Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

95. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 4, 1990, 4–7:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Secretary Baker
  • Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

• USSR

  • Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

Baker: I want to start by welcoming you and since you are the guest I think you should go ahead and feel free to kick off the discussions.

Shevardnadze: Thanks for the welcome. I believe this meeting is of great importance because we have little time before the Summit and we have a lot of work to do. I might begin by discussing the date of the Summit. Taking into account your previous proposals, we propose that we go ahead and have the Summit between May 30th and June 3rd. My impression is that this should be suitable to you. If it is acceptable we could make the announcement during my visit.

Baker: When the Ambassador gave me the dates he said that it was important that there be no leaks. I have discussed this only with the President and so far there have been no leaks. As I understand it, the dates and the scenario, as I have described them in Namibia, would be okay with you. That is to say we would have meetings here and then we would go to Maine and we might come back here.

Shevardnadze: I discussed this with Gorbachev before leaving and he believes that the main task right now is to set the dates. All that you propose in terms of scenario is basically acceptable, but he does prefer to reserve on certain possible proposals that he might want to suggest about the program. In any case, I will communicate our suggestions on the program after I get back to Moscow.

Baker: Good. You have no objection to the concept of spending time at the President’s residence in Maine?

Shevardnadze: No, that is fine with us.

Baker: Well, let me just say that the dates are acceptable to us. They really do suit our needs as well. We might decide how best to announce this. My sense would be that we should announce this simultaneously from both capitals while you are here.

Shevardnadze: We are ready to accept anything that you suggest. Whatever you say is fine with us.

Baker: Well, I think it might be agreeable to us to announce this tomorrow or Friday. If we announce this tomorrow, we could do it simultaneously with an announcement in both Washington and Moscow. That would leave much less of a chance of a leak.

Shevardnadze: That could be. Maybe we might want to announce it right after the meeting with the President or before.

Baker: Whatever. Again, I think the important point is that we would want a simultaneous announcement.

Shevardnadze: That is fine with us. Really whatever you say is going to be fine with us and if you want to do it before the meeting with the President, that is fine.

Baker: I just want to be sure that we agree that this should be a simultaneous announcement coming out of both Washington and Moscow.

Shevardnadze: Yes, that’s the most desirable.

Baker: Why don’t I ask the President. I do worry about a leak.

Shevardnadze: Fine. Let’s leave it to the President. Whatever he says will also be the opinion of the Soviet President. You know you have a big advantage. You can just pick up the phone and consult with him. It is a lot harder for me.

Baker: That is the way it is for me when I am in Moscow.

Shevardnadze: Well, it is good that the dates are set. The most important thing is to set the dates.

Now, as for the negotiations themselves, and what’s going to be involved with them, and what’s going to be involved with the results of the Summit, we have a lot to do and a lot is going to depend upon the talks that you and I have. Of course, a lot will also depend upon the specific results that emerge from Vienna and Geneva. We have every reason to hope by the end of May that we are going to have important and major agreements. As I discussed with you, we are going to have a lot to do in advance of that to prepare the documents that will be signed at the Summit and to prepare well for the Summit and that is one of the reasons I said we are going to need another meeting between the two of us.

I have studied very carefully the status of the talks and I must say that our readiness to have the Summit is not high at this point.

Baker: I agree with that. We might also just finalize what the other dates of the ministerial are going to be. The May 16-19 is acceptable for us.

Shevardnadze: That’s very good.

Baker: I do think on the announcement that tomorrow morning is probably better because that will guarantee there isn’t a leak. We could do it at 9:00 in the morning here, 5:00 in Moscow. Is that okay?

Shevardnadze: That’s quite okay.

Baker: One other item that the President wanted me to make very clear to you—and he just reiterated that on the phone—is that we are very concerned about the events in Lithuania. I know you are aware of this and I want to let you go through your agenda before I offer some comments on Lithuania. But it is important especially given what the President has just noted, that while we do not want to have anything get in the way of the Summit and the ministerial, we are making the assumption that Lithuania is going to be managed in the way that is consistent with the principles of perestroika and glasnost and that it will be settled peacefully.

Shevardnadze: Should we discuss the program of the Summit tomorrow or should we talk about it now?

Baker: Well, we could do it now. The way we see it is that the arrival would be in Washington on Wednesday afternoon, May 30. The formal arrival ceremony would be on Thursday morning, May 31st; there might be a state dinner that night. Friday, June 1st the two Presidents would go to Kennebunkport. You might have discussions here in advance of going up to Kennebunkport on June 1 and then you could continue discussions up there. There would be further meetings in Kennebunkport on Saturday, June 2nd and you might return to Washington either Saturday evening or Sunday morning. There would, of course, be the possibility of additional meetings down here in Washington, if needed. Perhaps there might also be a reciprocal dinner if that is what you want on Sunday and maybe also a concluding press event. What I am saying in a sense is that the June 1-3 timeframe can have a lot of built-in flexibility.

