Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

161. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, October 2, 1990

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Shevardnadze on CFE and START

[Omitted here is are points related to the CFE Treaty.]

START

The overall objectives are to resolve:

○ The “big three”: Non-circumvention, heavy ICBMs, and Backfire.

○ Conventional ALCMs.

○ The package of elements of common ground.

To accomplish this you have flexibility on:

○ Backfire.

○ Heavy ICBM flight testing.

○ ALCM letter.

○ A ban on using START missiles to deploy ABM interceptors in orbit.

1. Heavy ICBMs²

US position:	7 flight tests over a three year period. Ban new silos for heavies, ban downloading of heavies, no increase in launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs.
Sov position:	No further limits beyond what is already agreed.
Bottom line:	Subject to agreement on non-circumvention and Backfire, and the heavy-related issues nailed down (no new silos, no downloading, no increase in launch weight or throw-weight), we can drop flight test limits.

Tactics:

○ Open with heavy ICBMs and push flight test limits, try to pin down the other heavy-related issues, then move on leaving flight testing on the table.

○ Return to heavy ICBMs after Backfire and Non-circumvention. Play falling-off flight testing in that context.

Talking points:

○ Heavy ICBMs are a major strategic problem and a major political problem for us as well as for you.

○ We have backed away from bans on production and flight testing, big steps for us. We accept the Mod 5 and Mod 6 programs.³

○ But we need provisions to prevent further development of even more capable versions. No justification for still more threatening missiles.⁴

○ We propose 7 flight tests/year.⁵ If you have a better way to achieve this objective, we would like to hear it.

○ In addition there are a number of other important provisions related to heavy ICBMs:

— Ban new silos for heavy ICBMs.⁶ No justification for new silos.

— Ban downloading of heavy ICBMs.⁷ Heavy ICBMs have an inherent capability to carry at least 10 warheads, we cannot agree to attribute fewer.

— No increase in launch weight or throw of weight of heavy ICBMs.⁸ This is already part of the Soviet position in Geneva, we told you in Washington we agree with it.

2. Backfire⁹

US position:	250 air force, 200 naval (currently about 210 air force and 160 naval).
Sov positon:	350 air force, 200 naval. (Nazarkin told Rick they could accept 325 air force if we drop heavy ICBM flight testing.)
Bottom line:	500–525 total.

Tactics:

○ The Soviet move to 350 air force Backfire (and Nazarkin’s offer) bring our bottom line of 525 within reach, and 500 may be achievable.¹⁰

○ US agreement to 525 could be a card to play for non-circumvention.

○ Suggest you acknowledge his move to 350 air force, offer him 300 air force and press this. If he doesn’t buy 300, move on and keep the 25 more for play elsewhere.¹¹

Talking points:

○ We agreed at the summit that you would make a politically binding declaration that would include limits on numbers and capability.

○ Your letter¹² before Irkutsk offered to limit naval Backfire to 200, and we can accept that, even though it is well above your current level.

○ So the remaining problem concerns the number of air force Backfire.

— We started at 200 air force (400 total); you started at 400. We offered 250; Amb. Karpov came back with 350.¹³

— Let’s split the difference at 300. That still allows for plenty more growth above your current level.¹⁴

— Let me remind you that when you said you needed a limit on the number of SLCMs, we found a way to meet your need.¹⁵

3. Non-circumvention¹⁶

US position:	The treaty article, agreed statement, and unilateral statements worked out in Geneva solve the problem.
Sov position:	The “existing pattern of cooperation” with the UK should permit cooperation on SLBMs only. If agreement cannot be reached on this, Sovs would make a unilateral statement that they can withdraw from START if the US/UK program goes beyond SLBMs.
Bottom line:	No give on substance. Offer a written statement that complements the Hurd letter to Shev,17 and offer a solution on overseas basing as a sweetener.

Tactics:

○ Remind him that we have already done a lot.

○ Play our move on withdrawal from Holy Loch and ban on overseas basing.

○ Make a US statement to complement the Hurd statement; if necessary offer to give it to him in writing.

○ Press to close, tell him agreement on non-circumvention could open up flexibility on Backfire and heavy ICBM flight testing.

