Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

43. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 3, 1985, 11 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Interim Restraint Policy

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• The Vice President’s Office:

  • Craig Fuller

• State:

  • Secretary George P. Shultz
  • Lt. General John T. Chain, Jr.

• OSD:

  • Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
  • Richard Perle

• Justice:

  • Attorney General Edwin Meese, III

• CIA:

  • Director William J. Casey
  • Douglas George

• JCS:

  • General John W. Vessey, Jr.
  • Vice Admiral A. S. Moreau, Jr.

• ACDA:

  • Director Kenneth Adelman
  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward L. Rowny

• White House

  • Mr. Donald T. Regan
  • Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

• NSC:

  • Mr. David Chew
  • Mr. Sven Kraemer
  • Colonel Robert E. Linhard
  • Captain William Wright IV

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting with a short explanation of why it was important to review our interim restraint policy now. That policy, established in 1981, was based on reciprocity and there is clear evidence of Soviet violations and little restraint. In our examination we need to consider the impact of the restraint policy on the military balance, and whether promoting the notion that even the flawed SALT arrangements serve the national interest is valid or whether we should return to a more fundamental approach—determining force requirements exclusive of such arms control. We have a report due to Congress and finally, the intangible, political framework vis-a-vis our Allies, the Geneva negotiations and with regard to sustaining defense programs in Congress must be weighed. He then asked General Vessey to provide a brief overview of the military implications before turning to the options.²

General Vessey used a series of charts (TAB A) to explain US weapon capabilities, asymmetries in US/Soviet targeting tasks and the need for prompt hard target capability in the US modernization plan. He added that capping MX at 50 would be very bad but that keeping 50 MMIII and C–3 missiles in the force could help. However, the latter only contributed in the case of soft targets. With a fully generated force we can cover all soft targets today; whereas the day-to-day coverage was only 50% today rising to 100% by 1994. The Chairman indicated that the military implications of retaining or removing Poseidons/MMIII didn’t make much difference in the outcome of a war, assuming the full strategic modernization plan to include 100 MX is realized. He thought one could do some useful things to hedge against loss of MX by abandoning restraints and opined that interim restraint policy was largely a political decision with the JCS not clearly favoring one or another of the alternative options before the NSC.

Mr. McFarlane then reviewed each of the five options in detail as shown on the options chart TAB B,³ before asking for cabinet officers’ views.

Secretary Shultz stated it would be a great error to give up some sense of constraint associated with the two treaties since that would drastically change the environment. At the same time given clear violations, some response is called for. The Krasnoyarsk radar strikes people most strongly and although not directly involved with interim restraint we need to figure how to get mileage out of these types of Soviet violations in terms of realizing our strategic force modernization program. Experts are saying a supplemental as proposed in Option B won’t be achievable, but if it is worked with Congress we might get it. The Secretary then indicated that if a supplemental was truly out of the question, he would recommend Option C with two specific aspects; when Midgetman is ready, field it and at this time only make a decision on one SSBN. The next Poseidon, the Sam Rayburn should be taken out of service and “laid up to be reactivated at a later date.” To abandon constraints completely could lead to an unraveling of arms control, to our disadvantage. The asymmetries (open production lines, demonstrated mobile ICBM) mean that having a treaty regime operates to our advantage. We should try for the supplemental and make the decision on one submarine—giving a definite but moderate signal about non-compliance.

Secretary Weinberger cited the basic issue as one of our continuing to adhere to a fatally flawed and unratified treaty which is scheduled to expire, even as serious Soviet violations continue. Beyond that he felt there is much speculation on how valuable such arms control is. The Soviets can add 7,000 warheads right now within SALT. However, SALT bars us from responding with; Midgetman, putting MMIII into MMII silos or in simply setting aside rather than dismantling SSBNs. However, this latter is not practical since the submarines must be modernized. He recommended that we observe our own (independent) restraint program, to involve no surge and to assure our Allies that we were not talking about an unlimited arms race. Further, we have a built in interim restraint format whereby we don’t go any further than what is needed to deter. Secretary Weinberger felt that Option A was unacceptably unresponsive to Soviet violations, Option B unrealistic in that no supplemental would be granted, and that Option C represented the worst of all worlds since we would be forced to admit to violations (“exceptions”) openly while the Soviets don’t admit to anything; thus weakening the moral basis of our position. He felt that a combination of Options D and E would be viable whereby we would not announce we were abandoning SALT now but most would consider ourselves no longer bound by SALT II after its expiration in December 1985. We would thus be substituting our own independent form of restraint. Our Allies must be told we can’t continue, while the Soviets violate and that we would emphasize our Geneva arms reductions efforts.