Shevardnadze: After our meeting, I will convey this to President Gorbachev. We will want to have a reciprocal dinner and probably also a press event. It is possible that President Gorbachev will also want to make a public statement during his visit here, but that is not definite at this point.

Baker: President Bush would hope that this timeframe will be committed entirely to meetings with the President. If President Gorbachev wants other events in the country, outside of Washington, we would hope that those would take place either before or after the May 30th-June 3rd dates. That doesn’t mean that he might not have time to visit the Congress while he is here in Washington, that would be understandable. I’m really only talking about his possible travel to other parts of the United States.

Shevardnadze: Maybe we can decide this way. I will go ahead and convey this to Moscow and then give you an answer back on all this after my return to Moscow.

Baker: We can work out the details of the schedule through normal diplomatic procedure. Tomorrow we will announce only that there will be a Summit in the United States and we will announce what the timeframe is from Wednesday, May 30th to June 3rd.

Shevardnadze: That’s fine. We might also announce the next ministerial.

Baker: Well, we need not do that as part of the White House statement. We can do that at the conclusion of our meeting in our press statements.

Shevardnadze: That’s fine. What is important to me is that the May 16th–19th dates are acceptable to you for the ministerial. The only disadvantage that I see of those dates is that they are too close to the Summit. On the other hand, that gives our delegations a chance to work and to prove themselves; they are going to have a lot to do so that the Summit is well-prepared by the end of that meeting.

I brought with me a letter² from President Gorbachev that responds to President Bush’s letter.³ I’ll give the original to President Bush in the meeting but I wanted to give you an advance copy so that you could tell the President about the contents.

Let me make some preliminary comments on the letter. You will see in the letter that we are providing some answers to some of the questions you have raised. I would like to emphasize that we gave very close consideration to the letter and we take a very broad view of the problems and of the issues that will come up in the future talks after the 50% reduction treaty is concluded. Overall, our approach is that we need to really focus on concluding the 50% reductions treaty. I know this is a view that you share as well. This will enable us to initial the treaty at the Summit so that we can sign the treaty by the end of the year. As I have said, we still have quite a few issues that have to be worked out in the treaty, and they are both of a substantive and technical nature. It is going to require a lot of work to get that done. I know that your people have proposed that we should take an inventory of all the issues between us and see where we stand on each of them. I support this. I think it is a practical and appropriate way to proceed. I’d like to direct our people to do this exercise.

Baker: Good.

Shevardnadze: Yes, that would be very good because we really have, as I have said, a number of substantive and technical problems. And I remember the final stages of the INF Treaty, we really had a lot of difficulties with some of the technical problems that posed themselves.

Baker: Well, as you noted, I have got a list of the problems that need to be solved and I will present it to you tomorrow in the small group meeting on arms control and you can compare our list against any list you might have. You are quite right that we have a very big job if we are going to get ready by the 30th of May.

Shevardnadze: With respect to some of the substantive aspects of the reply, I do believe that it is not desirable at this time when we have a number of substantive differences to add to any of them. In other words, our real task right now is to try to reduce the substantive differences and not necessarily put a new one on the table—an additional item that we really don’t have time to work out. But in the context of your proposal, I have a suggestion to make. We would be ready to make a substantial cut in our mobile SS–24s if you would decide not to deploy your MX missile in a mobile form. We could record that in a political document if you’d like. To be more precise, we would be ready to stop deployment of these missiles by January 1, 1991. We would not be able to stop deployment during this year. This is our initial position. You will, of course, want to study it and discuss it. As you remember, I said in Namibia that there is a need for bold steps and major tradeoffs that are equitable if we are going to secure stability in our countries over time.

The second point in the letter I should note focuses on fixed MIRVed missiles in the next negotiations, and our readiness to discuss this. But cuts in one component should not create instability in other components. We are ready to discuss all problems, all issues, including major cuts in warheads in all missiles—ICBMs and SLBMs. We also are willing to discuss cuts in ALCMs and bombers. In other words, I think we need to have a full discussion of the strategic triad. There are quite a few different variants that need to be considered and I think all these elements must be taken into account if we are going to have a real balance.

There is a factor I would like you to consider and that is that we now have a situation that has been typical in your country for a long time. That being, that all of these issues of parity, balance, the end of the arms race, are being scrutinized by our legislature. That is not new for you but it is new for us. And I must tell you quite frankly that we are hearing that we have made too many concessions. Both Gorbachev and I are being criticized quite seriously. We are being told that we make too many one-sided concessions; we are being told that the INF treaty was an example of that; we are being told that in these agreements now we are reducing 50% more missiles than the US is. So, please understand that our positions reflect an awareness of some of our political pressures as well. There certainly are many interesting and reasonable points in President Bush’s letter and we want to look for solutions and variants that will be acceptable to both sides.