Talking points:

○ We need to settle this.¹⁸

○ You know we cannot do anything that would suggest that we are prepared to subordinate to START a long-standing relationship with a major ally.¹⁹

○ You say you have political concerns, and we have a lot to meet your political concerns, more than we have ever done before.²⁰

— Agreed to ban international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with the treaty.²¹

— Agreed to ban transfer of strategic offensive arms limited by the treaty, except for existing patterns of cooperation.²²

— Stated that we have no pattern of cooperation with allies other than the UK involving transfer of strategic offensive arms limited by the treaty.²³

— Foreign Secretary Hurd has given you a written statement making clear that the British force will remain a minimum one, in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union or the US.²⁴

We think this is enough to solve your problem. It should be reassuring to you on the size of the British force and the relative weight of the British force.²⁵

The long-established pattern of US/UK cooperation has not upset the balance, and will not upset the future balance.²⁶

All that said, I am prepared to take two more important steps to meet your political concerns and close off this issue.²⁷

First, not only to close off non-circumvention but also the whole question of third country issues, we are prepared to accept a ban on overseas basing of strategic offensive arms.²⁸

— The US does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory. The only ambiguous situation is Holy Loch, where US SLBM submarines receive support from a support ship, a tender.²⁹

— We are prepared to state that US SLBM submarines will not use Holy Loch after 1991, assuming START enters into force in 1991. No arrangements similar to Holy Loch will be established in the future.³⁰

— We are further prepared to accept your proposal to ban third country basing. While your proposal would not take effect for seven years, we are prepared to accept a ban on overseas basing within six months of entry into force.³¹

— This would not affect port visits by ballistic missile submarines, nor would it preclude temporary deployment of heavy bombers to overseas locations. Neither of these activities constitutes basing. Here is the text of an agreed statement to make this clear. (Give him draft agreed statement at Tab 2.)³²

— You would drop your proposal for inspections in third countries, which would now be unnecessary.³³

That is one big step. Second, I have a statement I want to make to you on our pattern of cooperation with the UK. I ask you to give it the weight it deserves. (Read him the statement at Tab 3.)³⁴

If you put together what we have done to meet your concerns, and the further steps I am now taking on third country basing, and the Hurd statement, and the statement I have just made to you, this should meet your political concerns.³⁵

This package makes clear that US/UK cooperation has not been and will not be a vehicle for undermining the balance or undermining arms control agreements.³⁶

Let us agree on this comprehensive solution to all the third country issues.³⁷

— The already agreed treaty article, agreed statement, and unilateral statements on non-circumvention would stand.

— We would accept a prohibition on basing strategic offensive arms outside national territory beginning six months after entry into force.

— The agreed statement I gave you would make clear that ballistic missile submarine port visits or temporary deployment of heavy bombers to overseas locations do not constitute basing.

— The USSR would drop as unnecessary its proposal for inspections in third countries.

— And you have the statement I have just made to you, plus the statement you received from Foreign Secretary Hurd.

(If he says suggests the way out is for the Soviets to make a unilateral statement that they are free to withdraw if the US/UK program goes beyond SLBMs.)³⁸

○ I have given you a lot today. Look forward to your considered response.³⁹

○ We will consider your alternative in Washington.⁴⁰

4. ALCMs⁴¹

US position:	No limits on conventional ALCMs including conventional MIRVed ALCMs.
Sov position:	Ban conventional MIRVed ALCMs.
Bottom line:	No give on conventional ALCMs.42

Talking points:

○ We have come a very long way on ALCMs. Both sides have contributed to this.

○ Still vestiges in the Soviet position of the old approach of limiting the entire inventory of ALCMs. Trying to clean this up in Geneva.⁴³

○ Biggest remaining problem is Soviet proposal to ban conventional ALCMs with multiple warheads.

○ We have agreed to ban ALCMs with multiple nuclear⁴⁴ warheads. Such weapons are germane to our negotiations.

○ But conventional ALCMs are not.⁴⁵ All of the constraints the US has agreed to on long-range nuclear ALCMs, and in particular our agreement to the 600 km range threshold, were accepted by the US on the understanding that non-nuclear ALCMs would not be constrained. That was our explicit understanding.

○ Conventional forces are not what START is about. The Gulf situation today is just one illustration of how important conventional forces are to us. We cannot limit conventional ALCMs.

