91. Letter From Soviet President Gorbachev to President Bush1
Your letter of March 21, 19902 prompts serious reflections on the emerging—and possibly unique—prospects of the evolution of the Soviet–US strategic relationship.
Indeed, now that we have come within reach of completing painstaking work on a whole package of arms reduction agreements the time [Page 547] has come to think about the future and to try to delineate the main parameters of the next, qualitatively different phase of disarmament.
I have to say that we remain committed to radical balanced measures aimed at a gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. Achieving this noble goal, set forth in our program of January 15, 1986,3 would give the most solid guarantee of security and tranquility for all people on Earth.
I think, however, that you will agree that our immediate and top-priority task is still the early completion of the treaty on 50 percent strategic offensive arms reductions and its official signing, in keeping with our agreement at Malta, before the end of the year.
In light of this common understanding, I welcome your proposal that we initial the treaty at our forthcoming meeting in Washington, having in mind that all the main issues would be resolved by that time.
I am encouraged by the efforts of our delegations and the more rapid pace of work on the treaty, although I still think that the negotiating process should be speeded up substantially. In this regard the Soviet side attaches key importance to the April round of talks between our foreign ministers.
Let me now turn to some additional ideas that you outlined in your letter of March 21, 1990.
I have studied it carefully, and I find that the suggestions and proposals contained in it merit thorough consideration in our dialogue.
Regarding your proposal on banning MIRVed mobile ICBMs, I would like first of all to say that, in principle, I welcome your readiness to adopt radical, large-scale decisions in the field of strategic arms reduction. Also, I can only agree that it is always better not to deploy some weapons systems rather than first to deploy and then eliminate them. Thorough analysis of the draft START Treaty shows, however, that it would be difficult to implement your proposal within its framework now.
First of all, our countries have already reached fundamental agreement that ICBM mobility is a factor that serves to strengthen strategic stability. Both of us proceeded on that basis while preparing the START Treaty in its present form. In the process of negotiations the two sides have arrived at a carefully-weighed balance of mutual concessions and compromises; changing any part of that balance would entail the risk of reopening many of the problems already solved.
Nevertheless, we could consider a substantial reduction of our deployment program of SS–24 mobile missiles, limiting their number [Page 548] at the level of January 1,1991, if the US side were to decide not to deploy the MX missiles in a mobile mode. An understanding to this effect could be formalized through an exchange of political declarations. This would, without doubt, impart additional momentum to the process of real nuclear disarmament.
Concerning the other of your proposals - on considering the question of fixed MIRVed ICBMs in subsequent negotiations. This is a question that has a bearing on the entire range of further strategic offensive arms reductions. We have more than once spoken in favor of starting negotiations on second-phase reductions right after the conclusion of the treaty now being prepared. I regard positively the fact that discussions, for the time being informal, of the tasks of future negotiations are already underway in Geneva. I think that at our meeting in Washington we could adopt a declaration of intent regarding future talks on further reductions in US and Soviet strategic offensive arms and agree on when they should begin. A draft such statement could be worked out by our foreign ministers during their forthcoming meetings.
It appears that even now we could record a common view which has emerged in the exchanges between the two of us, i.e. that future negotiations should provide for reductions in quantitative levels of all strategic arms and help to attain a mix and structure of arms that would be consistent with the goal of strengthening strategic stability.
In this context I would like to emphasize that, as before, we regard observance by the USSR and the USA of the ABM Treaty as the basis for maintaining and strengthening strategic stability.
I also wrote to you about the problem arising from significant differences in the structures of Soviet and US strategic offensive arms. Logic prompts that in the future, too, this objective factor will have to be considered by us in further arms reductions. Accordingly, all our steps should be extremely prudent and cautious. Reducing one component of the strategic triad should not lead to a general destabilization of the strategic situation as a result of the two other components remaining intact.
In the context of these talks the whole range of issues, considered by each side to be important for attaining the final objective of the negotiations, could be examined. In particular, we believe it is possible to consider the question of significantly reducing the concentration of warheads on all ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and of ALCMs on heavy bombers, and the number of their delivery vehicles as well.
In our view, the situation now evolving in the world and in Soviet-US relations augurs well for negotiations on follow-on strategic arms reductions to proceed at a good pace and productively.
We even do not rule out the possibility that a new agreement could be concluded earlier than reductions would actually be completed [Page 549] under the treaty being prepared now. This would enable us more rapidly to attain genuinely stable structures of both sides’ strategic arsenals at low levels.
I am convinced that we can confidently put before ourselves such far-reaching goals and expect to achieve them, not only in START, but also as regards the limitation and prohibition of nuclear tests, radical reduction of conventional arms in Europe, the prohibition of chemical weapons etc.
In conclusion let me also point out the following. In order to advance effectively along this path we have to attach particular importance to the atmosphere of our dialogue and the mutual willingness to avoid unnecessary complications and artificial problems. I appreciate your realistic approach to the development of Soviet-US dialogue, your desire to understand the other side, to consider its interests and problems. This is how I regard your private letter to me of March 29, 1990.4 I want to reiterate that we intend firmly to continue to follow the course of radically reshaping Soviet society on the basis of democratization and glasnost, active and serious dialogue, and building a truly law-governed state. It goes without saying that all this presupposes respect for constitutional order and safeguarding the rights and security of all citizens of our country.
Eduard Shevardnadze plans to share with you thoughts on how these fundamental principles are being applied to the difficult task of creating a new federation in our country and building just and healthy interethnic relations.
Sincerely,
- Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, Brent Scowcroft Collection, Special Separate USSR Notes Files, Gorbachev Files, OA/ID 91126–004, Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989–June 1990 [4]. No classification marking. Printed from a copy marked: “Unofficial translation.”↩
- Reference is to Document 90.↩
- Reference is to Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000.↩
- Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.↩