Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

83. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 13, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

On June 10, 1985, when you announced that the U.S. would go “the extra mile” to give the USSR time to correct its Treaty violations,² you asked us, in National Security Decision Directive 173,³ to give you an analysis of Soviet violations of arms control and other treaties. You also asked me to recommend incentives we might provide to the Soviets to correct their violations and, should such corrective action not be forthcoming, to effect appropriate and proportionate responses to those violations.

I am attaching Part One⁴ of this report you requested, together with an executive summary covering its main points. The report’s principal conclusion is that Soviet violations are continuing and require an appropriate and proportionate response on our part. The Joint Chiefs generally feel that your Strategic Modernization Program, as announced by you in October 1981, and the conventional and readiness improvements requested in your budgets would constitute the “appropriate and proportionate response” if fully funded by the Congress. I tend to agree with this opinion but, of course, Congress has made many cuts in your requests.

The Soviet violations put us in a particularly vulnerable and dangerous position when these violations are compared with the sharp reductions in our requests for Strategic Defense funding. We all feel that it is essential to move as rapidly and effectively as possible on SDI because Soviet violations do give them an advantage which makes it very difficult for us to maintain a deterrence balance with them.

Of course, their violations also constitute a powerful argument for getting the deepest possible cuts in nuclear arms by agreement, if we can secure agreements that bring us to parity at these lower levels and are thoroughly verifiable. Also, as we approach budget time for next year we may want to consider a supplemental for this year of more than 3 percent growth next year to compensate in specific ways for these violations. We will present to you on your return from Geneva a range of options for appropriate responses. I will be glad to take up with you the responses we can make within various classified programs.

If I may be permitted, I would like to mention a few other points here:

In Geneva, you will almost certainly come under great pressure to do three things that would limit severely your options for responding to Soviet violations:

○ One is to agree to continue to observe SALT II.

○ The second is to agree formally to limit SDI research, development, and testing to only that research allowed under the most restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, even though you have determined that a less restrictive interpretation is justified legally. The Soviets doubtless will seek assurances that you will continue to be bound to such tight limits on SDI development and testing that would discourage the Congress from making any but token appropriations.

○ Third, the Soviets may propose communique or other language that obscures their record of arms control violations referring to the “importance that both sides attach to compliance.”

Any or all of these Soviet proposals, if agreed to, would sharply restrict the range of responses to past and current Soviet violations available to us. A pledge to continue to adhere to SALT II, even though the Soviets are violating it, could make it difficult, if not impossible, to do other things we should do to make up for their violations. We can, of course, continue to observe parts of SALT II, at your option, but a pledge to continue observing it all, could put rigid constraints on your ability to respond to Soviet violations.

Also, such a pledge would require us to dismantle far larger numbers of modern weapons than the Soviets over the near-term. (See pages 1–4 of the attached Annex A.⁵ This annex indicates the dramatic disparity between our respective dismantling requirements. Essentially, the U.S. would have to dismantle between 1320 and 2240 MIRVed ballistic missile warheads by 1991, whereas the Soviets would have to dismantle only about 558 ballistic missiles, of which just 112 would be MIRV systems. Because Soviet modernization processes can go on, the net effect would be thousands of additional USSR warheads by the early 1990s.)

Any agreement to limit the SDI program according to a narrow (and, I believe, wrong) interpretation of the ABM Treaty—a Treaty which the Soviets are violating under any interpretation—would diminish significantly the prospects that we will succeed in bringing our search for a strategic defense to fruition.

Communique or other language that enables the Soviets to appear equally committed to full compliance—even as they continue to enlarge their pattern of violations—will make the difficult task of responding to those violations even more problematic.

Geneva offers the opportunity to underline the importance we attach to strict compliance with arms control agreements previously made. And it will help to build the foundation on which any proportionate response must be based.

My report to you emphasizes that our failure over the years to respond promptly to Soviet violations can only encourage them to commit more—and more significant—violations. It is significant that you are the first President to report to Congress violations by the USSR that have continued for 20 years. The verification the Soviets have agreed to in the past is no substitute for actual compliance. This simply emphasizes that determined action to avoid a double standard, in which we comply and the Soviets do not, is as necessary as it is difficult.

