the prospective agreements.

START: Mobile ICBM Verification

Moving to other START issues, Shevardnadze said he wanted to address mobile ICBM verification. He recalled that during the Secretary’s February visit to Moscow he had put forward new U.S. proposals for verifying mobile ICBM launchers. The Soviets had studied these carefully and had come to the conclusion that it would be possible to work on the basis of the U.S. approach. We should turn it over to our experts in order to find a definitive formula.

The Secretary replied that this was good news and agreed that the experts should engage in order to work out specific language. Shevardnadze commented that today or the following day the Ministers would have good results.

START: Non-Circumvention

Shevardnadze said he next wanted to turn to the question of non-circumvention. In Moscow the Soviet side had proposed that the non-circumvention provisions apply only to future reductions. What was implied was that the obligations the U.S. had assumed in the past with respect to Third countries would not be affected.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. approach proceeded from a few basic premises. First, we had programs of cooperation with our allies—in particular, an obligation to cooperate with the UK to support its deterrent, an obligation that dated back thirty years. This was a commitment we intended to keep. We were not in a position to accept constraints on this commitment, as it was one that had been made over a period of decades by successive U.S. Presidents. During this period the U.S. and USSR had reached agreements in SALT I and SALT II, neither of which affected continuing patterns of cooperation between the U.S. and its allies. Therefore, we saw so no need for any non-circumvention provision since customary international law made clear that states had an obligation not to circumvent the intent of a treaty; it was the U.S. intention scrupulously to comply with treaty obligations.

In Moscow, the Secretary continued, the Soviets had made an important statement recognizing that the pattern of cooperation between the U.S. and the UK would continue. This could open the way to a solution. The U.S. had looked into what it could do in START to address Soviet concerns without affecting longstanding U.S. commitments to the UK. As a result, the Secretary said he had proposals for language in the START Treaty. He presented Shevardnadze with the text (attached).³ The Secretary added that we would like to put this issue behind us on the basis of this text.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for the proposal and emphasized again that the Soviet side respected the obligations the U.S. had already assumed. The future was a different matter, however.

START: PPCMs

Turning to the question of continuous monitoring of ICBM production facilities, Shevardnadze said this was a key issue in the system of verification being developed in Geneva. The Soviet approach was based on a position of principle that we must have rigorous verification and constraints based on reciprocity. The Soviets were prepared to accept monitoring of the production of systems of types that did not yet exist in the U.S. Specifically, he said, verification of rail-mobile ICBMs would be acceptable to the Soviets if the verification regime did not also exempt other strategic offensive arms. On this basis we could agree on a mutually acceptable solution.

The Secretary said that on this subject we hoped to table a proposal soon in Geneva. At that point our delegations could take it on as a priority item. He agreed with Shevardnadze that this was quite complex and complicated a subject.

START II Principles

Shevardnadze said fine, this could be discussed among the experts. The next question he wanted to turn to concerned the Joint Statement of intentions regarding future strategic arms and strategic stability talks. The previous day⁴ he had explained some of the views of the Soviet delegation. A commitment in the START Treaty to future negotiations would be an important milestone for the disarmament process. The START Treaty at this time did not set any goals for the future.

Shevardnadze said he thought we already had a good understanding about beginning START II. This second phase of negotiations would focus not only, or not so much, on numerical reductions. Instead, the emphasis would be on deep and radical restructuring of the strategic potentials of the two sides, in order to remove the most destabilizing aspects. The Soviets proposed working out a Joint Statement by the summer summit. The Soviets had already done preliminary work and had given a draft text to the Secretary’s colleagues. He proposed working on this constructively in order to define the main avenues for START II.

The Secretary replied that before we could agree on a Joint Statement or a text it was important to do further work on the content of possible follow-on negotiations. If we could reach some understanding on what we would like to see as principles for those talks, then perhaps we could consider whether a Joint Statement would be appropriate. The U.S. had some preliminary ideas of its own about START II:

— The talks should be bilateral negotiations involving only the U.S. and USSR.