○ We have studied the concerns that Amb Nazarkin has expressed, and we have drafted a letter⁴⁶ that meets those concerns. (Give him draft at Tab 4.)⁴⁷

— We will not produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

— We will not produce, test, or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

— Any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons would be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, and would be subject to the appropriate procedures for exhibitions and inspections which apply to non-nuclear ALCMs now being worked out in Geneva.

— Any ambiguities would be addressed in the Joint Commission.

○ As you see, we have gone a long way to address the concerns your negotiators have expressed. Let us resolve the conventional ALCM issue on this basis.

○ This letter is designed to be part of an overall solution to the remaining ALCM issues—particularly agreement that conventional ALCMs are not limited by START.

○ If you can tell me that with this letter the Soviet Union will no longer pursue a ban on non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons or other limits on non-nuclear ALCMs, I am prepared to sign it.

5. Throw weight⁴⁸

US position:	Cut ICBM and SLBM throw weight to 50% of current Soviet level.
Sov position:	Cut to 55% of current Soviet level.
Bottom line:	52.5–53%

Tactics:

○ Try to split the difference.⁴⁹

Talking points:

○ We have made progress in Geneva on defining throw weight.

○ The remaining issue concerns the aggregate throw weight limit.

— The US position is that Soviet aggregate throw weight should be reduced to 50% of the current level.

— The Soviet side has proposed that its aggregate throw weight be reduced to only 55% of its current level.

○ We believe that a 50% level would be the best way to implement the agreement that was reached at the December, 1987, Washington summit, which said throw weight would be reduced to a level approximately 50% below the current level.

○ In the interest of resolving this important issue, with the understanding that full agreement is achieved on the definition of potential throw weight, we are prepared to accept a level set at 52.5% of the current Soviet level.

— Of course this would depend on agreed data on the throw weight of existing types of ICBMs.

○ This concedes a considerable margin over the 50% level, and represents a major move on our part to close this issue.
(If he proposes to accept reductions to 50% of the current level in return for US acceptance of the SALT II throw weight definition:)

○ We cannot accept that. We need potential throw weight for future missiles.

6. Common Elements Ambs Burt and Nazarkin have discussed a package with the following elements (text at Tab 5):⁵⁰

○ No destruction of missiles (except for those that exceed the NDM limit).

○ Limit of 250 non-deployed mobile ICBMs, including silo-based variants (all SS–24s, SS–25s, Peacekeeper, and future mobiles), of which no more than half can be rail-mobile.

○ PPCM in some form.

○ Ban on using ICBMs and SLBMs converted for space launch to deploy in orbit ABM interceptor missiles or components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles such ICBMs and SLBMs can be used for other purposes, consistent with existing international treaty obligations.

○ Include reference to and language from Art XI of the ABM Treaty in the START preamble (as well as references to our obligation in the Non-proliferation treaty and the Washington summit joint statement to negotiate on strategic arms).

○ No agreed statements on the ABM treaty.

These elements can resolve a number of issues, but they are hung up on the paragraph banning use of converted START missiles to deploy in orbit ABM interceptors. The Soviets rejected our Sept. 29 language, claiming it prejudiced the ABM issue. We disagree. However, we have developed alternative language which we believe protects both sides so long as the negotiating record is clear. The talking points are designed to achieve closure and make clear our position. In particular, you need to make clear to Shev that this can in no way limit our freedom to use START missiles to put ABM interceptors into orbit for testing purposes.⁵¹

Talking points:

○ The elements of common ground our negotiators have worked out are useful and resolve a number of issues.

○ We cannot agree, however, to START limits which put constraints on research, development, and testing.⁵²

○ That would link START to Defense and Space, something we agreed a year ago in Wyoming we would not do.⁵³

○ One way to resolve this is to draw a clear distinction between testing and deployment. The draft elements of common ground only limit deployment.⁵⁴

— We can agree to prohibit using START missiles to deploy in orbit ABM interceptor missiles or components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles.

— In Washington your representatives told us you sought limits on deployment but not testing. Our proposal, which precludes use of these missiles for military deployment should address your concerns.⁵⁵

— We cannot agree to limit using START missiles for other purposes, such as research, development, and testing, and the language we propose does not do that. Limits on testing would relink START to ABM and are contrary to what we agreed in Wyoming and I have no flexibility.⁵⁶

○ Our proposed language would not prejudice your position on the ABM Treaty, nor would it prejudice ours.

