Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

64. Memorandum From William Wright and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

• SACG, Friday, October 4, 4:30–5:30 P.M.

Purpose. This package provides the agenda and some supporting material for the SACG meeting scheduled for Friday, October 4. Because each of the agenda items is currently in a fluid state an update including your talking points will be provided tomorrow morning.

Objectives. The objectives of this SACG meeting are to:

1. (Agenda Item 2—Paris Developments) The Gorbachev announcements today from Paris,² revealed new elements at the Soviet propaganda campaign in Europe. A short five-minute assessment of the new elements and our response will be useful to keep everyone up to date and solicit comments. A preliminary set of press Qs and As is at Tab C.³

2. (Agenda Item 3—Special Paper on Options) As directed, the Support Group has produced a rough draft based on the outline at Tab D.⁴ Your talking points will support a discussion focused on the outline only—we expect to have a more mature paper completed this weekend.

3. (Agenda Item 4—ABM Treaty Terminology) The Support Group has produced a draft decision document (Tab E) but OSD participation has been limited by a fundamental belief, as expressed by Fred Ikle in today’s memorandum to you (Tab F) that no decision be taken pending a complete legal and technical analysis. The issue needs a decision because failure to agree to a standard set of terminology gives the impression that we are hedging; spokesmen and negotiators are hesitant to reaffirm existing interpretations for fear that it will prejudice the outcome.

4. (Agenda Item 5—Pending Actions) You asked Ken Adelman to be prepared to lead a discussion on the intended use of the “transition” paper and Mike Guhin is prepared to do so in his stead. Also, Fred Ikle, who objected strongly to the ABM Treaty “erosion” paper, at Tab G, is prepared to offer views on why that paper should not be approved for use.

Agenda and Talking Points, The agenda (Tab A)⁵ and proposed talking points (to be provided) (Tab B)⁶ are to support your chairmanship of the meeting.

Recommendation

That you use the approach outlined above, and the supporting agenda (Tab A) and talking points (Tab B), in conducting the SACG on Friday, October 4.⁷

Concurrence: Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard, Steve Steiner and Jack Matlock⁸

Tab E

Paper Prepared in the Senior Arms Control Group⁹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

• ABM Treaty Terminology

Issue: Should the U.S. change its longstanding interpretation that the ABM Treaty’s prohibition on “the development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems and components” applies to systems based on “other physical principles” as well as those on which ABM systems were based at the time the ABM Treaty was signed?

Introduction: A standard set of terminology is required now for internal guidance and, to handle both public inquiry and Geneva negotiating tactics. Since 1972, the U.S. has publicly and privately maintained that Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits development, testing and deployment—but not research on—ABM systems and components that are not fixed, land-based and regardless of whether they are based on new or older technologies or principles. The central choice is between retaining this “customary” interpretation and introducing a “new” interpretation which would maintain that the Treaty permits development, testing and deployment of non-fixed ABM systems or components which are based on other physical principles.

This paper addresses the generally accepted Treaty terminology, the two interpretations and their supporting rationale, and three options for decision. Relevant ABM Treaty provisions are at Tab A for reference.¹⁰

ABM Treaty Terminology

The ABM Treaty provisions regarding “components” can be most clearly understood by considering the three categories of ABM systems contemplated by the Treaty.

a) “Current” systems. These are systems consisting of fixed, land-based components that composed the “current” systems at the time the Treaty was negotiated. Article II defines such components as ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The deployment of such components is limited to locations and numbers specified in Article III and such components may be tested in conformity with Article IV.

b) Article V systems. These are ABM systems with components that are mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based. Such components would include ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars as defined by Article II and devices capable of substituting for one or more of such ABM components. Article V, paragraph 1 provides that such systems or components may not be developed, tested or deployed; research on such systems or components is not prohibited.

c) ABM systems based on “other physical principles” addressed in Agreed Statement D. These are ABM systems with components based upon physical principles other than those used in ABM systems “current” at the time the Treaty was negotiated. These would be devices capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars. Articles III and IV and Agreed Statement D allow the research, development and testing of such fixed, land-based components, but prohibit their deployment absent prior discussion pursuant to Article XIII and agreement to amend the Treaty in accordance with Article XIV.

