Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

165. National Security Directive 50¹

Washington, October 12, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR

• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Secretary of Energy
• The Director, Office of Management and Budget
• The Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

• Decisions on START and CFE Issues (U)

I remain committed to achieving START and CFE agreements that enhance U.S. national security and strengthen international stability. Consistent with that objective, completion of both treaties during the remainder of 1990 remains an important goal. I have made the following decisions to achieve these two objectives. (C)

START

1. Backfire. The United States has reached an agreement in principle with the Soviet Union on a politically binding commitment not to give Backfire the capability to operate at intercontinental ranges, through in-flight refueling or in any other manner. On that basis, the United States can accept Soviet agreement to limit the total number of air force and naval Backfires to no more than 500–525 aircraft. (S)

2. Missile and Re-Entry Vehicle Elimination. The United States should continue to oppose any requirements that missiles and/or re-entry vehicles be eliminated as a consequence of reductions mandated by the START Treaty, except for reductions required to meet agreed numerical limits on non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers. (S)

3. Non-Circumvention. The United States will refuse to accept any limitation in START on the existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom to help maintain and modernize the British independent nuclear deterrent. In that context, and in close consultation with our British ally, the United States may provide assurances to the Soviet Union that this existing pattern of cooperation will not be used by the United States to circumvent any START limits. (S)

4. Ban on Third-Country Basing. The United States may accept a ban on the basing of strategic offensive arms outside its territory, provided such a ban does not entail inspections in third countries, or interfere with our right of ability to have U.S. ships make port visits or temporarily to locate heavy bombers overseas. (S)

5. Limits on Heavy ICBMs. On the understanding that the United States will seek the ultimate elimination of heavy ICBMs in follow-on negotiations, and that the Backfire and non-circumvention issues are satisfactorily resolved, the U.S. may accept a package of constraints on heavy ICBMs consisting of the following:

a. A maximum of 1540 RVs on 154 heavy ICBMs. (S)

b. A ban on new types of heavy ICBMs. (S)

c. A ban on mobile heavy ICBMs. (S)

d. A ban on downloading of existing types of heavy ICBMs.

e. Additional constraints on existing types of heavy ICBMs—including a ban on increases in their launch weight and throw-weight—that would have the effect of constraining further improvements in their capabilities. (S)

6. Throw-weight Limits. The United States and Soviet Union have agreed to a requirement to reduce current Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight by “approximately 50 percent.” The specific throw-weight reductions the United States will require to achieve this objective will depend in part on Soviet willingness to accept U.S. proposals in related areas. For example, in the context of the proposed U.S.-Soviet compromise on the limitation of the “potential throw-weight” of future types of ballistic missiles, the United States can accept reductions that are the equivalent of at least 47 percent of the throw-weight of the current Soviet ballistic missile force. U.S. agreement to reductions in aggregate throw-weight shall be contingent upon the acceptability to the U.S. of Soviet declarations of the throw-weight of their existing types of ballistic missiles.

7. Related Issues. To achieve Soviet agreement on the necessary use of retired and former ballistic missiles to conduct SDI tests, the United States may accept (a) a narrowly drawn ban on the use of ballistic missiles to deploy SDI components in space, and (b) the citation of Article XI of the ABM Treaty in the preamble to the START treaty. (S)

CFE

1. Aircraft Limits. Land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) must be subject to numerical constraints in the context of any CFE agreement to limit aircraft. Although a legally-binding limit is preferable, a politically-binding commitment outside the CFE agreement that embodies these numerical constraints is acceptable. The United States cannot accept any constraints on sea-based aircraft as part of such an agreement. If agreement cannot be reached on numerical constraints on LBNA, the treatment of aircraft should be deferred to follow-on negotiations. (S)
The United States can accept aggregate limits—within or associated with the CFE treaty—on aircraft (other than primary trainers) that would allow the Warsaw Pact to have no more than about 7,000 aircraft of which the Soviet Union could have no more than about 5,500 aircraft. (S)

2. Sufficiency Rule. The United States can accept any sufficiency rule between 30 and 35 percent, including an average sufficiency rule of 33 1/3 percent, for all treaty-limited ground equipment. It can accept a higher sufficiency rule for aircraft in the context of an otherwise acceptable resolution of the aircraft issue. (S)

3. Zones. Given other proposed constraints, the United States can accept a CFE agreement with or without the NATO-proposed structure of zones and zonal limits. In the interests of preserving Alliance cohesion and expediting completion of the CFE agreement, however, the U.S. should press the Soviets and East Europeans to accept the current NATO proposal. In the context of seeking such agreement, the U.S. may propose that the issue of zones and zonal limits be addressed further in follow-on negotiations. (S)

4. CSCE Summit. It continues to be the policy of the United States that the CSCE Summit should only be held when the CFE agreement has been completed. Accordingly, my attendance at such a summit is contingent on the CFE agreement having been completed. (S)

Except as modified by the foregoing, NSD–40² remains in effect. (U)

George Bush

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, H-Files, NSD Files, OA/ID 90004–026, NSD–50—October 12, 1990—Decisions on START and CFE Issues. Secret.
2. See Document 117.