162. Letter From Secretary of State Baker to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze1
Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with multiple warheads. As you recall, we agreed in May to ban long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. I understand from my experts that the Soviet side believes such a ban must be extended to include long-range non-nuclear ALCMs as well.
As I have told you in the past, we cannot permit START to limit our conventional capabilities. In our view, the recent events in the Gulf underscore the importance of preserving non-nuclear options. At the same time, I would like to address your concerns over the possible circumvention of a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, let me make the following points:
First, the United States, under the START Treaty, will not produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. We will strictly comply with our Treaty obligations in this as in every other regard.
Second, I can state categorically that, under these Treaty obligations, the United States will not produce, test, or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the future capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor would the United States convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear [Page 888] ALCMs with multiple weapons. We would regard any such actions as inconsistent with our obligations under the Treaty.
Third, any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons which might be deployed would, of course, be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with the procedures, including exhibitions and inspections, which are now being worked out in Geneva for distinguishing long-range nuclear ALCMs from long-range non-nuclear ALCMs.
Finally, as Article XII of the Treaty makes clear in this as in all other areas, we consider that we would have an affirmative obligation to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to any questions raised by the Soviet side in the event of ambiguity or concern with respect to our compliance with our obligations under the Treaty not to produce, test or deploy a long-range nuclear ALCM with multiple weapons.
Naturally, these assurances are premised on the assumption that the Soviet side interprets its obligations toward the United States under the Treaty with regard to long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons in the same way.
I believe that these points should alleviate your concerns. You should feel free to share them with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to meet with you to finalize this or any other issues.
Eduard, with these responses, and with the constructive steps your side took recently in Moscow on ALCMs, we should be able to resolve all remaining ALCM issues. Let’s do so now.
Sincerely,