To review the options for future Interim Restraint Policy.
I will introduce the subject by way of background and review of the issues.
Next I will outline the Interim Restraint Policy options and we will devote
about 40 minutes to general discussions. No specific decisions are being
requested at this meeting. After the meeting and after Secretary Shultz’s consultations with our European
Allies, we will recommend an NSDD to be
issued before the end of the week which will form the basis of the June 10
report to the Congress.
Tab C
Options Paper4
INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY OPTIONS
| CURRENT POLICY |
We will take no actions which undercut
existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercises
equal restraint. |
| OPTION A |
Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II and continue current
strategic programs.
Continue no undercut; depends on the full Strategic
Modernization Program; continues US commitment not to undercut existing agreements;
keeps open future force options. |
| OPTION B |
Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II, but with a
programmatic response to Soviet violations.
Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT
II; request a supplemental appropriation to increase US deterrent capability; continue
to condemn Soviet violations; review policy periodically. |
| OPTION C |
Continue not to undercut SALT I and SALT II, but with
exceptions.
Continue not to undercut launcher limits of SALT I and SALT II but respond to Soviet
violations by flexibility re dismantling Poseidons, etc. |
| OPTION D |
Discontinue no undercut of SALT I and SALT II.
Discontinue policy of not undercutting SALT I and SALT II; the US will size and configure its
strategic offensive forces to provide an effective deterrent to
aggression. |
[Page 131]
| OPTION E |
Adopt a new policy of US independent restraint.
Discontinue policy of not undercutting SALT I and SALT II; maintain adequate
strategic forces for Western security; continue SDI research; independently
exercise restraint concerning increases in nuclear
forces. |
Option A: Continue Current
Policy and Strategic Programs
This option, which depends on the Strategic Modernization Program to
address the strategic nuclear balance, would continue U.S. commitment to not undercut existing
arms control agreements. At the same time, it would keep open future
force options to go beyond SALT limits
if lack of progress at Geneva or Soviet behavior so warranted. This
option is intended to maintain an arms control posture which is
supportive of the President’s commitment to deep reductions of strategic
nuclear forces. To allow the U.S. to
maintain stable deterrence with potent and flexible forces capable of
responding to Soviet aggression at any level of conflict, the option is
intended to promote and sustain broad support from the U.S. public, Congress and the Allies for
the Strategic Modernization Program, strong and modernized conventional
forces, continuing improvements to NATO’s defenses and the promise of the Strategic Defense
Initiative. Finally, it proposes addressing the Soviet Union’s
violations of existing arms control agreements in such a way that allows
the United States to exert leverage on the Soviet Union to observe its
commitments to abide by the provisions of those agreements. It could
also create the circumstances by which we can continue to call national
and international attention to these violations.
Presentation
This reaffirmation of current policy should be announced in a major
Presidential speech. The speech should be made when it could best affect
the Geneva negotiations, influence key defense votes in Congress, and
garner support from our Allies. In it the President would stress the
following points: The United States remains firmly committed to deep
reductions in strategic forces and to the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons. We will continue to make every effort to achieve these
goals in negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The U.S. has continued to abide by our
political commitment not to undercut existing strategic arms agreements
so long as the USSR shows equal
restraint. It is now evident that this restraint has been increasingly
one-sided as the Soviets have selectively violated provisions of SALT II as well as other arms control
agreements. Such behavior, should it continue, undermines the prospects
for meaningful arms control and could threaten deterrence. The U.S. believes in equal restraint and will
move forward with the elements of the Strategic Modernization Program
permitted to us by the SALT
agreements. We also reserve the future right to test
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and deploy Midgetman, currently prohibited
by the Interim Restraint Policy, in the absence of suitable progress in
US/USSR bilateral arms control talks or successful resolution of U.S. concerns with Soviet noncompliance. In
the interim, the U.S. will continue to
dismantle strategic systems to meet SALT I/II limits. This show of good faith should serve to
encourage the USSR to observe its arms
control commitments while insuring progress toward our mutual goals of