Very respectfully,

Cap

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan⁶

Washington, November 13, 1985

SUBJECT

• Responding to Soviet Violations Policy (RSVP) Study

This memorandum responds to the several issues on which you requested comment in National Security Decision Directive 173. It is an executive summary to which is attached the full report. As I mentioned in my cover letter to you of today, I will be glad to discuss with you some specific things we might do to respond to these violations. The most important thing we can do is press for full funding for SDI in the Congress. The report is an analysis of the pattern and significance of Soviet violations, the prospects for reversing them in Geneva, and some lessons of the past and for the future.

First, if I might be permitted, a preliminary word about history, Soviet violations, and what they mean to us. The full report makes clear that the Soviet Union has been violating with impunity its principal arms control agreements with the United States. From the beginning, many felt that the Soviets used the arms control process to obscure their planned offensive buildup, weaving into the fabric of the SALT I and ABM Treaty the loopholes and ambiguities that they would later rely on to becloud or extenuate their violations. That pattern of Soviet behavior continues to this day.

LESSONS

The lessons that I believe emerge from our analysis are as follows:

First, our original assumptions that the Soviets would not violate agreements, because the political repercussions would not be worth any possible gain, have been proved false. The Soviets have, in many cases, violated treaty provisions for small, even marginal gains. The deployment of several dozen SS–16 missiles at a test facility is a case in point. So is the insignificant number by which the Soviets have exceeded the SALT II ceiling on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the protracted delays in dismantling systems as required by the Treaty.

Second, there will always be very strong pressures to ignore violations rather than abandon treaties—or even to respond proportionally, and the Soviets know this.

Third, a failure to respond immediately to small infractions often encourages larger ones.

Fourth, verification is not a substitute for compliance. It is vital to know what the Soviets are doing and to be able to judge when violations take place. But verification does not guarantee compliance. Some of the most troubling violations are also the most easily verified. The Krasnoyarsk radar and the SS–25 are examples of violations that the Soviets must have known we would detect.

Fifth, the Standing Consultative Commission, the body assigned to deal with violations, has failed to gain Soviet compliance and will continue to do so. Indeed, it has, I think, generally discouraged more effective measures to gain Soviet compliance by pushing compliance issues into the recesses of a languid, confidential and ineffective forum.

Sixth, as we attempt to negotiate deep reductions in offensive forces the advantages to be gained by cheating will become proportionally greater.

Seventh, it is essential to recognize that the Soviets will exploit loopholes and ambiguities and that their presence in even carefully drafted agreements is unavoidable. This is because the Soviets resist precision and we have a history of acquiescing when they do so.

Eighth, it is easier to fall into a double standard of compliance than to avoid it. Without fear of contradiction at home the Soviets are able to deny violations. We are not. As a democracy we are rightly unwilling (and unable) surreptitiously to violate agreements. Even the decision to make a response proportional to Soviet violations requires great political courage, particularly if violations are not challenged early. Indeed, you are the first President to decide to do so and you can expect considerable controversy over any specific proportional response that you choose to make.

Ninth, violations can only be deterred by responding to them in ways that are more costly to the Soviets than the gains they expect to achieve through cheating. Establishing that we will respond, that we will impose costs at least equal to the benefits of Soviet violations, has been made more difficult by years of indifference and Congressional preoccupation with defense cuts. None of this is to say we should not try urgently and patiently to get the arms reductions agreements you and others want. It is to say there are many problems ahead.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

Following is a more detailed summary of the report itself, which, while long, is so because it traces the history of our arms negotiations relationships with the Soviets, and it does provide, I believe, useful background for any new set of negotiations. I hope you will not consider it too negative, or too lacking in hope. I have great hopes myself, based on my certain knowledge of how much you want agreements that will reduce arms.

Your Veteran’s Day address at Arlington⁷ was a most eloquent statement of why we must continue to try to secure agreements for real and deep reductions that preserve our ability to maintain deterrence at much lower levels, and leave us free to pursue your better way to peace—the SDI—and, above all, agreements that are truly verifiable.