— The U.S. agreed with many of the ideas put forward by Ambassador Nazarkin in Geneva. For example, we shared the view that the follow-on talks should aim to remove the incentives to strike first, reduce the concentration of warheads on MIRVed ICBMs and give preference to survivable systems.

— The U.S. believed that stability would be strengthened if the sides could agree on measures that would seek a balance between strategic defenses and offenses. In this regard, the U.S. believed the Defense and Space Talks should continue.

— Of course, stability could be enhanced in other ways as well, including confidence-building measures, and these should also be addressed in follow-on negotiations.

— It was our strongly held view that our objective should be to build on START and not to replace it with another 400-page treaty. We should work out amendments, protocols and supplementary measures rather than beginning again from scratch.

The next step, the Secretary concluded, was to see whether we could reach an understanding regarding the contents of START II. If we found we were very far apart, we would need to rethink whether to have a Joint Statement. He repeated that before we decided that a Joint Statement was the route to follow, we should see how close we are on the principles to be embraced by such a statement.

Shevardnadze responded that he had listened very carefully to the Secretary’s remarks. Having already set forth the Soviet position, he did not think that our views fully coincided; but there were elements that could provide the basis for a joint document. He suggested the experts get together in order to reach agreement. He added that he had no other NST questions. He then passed along the package of Soviet papers,⁵ remarking that the conveyor belt was fully operational.

START: Backfire

The Secretary said he had a couple of additional START-related issues to raise. The first was the Backfire bomber. This remained a serious concern to the U.S. In our view it would need to be captured one way or another. One way to do this would be to count Backfire in START but to discount it by 50% in terms of the 1600 and 6000 limits. Another alternative would be to limit Backfire in CFE as we had proposed in Vienna. The U.S. was flexible, but this system had to be addressed one way or the other. We simply wanted to submit two alternatives. He added that there would be major ratification problems if we were not able to handle Backfire in some way.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to make a clarification. He did not know if the Secretary was aware, but Soviet negotiators in Vienna had already expressed a desire to include medium bombers—including the TU–22M or Backfire—in the conventional forces agreement. So this would be discussed in Vienna and the Soviets considered the subject closed.

The Secretary said he had wanted only to offer an alternative, specifically, inclusion in START with a discount.

Shevardnadze rejoined that this would be a departure from the Moscow agreements.

START: Other Issues to be Resolved

The Secretary said he had spoken in his one-on-one meeting the previous night about exchanging a list of START issues to be resolved by the June summit. He wanted to pass over this list (attached).⁶

Shevardnadze said he believed we had very important work to do. The Soviets had their experts here. They would prepare their own list to be exchanged immediately.

Defense and Space

The Secretary said he wanted next to discuss the Defense and Space Talks. Our discussions in Moscow had been useful in making clear that a START agreement was not linked to a Defense and Space agreement. We hoped we could engage in Geneva in a dialogue on how new technologies could make a safer future. The draft treaty the U.S. had put on the table in early December, including our space testing and sensors initiatives, offered a sound basis for a transition from the past to the future. Our negotiator in Geneva had given the Soviet side a proposal to demonstrate our proposed predictability measures. This would work something like the START verification and stability measures. As a means of moving the Defense and Space Talks forward, the U.S. proposed that we work out a freestanding predictability agreement—one that would not be linked to the ABM treaty—in order to build confidence in this area.

The Secretary added that he wanted to emphasize the words free-standing. We were talking about an agreement that was not tied in any way to the ABM treaty. This was the only basis on which we would be prepared to proceed. He then handed over the draft predictability agreement (attached).⁷ The Secretary added that the measures proposed included an exchange of data, meetings of experts, briefings, visits to laboratories, and notifications of certain tests. A sound agreement on these modest but valuable confidence-building measures would be an important step toward resolving our differences in this area.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets would study the document very carefully. He only wanted to make two general clarifications. In Wyoming we had found a reasonable solution that would make it possible to sign a START agreement in the near future. But he wanted again to emphasize what he had said many times before: the START treaty would not be able to be effective or remain in force if the ABM treaty were violated. In Geneva, at the level of negotiators, we should make a determined effort to resolve the principal issue as to what is prohibited and what is permitted. The Soviets were prepared to discuss this and find a reasonable solution.