Director Adelman felt that from an emotional stand he favored Option D, but his common sense dictated Option C which permits exceptions to not undercutting agreements. He felt that we need to use compliance issues to maximize mileage on the Hill—in that regard the supplemental proposed in Option B is phony since the violations were first catalogued two years ago and we asked for no compensation from Congress. Additionally, the Soviets won’t think much of our resolve; we send the wrong signal if we simply accept their violations. He recommends that we not revoke our interim restraint policy but invoke it with regard to Soviet reciprocity. Option C is a measured response; future US actions will depend on Soviet compliance.

Director Casey referred to Saturday’s⁴ PDB article in citing a Soviet preference to continue interim restraint; he believes their motives are to impair US growth and politically to divide US public opinion and Allies. Soviet missions have been told to spread the word that if we leave SALT, onus will be on US. In doing so, they will be let off the hook on violations. When Secretary Shultz expressed concern for unravelling of restraint, Casey stated that continuing interim restraint would do little to restrain Soviets—they have broken the bank—they can have 12,000 warheads by 1990 and we can do little to change that in near term. Their decisions have always been based on their needs, right now they already have all that they need. Casey expressed a preference for Option E “independent restraint” as the Soviets need to know there is a political price associated with violations.

Attorney General Meese reviewed the original decision on adopting interim restraint which hinged on the JSC view that we were better off going along with a mutual restraint regime and with the two criteria of Soviet reciprocity and not inhibiting the US strategic modernization programs. Neither condition is being met. Since these treaties are not legally binding, the issue is how to get into the best propaganda position. This is achieved by recognizing that the treaties have expired and invoke a new leadership strategy in which, although not legally bound, we will apply a policy of (independent) constraints to contribute more fully to a stable world and in hope of progress in the Geneva negotiations.

Ambassador Nitze felt that the only real decision involved one US submarine this fall. We can take it out of service. The important matter is how we describe this action. Option B could draw in Congress on the problem of dealing with noncompliance. We could describe our action under C or it could be under D. The issue is really a matter of how you fashion the words.

Secretary Weinberger disagreed with making just a short-term decision saying we will face the issue continuously and it is better now to deal with the longer term.

Ambassador Rowny stated a preference for Option C, but felt that if E could be presented in a positive manner, i.e., we are not discontinuing restraints, then we are sending the right signal to the Soviets and can help the public perceptions, as well. Key will be how best to achieve our defense programs in Congress. We can tie up the Poseidon in August and see how the Soviets respond in Geneva before final decisions on dismantlement.

The President asked how we answer the question about the fact that the Soviets have dismantled 2½ times the number of systems that we have (755 versus 294).

Chairman Vessey answered that it was a matter of packaging—since we MIRVed first, they have been taking down much older non-MIRV systems. He referred to a chart that showed the pattern of Soviet modernization which resulted in extensive dismantling to make room for modern systems. (SECDEF observed that future US dismantlements under SALT would be far greater for the US than for the Soviet Union.)

The meeting closed at 12:06 p.m.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–104, NSC 00118. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Wright and Kraemer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. In a personal diary entry for June 3, Reagan wrote: “An N.S.C. meeting dealt with what to do about the SALT II unratified treaty which expires in Dec. So far the Soviets & us have operated on an agreement that even though the treaty had not been officially adopted we’d both conduct our arms policies within the treaties restraints. We’ve done so but they have cheated a number of times. Now we are coming to a time when we’ll have to dismantle Poseidon sub’s. as we add Tridents to our Navy. Question do we do that even though they are cheating or do we announce that we’ll no longer abide by the agreement? I’ve had 5 options presented to me & now it’s up to me & frankly I dont have the answer yet.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 466)
2. Attached but not printed at Tabs A and B are a series of charts prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Attached but not printed are a series of charts prepared in the Interagency Group. For the options, see Tab C, Document 41.
4. June 1.