Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

94. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 4, 1990, 3:45–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• “Experts” Group Meeting on START Issues

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Linton Brooks, NST
  • Gen. Curtin, JCS
  • Rich Davis, NSC
  • Rich Davison, OSD
  • Lucas Fischer, ACDA
  • [Name not declassified]
  • Sally Horn, OSD
  • Ed Ifft, State
  • Jerry Stacy, State,
  • Jeanne Arensberger, Int

• USSR

  • L.A. Masterkov
  • G.K. Khromov
  • Yu. I Roslyakov
  • Col. V.S. Koltunov
  • V. Prokoviev, Int.

Brooks opened the meeting by noting that Ambassador Nazarkin had previously indicated the Soviet side wished to discuss four issues—R&D boosters, suspect site inspection (SSI), throw-weight and the phasing of reductions. Brooks said the U.S. side would also like to ask some additional questions about the proposals the Soviet side had made that morning² on mobiles verification and PPCM.

Masterkov responded that their view of the meeting was that it should continue the morning discussion on mobile verification, in particular the regime for road-mobiles. Brooks said he had discussed the Soviet verification proposals with his colleagues and that they had some questions to pose.

Horn asked, in the context of the previous Soviet proposal for Restricted Areas (RA) larger than 5 square kilometers, how they would make that entire area subject to inspection. Masterkov expressed some befuddlement at the question since the Soviet side has now expressed its willingness to agree to RAs of 5 square kilometers. Brooks clarified Horn’s question pointing out that under the original Soviet proposal for 100 square kilometer RAs, Colonel Koltunov had said the entire RA would have been subject to inspection. Brooks said the U.S. side didn’t completely understand the old Soviet approach and that some clarification would help the U.S. side form its own ideas on how best to solve the mobiles verification problem.

Koltunov offered that the U.S. side was correct in indicating that under the previous Soviet approach the entire RA would be inspectable. He noted that the U.S. side had argued that when an inspection team arrived at an RA they must be able to confirm the number of launchers in the RA and in their specified fixed structures. He indicated that if for some reason mobile launchers were not in their structures, these absent launchers could be demonstrated to the other side. Curtin asked whether the inspectors would go out into the RA to visit the launchers or whether the launchers would be brought to the inspectors. Koltunov replied that Curtin was correct, a side would be able to visually observe where launchers were located in the RA. Brooks noted that the Soviet proposal of that morning suggested that, even with a large Deployment Area (DA) of 160,000 sq. kilometers, the Soviet side had indicated that all launchers would return to their RA before an inspection was concluded. He stated that launchers in their shelters would be easy to count, but that other launchers might be counted in one of two ways—returning launchers in the field to the RA prior to the conclusion of the inspection or by putting inspectors in a truck, or helicopter and taking them to the launchers. Brooks asked whether the Soviet side had considered the second approach.

Masterkov recalled that in previous discussions the U.S. side had cited the need for notifications when road-mobile launchers left the RA. The U.S. side had offered the hypothetical example that if an inspector arrived at an RA and saw only six launchers, he would not know where the other four launchers are located unless notifications for the departure and return of launchers are provided. In view of this concern, the Soviet side was proposing that, in the conduct of an inspection, all road-mobile launchers attributed to that RA would have to return prior to the time allowed for that inspection. There were two exceptions to this rule—launchers located at maintenance facilities or those in the process of a redeployment or relocation. Masterkov said he was not sure how the different procedure proposed by Brooks was better. Brooks responded that he was not sure his proposed procedure was better, that he was only attempting to explore what is and is not important to the Soviet side in an attempt to decide what type of verification regime might be best. Keeping a launcher in the field would be easier and would keep it more survivable. Counting launchers in the field could also be as easy as counting them in an RA. Brooks said he was only trying to see if the Soviet side attaches importance to counting launchers at a particular place or to counting those launchers assigned to a particular place no matter where they are located.

Khromov argued that the optimal solution would be to apply the same verification regime as applies to submarines—that there is a good deal of similarity between mobiles and SSBNs. With regard to Brooks point, however, Khromov asserted that the maximum distance a launcher would have to travel to return to its RA would be on the order of 100–120 kilometers. Brooks rebutted Khromov’s analogy of mobiles to submarines noting that, because mobile launchers were much smaller, a side would not have the same confidence in the number produced. This was why the U.S. side was proposing a method for periodically counting launchers and why we were not taking the same verification approach to the two types of systems.

Khromov retorted that the Soviet side was proposing not just one verification measure in the JDT but rather a set of measures that were more than sufficient to ensure confidence in mobile launcher verification. He asserted that on the eve of the signing of the INF Treaty the U.S. had, only through NTM, complete information on the number of deployed SS–20 launchers. Koltunov added that although SSBNs are larger than mobile launchers, such launchers are not “flying Dutchmen.” They require fixed structures, maintenance facilities etc. that would allow the sides to define the exact number of mobile launchers in an RA and in the aggregate. Even if hypothetically the sides had some hidden launchers (e.g. 1–2 launchers) their contribution to the overall balance of forces would not be considerable. It would not be possible to conceal a great number of such launchers.

