Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 5, 1990, 2–6:30 p.m.

Baker-Shevardnadze Ministerial in Washington, D.C.
Arms Control Working Group

SUBJECTS

• START, CFE, CBW, NTT, Open Skies

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Reginald Bartholomew
  • Ronald Lehman
  • Richard Clarke
  • Steven Hadley
  • Howard Graves
  • Arnold Kanter
  • Richard Burt
  • James Woolsey
  • Stephen Ledogar
  • David Smith
  • C. Paul Robinson
  • John Hawes
  • Edward Rowny
  • Read Hanmer
  • Linton Brooks
  • Avis Bohlen
  • Robert Walpole
  • James Timbie
  • Victor Alessi
  • Douglas MacEachin
  • Steven Pifer
  • Robert Einhorn
  • Richard Davison
  • Eleanor Sutter (notetaker)
  • Rose Gottemoeller (notetaker)
  • Eugenia Arensburger (interpreter)

• Soviet

  • Sergey F. Akhromeyev
  • Yuriy K. Nazarkin
  • Oleg A. Grinevskiy
  • Sergey B. Batsanov
  • Aleksandr S. Peresypkin
  • Igor M. Palenykh
  • Lem A. Masterkov
  • Gennadiy K. Khromov
  • Viktor S. Koltunov
  • Yuriy I. Roslyakov
  • Sergey D. Chuvakhin
  • Aleksandr A. Churillin (Soviet Embassy notetaker)
  • Igor S. Neverov (Soviet Embassy notetaker)
  • Feliks F. Popov (interpreter)

Opening segment, 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm.

Bartholomew opened the session by suggesting that the ambassadors involved in CFE, CW, NTT, and Open Skies should repair to individual sub-group meetings, leaving START and D&S to be dealt with in a smaller core group.

Akhromeyev agreed.

Bartholomew noted that he and Akhromeyev were required to make a report to their ministers at 6:00 pm. He asked the ambassadors who were serving as chairmen of the sub-groups to be available at 5:15 pm to brief the core group, and to be able give two or three points summing up their sessions.

Akhromeyev agreed, noting that by 5:15 the chairmen should be ready to brief on what they had achieved.

Bartholomew stated that the two sides were thus in agreement on procedure, and asked Akhromeyev if the chairmen of the sub-groups should be asked to leave and go to work.

Akhromeyev suggested that a sub-group should also review the joint statement on non-proliferation.

Bartholomew agreed, but also suggested that perhaps the statement might be something that he and Akhromeyev could themselves take a first look at, since agreement on the statement at the summit would be very important.

Akhromeyev said that on that day, he and Bartholomew should address START and CFE as the first priorities. He suggested that the subgroup chairmen could discuss the non-proliferation statement, and that he and Bartholomew could then return to it on the following day.

Bartholomew agreed, noting that Ambassadors Lehman and Ledogar could address non-proliferation, and that Ambassador Hawes would address Open Skies.

(At this time, sub-group chairmen and experts departed for individual meetings. After a few moments, the core group session resumed.)

Akhromeyev began by stating that the results of the Moscow ministerial on ALCMs and SLCMs created friction among Soviet experts; when they got a look at the equation with regard to those two systems, they had legitimate concerns. Akhromeyev offered to go over the points and answer U.S. questions, so that the sides could reach agreement on their differences.

Bartholomew repeated his deep concern over two basic problems: first, the overturn of important decisions reached in Moscow; second, the return to solutions that had proved unworkable in the past. The net result had been to convince the U.S. side that these were two major blocks preventing the sides from reaching agreement on strategic arms reductions this year, as had been agreed by their leaders. Bartholomew asked Akhromeyev how he would reconcile the positions broached the previous night with those reached in Moscow. Bartholomew cited the following points:

○ On SLCMs, the Moscow statement recorded agreement to proceed on a politically binding document. Now the Soviet side was working on the basis of a legally binding protocol to the agreement, which contradicted what had been decided in Moscow.

○ The previous night’s proposal had been for detailed verification measures, whereas in Moscow, working with a bracketed SLCM declaration, the Soviet side had set the verification issue aside, making no mention of it.

