Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

42. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 3, 1985

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting, June 3, 1985,—US Interim Restraint Policy concerning the SALT Agreements

ISSUE

Future US policy concerning “Interim Restraint” and the SALT I and SALT II strategic arms agreements. A report on this issue will be transmitted to the Congress on June 10, 1985.

BACKGROUND

Since 1981, it has been US policy, known generally as “Interim Restraint,” not to “undercut” the SALT I Interim Agreement which expired in 1977 or the SALT II Agreement of 1979, which would have expired at the end of 1985 had it been ratified, so long as the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. The policy requires reciprocity and was intended to foster mutual restraint on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States while negotiations were underway on new agreements to achieve significant arms reductions. In adopting this interim policy, you made clear that the flawed SALT II Agreement (which was withdrawn from Senate consideration by President Carter following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) was not an acceptable foundation for a final, equal and verifiable arms agreement. You indicated that it would be a major mistake to attempt to formalize SALT II’s high ceilings, numerous inequities and verification problems.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have publicly pledged to observe the “no undercut” policy, and both sides have dismantled nuclear weapons systems to remain within specific SALT limits. However, the scale of the Soviet strategic buildup, much of it permitted under SALT, and the increased pattern of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT Agreements and with other arms control agreements have raised fundamental questions about a policy built upon a standard of reciprocity but wherein we increasingly appear to be in unilateral compliance.

DISCUSSION

Soviet Military Forces: Concerning Soviet forces, while the SALT agreements may have helped set some limits, the high ceilings and ambiguities of SALT appear to have largely validated rather than constrained the Soviet force configuration and the unparalleled Soviet strategic buildup. SALT limits have been breached by such actions as Soviet testing of a second modern ICBM and possible deployment of the SS–16 ICBM, and by an excess in deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In addition, Soviet denial of data required for verification and Soviet development of mobile missiles and cruise missiles which are extremely difficult to locate have greatly complicated our ability to verify Soviet compliance.

US Military Forces: It has been fairly painless to date for the United States to pursue the “interim restraint” policy. Such a policy restricted US military programs only marginally and required the dismantling only of relatively aging systems such as the Titan ICBM and the older Polaris submarines that had reached the end of their useful life.

Now, however, there is potential that a continued US interim restraint policy could become militarily more painful. Beginning in September of this year, when the seventh Trident submarine, the USS ALASKA, begins sea trials, and subsequently with each new Trident submarine, the United States would have to destroy (rather than trying to overhaul or retain) weapons systems such as Poseidon submarines or Minuteman III ICBM launchers in order to remain within the SALT limits. Similarly, by June, 1986, when the 121st B–52 is deployed with Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), the US would have to dismantle additional submarines or land-based MIRVed missiles for each new ALCM-carrying bomber. Longer-term adherence to SALT II will also mean that the US cannot deploy both the M–X and the smaller “Midgetman” ICBM, as only one new ICBM is permitted under that agreement.

The strategic modernization program undertaken by your Administration was designed, along with modernization programs for conventional forces, to assure effective deterrence across a broad spectrum of threats in the face of the Soviet buildup. Recent Congressional cuts in that program—especially with regard to M–X “Peacekeeper” ICBM—and Soviet noncompliance, have raised fundamental questions about the wisdom of continuing SALT restraints on US forces. These factors have led most US agencies to propose that in applying the reciprocity standard of current policy, we should exercise the right to respond appropriately to Soviet violations, taking account of US national security requirements, and seeking additional support, including possible extra funds, for US military programs from the Congress.

The Congress: Within the Congress, the Senate begins debate on US interim restraint policy on June 4, and views are sharply divided about the wisdom of either continuing or not continuing any or all US interim restraints. Of those pressing for a “continuation of current policy,” most choose to neglect the fact that current policy requires reciprocity and that in the face of Soviet noncompliance, current policy therefore would seem to require that we lift self-imposed restraints on US forces in cases such as the USS ALASKA, a 121st ALCM-carrying bomber, or the Midgetman ICBM.