This is a noble quest and you are rightfully pursuing it with my total support. But it is essential, I believe, that we all be aware of how many pitfalls there are, based on the history of Soviet past behavior. We have called attention to their behavior, trying (with only moderate success) to stimulate interest and understanding on the part of Congress, the American people, and the allies, and urging (with no success) the Soviet government to cease and desist.

In our current negotiations with the Soviets, we have worked to devise positions that take account of the verification and compliance problems we have faced in connection with existing treaties. But these steps, however sensible, cannot impose a substantial cost on the Soviet Union for its violations; even more important, they have not negated the special military advantages the Soviets have created for themselves through their violations.

A failure on the part of the United States to respond strongly to the Soviet Union’s policy of treaty violation would damage our interests in various ways. It would signal the kind of uncertainty and political weakness that invites adversaries to put one further to the test, and it could be taken as recantation of our findings of violation, thereby undermining our credibility. A more tangible ill effect would be the consolidation of the military gains the violations have afforded the Soviet Union in fields such as offensive strategic weaponry, strategic defense, and biological warfare.

Moreover, a less than forceful response to the violations would undermine any serious diplomatic endeavor to improve the U.S.- USSR relationship, in the arms control and other arenas.

It may appear paradoxical that the key to improved U.S.- Soviet relations is a vigorous response by us to Soviet treaty violations. But it is no more so than the observation that the key to domestic peace is a police force ready to exert itself to preserve the law.

THE PAST AS PRELUDE

History has repeatedly demonstrated that violations of international obligations feed on themselves; the violator tests and judges the reaction to each violation before moving on to the next. This was certainly the experience of the Allied Powers in the period between the wars as Hitler probed to its abject limit the unwillingness of France and Britain to respond to a widening pattern of German treaty violations.

Thus was massive German rearmament permitted to take place, on the land, at sea and in the air, in violation of legally binding treaties. From small German violations great battleships grew.

The failure of the democracies in the 1930s had little to do with the verification of illegal Nazi rearmament. The transformations of Boy Scout troops and police precinct units into Wehrmacht divisions, or the conversion of flying clubs into Luftwaffe squadrons, were not deceptions put over on an unsuspecting allied intelligence establishment. They were, on the contrary, clever devices to give those bent on appeasing the Nazis a pretext for inaction.

To those, like Churchill, who saw the consequences of acquiescing in German rearmament, the evidence was clear enough. But for those who were not prepared to act because action required sacrifice and large defense expenditures, always unpopular in democracies, there was ample scope for inconclusive debate over the interpretation of law and intelligence.

And so there is today. Failure to object or respond to violations will invite further violations, many of which are already foreshadowed by national intelligence estimates.

THE PATTERN OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS AND U.S. RESPONSES

The failure of the Johnson,⁸ Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations to respond seriously to the many Soviet violations that took place during their tenures led to the situation you confronted when, in 1984, you became the first President in five Administrations to find the Soviets in violation of a number of important provisions of several arms control agreements, many of which had gone on for years before you called attention to them.

The United States might not be faced with the Krasnoyarsk radar today if, more than a decade ago, we had effectively protested the construction, also illegal under the ABM Treaty, of a Soviet radar at Kamchatka. Although the two violations are quite different in nature (Kamchatka was not nearly so serious militarily), it is likely that the ease with which the U.S. Government acquiesced in the Kamchatka violation in 1975 emboldened the Soviets to approve the Krasnoyarsk project probably in 1977 or 1978.

In concluding and implementing treaties with friends and allies we assume good faith. Our friends and allies rarely craft loopholes, ambiguities, or definitional imprecision as devices to distort the plain intent of the parties and recapture concessions apparently made by them during the negotiating process. Disputes, when they do arise, are generally settled by negotiation in which the original intent of the parties is a crucial factor in the resolution.

In dealing with the Soviets, however, our experience has been quite different. In SALT I and II and the ABM Treaty, the Soviets insisted on formulations calculated to excuse subsequent actions of precisely the sort the agreements were understood to curtail. And since the agreements were signed, the Soviets have made prodigious use of the loopholes and ambiguities they argued for.

