Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

97. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 5, 1990, 9–10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Secretary Baker
  • Dennis B. Ross, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

• USSR

  • Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Sergey Tarasenko, Notetaker
  • Interpreter

Baker: You said you wanted a private word before we begin—I would also like a private word with you. Why don’t you go ahead first.

Shevardnadze: First, I want to tell you that a political decision has been taken by us and it regards our Ambassador to Washington. Ambassador Dubinin has been a good ambassador, he has good prestige, he has good communication skills, and he has the overall skills of a good ambassador. We are planning to send him now to Paris. He is after all a European expert, he has previously served in France, and we know he will do very well. And it happens to also be consistent with his wishes. We are now going to assign Ambassador Bessmertnykh to come to Washington. Presently, he is one of my first deputies. He has worked here in Washington for many years; he is a very decent individual; he knows the United States extremely well, and he respects the United States. It is my view that if you don’t respect the country and the people to which you are assigned, you really cannot do a very good job. In any case, we are going to formalize his appointment. I hope and I assume there is no problem with gaining your consent for him. It is important that he participate in all our meetings. He knows the State Department and the President well and he’s also close to Gorbachev. A few months ago he came here with a special message from Gorbachev. Since he’s going to be the ambassador there certainly will be no need for any special envoys. You can fully assume and you can have full confidence that he is very close to both Gorbachev and to me. He knows all the problems of arms control and all the other problems extremely well. You can feel confident that when you talk to him about any issue it will be transmitted to both Gorbachev and to me.

Baker: We’ve heard rumors that this might be happening and let me just say that we are pleased to have Bessmertnykh come here. You can count on the fact that he’ll have access, and he will do very well here. In saying this I want you to know while we are pleased to have Bessmertnykh come, please understand that we do believe that Ambassador Dubinin has been an excellent ambassador. He’s discrete, he has good communication skills, he’s efficient, he’s enjoyed good relations with the people here, and he has developed a reputation that is quite good. I’ve trusted him, and I’m pleased that he will be going to Paris because that is something that I know he’d like to do. I am a little concerned that there were rumors that he did not enjoy the confidence of the top levels of the U.S. Government, and I want you to know that’s simply not true. He’s been an excellent ambassador.

Shevardnadze: Thanks. The second point I’d like to raise is about how we are going to conduct our work here in this Ministerial. I think the first session will be on arms control and will be attended by the experts. Then we’ll have the regional issues and the bilateral issues meeting and we should invite the leaders of the subgroups and especially the subgroups on the regional questions. Then I think tomorrow we might ask them to give us formal reports.

Baker: Fine. That’s the way it’s set up.

Shevardnadze: Let me also mention another item—the SS-24 missile. You remember I said in Namibia there might be other possible variants that could be considered, and I just want to say that it’s not by mere chance that I said we need to think about different variants, different options, and different kinds of tradeoffs. We are continuing to look at this problem and I understand that the President might write a letter of reply to what he’s received from Gorbachev and I think it would be good if you were to bring such a letter when you came to Moscow. You could bring it to President Gorbachev and I would not rule out a solution on this issue at that time.

Baker: I understand that. Are you saying there might be some solution to banning MIRVed mobiles or at least substantially reducing them that might be different from what I gave you in Namibia and different from the response we just received from Gorbachev?²

Shevardnadze: Yes. Another variant is a possibility. There are some ideas we are working on. They have not jelled yet. But we are continuing to look at this, and I think our ideas will develop in a short time.

Baker: That’s good to hear. It makes a difference in how we respond to the Gorbachev letter.

Shevardnadze: In Windhoek, I said it was very important that there be equivalence and equitable tradeoffs.

Baker: There are two things I want to raise and I want to make certain that there is no misunderstanding from yesterday. First, when I use the term deMIRVing I’m talking about a ban or a phased reduction in ICBMs with MIRVs. I understand that you, in the letter from President Gorbachev to President Bush, are willing to consider if it could be extended to all missiles, not just ICBMs. I don’t want there to be any misunderstanding about what I’m talking about—I am talking about ICBMs only. Maybe there is no misunderstanding but I just want to be sure that the record is clear about what it is I was referring to.

Shevardnadze: But you are speaking about deMIRVing of ICBMs of all types.

Baker: Yes. Another matter arose that is more troubling. And that really arises from the briefing I received on the papers³ that Marshal Akhromeyev gave to Ambassador Bartholomew last night. Our leaders set for us the goal of resolving all of the substantive issues in START by June. But I am seriously troubled by the approach on those papers, because they make it virtually impossible to achieve that goal. There’s at least two problems. Let me explain.

First and foremost, the papers walk back from the understanding that we reached at the political level in Moscow. They seek to return us to approaches that for many years had been unworkable. Let me give you two examples. In Moscow our joint statement on SLCMs said that they would be dealt with by parallel, politically binding declarations. That’s an exact quote. Now, with six to seven weeks before the Summit we’re hit out of the blue with a paper that calls for legally binding numerical limits in a protocol to the treaty.

Another example: The bracketed SLCM declaration that we worked out set aside verification. Now the paper proposes detailed verification measures which have been a stumbling block on SLCMs for many years.

