79. Editorial Note
On October 14, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz delivered an address, “Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security,” before the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco. In describing the relationship between the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva and the Strategic Defense Initiative, he asserted: “Our research program is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles. The treaty’s text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since that time are subject to differing interpretations. Because of the great potential contribution that SDI could make to our security, and because of our interest in a rigorous implementation of the ABM Treaty by both sides, we have devoted much attention to the question [Page 272] of how to interpret the treaty. It is our view, based on a careful analysis of the treaty text and the negotiating record, that a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. This is, however, a moot point; our SDI research program has been structured and, as the President has affirmed last Friday, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty’s obligations. Furthermore, any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultations with our allies and to discussion and negotiation, as appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 1985, pages 21–25) President Ronald Reagan had signed NSDD–192, “The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program,” on Friday, October 11. (Document 76.)
On October 15, at the same forum in San Francisco, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul Nitze delivered an address, which included a section on the nature of SDI: “Let me be clear as to exactly what SDI is. SDI is a research program that is investigating the feasibility of new defensive technologies, both Earth and space based. The program is and will continue to be conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty. The treaty’s text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since 1972 have been variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing, as well as what kinds of research, are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principals.” “Should SDI prove new defensive technologies feasible, by indicating that defensive systems can meet demanding criteria of survivability and cost effectiveness, we believe the strategic balance could be made more stable by greater reliance on such defenses. Survivable and cost-effective defenses could so complicate a potential attacker’s planning for a first strike that such an attack could not be seriously contemplated and deterrence would thus be significantly enhanced. Additionally, such defenses could render a continued offensive buildup futile. Looking to the more distant future, strategic defenses might make an important contribution toward the eventual elimination of nuclear arms. Achieving that ultimate objective would, of course, presuppose a much more cooperative overall East-West relationship, one in which, for example, efforts to establish conventional force balances at lower levels and to enhance mutual confidence should also prove fruitful. Even should all nuclear arms be eliminated, the technical knowledge required to make such weapons would remain, and we would need to deal with the danger of cheating or exploitation by irresponsible elements. Non-nuclear defensive systems would serve that purpose.” (“SDI: Its Nature and Rationale,” Department of State Bulletin, December 1985, pages 69–71)