Brooks said the discussion had wandered off the Soviet proposal and asked whether his colleagues had additional questions. Curtin noted that the Soviet side had accepted the U.S. concept of the Deployment Area (DA) but at a size of 160,000 square kilometers rather than 90,000 square kilometers as proposed by the U.S. He asked why the larger size was necessary. Koltunov replied that the reason was to ensure survivability. He stated that hemming in mobiles defeated their purpose and made an analogy to the patrol area of submarines. Curtin said that the U.S. side thought a DA 300 kilometers on a side was large, but that the Soviet side was proposing an area 400 kilometers on a side. Brooks added that he could have used Koltunov’s words to defend the U.S. position—the U.S. side agrees with survivability. The U.S. side was wondering whether there was a particular reason the Soviet position called for a larger area than under the U.S. proposal.

Khromov opined that while the area the Soviet side had proposed could be defined on a map, under practical conditions parts of this area would be excluded from use, e.g., bodies of water. If the situation was assessed realistically, the actual operating area could be even smaller than the U.S. proposal for 90,000 square kilometers. This area, however, could not be recorded on paper or written into a Treaty.

Brooks asked whether there would be a limit on the number of RAs within a specific DA. Koltunov recalled that the original Soviet proposal had called for a limit of 5 RAs per Missile Base. This proposal had been withdrawn to accommodate the U.S. side which had stated that it did not yet know what number of RAs would be associated with a DA under the U.S. basing concept. If the U.S. side preferred, this limit could be reintroduced. Brooks commented that the situation on the U.S. side had not changed, but that it was helpful to know what was new in the Soviet proposal and what had remained the same. Brooks asked whether the Soviet proposal provides that DAs may not overlap. Khromov replied affirmatively noting that if DAs overlapped this would complicate verification. He added in response to Brooks previous question that the RAs associated with a DA would be listed in the MOU and that this should address any problems.

Horn said she understood that in the context of Soviet acceptance of the smaller RA, there would be no percentage cap on the number of missiles and launchers that could be outside of the RA. She asked if the Soviet side could explain further their concept and its relation to their deployment plans. Masterkov agreed that under the new Soviet proposal there would be no limit on the number of launchers outside of RAs. However, he wanted to call attention to the fact that the Soviet side has taken into account the U.S. proposal by limiting routine movements and dispersals to within the boundaries of the DA. The Soviet proposal aimed to achieve a happy marriage between survivability and effective verification and the Soviet side believes their new proposal strikes a good balance between the two.

Ifft asked what the difference was now between routine movements and exercise dispersals under the Soviet concept. Davison amplified Ifft’s question noting that, if there is no limit on the number of launchers outside of an RA and if there is no requirement to notify the departure of a launcher from an RA, and, additionally, if neither type of movement can depart from the DA, it now appears that the Soviet proposal has rendered the concept of an exercise dispersal, and the strict limit on their frequency, meaningless. After some initial confusion, Koltunov agreed that under the new Soviet concept the requirement for exercise dispersals could be reviewed. Masterkov questioned whether under the U.S. concept for exercise dispersals there would be no limit on the number of launchers outside an RA, but that such movements would be confined to the DA. Brooks confirmed that this was correct. Ifft added that the U.S. had dropped the percentage limit on routine movements only under the understanding that such movements would be pre-notified.

Fischer, referring back to Khromov’s earlier statement that under the Soviet proposal a launcher would have to travel a maximum of about 120 kilometers to return to its RA during an inspection, noted that if DAs are 160,000 square kilometers in size this would mean that a launcher would not be traveling from the opposite side of the DA. Khromov said his understanding was that RAs would be scattered through a DA like pepperoni on a pizza and that during routine movements and dispersals launchers assigned to one RA would not travel near other RAs, since survivability would dictate mobile launchers being spread out. Fischer said his question was whether the maximum distance suggested by Khromov was a statement about unilateral planning or whether it was intended to be a Treaty restriction. Khromov replied that it was only a hypothetical figure intended to give a sense of the magnitude of such movements. Koltunov added that the underlying proposition was that the sides would commit to having launchers return to their RA during inspections. It was up to the inspected side to ensure that this happened.

Brooks said the U.S. side understood reasonably well the second proposal the Soviets had made on facilities subject to PPCM. He noted again that Ambassador Nazarkin had suggested other topics for the experts to discuss. He asked when such discussions should take place. Masterkov joked that he could not use his usual response that this could be arranged through Executive Secretaries since they were not in Geneva. He said he understood Brooks’ question and assumed something could be agreed. Brooks concluded by noting that he hoped the Soviet side would have a lot to say on these topics because the U.S. side would have little to offer beyond what the Soviet side had already heard.

1. Source: Department of State, Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Lot 06D436, Verification, Compliance and Implementation Subject Files, 1983–2005, Ministerials: Washington April 4–6 1990. Secret. The meeting took place in the NRRC Conference Room at the Department of State.
2. No minutes were found.