The term “development” under Article V of the Treaty does not extend to tests of devices that (1) are not ABM systems or components based on then-current technology; or (2) are not devices capable of substituting for such components. Development and testing of such non-ABM devices are not limited by the Treaty whether such development and testing is observable or not.

The distinction between permitted research and prohibited development of an ABM system or component is generally related to the ability of NTM to detect the prohibited activity. “Laboratory research” generally cannot be observed by NTM. In contrast “field testing” is more amenable to observation by NTM. Thus, the prohibition on development of ABM systems or components prohibited by Article V becomes applicable with the commencement of field testing of a prototype of such a system or component.

For a “prototype” to be limited by the ABM Treaty it must be a prototype of an ABM system or ABM component or of a device capable of substituting for an ABM component. Regardless of whether a device is labeled “prototype”, “breadboard”, “test bed”, or “preproduction model”, or any other term of art, the determination of what treaty restrictions apply is based on whether it constitutes an ABM component under the Treaty, or is capable of substituting for an ABM component. Neither the Treaty nor the relevant negotiating record refer to the terms “subcomponent” or “breadboard model.”

Customary Interpretation

Under the customary interpretation, with the above terminology as background, the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components based on physical principles other than those on which ABM systems were based at the time of signature of the ABM Treaty (as well as ABM systems and components based on then-current technology).

This interpretation is supported by the following argumentation:

Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an ABM system as a “system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.” It states that ABM systems “currently consist of” ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Thus, Article II indicates that there could be other types of ABM systems or components developed in the future. Article III of the Treaty prohibits the deployment of ABM systems except that fixed land-based ABM systems utilizing technology current in 1972 can be deployed at specific sites under specific limitations. Article V, paragraph 1, prohibits the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems. Like Article III, Article V is all encompassing. Article II makes clear that Article III and Article V apply to all types of ABM systems regardless of the technology utilized. In agreeing to the language of Article V, 1. the U.S. and Soviet negotiators also agreed that the text covers “any type of present and future components.” Thus, the development, testing and deployment of other than fixed land-based ABM systems or components based on other physical principles is prohibited by Article V, 1. Agreed Statement D is by its terms associated with Article III and provides that should types of ABM systems appear in the future based on other physical principles, they cannot be deployed at these permitted sites without amendment of the Treaty—otherwise the balance established by Article III would be upset.

New Interpretation The new interpretation holds that the ordinary meaning of Agreed Statement D is that “specific limitations” on ABM systems “based on other physical principles” will be “subject to discussion.” Moreover, by implication, the Treaty—apart from Agreed Statement D—does not provide “specific limitations” on sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems, based on physical principles other than those current at the time the Treaty was signed.

This new interpretation is supported by the following argumentation:

The use of the phrase “currently consisting of” in Article II can be read to mean that all future variants of existing ABM systems and components are covered by the Treaty. In that case, Article V would prohibit testing, development, and deployment of all mobile systems using new technologies. On the other hand, if Articles II and V had this effect, there would not be a need for the undertaking in Agreed Statement D to discuss “specific limitations” on future ABM systems “based on other physical principles.” The fact that “specific limitations” on future systems remain “subject to discussion” indicates that the Treaty by itself does not limit these systems. Furthermore, the text of Agreed Statement D is unclear as to what rules, if any, apply before the Parties reach agreement on “specific limitations” and amend the Treaty accordingly.

The ambiguity should be resolved by looking at the negotiating record, not at subsequent unilateral statements by U.S. officials. The negotiating record contains conflicting evidence, but the dominant evidence is that the Soviets never committed themselves to limitations on future systems.

