Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

163. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, October 4, 1990

SUBJECT

• Your October 6 meeting with Shevardnadze on START

The purpose of the meeting is to get a response to the points you made on Wednesday,² and you basically have what you need in your package for Wednesday’s meeting.³ The following are a few additional points⁴ that respond to comments made by Shevardnadze and Nazarkin:

Non-circumvention Nazarkin told Burt Thursday⁵ that they saw nothing new in the US statement on non-circumvention, and the solution was for them to make a unilateral statement.

(If Shev says the solution is for them to make a unilateral statement that if the US/UK program goes beyond SLBMs, they can withdraw from START:)

○ We have done a lot for you on non-circumvention—the ban on undertakings which would conflict, ban on transfer except for existing patterns of cooperation, the Hurd letter, the ban on overseas basing and the statement I gave you on Wednesday.

○ We have worked hard to put together the package I gave you on Wednesday.

○ What we cannot do is predict the future. The objective of our cooperation is to help maintain and modernize the independent UK nuclear deterrent, which as the Hurd letter makes clear, will continue to remain a minimum one. But we cannot say now what might be necessary in the future to maintain and keep modern the UK force.

○ Urge you to look hard at what I gave you on Wednesday. That should meet your political problems. It would be better to have an agreement rather than to leave this to unilateral statements.

(If he pushes for inspections in third countries:)

○ Inspections in third countries are not necessary or possible.

○ I have told you that we do not base strategic forces overseas, and we are prepared to commit to leave Holy Loch by the end of 1991. So there will be nothing to inspect.

○ National Technical Means can verify the ban on overseas basing.

○ And we have no authority to agree to inspections in third countries. These are sovereign countries.

○ Our agreement to ban overseas basing and pull out of Holy Loch makes inspections unnecessary.

○ If any ambiguities arise, you can raise them in the Joint Commission.

Heavy ICBMs We are working with the other agencies to get in position to accept the Soviet proposal to permit new silos for heavy ICBMs only if existing silos are destroyed, as an alternative to a ban on new silos for heavies.⁶

Elements of Common Ground On Wednesday at the Soviet mission Nazarkin gave Burt⁷ informally new language on the question of use of START missiles:

“ICBMs and SLBMs subject to the Treaty which have been converted for space launch shall be used only for purposes consistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the two Parties.”

Nazarkin emphasized this was personal and had not been cleared by his people. Our people all agree this is actually preferable to the US language, and Rick has told Nazarkin we can accept it. Nazarkin is still trying to work it with Moscow. The elements of common ground with the Nazarkin language at para 6 are at Tab 1.

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁸

October 4, 1990

Elements of Common Ground

1. There shall be no requirement under the START Treaty to destroy ICBMs or SLBMs when their associated launchers are eliminated. Instead of being destroyed, such ICBMs and SLBMs will be transferred to the category of non-deployed missiles.

2. There shall be a limit of 250 non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of which no more than half may be non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

A. This limit shall apply to silo-based and mobile Peacekeeper ICBMs, silo-based and mobile SS–24 ICBMs, and silo-based and mobile SS–25 ICBMs, as well as to both silo-based and mobile variants of any future type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

B. Non-deployed ICBMs of types subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles which exceed those numerical limits shall be converted or eliminated.

3. All non-deployed ICBMs, whether or not subject to numerical restrictions, and all non-deployed SLBMs will be subject to the appropriate locational and reporting requirements now being worked out in Geneva.

4. When non-deployed ICBMs of types subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles are eliminated, they shall be converted or eliminated using the procedures now agreed in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination. Each side shall decide for itself the timing of and the procedures for the elimination of SLBMs or of ICBMs not subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles. Inspection of the elimination of SLBMs or of ICBMs not subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles shall not be required. Notification of such elimination shall be provided.

5. Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) shall apply to all types of ICBMs subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles. Details, including what specific facilities shall be subject to monitoring, shall be agreed.

6. ICBMs and SLBMs subject to the Treaty which have been converted for space launch shall be used only for purposes consistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the two Parties.

7. The Preamble to the START Treaty will include a reference to Article XI of the ABM Treaty, Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990, with respect to the undertaking in those documents to continue active negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

8. The START Treaty will not include any Agreed statements referring to the ABM Treaty.

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, New York October 5, 1990. Secret. Timbie affixed a note on the memorandum: “DR: For tomorrow’s meeting. J.T.” (Ibid.) No memorandum of conversation for Baker and Shevardnadze’s October 6 meeting was found.
2. October 3.
3. See Document 161. Ross underlined “you basically have what you need in your package for Wednesday’s meeting.”
4. Ross underlined “additional points.”
5. October 4. No memorandum of conversation was found.
6. Ross placed an asterisk at the end of this sentence and wrote at the bottom of the page: “(*1/3 of the SS–18 silos are in Kazakhstan, which is why the Soviets may want flexibility—to move them to Russia!)”
7. No memorandum of conversation was found.
8. Secret.