Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

80. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, William Wright, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 15, 1985

SUBJECT

• SACG, Tuesday, October 15, 4:30–5:30 p.m.

Changed Agenda. We had planned to devote the majority of today’s SACG to an update on the DoD Report originally tasked for November 15.² In fact, at three previous meetings you had asked DoD to complete its work by today (October 15) so that we could have time for other agencies to comment on the report prior to its submission to the President. This early submission could also serve to defuse any “event” being created by the arrival of the report just prior to the meeting in Geneva in November. Richard Perle has informed us that the report is not yet ready (or written), and that he has nothing more to add with respect to an update today. This being the case, we have reshaped the agenda for today’s SACG.³

Objectives of the SACG. The objectives of today’s restructured SACG would be to:

1. clear the air concerning the ABM interpretation issue and discuss how the President’s decision can be best presented to the press and Congress (especially in upcoming Congressional hearings);

2. discuss the most recent Soviet proposals (especially the radars issue) and how the USG should evaluate these ideas; and

3. reestablish an agreed and firm schedule for coming to closure on certain outstanding actions, notably the DoD Report and the MBFR decision.

Agenda. The agenda for a SACG meeting today would simply include the three major items cited above: (a) presenting the President’s decision on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty; (b) evaluating the most recent Soviet proposals; and (c) finalizing a plan for closing on outstanding actions.

— An agenda is provided at Tab A.⁴ Supporting talking points are at Tab B.⁵

Agenda Item 2—ABM Treaty Interpretation. The intent is to use this time to clear the air regarding the NSDD. Defense (Perle) has indicated that his debrief of last Friday’s⁶ NSPG included consensus with adopting the broader interpretation. We feel that it will be useful to meet this head on by reviewing the decision and the public handling aspects before any misperception develop.

— We would suggest that you review the NSDD (Tab C)⁷ to ensure that all concerned understand the content of the decision. We can anticipate that there will be some complaints about the decision and the problems caused by this decision. Richard Perle will be most vocal on this score. You need to hear these and attempt to use this discussion as an opportunity to put this issue behind us.

— This done, you can solicit ideas on how best to present the decision to the press, allies and Congress. A copy of the Q&As which you approved for use is provided at Tab D.⁸ You may wish to review these also. Additional guidance to the NST delegation should also be discussed.

Agenda Item 3—Soviet Informal Proposals. Yesterday Karpov provided two informal proposals (Tab E)⁹ to Ambassador Tower on an “urgent” basis. The first involved an offer to halt construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar in return for a halt to the Thule/Fylingdales upgrades. The second was an interim INF missile agreement in which the U.S. would limit GLCMs to 100–120 in Europe and the Soviets would reduce LRINF warheads in Europe to the sum of U.S., U.K. and French warheads, plus freeze SS–20s in the Eastern USSR. Backstopping guidance (also at Tab E) is negative on both proposals. It will be useful to discuss this approach with SACG principals.

Agenda Item 4—Pending Items. At today’s meeting, we need to arrive at a firm plan for moving forward on two key actions.

— The November 15 report from OSD should have been ready in draft today. Our reading is that Richard Perle will not be prepared to distribute the draft. This being the case, we recommend that you ask for a status report and indicate that if the report is going to have any impact prior to the November 19 meeting it must be worked before November 15.

— The MBFR IG’s Option Paper should be arriving during the day (State now supports UK/FRG position) and SACG should have MBFR discussion at next meeting, with NSC meeting probably required to follow.

UNGA Speech. With only 9 days remaining until the UNGA speech, you may receive questions about its status.

Recommendation

That you use the approach outlined above, and the supporting agenda (Tab A) and talking points (Tab B), in conducting the SACG on Tuesday, October 15.¹⁰

Concurrence: Ron Lehman, Steve Steiner and Jack Matlock

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SACG (Senior Arms Control Group) Meeting—10/15/1985. Secret. Sent for action. An unknown handwrote at the top of the memorandum: “RCM Has Original.” Linhard’s handwritten notes of the October 15 meeting are ibid. No minutes were found.
2. See Document 51. On the report, see Document 83.
3. Poindexter drew a bracket in the left-hand margin beside this paragraph and wrote: “Bob Linhard. My bet is that Perle will never be ready. I believe Cap plans to send this report direct to Pres. without any interagency review. JP”
4. Not attached.
5. Not attached.
6. October 11.
7. Not attached. See Document 76.
8. Not attached.
9. Not attached.
10. Printed from a copy on which McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.