Options: Based on the foregoing and given that a standard set of ABM terminology is needed in the near term, the U.S. is faced with the following three options to resolve the issue at hand:

Option One: Retain the customary interpretation now

Advantages

— consistent with past public, Congressional and allied presentations

— avoids exacerbating public controversy on SDI

— retains credibility of U.S. claim that SDI is consistent with Treaty

Disadvantages

— this interpretation will inhibit achievement of SDI milestones sooner than the new interpretation

— gives up near term opportunity to interpret ambiguity in our favor

Option Two: Introduce the new interpretation now

Advantages

— greatly facilitate progress of SDI beyond currently identified program

— shows resolve for the fulfillment of the program

— could force a discussion with the Soviets which might lead to mutual agreement on a resolution of the ambiguity

Disadvantages

— could be seen by some as abandoning the Treaty

— undercut our case on Soviet non-compliance

— no immediate need for the less restrictive interpretation now to proceed with current SDI program

Option Three: Do not volunteer any interpretation on how Article 5 applies to future ABM systems but, if pressed, fall back to the customary interpretation.

This is a variation of and has basically the same advantages and disadvantages as Option 1 above except that it has an advantage that may leave the door more open to the possible future review. As a disadvantage, this option may not diminish public controversy.

Tab F

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹¹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

• Preparing for Presidential Decisions on Interpreting the ABM Treaty (U)

(S) I understand that the Arms Control Support Group has been asked to provide comments to your staff on a draft decision paper on “ABM Treaty Terminology.” I wanted to convey to you my personal views on this subject in the hope that we might adopt a somewhat different approach to senior-level review of, and Presidential decisions on the matters nominally covered by the paper in question.

(S) As you know, I regard the question of whether or not we continue to espouse the conventional approach to interpreting and defining our commitments under the ABM Treaty as one of the most critical SDI-related decisions the President will face. It is hard to exaggerate the long-term impact our actions on this question may have on future options for the SDI program, and indeed on the very viability of that program. The President’s choices in this area could also have major import for our stated requirement for full and equal Soviet compliance with existing arms control accords and for the negotiation of future agreements with the USSR.

(S) Given these high stakes, it is crucial that principals be given an opportunity to discuss the issue of ABM Treaty interpretations with the President before any decision is made. Such a discussion must be informed by the best possible legal analysis of the Treaty and its associated, agreed documents. As you know, we have done a preliminary analysis which strongly suggests that—notwithstanding past U.S. Government statements to the contrary—the Soviet Union never agreed to our interpretation of Treaty language regarding mobile systems exploiting “other physical principles.” Our General Counsel is now engaged in a review of this assessment with the Department of State’s Legal Advisor.

(S) A further important consideration in such a discussion must be the actual implications for the SDI program, over the near- and longer-term, of adherence—especially unilateral adherence—to a “strict construction” of the Treaty. Decisions on treaty interpretation will affect the pace and design of planned experiments as well as the long-term level of effort devoted to specific technologies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is now preparing on an extremely close-hold basis such an analysis.

(S) In my view, the completion of these legal and technical analyses must precede senior-level decision on the approach for us to take to Treaty interpretations. It would be irresponsible to precipitate a decision by the President uninformed by such assessments.

(S) Still another factor argues for caution and thoroughness in our review and decision-making on this issue: if the Soviets in fact did not agree to a “strict construction” approach comparable to our own in the past, anything we say from now on to reinforce the conventional interpretation is tantamount to giving them a potentially significant constraint on SDI without the United States getting anything in return. I am not sure we should accept such constraints under any circumstances; to do so as a result of some hastily-prepared and ill-considered effort to further define ABM “terminology” seems to me both unnecessary and unwise.

(S) In short, I urge that you direct your staff and the Arms Control Support Group to stand down on the preparation of the afore-mentioned decision paper. In addition, I recommend that planning and preparations begin promptly for an NSC meeting at which all of the relevant materials and analyses can be reviewed. Only in this way will we be able to ensure that a decision of this importance, when ultimately addressed by the President, is made with the benefit of the necessary, full understanding of its implications.

Fred C. Ikle¹²

Tab G (1)

Paper Prepared by the Standing Consultative Commission¹³

Washington, undated

Avoiding Further Erosion of the ABM Treaty

I. Introduction

According to the President’s February 7, 1985 Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance, the aggregate of the Soviet Union’s ABM and ABM-related actions suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The Treaty prohibits, inter alia, providing a base for such a defense.