○ Indeed, Bartholomew added, the concept of verification measures was inconsistent with the idea of a politically binding agreement.

○ Lastly—although there were other issues—the Soviet side had proposed an agreed numerical limit on the number of SLCMs per ship type, whereas the declaration in Moscow spoke only of a confidential exchange of information on capabilities.

On ALCMs, Bartholomew listed five points:

○ The Soviet paper of the previous night had proposed to include all heavy bombers in the 1600 limit; but the Moscow elements of common ground (hereafter MECG) provides for 115 conventional heavy bombers outside that limit.
Burt interjected that Nazarkin had told him in Geneva that the Soviet side had never accepted the 115 number, but in Jackson Hole, the Soviet side had said it would accept 100.

○ Continuing, Bartholomew said that the Soviet side also had proposed the previous night that conventional ALCMs would have functionally related observable differences (hereafter FRODs) from nuclear ALCMs. But the MECM provided for differences observable by national technical means (NTM) and on-site inspection (OSI). OSI in this case was a major step on the U.S. part to answer Soviet concerns.

○ Third, Bartholomew noted that the Soviet paper had also proposed a maximum capacity of 16 ALCMs on existing heavy bombers, although the paper itself acknowledged 12 had been agreed in the MECG.

○ Fourth, the Soviet paper had called for attributing maximum real numbers for future heavy bombers, i.e., maximum as equipped. The MECG, by contrast, set 10 as the attribution and 20 as the maximum to be deployed on future heavy bombers.

○ Bartholomew completed his comments by noting that the newly delivered Soviet paper called for all heavy bombers to be subject to inspection, but the MECG provided only for the inspection of heavy bombers tested to carry ALCMs and also former heavy bombers.

This was not an exhaustive list of U.S. concerns, Bartholomew stated, but it was sufficient to demonstrate the great difficulties that the new Soviet proposals had produced for the U.S. side. If the Soviet side persisted, it would be difficult to conclude a START treaty, as had been agreed.

Burt noted that from a Geneva perspective, it was important to comment. He did not wish to embarrass Ambassador Nazarkin, since they had an excellent working relationship, but he did want to help the Soviet side to understand why the United States was so surprised. Nazarkin and Burt had reviewed the results of the Moscow ministerial upon their return to Geneva, and had agreed on what had been resolved in the MECG. On SLCMs, the sole question remaining had been range, and whether conventional SLCMs should be included in the political declaration. On ALCMs, to be fair, attribution for future heavy bombers had remained a question. Burt stated that it was his feeling that the issue of an exclusion for conventional bombers and the question of distinguishing nuclear and conventional ALCMs had been settled in Moscow, and he had thus reported to his government.

Akhromeyev responded that he would like to analyze the Soviet position on ALCMs, since he had taken part in the discussion in Moscow. He had not taken part in the discussion on SLCMs, but Ambassador Nazarkin had, and could give his own clarifications.

Akhromeyev referred to the Soviet minutes of the discussions, saying that they contained all the language exchanged. The first issue, he stated, had to do with conventional heavy bombers. The question was whether 115 (the U.S. number) or 100 (the Soviet number) should be included in the 1600 launcher total.

In Wyoming, Akhromeyev explained, Minister Shevardnadze gave his agreement to have 100 conventional heavy bombers excluded from the 1600 total. This offer was part of a package of proposals involving two preconditions. The first involved U.S. agreement to the 600-km range. The second assumed that the counting rule for bombers would be according to their real carrying capacity. ALCMs would not be counted as the U.S. proposed in Moscow, i.e., 10 missiles per bomber when it could actually carry 20; but realistically, as equipped. Under those conditions, the Soviet side offered to exclude 100 conventional bombers from the 1600 total. The difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions—115 vs. 100 bombers—was not discussed in Moscow. Not a word appeared in the minutes. For that reason, Akhromeyev stated, the Soviet side had decided to include all heavy bombers in the 1600.