○ If we can’t agree on this approach, the best solution would be simply to drop all restrictions on use of START missiles. That would be consistent with our Wyoming agreement and would not prejudice either side’s position on ABM.

— After all, treaty constraints already exist, including a ban on placing mass destruction weapons in orbit.⁵⁷

[Omitted here is are points related to the CFE Treaty.]

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵⁸

Washington, undated

Agreed Statement

The Parties agree that, with regard to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty, the requirement that the strategic offensive arms of each Party shall be based only within its national territory refers to permanent basing involving the establishment of facilities equipped to support the long-term operation of strategic offensive arms. The obligations of paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty shall not affect generally recognized principles of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft or relating to visits of submarines to ports of States not party to this Treaty.

The Parties further agree that, with regard to heavy bombers, paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty shall not preclude the temporary stationing for extended periods of time of heavy bombers outside the national territory of a Party. If a Party stations heavy bombers outside its national territory for a period in excess of 30 days at any one time, it shall advise the other Party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30-day period.

Tab 3

Statement Prepared in the Department of State⁵⁹

Washington, undated

As we have indicated in the past the United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent in helping to maintain world peace.

As a result, the United States has engaged in a broad pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom for many years to help maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as “the existing pattern of cooperation” between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes the provision by the United States to the United Kingdom of Trident SLBMs.

The United States notes the statements made by British Foreign Secretary Hurd to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze regarding the future British plans for United Kingdom nuclear forces: “The British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.”

We believe this statement with regard to the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent should satisfy the Soviet Union’s concerns.

Tab 5

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶⁰

Washington, October 3, 1990

Elements of Common Ground

1. There shall be no requirement under the START Treaty to destroy ICBMs or SLBMs when their associated launchers are eliminated. Instead of being destroyed, such ICBMs and SLBMs will be transferred to the category of non-deployed missiles.

2. There shall be a limit of 250 non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of which no more than half may be non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

A. This limit shall apply to silo-based and mobile Peacekeeper ICBMs, silo-based and mobile SS–24 ICBMs, and silo-based and mobile SS–25 ICBMs, as well as to both silo-based and mobile variants of any future type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

B. Non-deployed ICBMs of types subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles which exceed those numerical limits shall be converted or eliminated.

3. All non-deployed ICBMs, whether or not subject to numerical restrictions, and all non-deployed SLBMs will be subject to the appropriate locational and reporting requirements now being worked out in Geneva.

4. When non-deployed ICBMs of types subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles are eliminated, they shall be converted or eliminated using the procedures now agreed in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination.

5. Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) shall apply to all types of ICBMs subject to numerical limits on non-deployed missiles. Details, including what specific facilities shall be subject to monitoring, shall be agreed.

6. ICBMs or SLBMs subject to the Treaty which have been converted for space launch shall not be used after their conversion to deploy in orbit ABM interceptor missiles or components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles. Such ICBMs or SLBMs may be used for any other purposes, consistent with existing international treaty obligations. Launches of such converted ICBMs or SLBMs shall only be made from space launch facilities.

7. The Preamble to the START Treaty will include a reference to Article XI of the ABM Treaty, Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990, with respect to the undertaking in those documents to continue active negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