None of this is to say that it will never be possible to get a good arms reduction agreement with the Soviets that is in our interest. Indeed, I think you are in a better position to do this than any previous American president because we are strong and the Soviets know you are perfectly able and willing to work for good agreements and not be pressured into bad ones.

EXPLOITING LOOPHOLES AND AMBIGUITIES

The most important example of Soviet exploitation of loopholes, drawn from SALT I, has to do with the deployment of the SS–19, a large, MIRVed Soviet ICBM. Central to the SALT I agreement was a prohibition on the conversion of launchers for light missiles into launchers for heavy missiles. The Soviets successfully resisted U.S. efforts to nail down the definition of the terms “light” and “heavy,” claiming that the distinction was “obvious to everyone.” Because there then existed one missile, the SS–9, vastly larger than any other deployed on either side, the Soviets encouraged the view that since both sides understood the SS–9 to be “heavy” and the several smaller missiles then deployed to be “light,” there would be no problem of distinguishing the two types during the period of the Interim Agreement.

While this issue was under discussion the Soviets delayed (in order to conceal it from the U.S.) the flight test and silo construction program of a new ICBM. Once the agreement was signed, the Soviets launched the first test flights of the SS–19, which turned out to have three times the destructive potential (throw weight) of either side’s largest “light” missile. It was as if one party to an agreement limiting the sides to specified numbers of feathers and bricks secretly piled up stones and then argued that because stones are not bricks they must be counted as feathers. We now know that the aura of good faith with which the Soviets enveloped the American negotiators was intended to allay the sort of skepticism that might have led us to insist on precise definitions of such terms as “light” and “heavy.”

In building a loophole large enough for the SS–19, the Soviets calculated that the U.S. would eventually acquiesce in a fait accompli. They could not have anticipated how scant a protest we would make or how readily the Nixon Administration would plead the Soviet case in order to contain the complaints of Senators who had been told in hearings that the United States would regard as “heavy” any missile larger than the “light” missiles deployed when the agreement was signed.

Looking back on the deployment of the SS–19 in 1975, it would be hard to fault the Soviets for concluding that the United States would accept without effective protest any Soviet action that could be excused, however disingenuously, by invoking a convenient loophole or ambiguity. And if one can call a rock a feather and get away with it, why not say an early warning radar with a substantial ABM potential is a radar for space tracking and build it at Krasnoyarsk? Such has been the evolution of Soviet non-compliance.⁹

VIOLATIONS THAT EXPLOIT U.S. INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS

In 1985, the Soviet Union commenced deployment of the mobile SS–25 and thereby violated a provision of the SALT II Treaty limiting each side to the deployment of only one new type of ICBM.¹⁰ [3 lines not declassified] The SS–25 is a new type of ICBM in every respect, including measurable characteristics by which the Treaty defines new types. Particularly troubling is the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS–25 since it is likely to be applied to additional new types of ICBMs identified by U.S. intelligence but not yet flight tested. For this reason, a failure to respond effectively to this violation will almost certainly invite additional violations in the future.

In 1979, proponents of the SALT II Treaty stressed the importance of the new-type limit on modernization. They argued that, with the Treaty, the Soviets would be limited to one new type of ICBM while, without a Treaty, several were expected. A third possibility—that the Soviets would sign the Treaty, violate it and wind up with several new types nonetheless—never figured in the ratification debate, although there was a good deal of discussion about whether the new-type limitation was verifiable.

The evolution of the one-new-type limitation in the SALT II negotiations is instructive. The United States proposed banning all new types of ICBMs. The Soviets insisted that one be permitted and that provision be made for the modification of older types. We conceded both points. There followed a lengthy negotiation aimed at defining the sort of modification that would be allowed for older types of ICBMs.

The constraints finally agreed to under Soviet pressure were narrowly defined. All along, our intent for the one-new-type limit and the associated rules covering allowable modification was to restrict severely the Soviet freedom to bring out a new missile in the guise of modifying an old one. In the end, the Soviets twisted the Treaty’s intent and then violated it so as to permit the development of at least two new types. What had begun as a cul de sac ended up a superhighway leading to the development of a whole generation of new and substantially more capable intercontinental ballistic missiles.