Akhromeyev continued by recalling that Under Secretary Bartholomew had asked him to clarify in Moscow whether the 40% rule would apply to future heavy bombers. The Soviet minutes of the meeting showed, Akhromeyev said, that he had responded by saying that all future heavy bombers would be equipped to carry 10 ALCMs, and the Soviet side would not object to their carrying 10 nuclear warheads each. Thus, future heavy bombers would be equipped to carry 10, and would count as 10. Akhromeyev recounted that Bartholomew had asked him to confirm that the 10/20 counting rule would apply only to existing bombers. He stated that he had answered in the affirmative, i.e., that the Soviet side had not agreed in Moscow to extend the number to 20 for future heavy bombers.

Akhromeyev said further that the U.S. side had stated that in Moscow the Soviet side proposed to count Soviet heavy bombers with 8 and show a maximum of 16. This does accord with the Soviet side’s minutes, and if the U.S. side insists that the number should be 12, then the Soviet side would agree. The changes in the Soviet position had come about, Akhromeyev explained, because ratification had reared its head in Moscow. During the Moscow ministerial, he stated, the Soviet side did not take certain things into account when the United States made its proposals. The Soviet side answered the proposals quickly, in less than a day, which was an exceptional undertaking, taken on the Soviet side’s own initiative.

Akhromeyev continued with the explanation that for purposes of ratification, the combination of 8 (counted) and 16 (maximum) would be better for the Soviet side than 12. In that case, the Soviet right to more heavy bombers would be only 20%, not 40%. However, he noted, if the U.S. side insisted on retaining 12, that position should be stated. The Soviet side was asking officially that it be changed.

The next issue, Akhromeyev went on, had to do with a sliding number of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. He noted that he had talked to Ambassador Burt in Moscow, with Secretary Baker present, and had stated that there should be a set limit on bombers within the 1600. He then recounted that Burt had indicated the United States would not be pleased with such a limit. Akhromeyev then said that he had suggested a flexible or floating number. When the issue was raised in the plenary session with the ministers present, Akhromeyev continued, Secretary Baker had also confirmed that a fixed limit on bombers would not be acceptable to the United States. But Secretary Baker had seemed to indicate, Akhromeyev said, that flexibility would be acceptable. We agreed, Akhromeyev said, that U.S. heavy bombers were equipped to carry 40% more warheads than Soviet bombers, and that the Soviet Union was to have more ALCM heavy bombers as a result.

Akhromeyev then stated that on three occasions Secretary Baker had reiterated the point that the United States would not be pleased with a fixed limit on ALCM heavy bombers. Baker stated, according to Akhromeyev, that the United States insisted on keeping the right to deploy as many heavy bombers as it wished within the 1600 limit.

Bartholomew, conferring with Ambassador Burt, stated that the U.S. side understood that the Soviet Union was not asking for a specific sublimit on bombers.

Akhromeyev stated that this was the crux of the matter. He stressed that since Secretary Baker’s intention had not been very clear in the conversations he was describing, the Soviet side had deliberately avoided answering the question. This was reflected in the minutes of the meeting. Akhromeyev stressed that at the time he had not known precisely what the the Soviet answer would be.

Burt asked if Marshal Akhromeyev was referring to the question of floating limits.

Akhromeyev replied negatively, saying the sides had agreed to that.

Burt said he did not think that agreement had been reached on that point.

Akhromeyev asserted that the sides had agreed the level should be floating. However, he said, Secretary Baker had asked that the limit not only float, but that there be no ceiling at all. The Soviet side had not replied to this proposal in Moscow, however.

Burt asked whether the Soviet side had rejected the proposal.

Akhromeyev said no—the Soviet side had said neither yes nor no. The Soviet side needed time to analyze the idea, so it had given no answer at that time. After subsequent analysis, however, the Soviet side had realized that it should not respond positively. Akhromeyev emphasized that this was not a departure from the former Soviet position; initially the Soviet side had simply not answered. After analysis, the Soviet side had realized that if the U.S. took this limit to 200 long-range ALCM-carrying heavy bombers, it would have the capacity to deploy 4000 warheads. Of those, 1100 would be counted against the 6000-warhead limit in START, and the uncounted numbers would come to 2900.

