Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

90. Letter From President Bush to Soviet President Gorbachev¹

Washington, March 20, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

Our two countries have made dramatic and historic progress in our efforts to invigorate and accelerate the arms control process. Our own talks at Malta and the recent meetings between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow and Ottawa² have imparted significant momentum to the negotiations and have injected important new ideas that can help resolve the major issues quickly.

I believe the time is right to build on this momentum by taking a bold initiative in START.

Our two sides are in agreement that the principal goal of START is to enhance strategic stability. As we have discussed in the past, this means more than reducing numbers of systems—it also means shaping the forces of each side so that they are inherently more stabilizing. I believe we can do more toward this end in the current START negotiations, without delaying their conclusion, and also set the course for even more stabilizing measures in future negotiations that could begin immediately after START. In particular, I believe we should consider the elimination of mobile MIRVed missiles as part of the current START agreement. Then, in follow-on negotiations, we should eliminate all land-based MIRVs.

Let me emphasize that I put considerable priority on the prompt completion of the current START agreement. In fact, I would suggest that you and I be prepared to initial the draft treaty during the upcoming Washington Summit to signify that we have agreed on all the major substantive issues. However, I believe a ban on mobile MIRVs could be incorporated into the current START agreement without delaying its completion. To achieve such a ban, I am prepared to cancel our rail-garrison system in exchange for the elimination of Soviet mobile SS-24s. I know you have several trains already deployed. The United States has a system that I am ready to deploy rapidly, but I would prefer another course, to ban these mobile-MIRV systems now before our two sides have even more invested in them and their elimination becomes that much more difficult.

I also am prepared to agree to the mutual elimination of silo-based MIRVed missiles. Certainly this bold step would take more extensive negotiations, but our agreement on this goal could be the foundation of follow-on talks that could begin as soon as substantive agreement is reached on the current START Treaty. I also would note that if our two countries are able to agree to the eventual elimination of all MIRVed ICBMS, the US will be willing to defer our remaining concerns about heavy ICBMs to the follow-on negotiations.

I hope we will be able to announce agreement on all three goals—banning mobile MIRVs in START, initialing the START Treaty at the June Summit, and beginning follow-on talks immediately to eliminate all land-based MIRVS—at the meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next month. If, however, you are unable to agree to consider a ban on mobile MIRVs in the current negotiations, an alternative would be for the two sides to announce, following the April Ministerial, an agreement to begin follow-on talks once the current START agreement is initialed that would have as central objectives the near-term elimination of mobile MIRVs, followed by all land-based MIRVs.

I have asked Secretary Baker to outline these ideas to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when they meet in Namibia in order to be in a better position to have substantive discussions about this proposal when they meet in Washington in April.

I know that we already have a great deal of work before us but I am convinced that conditions may never be better to begin to improve stability and eliminate these most threatening systems.³

Sincerely,

George Bush

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Special Separate USSR Notes Files, Gorbachev Files, OA/ID 91126–006, For the President. No classification marking.
2. Reference is to the Open Skies Ministerial Conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Ottawa, February 11–13. Memoranda of Baker and Shevardnadze’s conversations are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.
3. Scowcroft transmitted the letter to Matlock via privacy channels in a backchannel message of March 21, 0001Z, which began: “Please pass the following message to President Gorbachev from President Bush. Obviously the text of the message is very sensitive. Jim Baker and Larry Eagleburger are the only two people in State aware of its contents. Secretary Baker discussed the same proposal with Shevardnadze during their meeting in Namibia.” In a backchannel message sent via privacy channels on March 21 at 1107Z, Joyce wrote Scowcroft: “Jack Matlock will be returning from Central Asia on March 23. In his absence I delivered the President’s letter to Gorbachev to First Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh at 10:30 local March 21. Though I handed the letter in a sealed envelope I told him that it contained important proposals on START. He undertook to transmit the letter to Gorbachev immediately.” Scowcroft responded to Joyce via privacy channels in a backchannel message of March 21, 1924Z: “If I had wanted the letter to Gorbachev to go through the foreign ministry, we would not have sent it back channel and asked for delivery personally to Gorbachev. I suggest that in the future when communications are handled in a manner out of the ordinary that you consult before deciding on a different course of action.” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Special Separate USSR Notes Files, Gorbachev Files, For the President).