VIOLATIONS EXACERBATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS

We think U.S. efforts to obtain a Soviet pledge to refrain from the encryption of test data telemetry almost certainly alerted Moscow to the importance of telemetry as a source of intelligence about Soviet military programs. [4 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

During the SALT II ratification debate, the Senate was particularly forceful in asserting the importance it attached to Soviet compliance with the limitations on telemetry encryption. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Treaty included the following statement:

. . . Any practice with regard to the transmission of telemetric information during the testing of strategic arms limited by the Treaty, including but not limited to the failure to transmit relevant telemetric information, which results in impeding of verification by United States national technical means of any provision of the Treaty, will be raised by the United States in the Standing Consultative Commission and if the issue is not resolved to the satisfaction of the United States, the United States reserves the right to exercise all other available remedies, including, but not limited to, the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

The Administration and Congress alike understood that a violation of the encryption provision would have profound consequences for U.S. intelligence and could undermine the many Treaty provisions whose verification depended on access to Soviet test data. Here again we are faced with a violation which, unless reversed, is certain to diminish still further our ability to monitor Soviet activities and to verify their compliance with Treaty obligations.

KRASNOYARSK AND TERRITORIAL DEFENSE

Of the many violations of the USSR’s arms control obligations, the most serious includes, but is not limited to, the large Soviet phased-array radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk. For associated with that radar is a variety of other violations, some of the spirit or intent, others of the letter, of the complex constraints in the ABM Treaty aimed at preventing the deployment of a territorial defense involving a nation-wide anti-ballistic missile system.

While the evidence is not conclusive, there is good reason to be alarmed at the combination of Soviet development of readily-transportable radars, significant upgrading of the Moscow ABM system, the testing of air-defense components in an ABM mode, the development (and testing) of air-defense missiles capable of intercepting ballistic missile warheads and the completion of a network of large phased-array radars of which the radar at Krasnoyarsk is a part. Taken together, these activities, some reaching back into the early and mid-1970s, could indicate the beginning of Soviet territorial defense against ballistic missiles.

The central restriction of the ABM Treaty is the limit it places on the deployment of large phased-array radars. Because they typically take five-to-seven years to build and are the pacing element in an integrated defense system, these highly visible large radars were severely constrained in the 1972 Treaty. Once deployed, these radars form the essential infrastructure to which interceptors and smaller radars might be added, expanding incrementally the capacity of the system as a whole to detect, track and intercept U.S. or allied warheads launched in retaliation against Soviet targets.

That the Soviets are today poised for such a development is a consequence of a pattern of violations, many of which must have been planned during and in the period immediately following the ABM Treaty negotiations. It is likely that the Soviets will continue further to refine the air defense components and transportable radars necessary to make full use of the large phased-array radar base that is now nearing completion—a base that greatly exceeds that planned by the United States for deployment of the Safeguard ABM system abandoned in the aftermath of the ABM Treaty.

THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

SALT I and II and the ABM Treaty all provided for a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for the drafting of technical implementing agreements and the resolution of compliance issues. It consists of representatives of the U.S. and Soviet Union who negotiate on the occasion of their meetings. Its deliberations are secret.

Contrary to the claims often made for it, the SCC has failed to resolve any significant compliance issue in the approximately 1,500 days that it has been in session over the last 13 years. A less productive forum for the resolution of disputes would be difficult to find.

Far from resolving disputes over compliance, the SCC has become a diplomatic carpet under which Soviet violations have been continuously swept, an Orwellian memory-hole into which our concerns have been dumped like yesterday’s trash. Unwilling to face up to a mounting record of Soviet violations, successive administrations have consigned our concerns to the SCC where they have been “discussed,” often for years on end, with wholly unsatisfactory results.

Violations raised by the U.S. in the SCC were dealt with in slow motion while they continued and until they had run their course, at which time they were declared to have been resolved. A good case in point is the Soviet program for testing air defense components in an “ABM mode” in violation of the ABM Treaty. Well over 100 suspicious tests were conducted over twelve years while the SCC painted an attenuated arabesque that served to obscure their continuation. When their tests were completed the Soviets announced, and the United States gratefully received, the news that they would cease. Even this dismal result proved ephemeral; after a brief interval, the Soviets resumed the prohibited tests—and back we went to the SCC.