Bartholomew disagreed with Marshal Akhromeyev, stating that according to simple arithmetic, each bomber would count as 10 warheads; that would amount to 2000 warheads within the 6000 limit, not 1100, one-third of the 6000-warhead limit.

Akhromeyev agreed, but noted that if a floating level of bombers were allowed with no ceiling or cap, then the warhead numbers might go too high. He reiterated that the sides needed to discuss a ceiling.

Akhromeyev went on to address the question of distinguishing nuclear and conventional ALCMs by functionally related observable differences or by national technical means. Why, he asked, is it so difficult to solve this problem? Why is it difficult to establish continuous verification and monitoring of all heavy bombers? He then concluded by stating that he was ready to listed on the ALCM issue.

Bartholomew asked Marshal Akhromeyev to clarify what Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker had signed in Moscow on February 10, noting that it was difficult to reconcile with what had just been said. He then quoted from the Moscow agreed statement to the effect that on ALCMs substantial progress had been made, and that all issues had been resolved except range. Asserting that diplomats could be as blunt as soldiers, Barrtholomew questioned whether he and Akhromeyev had been in the same city, much less discussing the same subjects.

Akhromeyev asked to respond, stating that Secretary Baker had, at the Moscow ministerial, privately noted to Akhromeyev that they had done all they could to reach agreement, and had made substantial [progress] on all issues except range. Akhromeyev reported that he had answered by saying that the two issues were related. He then noted that Baker had stated that it would be shame to say to the press that if everything were not agreed on, then nothing could be said to be agreed on.

Bartholomew stated that the reported remarks had preceded the joint statement in time and had been private, but the Moscow agreed elements constituted the record agreed to by the two ministers. These had been revamped to include the right for the Soviet side to deploy 40% more bombers. On the issue of 115 former heavy bombers, Bartholomew continued, the Soviet side had raised the Wyoming discussion, but the Wyoming discussion did not count—Moscow counted. We invited the Soviet side’s discussion on the sentence in the MECG, and that sentence stated that 115 former heavy bombers would be left outside the agreement.

Burt noted that the U.S. side wanted to be as accurate and fair as possible on the issue of former heavy bombers. Burt reported that he had discussed the issue with Ambassador Nazarkin and with the military members of the Soviet delegation, and that there were differences on numbers between the two sides—115 v. 100—and differences on the question of a “continuing right” to deploy former heavy bombers: would it apply to existing types only, or also to future types? There was a further question, Burt continued, on the relationship of former heavy bombers to platforms used for communications, tanking, command and control, reconnaissance, etc. But the Soviet side had never given any indication that all conventional or former heavy bombers should be included in the 1600 limit.

Nazarkin stated that he would like to clarify what had been discussed with Ambassador Burt in Geneva on the question of former heavy bombers. The two sides had diverged on the question, Nazarkin said, and had not addressed the issue of the entire package.

Bartholomew reiterated that the United States would not under any circumstance accept a measure to place former heavy bombers under the 1600 limit. The START agreement was to embrace strategic, not conventional weapons, he said.

Akhromeyev returned to the six points that had been raised by the Soviet paper of the previous evening. He stated that, in his view, it would be useful for the sides to go through the paper and note where they agreed and disagreed.

Bartholomew stated that the U.S. side would prefer to work with the agreed elements recorded in Moscow, but that the sides could proceed based on the understanding of that preference.

Akhromeyev noted that the Soviet side in Moscow had disagreed with the U.S. counting rule on heavy bombers, whereas the U.S. side had thought that they agreed. A different understanding of the outcome of the Moscow ministerial also extended to the ALCM range question, and to the question of 8 and 12 accountable ALCMs on heavy bombers.

Bartholomew reiterated that the U.S. side would prefer to proceed on the basis of the MECG.

Akhromeyev repeated that the two sides had a different understanding of the agreed elements, i.e., interpreted them differently.

Bartholomew proposed a break until 3:30.

Akhromeyev agreed.

After the break, the discussions continued in a side meeting from 3:30–5:30 p.m.

[Omitted here is a discussion not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control, International Security Affairs, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Record of James P. Timbie, START Meetings (Bartholomew) April 1990. Secret. Drafted on April 15. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary’s Conference Room.