Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

376592.

Washington, November 6, 1990

SUBJECT

• PPCM Letter

1. (Secret) Entire Text.

2. Text follows at Para 3 below of a letter from Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on PPCM. Please deliver it ASAP. There will be no signed original. We are providing this now so the Soviets will have time to react at Thursday’s² meeting.

3. Dear Eduard,

— During our recent meeting in New York, we acknowledged that considerable progress has been made in the START negotiations, but that a great deal more work was required before we could bring the treaty to a successful conclusion. One of the most important, time-consuming, and difficult issues remaining before us is the establishment of perimeter-portal continuous monitoring (PPCM) at production facilities for ICBMs subject to non-deployed missile limits.

— As you know, throughout the START negotiations, the United States has made clear that agreement on measures permitting effective verification is necessary if mobile ICBMs are to be permitted in START. Both sides have made major efforts to devise mobile ICBM verification provisions, and much progress has been made. Still outstanding, however, is the core of the mobile verification scheme: rules to implement our agreement in principle that PPCM will be established to monitor production of all ICBMs with mobile variants.

— We need to resolve this issue now, both because of its central importance to the treaty and because of the number of detailed procedures which must be agreed to implement the basic arrangement. In that spirit I would like to propose the following approach to PPCM. This compromise goes far to address your stated concerns. Your acceptance of this proposal will set us on the path to completion of the START agreement.

— The US has proposed to establish PPCM at the solid rocket motor plants where all first stages of mobile missiles and their silo-based variants are produced. You have expressed concerns over the effect on Soviet programs of PPCM at solid rocket motor plants, and suggested instead that PPCM be established at final assembly facilities. We have expressed concerns about verification of the constraints on mobile ICBMs, especially those with multiple warheads.

— In order to resolve the PPCM issue, the United States is willing to agree that PPCM will be established at all solid rocket motor plants producing the first stage motor of MIRVed ICBMs with mobile variants. For single-warhead ICBMs with mobile variants, PPCM will be established at final assembly facilities. As you see, this proposal incorporates ideas from previous US and Soviet proposals.

— Let me make two additional points to supplement this proposal:

— Under this approach, the US is prepared to drop its proposal for unique identifiers, or tags. This would substantially simplify conclusion of the START treaty. We would instead use existing factory markings or other agreed means to identify solid rocket motors.

— To verify that production of MIRVed NDM-limited systems is not taking place at other locations, all solid rocket motor plants which are not subject to PPCM but are capable of producing the smallest accountable stage of a MIRVed mobile ICBM will be subject to mandatory short-notice inspection. Solid rocket motor plants which are not capable of producing the smallest accountable stage of a MIRVed mobile ICBM will be subject to periodic scheduled tours.

— There would be reciprocity in the number of PPCM sites in the US and the Soviet Union when START enters into force. We can pursue ideas to minimize the number on both sides.

— The number of facilities subject to PPCM in the Soviet Union would depend on the number of plants producing first stages for MIRVed missiles with mobile variants, and the number of final assembly facilities for single-warhead missiles with mobile variants. The number of PPCM sites could be reduced by reducing the number of plants that produce the first stage of the SS–24.

— The number of PPCM sites in the Soviet Union could be further reduced by ceasing production of MIRVed mobile ICBMs and their silo-based variants. In this case no PPCM of solid rocket motor plants would be necessary. You have told me that production of the SS–24 for mobile launchers will cease in January. If you agree to cut off production of SS–24s for silo launchers by the date of entry into force of START, then it would not be necessary to establish PPCM at solid rocket motor plants, unless or until you resume production of MIRVed mobile ICBMs or their silo-based variants.

— No US ICBM has yet been tested in a mobile mode. Nevertheless, in the context of PPCM at the solid rocket motor plants for the first stage of the SS–24 and as part of an overall package ensuring effective verification of mobile ICBMs, the United States will accept PPCM at the solid rocket motor plant for the first stage of the peacekeeper. If the single-warhead mobile small ICBM and any silo-based variant becomes accountable under START, the final assembly facility will be subject to PPCM. Until then, the US would be prepared to continue the current PPCM site at Magna.

— I strongly urge you to accept this compromise proposal for verifying production of ICBMs subject to NDM limits. I will be prepared to discuss it further when we meet in Moscow.³ We must resolve this issue soon if we are to meet the goal of our presidents of completing START this year.

Sincerely,

James A. Baker, III

Eagleburger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N900008–0205. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Sent to NST Geneva. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Hadley, Lehman, MacEachin, and in JCS, NSC, S/S, and S/S-O; approved by Bartholomew.
2. November 8.
3. In telegram SECTO 24037, November 9, the Secretary’s Delegation in the Soviet Union transmitted Baker’s November 8 memorandum to Bush on discussions with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev about the ongoing crisis in the Persian Gulf and the status of Soviet political and economic reforms, which concluded: “On START, we closed out the non-circumvention issue, and may, with some effort, be able to resolve the remaining issues in our next ministerial. That would put us on track for a January summit. (Gorbachev is eager to nail down the summit date, but joked that a mid-January summit might be especially interesting given what we might be doing in the Gulf at that time.)” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N900008–0257)