Office of the Historian

77. Note From Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1

Washington, October 11, 1985

SUBJECT

  • Discussion with UK Embassy.

After finally returning the call from Sir Oliver Wright to you, I began to get a series of calls from John Kerr (Political Officer at the Embassy) who, it was clear, was under instructions to make sure HMG’s views were known tonight!

He offered the following points:

1.
Sir Oliver very much wished to talk to you since he was directed to do so by Howe—and also to go to State—to inquire about your remarks last Sunday on Meet the Press.2 Sir Oliver did not want to give the impression of going around you—but he did have to contact State (Armacost). He wants to talk to you as soon as possible to explain.
2.
Kerr provided HMG’s views, as he did State (Holmes), as follows:
—
Your remarks on Meet the Press have caused increasing concern in that it appears they signal a new interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
—
HMG welcomed the assurances of the President that the SDI program would be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. This welcome reflected certain understandings underlying the 4 Camp David points and reflected in the second point (SDI deployment is a matter of negotiation).
—
HMG had not expected any reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty; nor had it been aware that one was under consideration.
—
HMG sees two immediate disadvantages in such a reinterpretation:
1.
It could reopen debate within the Alliance, including about Allied participation in SDI just when consensus appeared to have been reached on the basis of the 4 Camp David points. This new and potentially contentious debate would come just prior to the Gorbachev meeting.
2.
It would hand the Soviets a new propaganda weapon and could be perceived as calling into question the US commitment to preventing the erosion of the ABM Treaty—at least suggesting the commitment was not as firm as it had been thought.
3.
HMG would hope that it, and other SDI supporting allies, would have been able to consult before such a step is taken. HMG’s legal experts would be interested in understanding the legal basis for such a reinterpretation—but the real issue is Allied unity on the run up to the summit.
3.
Kerr concluded that the Ambassador is particularly worried about his personal relationship to you based on what he was instructed to do today and his inability to contact you. He asked again, in Sir Oliver’s name, for a call at your earliest today.

  1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–110, NSPG 120 11 Oct 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.↩
  2. October 6. See footnote 2, Document 69.↩