Concerns with respect to the totality of Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities are:

— the construction of a network of large-phased-array radars (LPARs), including one at Krasnoyarsk, which might constitute the deployment of a major long lead-time component of a nationwide ABM defense;

— the apparent development and testing of a rapidly deployable ABM system;

— the probable concurrent testing of air defense radars and ABM radars;

— the development of a modern air defense system (SA–X–12) which may have capabilities against certain types of ballistic missiles; and

— the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a shorter period of time than previously observed.

This paper briefly examines some possible measures to address all of these compliance issues except the last. The suggested measures would not resolve these issues definitively, but would help alleviate our concern about further Soviet erosion of the ABM Treaty.

II. Structural Problems with the ABM Treaty

Actions that in their aggregate suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory may in some instances constitute exploitation of “structural problems” with the ABM Treaty. These structural problems include imprecise language and the absence of restraints in certain areas. For example, the large-phased-array radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk can be used for ballistic missile detection and tracking as well as space-track. The Soviets have taken advantage of this capability, which is characteristic of all LPARs, and the absence of Treaty limitations on the location of space-track and NTM radars to create a pretext for the Krasnoyarsk radar.

In addition, some Treaty provisions may need further definition or clarification as a consequence of technological developments since the Treaty entered into force in 1972.

Other Treaty language problems related to questionable Soviet activities include:

— the phrase “mobile” ABM components is not defined in the Treaty. This problem is compounded by the technological advances that have permitted the modularization of components;

— a distinction between prohibited ABM and permitted anti-tactical-ballistic-missile (ATBM) components is not made in the Treaty. This problem too is exacerbated by technological advances that have blurred the distinction between ABM, ATBM, and air defense components; and

— a prohibition on concurrent testing but not concurrent operation of ABM radars and air defense components, which permits the Soviets to claim that concurrent operations which US NTM detects are not prohibited concurrent testing. (Note: The June 1985 common understanding on concurrent operations prohibited the operation of air defense components concurrently with strategic ballistic missile reentry testing or ABM missile testing. It did not prohibit the operation of ABM radars concurrently with SAM launches, SAM target flights, or SAM radars.)

The following discussion of possible measures addressing all but one of our ABM Treaty compliance issues responds to some of these problems.

III. Possible Measures on LPARs

1. Ban future non-ABM LPAR construction.

2. Remove the space-track and NTM exemption for LPAR location and orientation from Agreed Statement (F).

3. Limit construction of future non-ABM LPARs to replacement radars at the sites of pre-existing LPARs and for the same purpose.

4. Require mandatory prenotification and consultation in the SCC, to include an exchange of pertinent technical characteristics, for future proposed replacement non-ABM LPARs, and limitations on such LPARs to the same operational frequency and power range.

5. Restrict the number of non-ABM LPARs permitted to each side for all purposes or for each purpose.

6. Restrict the total number of planar-array faces on non-ABM LPARs.

These possible measures could prevent exacerbation of our compliance concern. In particular, limits on further construction of LPARs, or on their total number, might reduce our concern as to the utility of a Soviet LPARs if called upon to contribute to an ABM territorial defense. However, these measures would not remove the concern we already have about Soviet LPAR construction. Restrictions on the number of non-ABM LPARs and non-ABM planar-array faces, for example, would not deprive remaining LPARs/faces of any inherent potential they might have to contribute to ballistic missile defense.

IV. Possible Measures on Mobile/Transportable ABM Components

1. Destroy radars on both sides which have raised concern about mobility.

2. Restrict the mobile/transportable radars in question to those in existence and prohibit their modernization or replacement.

3. Ban operation of these radars even at test ranges for any purpose whatsoever.

4. Define “mobile” in the 1972 Common Understanding to include or exclude modular components.

None of the proposals would divest the Soviets of whatever “mobile/transportable ABM component” knowledge or technology they may have acquired by developing three Pawn Shop and three Flat Twin radars. However, these measures would ease concern as to the ABM utility of whatever knowledge/technology the Soviets may have acquired, and could add “long-lead-time” requirements like new development, test, and production cycles to any future decision to “break out” of the ban. A ban on the operation of these radars would be much easier to monitor than a ban on their production.