deep reductions and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
Option B: Continue to Not
Undercut SALT I and SALT II, but with a Programmatic Response
to Soviet Violations
This approach would: 1) maintain no undercut policy on SALT I and SALT II; 2) request a supplemental appropriation to
increase U.S. deterrent capability,
consistent with SALT I and SALT II, as a proportionate response to
Soviet violations; 3) continue to condemn Soviet violations and seek
corrective action in diplomatic channels; and 4) review periodically the
new policy in light of the Soviet compliance record. The defense
supplemental would accelerate and/or increase selected strategic
programs as a response to Soviet actions. It reflects a judgement that,
if the U.S. were to selectively or
completely abandon restraints (however flawed they may be), we would
offer the Soviets a pretext to substantially increase their own forces,
while the U.S. would take the blame—here
and with the Allies—for destroying arms control. We would find Congress
legislating arms control and dictating how we could respond to the
unconstrained growth in Soviet strategic capabilities. This approach
would enhance deterrence, demonstrate to the Soviets that non-compliance
entails real costs, put the onus on them for any unraveling of existing
restraints, strengthen our position in ongoing negotiations and promote
Congressional consensus on a response to the Soviet violations and the
maintenance of restraints pending a new agreement.
Presentation
In 1982, on the eve of the START
negotiations, I decided that the U.S.
would not undercut the expired SALT I
or the unratified SALT II Treaty as
long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. The reasons behind
my decision were clear:
- ○
- First, this policy would not adversely
affect our security, provided we and Congress took steps
necessary to modernize our strategic deterrent and to offset
Soviet strategic advantages obtained over the past
decade.
- ○
- Second, I believed then and continue to
believe that a framework of mutual restraint was an important
contribution to stability as we sought to negotiate substantial
reductions in the nuclear threat.
- ○
- Third, this policy was conditioned on
Soviet exercise of equal restraint.
In adopting this policy, I hoped that the Geneva talks would by this time
have produced a new and more equitable agreement providing for
substantial reductions. The Soviets, however, have blocked success thus
far. Moreover, as noted in my two reports to Congress, the Soviets have
failed to comply with several provisions of existing commitments. They
have neither taken corrective actions nor provided any information that
might have alleviated our concerns.
For the present, I have decided that the prospects for achieving
agreement in Geneva will be greater with mutual restraint. The U.S. will continue not to undercut the
provisions of SALT I and SALT II. We cannot however, close our
eyes to Soviet cheating. Thus, I have also requested the JCS to recommend those additional steps
that need to be taken, within SALT
constraints, to counter Soviet violations. On the basis of their
recommendations, I will submit a supplemental appropriations request to
the Congress so that these steps can be taken and the danger posed by
Soviet violations redressed. For now, we can take the necessary steps
within the provisions of existing SALT
agreements. However, this new policy will require continuous review of
Soviet compliance and the status of the Geneva negotiations. We hope
that the Soviet Union will take arms control and compliance as seriously
as we do, so that genuine and significant reductions in nuclear weapons
can begin.
Option D: Cease Interim
Restraint of SALT I and SALT II
On May 31, 1982, the President stated: “As for existing strategic arms
agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as
the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.” The United States has
scrupulously adhered to this commitment. By contrast, the President has
found and reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union has repeatedly
violated its arms control obligations. Consequently, the USSR is not exercising equal restraint.
The United States regards such Soviet behavior as fundamentally inimical
to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and
that of its allies. In accordance with the President’s announced policy
the United States is, therefore, no longer bound to refrain from actions
which might undercut the existing strategic arms agreements. Until an
acceptable strategic arms reduction agreement can be negotiated, the
United States will size and configure its strategic offensive forces
exclusively on the basis of our longstanding national policy necessary
to provide an effective deterrent to aggression.
[Page 134]
Presentation
The US government has determined that the
Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control agreements and
hence has not exercised equal restraint. The integrity of the arms
control process would be damaged if the US unilaterally complied with agreements the Soviets are
violating. We cannot condone Soviet cheating. To be serious about arms
control is to be serious about compliance.