Those opposing a continuation of current US restraints in fact invoke current policy as requiring that we have the right to respond appropriately, outside of the SALT limits. They argue that we must not be in a position of applying a double standard by which the Soviets are allowed to cheat, while we remain restricted by agreements which are being violated and are deeply flawed. They quote your Lisbon statement of May 10 that: “We have tried . . . that we would both seek to abide by the terms. There’s considerable evidence now that that has been rather one-sided. If it has been, then there’s no need for us to continue.”²

On the Senate side, Senators Bumpers, Leahy, Chafee, Heinz, Gore, Pell, Cranston and Proxmire are in the lead in urging that the US continue current SALT restraints at least through December 1986, i.e., one year beyond the date the SALT II Treaty would have expired had it been ratified. On the other end of the spectrum, Senators Symms, East, McClure, Quayle, Denton and Wilson are among those who believe we should cease or modify our restraints and should avoid dismantling a Poseidon submarine. In the middle ground are Senators Stevens, Nunn and others, who are looking for some formula of “proportional deviation,” to use Senator Stevens’ words. On the House side there are similar divisions and views.

With regard to next week’s Senate debate, it is quite possible that those opposed to continued US limitations will at some point request that the Foreign Relations Committee release the SALT II agreement (which was withheld by the Committee from Senate consideration in 1979 at President Carter’s request) and send it to the Senate floor for a vote on ratification. Those making this request appear to have the votes to force such a release from the Committee, and in addition, to have the 34 votes required to defeat the treaty outright. In their argumentation supporting rejection, they can invoke not only the Senate Armed Services Committee report of 1979 condemning the agreement as against the national security, unequal, unverifiable, etc., but also many statements by you and other senior officials of your Administration opposing SALT II. In any case, if this course of events occurs, opponents of US interim restraint under current circumstances, will have won a major political victory with substantial impact on the future Congressional and public debate on this issue.

Diplomatic Considerations: Next week George Shultz will review the context of our interim restraint policy with key allies in Europe. Most of our allies are concerned about any potential changes in the US restraint policy (with many ignoring the policy’s reciprocity requirement). Many are skeptical about our assertions concerning Soviet noncompliance and fearing negative repercussions at the Geneva arms reductions negotiations, they are likely to urge “no change.”

At the same time, the Soviet Union seeks to restrict the US modernization program, while maintaining its own buildup. The Soviets clearly prefer US interim restraints and can be expected to react with strong rhetoric against any lifting of US restraints, no matter how justifiable from the US view. At that point we will need to counter that it is the Soviet arms buildup and Soviet noncompliance which have led us to this point, but that our negotiating proposals for deep and equitable nuclear arms reductions offer a sound basis for future mutual constraints.

The Options: It is in the above context that next week’s deliberations and decisions are taking place concerning future US policy with regard to the SALT agreements. After months of interagency effort, including extensive discussions by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, agencies have arrived at five different options in roughly three broad categories, as follows:

— Option A: would continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II and would continue current strategic programs. It would, in effect, remove the reciprocity requirement from the current policy and is thus not identical with current policy or the status quo.

— Option B: would continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II but would permit or propose programmatic US responses, within SALT limits, in response to Soviet violations. It proposes a supplemental request to the Congress.

— Options C, D and E: would in practice all discontinue “no undercut” of SALT I and II, though with different degrees of explicitness. Option C states that it would continue “no undercut”, but proposes not to dismantle POSEIDONs, which would contradict SALT provisions. On the other hand, Options D and E would explicitly discontinue “no undercut” of SALT I and II, thus permitting the US to develop the forces it considered essential for national/Western security.

Whatever the decision, we will need to remind the Congress, the public, our allies and the Soviets that we have restrained our strategic buildup while the Soviets have not, that we have complied with agreements while the Soviets have not, and that we have on the table in Geneva negotiating proposals for increased stability and deep cuts to equal and verifiable levels. We need to stress that the best constraint possible—one which could give full confidence to both superpowers and to the entire world—would be for the Soviet Union to say yes to our Geneva proposals.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–104, NSC 00118. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Kraemer and Wright. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it.
2. Reference is to Reagan’s remarks during a news conference on May 10, 1985. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, p. 600)