The Secretary did not comment and asked whether Shevardnadze wanted to turn to other arms control areas.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

Naval Arms Control

Shevardnadze said he once again wanted to raise a subject that he didn’t repeat too often, but one which we needed to approach on a more constructive basis. He had in mind naval forces. (Shevardnadze quipped that Akhromeyev perhaps reminded the U.S. of this question more often than did he.) Naval forces were an objective problem, a major challenge with respect to verification and monitoring. He knew the political and psychological difficulties this subject created for the U.S. and its allies. Therefore, the Soviets would like to move toward enhancing stability on the seas in a step-by-step manner. In this way we would not overload the boat.

As a first stage, Shevardnadze continued, the Soviets proposed that we elaborate measures of mutual understanding and openness. Such measures would not touch the structures of our naval forces; they would not affect NATO’s current edge in naval systems or any programs of modernization.

From this phase, Shevardnadze went on, we could proceed to discussions of stability in naval forces. After this there could be pre-negotiation consultations with the participation of all interested states, including all the major naval powers. These consultations could discuss the mechanism, format, ultimate goal of the talks, and the way to move toward such talks.

In tandem to these steps, Shevardnadze said the Soviets suggested bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. regarding radical reductions and elimination of non-strategic nuclear armaments beginning with nuclear weapons on surface ships. This had been proposed by Gorbachev at Malta.

Shevardnadze said he had one additional point: he believed we had to have serious discussion of strategic stability in the very broad sense of the phrase. By this he referred to strategic arms, conventional arms and naval forces, all taken together. It was necessary to have a serious discussion with the involvement of major experts in the field—academics, military representatives, and political specialists. He added that he was talking about strategic stability both in global terms and in regional terms. The experts could address Europe, the Middle East or Asia and the Pacific. In this respect, he noted that we had no discussions on the Asian-Pacific region even though many states in that area favored such exchanges.

Shevardnadze concluded that he wanted to raise this problem even though he knew that it would be difficult to find a solution right away. Nevertheless, we should strive to establish a mechanism that would be useful to both the U.S. and USSR.

The Secretary responded that he was underwhelmed and Shevardnadze would not be surprised to hear this. He would not cite again the reasons why we believed naval arms control was inappropriate, such as the geographical differences between our two countries and the special role naval forces played for the U.S. We understood the Soviet position and had heard the arguments before. He hoped we could put this issue to one side, including the issue of Asian arms control (particularly as we had differences regarding the sources of instability in Asia). Given the extraordinary difficulty we would have in finishing START by May 30 and in completing a CFE agreement this year, the boat really was loaded already.

The Secretary repeated that we had very serious issues between us on which we should concentrate our talent and resources in order to find solutions. We should see if we can complete START and CFE agreements before we took on this even more difficult issue.

Shevardnadze replied that he did not expect any different reaction. Nevertheless, he wanted to recall the talks in Malta at which Gorbachev raised this question and provided a rationale for limiting naval forces. The President had said that he understood that there was a question here. Well, if there was a question then we needed to find an answer. The Soviets understood that we would not be able to have a specific dialogue. But it was inadvisable to put this question off for very long.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Russian Affairs, Russia Desk Files, Lot 99D344, Baker-Shevardnadze Washington 4/4–6/90. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on April 11 by Vershbow; cleared by Seitz, Ross, and Timbie. The meeting took place in the Franklin Room at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
2. See Document 97.
3. Not found.
4. See Document 95.
5. Not found.
6. Not found.
7. Not found.