Our Administration has been the first to acknowledge the ineffectiveness of the SCC, and the first one willing to report publicly Soviet violations.

There are those who believe that the inadequacies of the SCC can be overcome by a redoubled effort. I believe this misses the essential point about the SCC. If the Soviets comply with agreements, the issue of violations will not arise in the SCC or anywhere else. If they wish to violate them, they will not be deterred by semi-annual meetings of the SCC. The SCC is merely a forum for discussion, a date and place and list of attendees. While, in theory, it could be used to dispel misunderstandings, misunderstanding is not the source of Soviet behavior; rather, Soviet behavior is motivated by a desire to gain advantage and the SCC is powerless to affect it.

A constituency has developed around the SCC composed, as is the SCC itself, of Soviets and Americans who believe that violations of agreements must not be permitted to become prominent features of the arms control dialogue. Only a clear declaration from the President that the SCC has failed offers any prospect that we will find the will and opportunity to make the appropriate responses that will create incentives for Soviet compliance and disincentives to Soviet violations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PATTERN OF VIOLATIONS

The current and future Soviet violations pose real risks to our security and to the process of arms control itself.

The Krasnoyarsk radar together with other indications suggesting a possible future territorial defense could have a profound impact on our strategic deterrent forces. Even a probable territorial defense would require us to increase the number of our offensive forces and their ability to penetrate Soviet defenses to assure that our operational plans could be executed. The deployment in significant numbers of the SS–25 (which is now well underway) will erode deterrence by allowing the Soviets to contemplate a first-strike using their fixed ICBMs, while retaining intact a reserve force of mobile systems resilient to counter-attack. [4 lines not declassified]

These few examples are illustrative. For each of the violations that you have reported to the Congress there are associated risks to our security. When violations of the spirit of past agreements are added to the list—the deployment of the SS–19, the conversion of ballistic missile launching submarines to cruise missile launching submarines, and the like—the cumulative impact on our security is deeply troubling.

We believe modernized strategic and conventional forces and vigorous SDI research present the strongest message to the Soviets in response to their treaty violations. Such U.S. forces and research also provide the best hedge against future Soviet threats. There are a number of military programs which have been cancelled or reduced due to budget constraints. These reductions could have a significant effect on our deterrent capability. Thus, our priority response should be to implement fully these programs. I will be prepared to discuss our options for proportionate responses upon your return from Geneva.

I think it is still possible to obtain, by patient negotiation with the Soviets, verifiable agreements that make sharp reductions, down to parity, in the nuclear arsenals. Both powers’ strategic defense remains, however, as the greatest single long-range hope of mankind.

Cap Weinberger

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Department of Defense Files, Box CL 838, Subject File, 1985 U.S.S.R #158–169 (12). Secret. The letter was printed in full in the November 16 edition of the New York Times.
2. Reference is to Reagan’s “Message to Congress Transmitting a Report on Soviet and United States Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,” June 10, Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, pp. 744–745.
3. See Document 47.
4. Attached but not printed is “Responding to Soviet Violations Policy Study, Part I,” undated.
5. Annex A to “Responding to Soviet Violations Policy Study, Part I” is attached but not printed.
6. No classification marking.
7. Reference is to Reagan’s “Remarks at Veterans Day Wreath-Laying Ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery,” November 11, Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 1366–1368.
8. During the Johnson Administration the Soviets began the practice of conducting underground nuclear tests in a manner that frequently caused venting of radioactive material into the atmosphere in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. American protests, some 32 of which have been lodged with the Soviets since 1965, became a secret ritual scorned by the Soviets. The most recent such Soviet violation of the LTBT took place on 27 October 1984. Twenty years passed from the time of the first unequivocal evidence of Soviet venting before you, in February 1985, publicly disclosed these chronic violations. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. A new CIA report confirms that the Krasnoyarsk radar is not suited for the purposes claimed for it by the Soviets but is indeed an early warning radar. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. The Soviets had earlier formally notified us that the SS–X–24 was to be their one permitted new type of ICBM. [Footnote is in the original.]