8. The START Treaty will not include any Agreed Statements referring to the ABM Treaty.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, SSIRM Records, Lot 93D187, Secretary James A. Baker III’s Classified Papers, January 1989–August 1992, JAB Papers Oct 1990. No classification marking. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “JAB notes from 10/3/90 mtg. w/USSR FM Shevardnadze (during CSCE Ministerial), NYC.”
2. Baker circled the number 1.
3. Baker underlined “We accept the Mod 5 and Mod 6 programs.”
4. Baker underlined “even more capable versions” and “No justification for still more threatening missiles.”
5. Baker circled this sentence and added “over 3” before “year,” which he changed to “years.”
6. Baker underlined this sentence.
7. Baker underlined this sentence.
8. Baker underlined this sentence. He also bracketed this point and the previous two points, in the left-hand margin, and wrote: “No new types of heavy ICBMs.”
9. Baker circled the number 2.
10. Baker underlined “525 within reach” as well as “and 500 may be achievable.”
11. Baker bracketed this point and the previous two points in the left-hand margin.
12. In telegram 26125 from Moscow, July 30, the Embassy transmitted Shevardnadze’s letter of July 29 proposing a ceiling of 200 naval Backfire aircraft outside the framework of CFE (in addition to the previous offer a 400 ceiling on Soviet Air Force Backfires). (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N900005–0161)
13. Baker underlined “200 air force,” “you started at 400,” and drew a short vertical in the left-hand margin beside this point.
14. Baker underlined “Let’s split the different at 300” and “still allows for plenty more growth above your current level.” He also drew a short vertical line in the left-hand margin beside this point, and placed an asterisk to the left of it.
15. Baker drew a short vertical line in the left-hand margin beside this point and placed an asterisk to the left of it.
16. Baker circled the number 3.
17. In telegram 220056 from London, July 6, the Embassy transmitted a June 29 draft of Hurd’s letter to Shevardnadze reiterating the United Kingdom’s legal and sovereign right to maintain an independent deterrent, that it supported a START agreement, but that “your negotiations with the United States would need to go well beyond the reductions envisaged as the original objective of the START negotiation process before the UK could consider its involvement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D9000617-0191)
18. Baker drew a short vertical beside this point and numbered it 1.
19. Baker drew a short vertical line beside this point, numbered it 2, and drew an asterisk.
20. Baker underlined “political concerns,” “we have done a lot,” and numbered this point 3.
21. Baker drew a short vertical line beside this point and numbered it “i.”
22. Baker drew a short vertical line beside this point and numbered it “ii.”
23. Baker drew a short vertical line beside this point and numbered it “iii.”
24. Baker drew a short vertical line beside this point and numbered it “iv.”
25. Baker numbered this point 4.
26. Baker numbered this point 5, and drew an arrow pointing to it in the left-hand margin.
27. Baker underlined “All that said,” “prepared to take two more important steps,” numbered this point 6, and drew three asterisks in the left-hand margin beside it.
28. Baker underlined “First,” “but also,” “ban on overseas basing of strategic offensive arms,” and numbered this point “A.”
29. Baker numbered this point “i” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside it.
30. Baker numbered this point “ii” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside it.
31. Baker underlined “six,” numbered this point “iii,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside it.
32. Baker underlined “basing,” “draft agreed statement at Tab 2,” numbered this point “iv,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside it.
33. Baker numbered this point “v” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside it.
34. Baker underlined “one big step,” circled “Second,” and underlined “a statement I want to make to you” and “Tab 3.” He numbered this point 6.
35. Baker underlined “put together,” bracketed this point, and numbered it 7. He delineated the sentence: (a) “what we have done to meet your concerns”; (b) “the further steps I am now taking on third country basing”; (c) “the Hurd statement”; and (d) “the statement I have just made to you, this should meet your political concerns.”
36. Baker underlined “This package,” numbered this point 7A, and placed three asterisks in the left-hand margin beside it.
37. Baker drew a horizontal line above this section, numbered it 8, and placed two asterisks in the left-hand margin beside it.
38. Baker drew a horizontal line above this section and underlined “unilateral statement.”
39. Baker underlined “I have given you a lot today. Look forward to your considered response.”
40. Baker underlined “We will consider your alternative in Washington.”
41. Baker circled the number 4.
42. Baker underlined “No give on conventional ALCMs.”
43. Baker placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin beside this point.
44. Baker underlined “nuclear.”
45. Baker underlined “conventional ALCMs are not.”
46. Baker underlined “a letter.”
47. Printed as Document 162.
48. Baker circled the number 5.
49. Baker underlined “Try to split the difference.”
50. Baker circled the number 6.
51. Baker underlined “on the paragraph,” “testing,” and drew a short vertical line in the left-hand margin beside this point.
52. Baker underlined “research,” “development,” and “testing,” drew a short vertical line in in the left-hand margin beside this point, and placed an asterisk beside it.
53. Baker drew a short vertical line in in the left-hand margin beside this point, and placed an asterisk beside it.
54. Baker underlined “testing,” “deployment,” and “deployment.”
55. Baker underlined “deployment” and “but not testing.”
56. Baker underlined “research,” “development,” “testing,” and “Limits on testing would relink START to ABM and are contrary to what we agreed in Wyoming and I have no flexibility.”
57. Baker underlined “a ban on placing mass destruction weapons in orbit.”
58. Secret.
59. Secret.
60. Secret.