Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

78. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, undated

NON-ZERO-SUM GAME/41 (per NGC)

On Friday, October 4, at a meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group chaired by Bud, Fred Ikle and Richard Perle pushed hard for an SDI program that, in my opinion, would go beyond the broad interpretation of the provisions of the ABM Treaty.² In particular, they argued that deployment, not just development and testing, of systems and components based on OPP was permitted.

An extended discussion ensued, in which I argued that the broad rather than the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty was fully justified but that that did not mean complete freedom from all constraints on the testing, development and deployment of systems and components based on other physical principles. Bud indicated that he supported my position, and in particular decided that deployment was not permitted, but also said that we would return to the subject the following Tuesday. During the night I worried about my part in the discussion of that day. What worried me was that, though I had won the non-deployment issue, I had not made clear another concern. That was that, even though I was confident the Soviets had never committed themselves to the narrow interpretation in a manner which they would consider binding on themselves, as a result of our recent report to Congress and discussions with Mrs. Thatcher and other Allies, we were in a position where we should not implement a decision on the broad interpretation without full prior discussion with the Congress and with our Allies. On Saturday morning I drafted a memorandum to Bud clarifying my position. This was in anticipation of the Tuesday meeting, to which Bud had referred the previous day, and at which I would not be present; I had already been directed to be in Europe for Allied Consultations on the day of the meeting.

The next day, Sunday, October 6, Bud appeared on “Meet the Press.” He announced, in response to a question, that only deployment of SDI was foreclosed. The ABM Treaty, he said, “does indeed sanction research, testing, and development of these new systems.”

I immediately informed Secretary Shultz of what happened. I also revised my Saturday memo to take account of Bud’s TV appearance. In the revised memo I recommended that we assure the Congress and our Allies that we would not implement an expansion of the scope of the SDI program beyond the narrow interpretation.

At a meeting of the National Security Planning Group later, the Secretary persuaded the President to adopt an amended position; i.e., that the permissive interpretation of the Treaty was fully justified, but that the United States would continue to observe the more traditional interpretation. NSDD 192 was issued accordingly.³

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal File 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. No classification marking. Prepared by Clyne.
2. See footnote 1, Document 64.
3. See Document 76.