I do think it is important that we try to correct some of the various
versions of the President’s decision that seem to be surfacing now.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense3
In NSDD–192 I gave further guidance
with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the relationship between our
obligations under the ABM Treaty of
1972 and the SDI program. I sought
therein to make clear that (1) the ABM
Treaty does not restrict the research, development or testing of ABM systems or components based on “other
physical principles”; (2) that the Treaty itself and the record of
negotiations, both of which have been carefully analyzed by government
counsel from several executive branch departments, support this
interpretation; and (3) that more restrictive interpretations of the
ABM Treaty, whose validity had
previously been argued, had never been accepted by the Soviet side
during the ABM Treaty negotiations.
I also consider the question of Treaty interpretation to be irrelevant to
the immediate issue of American compliance since the SDI program, as currently constituted, was
made to conform to the earlier interpretation. Thus the U.S.
SDI program, consisting of research,
development and testing now funded and programmed, is fully consistent
with both interpretations of the ABM
Treaty including even the more restrictive interpretation which I do not
accept as correct.
The issue has arisen as to which interpretation will be applied as the
progress of the SDI program offers
opportunities to advance toward a successful conclusion through
development and testing activities prohibited by the restrictive, and no
longer followed interpretation, but permitted under the less restrictive
interpretation that government counsel have advised me is valid and
proper.
Therefore I have concluded the following:
First, all presently planned activities will continue to be made to
conform to the earlier and more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
Second, future planning, short of actual programmatic activity, need
conform only to the less restrictive interpretation identified in point
(1) of paragraph one of this directive.
Third, programmatic activity pursuant to the above point, as distinct
from planning for such activity, will be approved in future only upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense with my concurrence.
[Page 277]
The fundamental purpose of the SDI
program remains the earliest practicable determination of whether
advanced technologies ultimately can provide for us all freedom from
attack by nuclear ballistic missiles.