The United States remains committed to the goal envisioned in its
proposal tabled at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva. This proposal calls
for both sides to make sharp reductions in their strategic offensive
arsenals and, in particular, to eliminate large numbers of the most
destabilizing weapons—ballistic missiles—by agreeing to a ceiling of
5,000 warheads on such missiles. We are interested in making rapid
progress toward this goal with the Soviets in Geneva.
By contrast, the Soviet Union has shown little interest in achieving
meaningful reductions or in making progress toward a verifiable,
equitable accord which requires them. To the contrary, the Soviet Union
has actually regressed from positions previously taken and instead
adopted a largely intransigent posture which severely impedes
progress.
In accordance with the policy I announced on May 31, 1982, the United
States is, therefore, no longer bound to refrain from actions which
might undercut the SALT strategic
offensive arms agreements. Until an acceptable strategic arms reduction
agreement can be negotiated, the United States will size and configure
its strategic offensive forces exclusively on the basis of our
longstanding national policy necessary to provide an effective deterrent
to aggression.
The Administration will shortly begin consultations with the Congress
regarding means of ensuring that options for this undesirable—and, we
would hope, avoidable—contingency are credibly preserved. In the event
the USSR chooses to amass ever more
threatening kinds and numbers of strategic weapons, the United States
reserves the right however, to respond appropriately.
Option E: Adopt a new
Policy of U.S. Independent Restraint
This new concept for security and stability would allow the United States
to continue to maintain adequate strategic forces for Western security
while we continue to research under the Strategic Defense Initiative and
independently refrain from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the
1990’s the U.S. would begin the
transition to a strategic defense posture with a corresponding reduction
of offensive nuclear weapons. This new course is, therefore, independent
of Soviet cooperation or their strategic military posture. Specifically,
the U.S. would announce a commitment to
Independent Restraint, that is, we would independently
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restrain the proliferation of further
nuclear weapons in lieu of being bound by past commitments to observe
the limits of the flawed SALT
agreements. We will continue all elements of the President’s Strategic
Force Modernization Program while refraining from needless proliferation
of nuclear weapons. We will independently remove older weapons from
service and certify these actions to the Congress and the American
public. By restraining needless proliferation, the inventory of U.S. strategic ballistic missile weapons
will remain essentially constant over the next decade, then begin
substantial decreases at a time when strategic defense may become a
reality. However, we would reassess and be able to modify our strategic
forces in the face of a Soviet strategic breakout, either offensive or
defensive. We will continue our commitment to transition to strategic
defense and do it in an open manner. And we will seek a renewed dialogue
with the Soviets to reduce the risk of war through meaningful measures
to improve stability and predictability.
Presentation
Independent Restraint should be announced in a major Presidential speech.
The speech could occur following the coming round of Geneva
negotiations, assuming the talks are unproductive, or following a
Reagan-Gorbachev summit, assuming no agreements of substance can be
extracted from the Soviets. Independent Restraint would take place on
January 1, 1986. Key Administration figures should be immediately
prepared to brief Congress, the press, and our Allies to explain the
rationale and the implications of the new course. To demonstrate U.S. resolve not to proliferate offensive
nuclear weapons, the President would state that the compromise resulting
in a pause after authorizing deployment of 50 Peacekeeper missiles
represents a degree of U.S. restraint.
He would also state that a Poseidon ballistic missile submarine would be
removed from strategic service. The President could offer the Congress
and the press the opportunity to inspect inactivated submarine and
ICBM systems to verify removal
from strategic service. Such an inspection offer could also be made to
the Soviet Union, if appropriate, as a confidence-building measure. Our
public presentation should emphasize that Independent Restraint offers
the choice between: (1) continuation of agreements which have not
constrained the expansion of nuclear forces, which are facing
increasingly difficult verification problems due to technological
developments and which are subject to Soviet violations, or (2) U.S. actions that do not hinge on Soviet
cooperation and, ultimately with strategic defense, will lead to greater
security and true nuclear arms reductions.