One more example: On ALCMs, the exact language of the joint statement in Moscow was “agreement reached on all remaining issues with the exception of the range threshold.” Yet, the ALCMs paper that you gave us reopens the counting rules, even the numbers of heavy bombers and a number of other issues as well.

You told me in Namibia and you repeated again last night that we won’t be able to meet our deadline unless you and I do it and unless there is a necessary commitment at the political level. Now I am asking myself if we would be able to resolve everything that remains to be done in the next seven weeks if after you and I agree the experts are free to roll things back. I just don’t see how we can agree to something at the political level and then have the experts roll it back. I want to say this, not in the larger group, but here. I didn’t want to go upstairs and go through this because I wanted you to know how serious and troubling this matter is to me.

Shevardnadze: Well, let me briefly comment and we can continue then with the experts. As regard ALCMs, I intend to reaffirm with the experts present that the Moscow agreement remains in effect. The only condition is the range threshold. If there’s no agreement acceptable to us on range then the rest of the package is destroyed. I have explained why we have taken this position, and it clearly is a very firm position. We simply can’t remake our entire anti-aircraft position. It’s not just a technical problem; it would be extraordinarily costly for us to do that. If we find something mutually acceptable, we can reach agreement on the other questions as well, including the counting rule. We have reaffirmed that the Moscow variants or agreement is in effect. After our meeting in Moscow, our experts have come up with a number of other possibilities. It can be examined, maybe it could be more acceptable. That does not mean that we reject and nullify what was agreed to in Moscow. The counting rule is in effect. Let the experts look at the other options that have been developed as well. But the range is fundamental. There’s no reserve here.

Baker: I understand that that’s your position. I understand that you need an agreement on that. I frankly don’t have the authority to change our position, especially after we have gone from 1,500 to 800 kilometers. But I don’t see why the absence of our agreement on the range threshold should mean that the whole package that we agreed to in Moscow unravels. Particularly, when we are only seven weeks away from the Summit. The range is an issue that we are going to have to resolve. I understand it’s important to you. I understand it’s a big problem. But the other elements should not unravel.

Shevardnadze: No, there is no unraveling of the package proposal. But, Mr. Secretary, the counting rule that we reached in Moscow does give you the advantage.

Baker: I don’t want to lead you to believe that we are going to solve the range question at this Ministerial. In fact it may be one of the last issues that we find an answer to.

Shevardnadze: Okay. But maybe we could try to discuss this at the next ministerial. As for SLCMs, it seems to me we accepted elements that were almost impossible before. We used to insist that the agreement must be in the framework of the START Treaty. Gorbachev himself said that if it’s not in, there’s not going to be a treaty. Now we’re ready to accept a political declaration that is not in the treaty. But a political declaration cannot simply be just a phrase. It’s got to be a declaration that has the two sides assuming certain obligations and certain numerical limits. There have to be some limits. We can’t have something without any limits at all. And it ought to be on the type of ships as well. We had an agreement that we would in fact have the types of ships indicated. As for verification, there is really nothing extraordinary happening. I would ask you to instruct your experts to look again at the December 1987 summit language. On-site inspection is mentioned and is signed by our Presidents. But I trust that the experts will have to work on this one more. In principle our approach is in effect. We’re not going to walk back from the Moscow agreement. But really SLCMs are a sensitive issue.

Baker: Legally binding limits were not discussed in Moscow. The Joint Statement says politically binding declarations. Each side will state or declare the number of such weapons of its inventory. But perhaps we could go upstairs and let the experts wrestle with this problem. I worry that all this doesn’t bode well for wrapping up our work in seven weeks. Our military will say that they see a different approach than we saw in Moscow. Anyway, I mention this here, not in a larger group.

Shevardnadze: Please let me ask you about range. Our military complains that the US has an advantage in the counting rule. The 40% more bombers does not compensate for the US ALCM advantage. They also complain that if we cannot get the 600 kilometer range the US will have a number of conventionally armed ALCMs that are clearly in excess of the 1,600 limit. That’s why the range question is really the basis for all the other concessions we make. Please think about that seriously.

Baker: The Summit dates. We’d like to leave open the question of the exact scenario. Specifically, the question of Kennebunkport. As I indicated to you the President is anxious to have President Gorbachev here, but he wants to be sensitive to the developments that take place between now and the time we finalize the scenario. For example, developments in Lithuania might have an impact on public opinion here in the United States. His preference is to go to Kennebunkport as part of the Summit and he assumes that that is something we can do provided there is not a deterioration of the situation between now and then.

Shevardnadze: Of course, the program is really up to you. It’s yours to determine, your proposal to make. We don’t know what retreats or residences you have available, so we’ll listen to you. We’ll accept the scenario that our host proposes. Maybe Gorbachev will have some problems of his own of such a trip.

Baker: The exact scenario is still to be developed.

Shevardnadze: This is what I told him. I told him we would get suggestions from the US side.

End conversation

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Russian Affairs, Russia Desk Files, Lot 99D344, Baker-Shevardnadze Washington 4/4–6/90. Secret. Drafted by Ross. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State.
2. See Document 91.
3. See footnote 3, Document 96.