V. Possible Measures on SAM Upgrade and Concurrent Testing

1. Ban development, testing and deployment of SAMs with ATBM capability by:

— prohibiting at the same test range concurrent operations of air defense missiles and radars, and all ballistic missiles;

— banning ballistic missile activity at test facilities, where the SA–X–12 is tested;

— restricting tactical SAM testing to specific test facilities; and

— restricting strategic SAM testing to Sary Shagan, where they are tested at present.

2. Define SAMs with ATBM capability and circumscribe permitted testing and deployment of them by:

— adding definitions of air defense and ATBM missiles to the definition of an ABM interceptor missile we now have, which has been blurred by technological advances;

— prohibiting mobile ATBMs;

— limiting total numbers of ATBMs deployed;

— restricting geographic areas of deployment; and

— requiring notification in the SCC prior to flight-testing and deployment of ABM or ATBM systems, and of the type to be tested or deployed.

3. Limit the number of certain types of SAM systems, possibly coupled with agreement to provide notification of the deployment of any new SAM systems.

4. Ban the concurrent operation of ABM radars and air defense missiles and radars.

Banning ATBM-capable SAMs will not divest the Soviets of whatever relevant knowledge/technology they may have acquired as a result of their development of the SA–10 and SA–X–12. However, a ban could deprive them of the ability to make use of that knowledge, and could add “long-lead-time” development, test, and production cycles to any future decision to “break out.” The desirability of developing a US/Allied ATBM capability is at present under study in the SDI IG.

Merely circumscribing testing and deployment of ATBM-capable SAMs does not erase the concern of some that the difference between systems designed to intercept SRBMs and those designed to intercept ICBMs is not as significant as those designed to intercept aircraft and those designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, limitations on the numbers, mobility, location and testing of such missiles could serve to ease concern as to their ABM utility.

A prohibition on the concurrent operation of ABM radars and SAM components could preclude the use of ABM radars either to guide SAM interceptors—presumably an initial step in providing those interceptors with an ABM capability—or to develop/assess the ABM capabilities of SAM radars.

VI. Legal Form of Possible Measures

Each of the measures discussed above would require individual analysis before specific recommendations as to the language to be used and the form the measure would take could be given.

Tab G (2)

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹⁴

Washington, undated

• OSD/JCS Memo on SCC Paper “Avoiding Further Erosion of the ABM Treaty”

The office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to pursuing any of the “possible measures” outlined in this paper and recommend that no further work on this topic be undertaken at this time.

First and foremost, proposing changes to the ABM Treaty to solve Soviet non-compliant behavior would undermine the President’s position that the responsibility for compliance lies with the Soviet Union. In fact, even suggesting that treaty language either by omission or ambiguous language is causing some of our compliance concern, would be tantamount to forgiving or grandfathering the violations and ignoring the other serious concerns we have.

Second, amending even a single provision of the ABM Treaty would open the entire treaty to review and would afford the Soviets an opportunity to seek restrictions on activities that would be inimical to our interests; for example, restrictions on SDI research. Moreover, negotiations to amend the treaty would likely take considerable time and might put the US in the position of finalizing a provision which the US could not comply with were SDI to result in a decision to develop certain systems.

The guidance from the NSC regarding the SCC work program specifically rejected proposals aimed at “increasing the viability” of the ABM Treaty. Most of the measures proposed in the SCC paper go far beyond “increasing the viability” to renegotiation.

Any decisions on amending the ABM Treaty must be considered in the context of all the arms control negotiations occurring between the two parties. Proliferating amendments, with no guarantee of compliance, would be a meaningless exercise.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chronological File, SACG (Senior Arms Control Group) Meeting—10/04/1985. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation indicates McFarlane saw the memorandum. Handwritten notes of the October 4 meeting are ibid. No minutes were found.
2. Reference is to Gorbachev’s joint press conference with Mitterrand, October 4, in which the Soviet leader called for a fifty percent reduction of strategic weapons. (Telegram 39858 from Paris, October 4; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850709–0417)
3. Not attached.
4. Not attached.
5. Not attached.
6. Attached but not printed.
7. McFarlane approved the recommendation.
8. An unknown handwrote “Not available” below Matlock’s name.
9. Secret; Sensitive.
10. Not found.
11. Secret.
12. Ikle signed the memorandum “Fred” above his typed signature.
13. Secret; Noforn.
14. Secret.