Also, in order to record the interests of both countries in continuing the START process, both Presidents really should sign a statement of intent at the Summit on future talks. Many of the ideas in the President’s letter should be reflected in such a statement of intent. We have come with a draft of such a statement or declaration of intent.⁴ Your people should take a look at it and we will try to take into account their ideas. When you were in Namibia, you mentioned that the proposal that you were passing on to us was one that you were keeping confidential. Do you intend to keep it confidential or are you going to go public with it?

Baker: Well, I think we will keep it confidential. But, undoubtedly, it will become public when we have to testify to Congress on our discussions. I must tell you that I have heard at the White House that an arms control reporter has already been inquiring about this matter. So I don’t know how much longer we will be able to keep it confidential.

Shevardnadze: Well, then let’s not make that a problem. If it comes out, it comes out.

Baker: We sought to keep it confidential because we did not want to publicize a proposal in the period between the time you got it and had a chance to come back with an answer on it.

Shevardnadze: I understand.

Baker: Two other points in response to what you said about the letter.

First, we too have a statement of intent or joint declaration of principles for follow-on negotiations⁵ that we would like to see signed. And secondly, in light of your response to our proposal, maybe we could put in that statement or that joint declaration the concept of de-MIRVing, noting that the concept ought to be explored because it is something that would promote stability. Our initial view is that we would prefer not to talk about START II, but rather talk of building on the START agreement because this is something that will facilitate our ratification process here. But these matters we can discuss further.

Shevardnadze: Yes, let’s discuss them in greater detail and get our experts to discuss that. Of course, when we speak of the arms reduction process we have in mind MIRVed missiles too, not only ICBMs, but SLBMs, and also heavy bombers. Indeed the entire spectrum of arms, not just one component of the armed forces.

Baker: I understand that’s your counter-proposal. We are not in a position to agree at this point but I think we ought to at least be thinking about some kind of generic statement on de-MIRVing of land-based missiles because this is something that could enhance our ability to talk about follow-on negotiations and its purposes.

Shevardnadze: Well, let’s think about that. In our statement we are trying to identify all the main areas or aspects of future talks, emphasizing the most de-stabilizing weapons. But, let’s take into account the fact that we each have interests and that historically our forces and structures have evolved in a certain way. That ought to be reflected in the statement.

Baker: Well, we will see. Certainly whatever you have to present, we will take a look at. Whether we could agree to it will depend upon what’s in it.

Shevardnadze: Yes, of course. The main element is our readiness to begin follow-on talks after the 50% reduction treaty has been completed. The objectives and the main aspects of those talks are what we are outlining. But we could compare our draft with yours and we will see where they overlap.

Baker: Yes, we will have to see it. I haven’t seen yours, you haven’t seen ours. Our experts can exchange them.

Shevardnadze: Let me emphasize what I said in Windhoek. On the issue of ALCMs, my bag is empty. I really have no room to maneuver on ALCM range. Other questions we can go over tomorrow and discuss them and see if we can find compromise solutions. I am hopeful that we can. On the possibility of a statement as a result of our talks, I think we ought to at least consider that. I have no objection to reflecting, in a short statement, what we have agreed to. Maybe we don’t have to have a long statement.

Baker: I think that is right. I think we ought to not have to feel the need to produce a long joint communique every time we meet. If there is a very brief statement that records what we have agreed to, that is fine.

Shevardnadze: I think that is right. We can ask our experts to work out a brief statement reflecting agreements only. On the basis of our previous meetings I have always had a sense that we really run out of time and don’t have enough time to review the results of our overall discussions. We have very wide-ranging talks. We have lots of experts, including experts on bilateral relations. And somehow 90 minutes for a concluding session doesn’t seem to leave enough time.

Baker: Well, we can always extend that.

Shevardnadze: I brought with me our best experts on regional issues, on economic issues, on transnational questions, on humanitarian rights issues, on arms control—really on everything.

Baker: Yes, it is true. In Moscow we made very good progress on arms control, but we really gave short shrift to the rest of our agenda. We shouldn’t do that this time.

Shevardnadze: Yes. President Bush was saying in Malta that at the forthcoming Summit, our bilateral relations should take an appropriate and big place. Now, would you like me to say something about Lithuania?

Baker: I have got some things to say, but you are the guest and if you would like to go first, that would be fine.

Shevardnadze: Maybe you should make your remarks first.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Lot 99D344, Office of Russian Affairs, Russia Desk Files, Baker-Shevardnadze Washington 4/4–6/90. Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. The complete memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
2. See Document 91.
3. See Document 90.
4. Not found.
5. Not found.